Re: Numbers
Hi, Le Jeudi 16 Mars 2006 14:46, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Georges wrote: - The multiverse is isomorphic to a mathematical object, This has to be saying simply that the multiverse IS a mathematical object. Otherwise it is nonsense. No, because all mathematical objects, as mathematical objects exist (or don't exit) on an equal basis. I don't understand what you want to mean here. Yet the universe is only isomorphic to one of them. It has real existence, as opposed to the other mathematical objects which are only abstract. What properties of the multiverse would render only one mathematical object real and others abstract... It's the same problem as single universe versus many. Quentin --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Georges wrote: - The multiverse is isomorphic to a mathematical object, This has to be saying simply that the multiverse IS a mathematical object. Otherwise it is nonsense. No, because all mathematical objects, as mathematical objects exist (or don't exit) on an equal basis. Yet the universe is only isomorphic to one of them. It has real existence, as opposed to the other mathematical objects which are only abstract. That is the question. That [The universe] has real existence, as opposed to the other mathematical objects which are only abstract. is what I called a dualist view. There is also a monist view in which there is nothing special about the universe among all the other objects it is isomorphic to (as all objects isomorphic one to each other are the same object) and in which the realness of the universe is only perceived as such from the inside. Both view seem to have their champions here. I guesse that when saying This has to be saying simply that the multiverse IS a mathematical object. Tom ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) defends the monist view as obvious and the only one making sense while when saying [The universe] has real existence, as opposed to the other mathematical objects which are only abstract. you defend the monist view as obvious and the only one making sense. For me, it is not obvious either way (both views make sense to me) and I think we need to postulate something either to include or to exclude the dualist (or the monist) view. Common sense seems to be in favor of dualism while Okham's razor would be against it. Georges. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Le 16-mars-06, à 14:46, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : No, because all mathematical objects, as mathematical objects exist (or don't exit) on an equal basis. Yet the universe is only isomorphic to one of them. It has real existence, as opposed to the other mathematical objects which are only abstract. I thought I was understanding your last comments on my post, i.e: http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@eskimo.com/ and I was preparing some comment, which can't make sense with your present remark to Peter D Jones. What do you mean by real existence? What do you mean by a non abstract mathematical object? It would help to know if you have studied the Universal Dovetailer Argument, which shows that by making the comp hyp, the physical universe cannot be isomorphic to a mathematical object, because the physical universe can only emerge on an infinity of overlapping computations as seen from some first person (plural) point of views, and then (this is non trivial) it can be shown that this is not captured by any mathematical objects. The reason is that the whole collection of mathematical objects cannot be itself a mathematical object, but physical appearances emerges from inside from a measure on that undefinable whole. With some set theories like Quine NF (New Foundations) it looks like the whole mathematical universe could be a mathematical objects. But then this shows that NF will got problem with comp. The notion mathematical wholeness is very tricky (to say the least). Actually, without comp, I have no clues how to give sense to such wholeness. I persist finding rather unclear the use you are making of the term universe, even in your monist and immaterialist (if I got you right) sense. Bruno PS take your time to answer. I will be busy. Also next week I will present the Universal Dovetailer Argument in London; cf: http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@eskimo.com/msg08749.html http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 16-mars-06, à 14:46, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : No, because all mathematical objects, as mathematical objects exist (or don't exit) on an equal basis. Yet the universe is only isomorphic to one of them. It has real existence, as opposed to the other mathematical objects which are only abstract. I thought I was understanding your last comments on my post, i.e: http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@eskimo.com/ and I was preparing some comment, which can't make sense with your present remark to Peter D Jones. Eeh... Who are you replying to exactly? Georges. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Hi Norman, Le 15-mars-06, à 17:32, Norman Samish a écrit : ( Norman Samish) I don't see how a list of numbers could, by itself, contain any meaningful information. Sure, a list of numbers could be an executable program, but there has to be an executive program to execute the executable program. The multiverse has to therefore consist of more than a matrix of numbers which amount to an executable program. Norman, I realize that not so much people seem to get this point (which is one of the main point I try to convey), and which is that if I am a machine (in the sense of being able to survive with a digital brain) then the physical universe cannot be emulate by any turing machine. The basic reason is that the Physical Universe needs to emerge at once from the set of all infinite computations, as seen from the first person point of view, in a way which is a priori not turing emulable. (Bruno Marchal) I am not sure what you mean by matrix of numbers. (Norman) I made the implicit assumption that everything in the multiverse can be precisely described by a tape feeding a universal Turing machine. The tape feeding the UTM is the matrix of numbers. You are probably confusing the propositions A and B: A) I am a machine B) the universe is a machine (supposing there is a universe) B implies A. (should be obvious) BUT: A implies ~B (by UDA!, not so obvious) Fromthis it follows that in all case we have ~B (not B). That is: in any circumstance the big thing cannot be emulate by a turing machine. Of course many people makes that confusion (until they understand the universal dovetailer argument). I think we need to come back to it. However, Bruno says the following, which, if I understand him, means he does not agree with my