Re: Movie cannot think
On 11 Mar 2011, at 03:39, Stephen Paul King wrote: From: Bruno Marchal Sent: Thursday, March 10, 2011 12:48 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Movie cannot think Dear Stephen, On 10 Mar 2011, at 16:27, Stephen Paul King wrote: -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal Sent: Thursday, March 10, 2011 9:10 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Movie cannot think On 10 Mar 2011, at 13:47, Andrew Soltau wrote: All the moments exist, and as Deutsch points out, as you summarise, 'The appearance of change is already explained by the fact that there are different frames that have an implicit sequence and in which the observers state is different', but for change to actually happen, the magic finger must move. Otherwise reality would be like a movie film sitting in the can in storage. The change in the working program is brought by the universal machine which interprets it. All you need is an initial universal machine. It happens that addition and multiplication, with first order logic is enough to define such an initial universal system, and the UDA+MGA shows that the laws of mind, including the laws of matter, does not depend on the choice of the initial universal system. So elementary arithmetic does emulate, in the mathematical sense, computations. Arithmetic does not just describe all those computations: it literally emulate them. This is not trivial to show, although computer science gives the insight. Computations in arithmetic are not like movie, they are like a observer line universe in a block universe. To add an external time reintroduces a mystery where it is not needed. That use of time is like the use of God as gap explanation by the pseudo-religious (authoritative) people. You will end up with a primitive time, a primitive matter, and why not a primitive god responsible for all this. That is, in my opinion, the correct insight of Deutsch. Except that he mentions an implicit sequence, which is typically made explicit by the universal machine which emulates, albeit statically or arithmetically-realistically, the computation. All computations in that setting are ultimately based on the explicit sequence 0, s(0), s(s(0)), ... (or the equivalent in the combinators, etc.). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ ** Dear Bruno, I only really have one difficulty with this thought: What choose that particular initial universal 'machine'? [BM] Addition+multiplication? (RA, Robinson Arithmetic) Because it is shown that it is enough to derive mind and matter from it. Because it is shown that, if we accept the comp bet, it *has to* be enough. And adding anything more betrays the solution of the 1-3 person relations. Because it is taught in high school, and with few exception accepted and used by everybody. Because it can be shown to be necessary, in the sense that any weaker theory cannot derive it. *** [SPK] But how does this address my question? I must have misunderstood you but the word “initial” appears three times in the following: “The change in the working program is brought by the universal machine which interprets it. All you need is an initial universal machine. It happens that addition and multiplication, with first order logic is enough to define such an initial universal system, and the UDA+MGA shows that the laws of mind, including the laws of matter, does not depend on the choice of the initial universal system.” Why does the word “initial” appear here, if there is no sense of a sequence of machine of which there is a least machine? So you are saying that the fact that a “weaker theory” cannot derive it determines its minimality in the sequence? Words have to be interpreted in their context. here by initial universal machine I was just meaning that I need to postulate the existence of at least one universal system, or a theory having the sigma_1 completeness property. And elementary arithmetic is enough. Why is it necessary to assume a form of the well founded axiom? Because the phenomenology of non well foundedness is simple to derive. It appears to me that you are otherwise there would not necessarily be a minimal machine! Things like that can be true from some person perspective. So we don't have to assume it, because we can explain it with less assumption. Even then we have no phenomenological interview of the so defined Löbian Machine to at least give us the appearance that we have found a derivation of mind and matter that can be analytically continued to any person’s experience of what it is like to have a mind in a physical world! I concede that within your argument there is something that seems to be like a mind in an abstract 3-p sense, but you have not shown how such a “mind” interacts with other similarly defined minds except in a reasoning that involves taking the plural case, but mere plurality is not sufficient for yield a
Re: Movie cannot think
Hi Bruno, I deeply appreciate your corrections to my misunderstandings in your response. I learned many things so far from you. I will re-read sane04. Onward! Stephen From: Bruno Marchal Sent: Friday, March 11, 2011 3:24 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Movie cannot think On 11 Mar 2011, at 03:39, Stephen Paul King wrote: From: Bruno Marchal Sent: Thursday, March 10, 2011 12:48 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Movie cannot think Dear Stephen, On 10 Mar 2011, at 16:27, Stephen Paul King wrote: -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal Sent: Thursday, March 10, 2011 9:10 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Movie cannot think On 10 Mar 2011, at 13:47, Andrew Soltau wrote: All the moments exist, and as Deutsch points out, as you summarise, 'The appearance of change is already explained by the fact that there are different frames that have an implicit sequence and in which the observers state is different', but for change to actually happen, the magic finger must move. Otherwise reality would be like a movie film sitting in the can in storage. The change in the working program is brought by the universal machine which interprets it. All you need is an initial universal machine. It happens that addition and multiplication, with first order logic is enough to define such an initial universal system, and the UDA+MGA shows that the laws of mind, including the laws of matter, does not depend on the choice of the initial universal system. So elementary arithmetic does emulate, in the mathematical sense, computations. Arithmetic does not just describe all those computations: it literally emulate them. This is not trivial to show, although computer science gives the insight. Computations in arithmetic are not like movie, they are like a observer line universe in a block universe. To add an external time reintroduces a mystery where it is not needed. That use of time is like the use of God as gap explanation by the pseudo-religious (authoritative) people. You will end up with a primitive time, a primitive matter, and why not a primitive god responsible for all this. That is, in my opinion, the correct insight of Deutsch. Except that he mentions an implicit sequence, which is typically made explicit by the universal machine which emulates, albeit statically or arithmetically-realistically, the computation. All computations in that setting are ultimately based on the explicit sequence 0, s(0), s(s(0)), ... (or the equivalent in the combinators, etc.). