1Z wrote:
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
Stathis,
...
Whatever 'reality' is, it is regular/persistent,
repeatable/stable enough to do science on it via
our phenomenality and come
up with laws that seem to characterise how it will appear
to us in our phenomenality.
You could say: my
1Z wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
No, I think Colin has point there. Your phenomenal view adds a lot of
assumptions to the sensory data in constructing an internal model of what
you see. These assumptions are hard-wired by evolution. It is situations
in which these assumptions are
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
Scientific behaviour demanded of the zombie condition is a clearly
identifiable behavioural benchmark where we can definitely claim that
phenomenality is necessary...see below...
It is all to easy to consider scientific behaviour without
phenomenality.
Except that in time, as people realise what I just said above, the
hypothesis has some emprical support: If the universe were made of
appearances when we opened up a cranium we'd see them. We don't.
Or appearances don't appear to be appearances to a third party.
Precisely. Now ask
Absolutely! But the humans have phenomenal consciousness in lieu of ESP,
which the zombies do not.
PC doesn't magically solve the problem.It just involves a more
sophisticated form of guesswork. It can be fooled.
We been here before and I'll say it again if I have to
Yes! It can be
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
Scientific behaviour demanded of the zombie condition is a clearly
identifiable behavioural benchmark where we can definitely claim that
phenomenality is necessary...see below...
It is all to easy to consider scientific behaviour without
phenomenality.
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
SNIP
No confusion at all. The zombie is behaving. 'Wide awake'
in the sense that it is fully functional.
Well, adaptive behaviour -- dealing with novelty --- is functioning.
Yes - but I'm not talking about merely functioning. I am talking about
the
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
But you have no way to know whether phenomenal scenes are created by a
particular computer/robot/program or not because it's just mystery
property defined as whatever creates phenomenal scenes. You're going
around in circles. At some
Le Dimanche 26 Novembre 2006 22:54, Colin Geoffrey Hales a écrit :
SNIP
What point is there in bothering with it. The philosophical zombie is
ASSUMED to be equivalent! This is failure before you even start! It's
wrong and it's proven wrong because there is a conclusively logically
and
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
You are a zombie. What is it about sensory data that suggests an
external world?
What is it about sensory data that suggests an external world to
human?
Nothing. That's the point. That's why we incorporate the usage of natural
world properties to
That's it. Half the laws of physics are going neglected merely because
we
won't accept phenomenal consciousness ITSELF as evidence of anything.
We accept it as evidence of extremely complex neural activity - can you
demonstrate it is not?
You have missed the point again.
a) We demand
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
Le Dimanche 26 Novembre 2006 22:54, Colin Geoffrey Hales a écrit :
SNIP
What point is there in bothering with it. The philosophical zombie is
ASSUMED to be equivalent! This is failure before you even start! It's
wrong and it's proven wrong because there is
The discussion has run its course. It has taught me a lot about the sorts
of issues and mindsets involved.
It has also given me the idea for the methodological-zombie-room, which I
will now write up. Maybe it will depict the circumstances and role of
phenomenality better than I have thus far.
On Nov 26, 11:50 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Why use the word if you don't like the concept?
I've been away for a bit and I can't pretend to have absorbed all the
nuances of this thread but I have some observations.
1. To coherently conceive that a PZ which is a *functional* (not
Of course they are analogue devices, but their analogue nature makes no
difference to the computation. If the ripple in the power supply of a TTL
circuit were 4 volts then the computer's true analogue nature would
intrude and it would malfunction.
Stathis Papaioannou
Of course you are
Colin Hales writes:
The very fact that the laws of physics, derived and validated using
phenomenality, cannot predict or explain how appearances are generated is
proof that the appearance generator is made of something else and that
something else else is the reality involved, which is NOT
Colin Hales writes:
OK. There is a proven mystery called the hard problem. Documented to death
and beyond. Call it Physics X. It is the physics that _predicts_ (NOT
DESCRIBES) phenomenal consciousness (PC). We have, through all my fiddling
about with scientists, conclusive scientific
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