implicit assumption. I'm not clear on what Bruno means by If comp is true. . . My notion is that comp is the computation hypothesis, which is that we first-person observers cannot tell if we are a computer simulation. But we can. My work indeed show that comp entails we already and forever are in a simulation, where the universal base can be just arithmetical truth. I predict already a (tiny) part of the quantum phenomena, and in that setting this can already be seen as a discovery of the dreamy nature of our universal home, let us say. If everything in the multiverse can be precisely described by a tape feeding a UTM, then it seems to me that comp must be true. Yes, but the reverse if false. If I am turing emulable, then the universe cannot be simulated by a turing machine. Remember that with comp the measure problem consists in eliminating the white rabbits. The 1-person indetermincay is apparently bigger than the quantum indeterminacy. Did you read the Universal Dovetailer Argument? (apology for looking like a teacher, but it is hard for me to explain without some idea of your knowldege of things already discuss in the list. I can reexplain, just ask). Best Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Le 16-mars-06, à 17:27, Georges Quénot a écrit : Eeh... Who are you replying to exactly? Oops. I guess it was Tom. Sorry. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
... or Peter D Jones. Really sorry. I will try to correct that issue tomorrow. I should not answer posts and teaching at the same time! I will try to remember that lesson. B. Le 16-mars-06, à 18:44, Bruno Marchal a écrit : Le 16-mars-06, à 17:27, Georges Quénot a écrit : Eeh... Who are you replying to exactly? Oops. I guess it was Tom. Sorry. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Quentin Anciaux wrote: What properties of the multiverse would render only one mathematical object real and others abstract... A non-mathematical property. Hence mathematics alone is not sufficient to explain the world. QED. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Le Jeudi 16 Mars 2006 21:27, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : Quentin Anciaux wrote: What properties of the multiverse would render only one mathematical object real and others abstract... A non-mathematical property. Hence mathematics alone is not sufficient to explain the world. QED. Hmmm... okay, so last questions what is an abstract thing ? what does it means to be abstract ? what render a thing real ? what does it means for it to be real ? what does it means to be real ? An answer like to be real means to exist or to be instantiated in the reality is not an answer. Quentin --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Is isomorphism or a one-to-one correspondence a mathematical concept or a metamathematical (or metaphysical? another complication in the discussion) concept? I take them as mathematical concepts, so that speculating about isomorphisms of things like the multiverse is in itself assuming that the multiverse is mathematical. I don't think we can use the one-to-one correspondence when it comes to metamathematical questions like the multiverse (or philosophy of everything), but this is simply because I assume that the multiverse (or everything) is metamathematical. Tom -Original Message- From: Quentin Anciaux [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Thu, 16 Mar 2006 22:05:17 +0100 Subject: Re: Numbers Le Jeudi 16 Mars 2006 21:27, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : Quentin Anciaux wrote: What properties of the multiverse would render only one mathematical object real and others abstract... A non-mathematical property. Hence mathematics alone is not sufficient to explain the world. QED. Hmmm... okay, so last questions what is an abstract thing ? what does it means to be abstract ? what render a thing real ? what does it means for it to be real ? what does it means to be real ? An answer like to be real means to exist or to be instantiated in the reality is not an answer. Quentin --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Is isomorphism or a one-to-one correspondence a mathematical concept or a metamathematical (or metaphysical? another complication in the discussion) concept? It is not mathematical in the sense tha both of objects have to be mathematical and nothing but mathematical --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 16-mars-06, à 14:46, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : No, because all mathematical objects, as mathematical objects exist (or don't exit) on an equal basis. Yet the universe is only isomorphic to one of them. It has real existence, as opposed to the other mathematical objects which are only abstract. I thought I was understanding your last comments on my post, i.e: http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@eskimo.com/ and I was preparing some comment, which can't make sense with your present remark to Peter D Jones. What do you mean by real existence? What do you mean by a non abstract mathematical object? It would help to know if you have studied the Universal Dovetailer Argument, which shows that by making the comp hyp, the physical universe cannot be isomorphic to a mathematical object, because the physical universe can only emerge on an infinity of overlapping computations as seen from some first person (plural) point of views, The argument does not show the the physical universe can only emerge on an infinity of overlapping computations, as such. It might show this given a series of assumptions-- that we are nothing but hardwareless computations, that the physical universe is a solipsistic illusion, and so on. and then (this is non trivial) it can be shown that this is not captured by any mathematical objects. The reason is that the whole collection of mathematical objects cannot be itself a mathematical object, but physical appearances emerges from inside from a measure on that undefinable whole. With some set theories like Quine NF (New Foundations) it looks like the whole mathematical universe could be a mathematical objects. But then this shows that NF will got problem with comp. Maybe what *that* means is that COMP is wrong. The notion mathematical wholeness is very tricky (to say the least). Actually, without comp, I have no clues how to give sense to such wholeness. I persist finding rather unclear the use you are making of the term universe, even in your monist and immaterialist (if I got you right) sense. Bruno PS take your time to answer. I will be busy. Also next week I will present the Universal Dovetailer Argument in London; cf: http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@eskimo.com/msg08749.html http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Quentin Anciaux wrote: Le Jeudi 16 Mars 2006 21:27, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : Quentin Anciaux wrote: What properties of the multiverse would render only one mathematical object real and others abstract... A non-mathematical property. Hence mathematics alone is not sufficient to explain the world. QED. Hmmm... okay, so last questions what is an abstract thing ? what does it means to be abstract ? what render a thing real ? what does it means for it to be real ? what does it means to be real ? If you kick it, it kicks back. --- Vic Stenger, after Samuel Johnson Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