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ ** Dear Bruno, I only really have one difficulty with this thought: What choose that particular initial universal 'machine'? [BM] Addition+multiplication? (RA, Robinson Arithmetic) Because it is shown that it is enough to derive mind and matter from it. Because it is shown that, if we accept the comp bet, it *has to* be enough. And adding anything more betrays the solution of the 1-3 person relations. Because it is taught in high school, and with few exception accepted and used by everybody. Because it can be shown to be necessary, in the sense that any weaker theory cannot derive it. *** [SPK] But how does this address my question? I must have misunderstood you but the word “initial” appears three times in the following: “The change in the working program is brought by the universal machine which interprets it. All you need is an initial universal machine. It happens that addition and multiplication, with first order logic is enough to define such an initial universal system, and the UDA+MGA shows that the laws of mind, including the laws of matter, does not depend on the choice of the initial universal system.” Why does the word “initial” appear here, if there is no sense of a sequence of machine of which there is a least machine? So you are saying that the fact that a “weaker theory” cannot derive it determines its minimality in the sequence? Words have to be interpreted in their context. here by initial universal machine I was just meaning that I need to postulate the existence of at least one universal system, or a theory having the sigma_1 completeness property. And elementary arithmetic is enough. Why is it necessary to assume a form of the well founded axiom? Because the phenomenology of non well foundedness is simple to derive. It appears to me that you are otherwise there would not necessarily be a minimal machine! Things like that can be true from some person perspective. So we don't have to assume it, because we can explain it with less assumption. Even then we have no phenomenological interview of
Hutter's article on a complete theory of everything
Rummaging through the archives, I realized that a highly relevant article by Marcus Hutter apparently has not yet been discussed on this list, although many have downloaded it: A Complete Theory of Everything (Will Be Subjective) Algorithms 2010, 3(4), 329-350; doi:10.3390/a3040329 Part of the Special Issue Algorithmic Complexity in Physics Embedded Artificial Intelligences In Memoriam Ray Solomonoff (1926-2009) http://www.mdpi.com/1999-4893/3/4/329/ Abstract: Increasingly encompassing models have been suggested for our world. Theories range from generally accepted to increasingly speculative to apparently bogus. The progression of theories from ego- to geo- to helio-centric models to universe and multiverse theories and beyond was accompanied by a dramatic increase in the sizes of the postulated worlds, with humans being expelled from their center to ever more remote and random locations. Rather than leading to a true theory of everything, this trend faces a turning point after which the predictive power of such theories decreases (actually to zero). Incorporating the location and other capacities of the observer into such theories avoids this problem and allows to distinguish meaningful from predictively meaningless theories. This also leads to a truly complete theory of everything consisting of a (conventional objective) theory of everything plus a (novel subjective) observer process. The observer localization is neither based on the controversial anthropic principle, nor has it anything to do with the quantum-mechanical observation process. The suggested principle is extended to more practical (partial, approximate, probabilistic, parametric) world models (rather than theories of everything). Finally, I provide a justification of Ockham’s razor, and criticize the anthropic principle, the doomsday argument, the no free lunch theorem, and the falsifiability dogma. Keywords: world models; observer localization; predictive power; Ockham’s razor; universal theories; inductive reasoning; simplicity and complexity; universal self-sampling; no-free-lunch; computability Remarkably, Prof. Hutter holds doctoral degrees in both physics and computer science, where he made fundamental contributions. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Movie cannot think
On 10 Mar 2011, at 16:15, Stephen Paul King wrote: From: Andrew Soltau Sent: Thursday, March 10, 2011 7:47 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Movie cannot think On 09/03/11 16:53, Brent Meeker wrote: The appearance of change is already explained by the fact that there are different frames that have an implicit sequence and in which the observers state is different. Further explanation is just muddying the picture - at leas that's what Deutsch et al would say. by saying that the frame of reference is changed, f But this is no more than a magic finger pointing to the frames and saying, This one. And then this one. And then Which is what one seems to be experiencing. snip [SPK] One thing must be considered: There are more that one possible sequence of observer states. Not only are we considering all possible frames for a single movie but the frames for every possible movie too, even the ones that are pure noise! I guess you mean 'computation' for 'movie'. The movie idea has been introduced to tackle the more subtle problem of the supervenience thesis. A movie, in that setting, shows that a physical system can mimic perfectly a particular computation without doing a computation, and its use is not related to the more easy selection of actual experience issue. I suggest to come back on this later. All of them will be equally co-present in the heap and there is no a priori bias for one over another. The magic finger is a figure of speech of something that selects one of them: how is the one that is “actually experienced” selected? The comp answer is perhaps terrible, but is quite fitting with the many-worlds or 'everything' philosophy. There is no selection at all. If you prefer: each observer, or even each 'observer-moment' selects himself. This is already in the 3th UDA step. If you are cut and pasted in W and in M. The one in M could ask why am I the one in M, and the one in W could ask why am I the one in W, and we know that there is no answer, by construction, and the comp assumption. In a deeper sense, we can speculate (at this stage) that I am both, but such an I is more general than the usual local and relative I, which is the one needed to understand that physics will be reduced (but not eliminated) into arithmetic. I propose that a mutual constraint methodology such as what has been proposed as a solution the the concurrency problem in computer science may answer this. But this possibility seems to be a bit outside of the light of the lamppost under which we currently are looking for the answer... In the third person global picture, concurrency is managed by dovetailing. In the physics extracted from comp, this is more complex. It would be really nice to get already one qubit. Two qubits needs the tensor product, and for this we need to tackle the first order modal logic of self-reference, find neat semantics for the Z1* and X1* logics ... Difficult. It is not outside the lamppost, but it is neither in the brighter focus of it. Best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Movie cannot think
On 10/03/11 14:10, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Mar 2011, at 13:47, Andrew Soltau wrote: All the moments exist, and as Deutsch points out, as you summarise, 'The appearance of change is already explained by the fact that there are different frames that have an implicit sequence and in which the observers state is different', but for change to actually happen, the magic finger must move. Otherwise reality would be like a movie film sitting in the can in storage. The change in the working program is brought by the universal machine which interprets it. Yes, but you still require an explanation of how the machine actually runs. All possible states of the machine exist 'already' in an arithmetical universe. All you need is an initial universal machine. It happens that addition and multiplication, with first order logic is enough to define such an initial universal system, and the UDA+MGA shows that the laws of mind, including the laws of matter, does not depend on the choice of the initial universal system. So elementary arithmetic does emulate, in the mathematical sense, computations. Naturally. But you still require an explanation of how such arithmetic, or how such computations, are carried out. This is where you need an 'external' time. Arithmetic does not just describe all those computations: it literally emulate them. This is not trivial to show, although computer science gives the insight. Computations in arithmetic are not like movie, they are like a observer line universe in a block universe. Ok. And you still require an explanation of how something moves along the line. This is what is missing from physics. It is inherently absent in any concept of straightforward existence. To add an external time reintroduces a mystery where it is not needed. Provided you can explain how we come to be experiencing change, in other words, how it comes to be that the computation is running, as opposed to simply existing. That use of time is like the use of God as gap explanation by the pseudo-religious (authoritative) people. You will end up with a primitive time, a primitive matter, and why not a primitive god responsible for all this. That is, in my opinion, the correct insight of Deutsch. In which case you have to accept that the passage of time is an illusion. In this case, you are not a being which witnesses change. You are simply, at each moment in time, that which exists at that moment in time, and has the illusion, at that moment in time, that you have existed at other moments in time. Objectively this is unassailable. Subjectively I personally, for one, consider that it does not account for my experience. I don't really think that there is a lot more one can say about it. Except that he mentions an implicit sequence, which is typically made explicit by the universal machine which emulates, albeit statically or arithmetically-realistically, the computation. All computations in that setting are ultimately based on the explicit sequence 0, s(0), s(s(0)), ... (or the equivalent in the combinators, etc.). How the sequence is defined, and whether it is fundamentally physical or arithmetical, is of no consequence to this - admittedly highly philosophical - point. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Molecular Motion and Heat, was ON THE THEORY OF EVERYTHING was Another TOE short paper
On Mar 10, 8:57 pm, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote: To Evgeniy's train of thought I would attach another question (what you, savants of Q-science may answer easily): if the universe expands (does it, indeed?) do the interstitial spaces in an atom expand similarly, or they are exempt and stay put? They are exempt. Their structures are defined by the strengths of the electromagnetic and nuclear forces. Expansion is a spatial and gravitational phenomenon. If they expand, a recalculation of the entire (Q?)physics and cosmology would be in order G. If they don't, there must be some Big Bang initial volume That doesn't follow, because atoms aren't indivisible. The very early universe consisted only of particles. How much volume particles take up depends on factors like the Pauli exclusion principle, rather than an notion of a classical volume of packing. For instance, neutron star and white dwarf matter is much denser than conventional matter, because their constituent particles fill energy states rather than volumes -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Movie cannot think
On 11 Mar 2011, at 13:07, Andrew Soltau wrote: On 10/03/11 14:10, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Mar 2011, at 13:47, Andrew Soltau wrote: All the moments exist, and as Deutsch points out, as you summarise, 'The appearance of change is already explained by the fact that there are different frames that have an implicit sequence and in which the observers state is different', but for change to actually happen, the magic finger must move. Otherwise reality would be like a movie film sitting in the can in storage. The change in the working program is brought by the universal machine which interprets it. Yes, but you still require an explanation of how the machine actually runs. All possible states of the machine exist 'already' in an arithmetical universe. States alone do not make sense. What makes a state a machine's state is that there is a universal number, or the initial universal system itself (elemantary arithmetic, say), which includes it in a computation. It is a bit similar to Rovelli's relational idea, but in the context of arithmetic. It is standard to define states and (universal) machines, and pieces of computations in arithmetic. What makes a computation emulated in arithmetic is an infinity of true relations between numbers, and in this case most are provable in a tiny part of any formal arithmetic (like RA, that is Robinson arithmetic, which I use to fix the idea). All you need is an initial universal machine. It happens that addition and multiplication, with first order logic is enough to define such an initial universal system, and the UDA+MGA shows that the laws of mind, including the laws of matter, does not depend on the choice of the initial universal system. So elementary arithmetic does emulate, in the mathematical sense, computations. Naturally. But you still require an explanation of how such arithmetic, or how such computations, are carried out. This is where you need an 'external' time. Why? The internal time defined by the basic sequence of the natural numbers is enough. It can be used to define the notion of computational steps, and of sequence of computational steps. Assuming comp, you are here and now because it exists a sequence of computational steps leading to your current computational state, at the right level. Of course, there is an infinity of such sequences, and we will have to develop a relative uncertainty calculus on them (or prove that they cannot exist and refute comp). Arithmetic does not just describe all those computations: it literally emulate them. This is not trivial to show, although computer science gives the insight. Computations in arithmetic are not like movie, they are like a observer line universe in a block universe. Ok. And you still require an explanation of how something moves along the line. This is what is missing from physics. It is inherently absent in any concept of straightforward existence. Nothing moves in the block-universe, be it arithmetical or primary physical. But we can explain why machines will develop discourse about moving things, and, in the case of comp, we can even explain why a part of that moving will be considered as incommunicable by the machine from its first person point of view. To add an external time reintroduces a mystery where it is not needed. Provided you can explain how we come to be experiencing change, in other words, how it comes to be that the computation is running, as opposed to simply existing. Running is defined in term of sequence of steps. For all universal number, there will be a notion of steps associated with it, and a notion of running, which will be defined by reference to the successor relation. That use of time is like the use of God as gap explanation by the pseudo-religious (authoritative) people. You will end up with a primitive time, a primitive matter, and why not a primitive god responsible for all this. That is, in my opinion, the correct insight of Deutsch. In which case you have to accept that the passage of time is an illusion. I would not call it an illusion. It is only an illusion from the point of view of God (arithmetical truth, say). I would call it a personal (first person plural or not) subjective reality. Bergson's subjective duration is retrieved in the Bp p hypostase, and physical time is, or should be, retrieved in the material hypostase Bp Dp ( p). Physical time (and physical space) appears as first person plural sharable propositions. All we need is a good theory of self-reference, but this is provided by theoretical computer science/ mathematical logic. (The consequence of UDA are admittedly unbelievable. That is why the original name of the Universal Dovetailer Argument was Universal Dovetailer Paradox. But AUDA explains the paradox. The divine intellect, that is the modal logic G*, proves the equivalence, with