reductionism: please explain
Bruno Marchal writes: Le 11-mars-06, à 10:59, Georges Quénot wrote (to John): snip Yes also and indeed, the way of thinking I presented fits within a reductionist framework. Nobody is required to adhere to such a framework (and therefore to the way of thinking I presented). If one rejects the reductionist approach, all I can say isn't even worth reading it for him. And, again, all of this is pure speculation. Personally I disagree with any reductionist approach. But, given that I agree with many of your statement, perhaps we have a vocabulary problem. I do even believe that a thoroughly scientific attitude is automatically anti-reductionnist, whatever theories are used. Science, being modest, just cannot be reductionist(*). Even the numbers are nowadays no more completely reductible to any unifying theory. Only pseudo-scientist (or some scientist during the week-end) can be reductionist. I'm afraid I don't understand the version of reductionism to which you so strongly object. Are you perhaps referring to the mistake of trying to explain too much with too little? Or are you referring to what Daniel Dennett has called greedy reductionism: where something is not so much explained in terms of what it reduces to as dismissed or explained away, like saying there is no such thing as mental states because it's all just neurophysiology? Well, it is all just neurophysiology, in that the neurophysiology is necessary and sufficient for the mental states. The mental states in this sense can be said to reduce to the underlying brain states. But this is not the same as saying that the mental states therefore do not exist, or are not important. Stathis Papaioannou _ Dont just search. Find. Check out the new MSN Search! http://search.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200636ave/direct/01/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Yes, Iwas assuming that the descriptions "lose information", or generalize, just as "mammal" is a generalization, and just as Bruno's duplicationloses information. Otherwise, I would call it a re-representation of*ALL* the details of something, *as seen from a certain perspective*, into another form. I don't think this is possible with physical things in our universe. This is what I was trying to get at. If we are limiting our discussion to numbers to begin with, then we would have to assume at the outset that the universe is totally representable(not just describable) by numbers in order for the discussion to have any bearing on the final true nature of the universe. I don't assume that. So on a side note:Even if we are talking about justnumbers, I don't think that multiplication is all that Platonic of a thing, hence I have a similar idea about the prime factorization of integers. I think that the closest thing to a Platonic representation of4 is "" rather than "2^2". Mathrequires a person. I don't think it's possible to prove it otherwise.;) Tom In a message dated 3/14/2006 7:38:40 P.M. US Mountain Standard Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:"Another note about numbering. It seems to be that if you repeatedly make descriptions of descriptions, you eventually end up with all 0's or all 1's, showing that numbers describing numbers is meaningless. Does this also prove that numbers do not have a Platonic existence?" I'm not sure what you mean. Are you saying that descriptions of descriptions must lose accuracy? If so, why must it?Suppose that somethingis described by a tape run on a computer - a universal Turing machine. It seems to me that a "true description" of that tape could only be an identical copy. How could a true description of that tape degenerate into a string of all 0's or all --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Quentin Anciaux wrote: What properties of the multiverse would render only one mathematical object real and others abstract... A non-mathematical property. Hence mathematics alone is not sufficient to explain the world. QED. This looks *very* similar to; ]] What properties of the mind/brain would render only one (type of) ]] material object conscious and others not... ] ] A non-material property. Hence matter alone is not sufficient ] to explain the mind. QED. Georges --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Georges Quenot wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Georges wrote: - The multiverse is isomorphic to a mathematical object, This has to be saying simply that the multiverse IS a mathematical object. Otherwise it is nonsense. No, because all mathematical objects, as mathematical objects exist (or don't exit) on an equal basis. Yet the universe is only isomorphic to one of them. It has real existence, as opposed to the other mathematical objects which are only abstract. That is the question. That [The universe] has real existence, as opposed to the other mathematical objects which are only abstract. is what I called a dualist view. Dualism says there are two really existing realms or substances. Saying the physical realm is concrete and real and the mathematical realm is abstract and unreal is not dualism. This *splits* things into realness and abstractedness. It postulates material substance just as classical dualism postulates a spiritual substance (and just as once vitalism postulated a living substance). Last but not least: you are unable to explain what you mean bt real except by a tautology or via a reference to common sense that no longer appears to be consensual. Both view seem to have their champions here. I guesse that when saying This has to be saying simply that the multiverse IS a mathematical object. Tom ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) defends the monist view as obvious and the only one making sense while when saying [The universe] has real existence, as opposed to the other mathematical objects which are only abstract. Well, I've never seen a mathematical object. Have you ever seen the number 3? Have you ever seen a single photon? Or even an electron? Do you descend from the ape by your father or by your mother? :-) You may find the monist idea crazy or a nonsense but it does not (completely) appear as such to everybody. Georges. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