Re: Implementing Machines
Dear Andrew and Bruno, Please forgive my intrusion here but I both share a concern with Andrew about a concept being discussed and have a series of comments. -Original Message- From: Andrew Soltau Sent: Friday, March 11, 2011 7:07 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Movie cannot think On 10/03/11 14:10, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Mar 2011, at 13:47, Andrew Soltau wrote: All the moments exist, and as Deutsch points out, as you summarise, 'The appearance of change is already explained by the fact that there are different frames that have an implicit sequence and in which the observers state is different', but for change to actually happen, the magic finger must move. Otherwise reality would be like a movie film sitting in the can in storage. The change in the working program is brought by the universal machine which interprets it. [AS] Yes, but you still require an explanation of how the machine actually runs. All possible states of the machine exist 'already' in an arithmetical universe. [SPK] It seems that we need a definition of the implied meaning of the word “runs”, but we only end up in a confused state much worse than the one we started in when we try to get an answer to this question!!! I can only try to explain what this word, in this context, means to me. When I say or write the word “a machine runs” there are implications of many things, including the laws of thermodynamics. I at least expect that the running of the machine is the action of of a physical system that involves the conversion of energy from a low entropy to a high entropy state. In this discussion here, we seem to ignore almost all of those ideas and concepts when we say “run the machine”. So what exactly are we considering Some kind of abstract version of a machine. OK, where is this abstract machine located? In our minds? Oh, never mind, we have discussed how abstract objects do not have a location per say and that they exist (somehow) independent of our cognition of them so the question is begged by undermining the premise that abstract object can exist or not exist at some location. Does this not imply a Cartesian duality between mental concepts and our physical brains? What causal relationship exists between them and if no causal connection exists, what explanation is there for the amazing synchronization that there appears to occur between physical activities and the mental experiences that I am having? But I digress We have this idea that something exists which we represent using some system of symbols following some set of rules and consider that the entity that that string of symbols represents actually exists independent of our representation of it. Does this scheme not implicitly involve a form of dualism or complementarity such that there is a categorical distinction between the strings of symbols (and their related ancillary rules, relations, definitions, etc.) and the entity that they represent? It sure seems to me that it does! Maybe I am naïve, but surely other persons can see this implied distinction between object and representation! Are we being faithful to the doctrines of Ideal monism? Hardly! So what does this word salad so far have to do with the topic of this thread in the Everything List? Well, we are considering some ideas that seem to only apply to the representations and not to objects per say and we are taking those representations, treating them as if they are objects themselves and then subtracting or neglecting the fact that we are doing just that – treating representations of objects as if they are objects having representations themselves can have the properties that we would usually only associate with physical objects. If we follow this kind of reasoning we can expect that it is ok to represent objects as representations of representations of representations of representations of Is this not an impermissible form of infinite regress? What is going on here? Is there some point at which this nesting of representations stops? If so what could it be? All you need is an initial universal machine. It happens that addition and multiplication, with first order logic is enough to define such an initial universal system, and the UDA+MGA shows that the laws of mind, including the laws of matter, does not depend on the choice of the initial universal system. So elementary arithmetic does emulate, in the mathematical sense, computations. [AS] Naturally. But you still require an explanation of how such arithmetic, or how such computations, are carried out. This is where you need an 'external' time. [SPK] Do we need an “external time” as in another ordered set of positive Real numbers acting as a valuation of a sequence of events encoding some transformation or do we only need a way of comparing the rate of change of a “machine” as it goes through its states
Re: universal numbers
On 3/9/2011 9:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Mar 2011, at 20:11, Brent Meeker wrote: On 3/8/2011 10:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: We could start with lambda terms, or combinators instead. A computation (of phi_4(5) is just a sequence phi_4^0 (5) phi_4^1 (5) phi_4^2 (5) phi_4^3 (5) phi_4^4 (5) phi_4^5 (5) phi_4^6 (5) ... _4 is the program. 5 is the input. ^i is the ith step (i = 0, 1, 2, ...), and phi refers implicitly to a universal number. Bruno, I don't think I understand what a universal number is. Could you point me to an explication. The expression universal numbers is mine, but the idea is implicit in any textbook on theoretical computer science, or of recursion theory (like books by Cutland, or Rogers, or Boolos and Jeffrey, ...). Fix any universal system, for example numbers+addition+multiplication, or LISP programs. You can enumerate the programs: P_0, P_1, P_2, ... So that you can enumerate the corresponding phi_i phi_0, phi_1, phi_2, ... Take a computable bijection between NXN and N, so that couples of numbers x,y are code by numbers, and you can mechanically extract x and y from x,y Then u is a universal number if for all x and y you have that phi_u(x,y) = phi_x(y). In practice x is called program, and y is called the input. Now, I use, as fixed initial universal system, a Robinson Arithmetic prover. I will say that a number u is universal if RA can prove the (purely arithmetical) relation phi_u(x,y) = phi_x(y). The notion is not entirely intrinsic (so to be universal is not like to be prime), but this is not important because from the machine's point of view, all universal numbers have to be taken into account. By not intrinsic I assume you refer to the fact that the Godel numbering scheme that idenitfies a number u with a program is not something intrinsic to arithmetic; it is a mapping we create. Right? But then what does it mean to say all universal numbers have to taken into account? If I understand correctly *every* natural number is a universal number, in some numbering scheme or another. So what does taking into account mean? Brent With that respect, here, mind theorist have an easier work than computer scientist which search intrinsic notion of universality. We don't need that, because the personal Löbian machine and their hypostases does not depend on the initial choice, neither of the computable bijection, nor of the first universal system. To put it more simply: a universal number is the Gödel number of the code of a universal system (a computer, or a general purpose computer (in french: an 'ordinateur'), or a 'programming language interpreter'). OK? Ask for more if needed. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Molecular Motion and Heat, was ON THE THEORY OF EVERYTHING was Another TOE short paper
John, I am probably not that far from agnosticism but the question is how to make it useful for practitioners like me who have to earn money. I mean that it is still necessary to take decisions and then the question would be how. Although this could be just illusion somehow made by numbers to confuse my first person view and in the reality as Rex says, everything is determined by the initial state of the universe (or Platonia). Evgenii on 10.03.2011 21:57 John Mikes said the following: Thanks, David, for a reasonable post. I admire Evgeniy for his boldness of a frontal attack against conventional physicality's terms. I would go a step further (is it a surprise?) like: ontology is rather a description of a stagnant knowledge (state? even if dynamic) of *a phase*considered in conventional science - if we consider a continuously changing complexity of everything for* the world* (whatever) - way beyond the limitations of our knowables (i.e. the 'model' we carry about our solipsism: the (world)view based upon the acquired knowables and their explanation at the level we actually reached). In such views atoms and molecules are cute explanations at a primitive level of knowledge for phenomena humanity thought to have observed and tried to understand (explain). So is the Brownian and other 'movement'(?) applied in the terms of 'heat' (not really) of those marvels. Since 'movement' is the relationship between our poorly understood terms of space and time the uncertainty is no surprise. Your last sentence may be a connotation to all that 'stuff' of everything' - outside of the so far acquired knowables, yet in the indivisible wholeness-complexity duly influencing whatever comes as 'knowable' within our model. (This - the so far unknown, but seeping gradually into our ssolipsism of yesterday - yet affecting the observed *model-behavior* serves my agnosticism, the uncertainty, the fact that our (conventional) sciences are* ALMOST* OK. Meaning: we may be proud of our knowledge and skills, but technological failures, evaluational mishaps, sicknesses, societal malaise and unexpected catastrophes etc. still occur.) To Evgeniy's train of thought I would attach another question (what you, savants of Q-science may answer easily): if the universe expands (does it, indeed?) do the interstitial spaces in an atom expand similarly, or they are exempt and stay put? If they expand, a recalculation of the entire (Q?)physics and cosmology would be in orderG. If they don't, there must be some Big Bang initial volume - not a zero-point start-up, unless that ridiculous 'inflation-theory' works to save the evening. I like fairy tales. Spilberg may get a physical Nobel. The idea is not new: Lenin said that the large increase in quantity turns into a change in quality. Regards John M On Wed, Mar 9, 2011 at 6:08 PM, David Nymanda...@davidnyman.com wrote: On 9 March 2011 19:22, Evgenii Rudnyiuse...@rudnyi.ru wrote: So I personally not that sure that molecular motion has more meaning *ontologically* than heat. Actually, I agree with you. Of course whatever we can speak or theorise about is, strictly, entirely epistemological and consequently those aspects we label ontological are properly a subset of the theory of knowledge. And of course even in these terms it isn't clear that the physical is simply reducible to independently existing fundamental entities and their relations. Even though I was attempting to pursue some rather obvious consequences of the idea that reality might be so reducible, I accept that the relation between what we know and what may ultimately ground such knowledge is doubtless altogether more complex, subtle and opaque. David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Implementing Machines
On 11/03/11 16:54, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Andrew and Bruno, Please forgive my intrusion here but I both share a concern with Andrew about a concept being discussed and have a series of comments. Dear Stephen I am delighted you have interjected. I find your thoughts most helpful and germane. -Original Message- From: Andrew Soltau Sent: Friday, March 11, 2011 7:07 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Movie cannot think On 10/03/11 14:10, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Mar 2011, at 13:47, Andrew Soltau wrote: All the moments exist, and as Deutsch points out, as you summarise, 'The appearance of change is already explained by the fact that there are different frames that have an implicit sequence and in which the observers state is different', but for change to actually happen, the magic finger must move. Otherwise reality would be like a movie film sitting in the can in storage. The change in the working program is brought by the universal machine which interprets it. [AS] Yes, but you still require an explanation of how the machine actually runs. All possible states of the machine exist 'already' in an arithmetical universe. [SPK] It seems that we need a definition of the implied meaning of the word “runs”, but we only end up in a confused state much worse than the one we started in when we try to get an answer to this question!!! I can only try to explain what this word, in this context, means to me. When I say or write the word “a machine runs” there are implications of many things, including the laws of thermodynamics. I at least expect that the running of the machine is the action of of a physical system that involves the conversion of energy from a low entropy to a high entropy state. In this discussion here, we seem to ignore almost all of those ideas and concepts when we say “run the machine”. So what exactly are we considering Some kind of abstract version of a machine. OK, where is this abstract machine located? In our minds? Oh, never mind, we have discussed how abstract objects do not have a location per say and that they exist (somehow) independent of our cognition of them so the question is begged by undermining the premise that abstract object can exist or not exist at some location. Does this not imply a Cartesian duality between mental concepts and our physical brains? What causal relationship exists between them and if no causal connection exists, what explanation is there for the amazing synchronization that there appears to occur between physical activities and the mental experiences that I am having? But I digress We have this idea that something exists which we represent using some system of symbols following some set of rules and consider that the entity that that string of symbols represents actually exists independent of our representation of it. Does this scheme not implicitly involve a form of dualism or complementarity such that there is a categorical distinction between the strings of symbols (and their related ancillary rules, relations, definitions, etc.) and the entity that they represent? It sure seems to me that it does! Maybe I am naïve, but surely other persons can see this implied distinction between object and representation! Are we being faithful to the doctrines of Ideal monism? Hardly! So what does this word salad so far have to do with the topic of this thread in the Everything List? Well, we are considering some ideas that seem to only apply to the representations and not to objects per say and we are taking those representations, treating them as if they are objects themselves and then subtracting or neglecting the fact that we are doing just that – treating representations of objects as if they are objects having representations themselves can have the properties that we would usually only associate with physical objects. If we follow this kind of reasoning we can expect that it is ok to represent objects as representations of representations of representations of representations of Is this not an impermissible form of infinite regress? What is going on here? Is there some point at which this nesting of representations stops? If so what could it be? ( I am not sure that this is directly to do with the issue I am focusing on. If one has a simulation running, then the passage of time in the physical reality in which the simulation is running results in the passage of time in the simulation. The clock cycles of the computer result in the updating of the virtual reality. One can have the folks in the virtual reality running a virtual reality, and the same goes all the way down the line, for as many nestings as one may chose to consider. But for anything to actually happen, in any of the nestings, layers or levels, something has to happen somewhere! At the top level of course. ) All you need is an initial universal machine. It happens
Re: Hutter's article on a complete theory of everything
On 11/03/11 09:39, Digital Physics wrote: Rummaging through the archives, I realized that a highly relevant article by Marcus Hutter apparently has not yet been discussed on this list, although many have downloaded it: Highly relevant indeed. He states in his summary I have demonstrated that a theory that perfectly describes our universe or multiverse, rather than being a Theory of Everything (ToE), might also be a theory of nothing. just as Russell maintains. The collection of all possible descriptions has zero complexity, or information content. ... There is a mathematical equivalence between the Everything, as represented by this collection of all possible descriptions and Nothing, a state of no information. (2006, p. 5) A Complete Theory of Everything (Will Be Subjective) Algorithms 2010, 3(4), 329-350; doi:10.3390/a3040329 Part of the Special Issue Algorithmic Complexity in Physics Embedded Artificial Intelligences In Memoriam Ray Solomonoff (1926-2009) http://www.mdpi.com/1999-4893/3/4/329/ Abstract: Increasingly encompassing models have been suggested for our world. Theories range from generally accepted to increasingly speculative to apparently bogus. The progression of theories from ego- to geo- to helio-centric models to universe and multiverse theories and beyond was accompanied by a dramatic increase in the sizes of the postulated worlds, with humans being expelled from their center to ever more remote and random locations. Rather than leading to a true theory of everything, this trend faces a turning point after which the predictive power of such theories decreases (actually to zero). Incorporating the location and other capacities of the observer into such theories avoids this problem and allows to distinguish meaningful from predictively meaningless theories. This also leads to a truly complete theory of everything consisting of a (conventional objective) theory of everything plus a (novel subjective) observer process. The observer localization is neither based on the controversial anthropic principle, nor has it anything to do with the quantum-mechanical observation process. The suggested principle is extended to more practical (partial, approximate, probabilistic, parametric) world models (rather than theories of everything). Finally, I provide a justification of Ockham’s razor, and criticize the anthropic principle, the doomsday argument, the no free lunch theorem, and the falsifiability dogma. Keywords: world models; observer localization; predictive power; Ockham’s razor; universal theories; inductive reasoning; simplicity and complexity; universal self-sampling; no-free-lunch; computability Remarkably, Prof. Hutter holds doctoral degrees in both physics and computer science, where he made fundamental contributions. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Implementing Machines
Hi Andrew, The answer to the simple question that you see that all of this detail leads to is that at its core, Existence is Change itself. Becoming is the fundamental ontological primitive., just as Bergson argued. This is the result that Hitoshi discovered and discussed in his Inconsistent Universe Paper in terms of the truth value of the total Universe being in an infinite oscillation between True and False. Bart Kosko also obtained a similar result in how research on Fuzzy sets. What Barbour really found is that there does not exist a universal global standard of measure of this change. If there is no standard then there is not a determination of definiteness for the Total Change of existence and thus there is no global measure of change. Since time can be defined in generic terms as a measure of change, Barbour is correct in claiming that time as a global quantity cannot exist. What Barbour missed, as have countless others, is that local measures of change can be defined. The fact that there is more than one measure of entropy is a huge clue of this. Chris Hillman has mapped out some of this. The main reason, I believe, that this fact continues to be overlooked is that people still insist on thinking of time as a scalar numerical/geometric quantity. Yes, it can be represented consistently as such, but we must not confuse a representation with its referent! Time itself is not its representation. Onward! Stephen From: Andrew Soltau Sent: Friday, March 11, 2011 4:19 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Implementing Machines On 11/03/11 16:54, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Andrew and Bruno, Please forgive my intrusion here but I both share a concern with Andrew about a concept being discussed and have a series of comments. Dear Stephen I am delighted you have interjected. I find your thoughts most helpful and germane. -Original Message- From: Andrew Soltau Sent: Friday, March 11, 2011 7:07 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Movie cannot think On 10/03/11 14:10, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Mar 2011, at 13:47, Andrew Soltau wrote: All the moments exist, and as Deutsch points out, as you summarise, 'The appearance of change is already explained by the fact that there are different frames that have an implicit sequence and in which the observers state is different', but for change to actually happen, the magic finger must move. Otherwise reality would be like a movie film sitting in the can in storage. The change in the working program is brought by the universal machine which interprets it. [AS] Yes, but you still require an explanation of how the machine actually runs. All possible states of the machine exist 'already' in an arithmetical universe. [SPK] It seems that we need a definition of the implied meaning of the word “runs”, but we only end up in a confused state much worse than the one we started in when we try to get an answer to this question!!! I can only try to explain what this word, in this context, means to me. When I say or write the word “a machine runs” there are implications of many things, including the laws of thermodynamics. I at least expect that the running of the machine is the action of of a physical system that involves the conversion of energy from a low entropy to a high entropy state. In this discussion here, we seem to ignore almost all of those ideas and concepts when we say “run the machine”. So what exactly are we considering Some kind of abstract version of a machine. OK, where is this abstract machine located? In our minds? Oh, never mind, we have discussed how abstract objects do not have a location per say and that they exist (somehow) independent of our cognition of them so the question is begged by undermining the premise that abstract object can exist or not exist at some location. Does this not imply a Cartesian duality between mental concepts and our physical brains? What causal relationship exists between them and if no causal connection exists, what explanation is there for the amazing synchronization that there appears to occur between physical activities and the mental experiences that I am having? But I digress We have this idea that something exists which we represent using some system of symbols following some set of rules and consider that the entity that that string of symbols represents actually exists independent of our representation of it. Does this scheme not implicitly involve a form of dualism or complementarity such that there is a categorical distinction between the strings of symbols (and their related ancillary rules, relations, definitions, etc.) and the entity that they represent? It sure seems to me that it does! Maybe I am naïve, but surely other persons can see this implied distinction between object and representation!
Re: Implementing Machines (errata)
fixing my typos From: Stephen Paul King Sent: Friday, March 11, 2011 10:24 PM To: everything-list Subject: Re: Implementing Machines Hi Andrew, The answer to the simple question that you see in all of this detail leads to is, that at its core essence, Existence is Change itself. Becoming is the fundamental ontological primitive, just as Bergson argued. This is the result that Hitoshi discovered and discussed in his Inconsistent Universe Paper in terms of the truth value of the total Universe being in an infinite oscillation between True and False. Bart Kosko also obtained a similar result in his research on Fuzzy sets. What Barbour really found is that there does not exist a universal global standard of measure of this change. If there is no standard for a measure then there is not a determination of definiteness for the Total Change of existence and thus there is no global measure of change. Since time can be defined in generic terms as a measure of change, Barbour is correct in claiming that time as a global quantity cannot exist. What Barbour missed, as have countless others, is that local measures of change can be defined. The fact that there is more than one measure of entropy is a huge clue of this. Chris Hillman has mapped out some of this. The main reason, I believe, that this fact continues to be overlooked is that people still insist on thinking of time as a scalar numerical/geometric quantity. Yes, it can be represented consistently as such, but we must not confuse a representation with its referent! Time itself is not its representation. Onward! Stephen From: Andrew Soltau Sent: Friday, March 11, 2011 4:19 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Implementing Machines On 11/03/11 16:54, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Andrew and Bruno, Please forgive my intrusion here but I both share a concern with Andrew about a concept being discussed and have a series of comments. Dear Stephen I am delighted you have interjected. I find your thoughts most helpful and germane. -Original Message- From: Andrew Soltau Sent: Friday, March 11, 2011 7:07 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Movie cannot think On 10/03/11 14:10, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Mar 2011, at 13:47, Andrew Soltau wrote: All the moments exist, and as Deutsch points out, as you summarise, 'The appearance of change is already explained by the fact that there are different frames that have an implicit sequence and in which the observers state is different', but for change to actually happen, the magic finger must move. Otherwise reality would be like a movie film sitting in the can in storage. The change in the working program is brought by the universal machine which interprets it. [AS] Yes, but you still require an explanation of how the machine actually runs. All possible states of the machine exist 'already' in an arithmetical universe. [SPK] It seems that we need a definition of the implied meaning of the word “runs”, but we only end up in a confused state much worse than the one we started in when we try to get an answer to this question!!! I can only try to explain what this word, in this context, means to me. When I say or write the word “a machine runs” there are implications of many things, including the laws of thermodynamics. I at least expect that the running of the machine is the action of of a physical system that involves the conversion of energy from a low entropy to a high entropy state. In this discussion here, we seem to ignore almost all of those ideas and concepts when we say “run the machine”. So what exactly are we considering Some kind of abstract version of a machine. OK, where is this abstract machine located? In our minds? Oh, never mind, we have discussed how abstract objects do not have a location per say and that they exist (somehow) independent of our cognition of them so the question is begged by undermining the premise that abstract object can exist or not exist at some location. Does this not imply a Cartesian duality between mental concepts and our physical brains? What causal relationship exists between them and if no causal connection exists, what explanation is there for the amazing synchronization that there appears to occur between physical activities and the mental experiences that I am having? But I digress We have this idea that something exists which we represent using some system of symbols following some set of rules and consider that the entity that that string of symbols represents actually exists independent of our representation of it. Does this scheme not implicitly involve a form of dualism or complementarity such that there is a categorical distinction between the strings of symbols (and their related ancillary rules, relations, definitions, etc.) and the entity that they
Re: Implementing Machines
On 3/11/2011 7:24 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote: Hi Andrew, The answer to the simple question that you see that all of this detail leads to is that at its core, Existence is Change itself. Becoming is the fundamental ontological primitive., just as Bergson argued. This is the result that Hitoshi discovered and discussed in his Inconsistent Universe Paper in terms of the truth value of the total Universe being in an infinite oscillation between True and False. Bart Kosko also obtained a similar result in how research on Fuzzy sets. What Barbour really found is that there does not exist a universal */global /*standard of measure of this change. I think Einstein found that long before Barbour. There's no time-like Killing vector field in an FRW universe, so there's no universal time. If there is no standard then there is not a determination of definiteness for the Total Change of existence and thus there is no global measure of change. Since time can be defined in generic terms as a measure of change, Barbour is correct in claiming that time as a global quantity cannot exist. What Barbour missed, as have countless others, is that/* local measures of change can be defined*/. The fact that there is more than one measure of entropy is a huge clue of this. Thermodynamic entropy has always been relative to whatever is taken to be the constraint (constant energy, constant pressure,...) In the Everett interpretation evolution is always unitary and the Boltzmann entropy is constant. Brent Chris Hillman http://www.google.com/url?sa=tsource=webcd=8ved=0CFcQFjAHurl=http%3A%2F%2Fkist.web.elte.hu%2Fdokumentumok%2FSurvey%2FINFORMACIOELMELET%2FHillman_entropy.pdfrct=jq=chris%20hillman%20entropyei=duZ6TefXBYnC0QG-zq3wAwusg=AFQjCNETdjj-Hv57uqqPDKsopCAfc5NHYwsig2=Y6eBWQsu5T6Y_VoCcwbD_gcad=rja has mapped out some of this. The main reason, I believe, that this fact continues to be overlooked is that people still insist on thinking of time as a scalar numerical/geometric quantity. Yes, it can be represented consistently as such, but we must not confuse a representation with its referent! Time itself is not its representation. Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Implementing Machines (errata)
Thanks, this is fascinating. On 12/03/11 03:34, Stephen Paul King wrote: fixing my typos *From:* Stephen Paul King mailto:stephe...@charter.net *Sent:* Friday, March 11, 2011 10:24 PM *To:* everything-list mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com *Subject:* Re: Implementing Machines Hi Andrew, The answer to the simple question that you see in all of this detail leads to is, that at its core essence, Existence is Change itself. Becoming is the fundamental ontological primitive, just as Bergson argued. This is the result that Hitoshi discovered and discussed in his Inconsistent Universe Paper in terms of the truth value of the total Universe being in an infinite oscillation between True and False. Bart Kosko also obtained a similar result in his research on Fuzzy sets. What Barbour really found is that there does not exist a universal */global /*standard of measure of this change. If there is no standard for a measure then there is not a determination of definiteness for the Total Change of existence and thus there is no global measure of change. Since time can be defined in generic terms as a measure of change, Barbour is correct in claiming that time as a global quantity cannot exist. What Barbour missed, as have countless others, is that/*local measures of change can be defined*/. The fact that there is more than one measure of entropy is a huge clue of this. Chris Hillman http://www.google.com/url?sa=tsource=webcd=8ved=0CFcQFjAHurl=http%3A%2F%2Fkist.web.elte.hu%2Fdokumentumok%2FSurvey%2FINFORMACIOELMELET%2FHillman_entropy.pdfrct=jq=chris%20hillman%20entropyei=duZ6TefXBYnC0QG-zq3wAwusg=AFQjCNETdjj-Hv57uqqPDKsopCAfc5NHYwsig2=Y6eBWQsu5T6Y_VoCcwbD_gcad=rja has mapped out some of this. The main reason, I believe, that this fact continues to be overlooked is that people still insist on thinking of time as a scalar numerical/geometric quantity. Yes, it can be represented consistently as such, but we must not confuse a representation with its referent! Time itself is not its representation. Onward! Stephen But I still stick to my guns! Even if existence is change itself, and becoming is the fundamental ontological primitive, there is still a fundamental difference of logical type between static existence, a specific state, however defined, and the time evolution of that state into a different state. And, with respect to such change, only something meta to any specific given state is in the position to encounter the change of state. Mundane and hackneyed though the movie analogy may be, it is apposite. Iteration is a nice simple to grasp example, but change of any kind is a different kind of thing to a state, it is of fundamentally different logical type. Barbour is simply pointing out that all possible states of the world exist 'already'. Just because local measures of change can be defined, this does not address the difference in logical type. In the linear time dimension of spacetime, Penrose essentially endorses Weyl's view. He refers to the 4D reality past which our field of observation is sweeping, just as Weyl says that Only to the gaze of my consciousness, crawling up the life-line of my body, does the world fleetingly come to life. These minds are addressing the fact that there is nothing in 4D reality that can witness such a change. Stepping back, all of the 4D reality complete with linear dynamics changes on collapse. But again, there is nothing in any 4D reality that can witness such a change, which is what Deutsch is saying /Nothing/ can move from one moment to another. To exist at all at a particular moment means to exist there for ever.. So the same problem exists in the quantum concept of time as exists in the linear time dimension of spacetime. If one is defined by a state, physical or arithmetic, one is not in a position to encounter change of that state, just as a portrayal of an avatar in a frame of a movie cannot watch the movie. This is a logical type issue. We are rather more complex than part of a 2D picture, but that does not affect the basic issue. We are 4D avatars of flesh and blood with onboard computers so complex and clever we are not really clever enough to understand them, but, at any given moment, there is still a specific state defining the avatar. Just as with the movie frame, the change of the real life avatar can only be encountered from outside the avatar. Obviously we seem very obviously to be the experiencer inside the avatar, so it is natural to assume this is an internal process, but this is a somewhat similar mistake to the Earth centred cosmology. It just looks like that. But the experiencer is necessarily 'outside' the sequence of frames, just as one is 'outisde' the virtual reality one participates in venturing in second life. This is all entirely in accord with Existence is Change itself, it's just that it is Existence with a big E which encounters change! This is the 'true self' of
Re: Implementing Machines
On 12/03/11 03:43, Brent Meeker wrote: On 3/11/2011 7:24 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote: Hi Andrew, The answer to the simple question that you see that all of this detail leads to is that at its core, Existence is Change itself. Becoming is the fundamental ontological primitive., just as Bergson argued. This is the result that Hitoshi discovered and discussed in his Inconsistent Universe Paper in terms of the truth value of the total Universe being in an infinite oscillation between True and False. Bart Kosko also obtained a similar result in how research on Fuzzy sets. What Barbour really found is that there does not exist a universal */global /*standard of measure of this change. I think Einstein found that long before Barbour. There's no time-like Killing vector field in an FRW universe, so there's no universal time. If there is no standard then there is not a determination of definiteness for the Total Change of existence and thus there is no global measure of change. Since time can be defined in generic terms as a measure of change, Barbour is correct in claiming that time as a global quantity cannot exist. What Barbour missed, as have countless others, is that/*local measures of change can be defined*/. The fact that there is more than one measure of entropy is a huge clue of this. Thermodynamic entropy has always been relative to whatever is taken to be the constraint (constant energy, constant pressure,...) In the Everett interpretation evolution is always unitary and the Boltzmann entropy is constant. Yes but! Thermodynamic entropy is a predictable process in the 4D reality, as is unitary evolution. But change of the state, the appearance of collapse, is necessarily a process 'outside' of the unitary evolution. One has to be outside of the 4D reality in order for one's field of observation to sweep through the 4D reality, just as one has to be outside of the computer screen to run one's eye across the text displayed on it. But, as I see it, the logic is even more compelling in the case of the change from state to state. Andrew -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
