Brent, Nick,
On 31 Mar 2011, at 03:06, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/30/2011 3:15 PM, Nick Prince wrote:
In Russell’s book there is a section on “Arguments against QTI”
And I want to put forward some issues arising from this.
It seems that (if MWI is true) we live in world(s) in which we appear
to li
On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 9:15 AM, Nick Prince
wrote:
> In Russell’s book there is a section on “Arguments against QTI”
> And I want to put forward some issues arising from this.
>
> It seems that (if MWI is true) we live in world(s) in which we appear
> to live a finite, small lifetime of around 70
On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 11:43 AM, Russell Standish
wrote:
> This is a variant of an argument that David Parfit uses in his book
> "Reasons and Persons", where he considers a continuum from his mind
> to that of Napoleon. (Don't flame me if I get the details wrong - the
> essence is what is import
On 31 Mar 2011, at 13:53, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 9:15 AM, Nick Prince
wrote:
In Russell’s book there is a section on “Arguments against QTI”
And I want to put forward some issues arising from this.
It seems that (if MWI is true) we live in world(s) in which we app
-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal
Sent: Thursday, March 31, 2011 8:52 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Is QTI false?
On 31 Mar 2011, at 13:53, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 9:15 AM, Nick Prince
wrote:
In Russell’s book there is a secti
On 31 Mar 2011, at 15:35, Stephen Paul King wrote:
-Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal
Sent: Thursday, March 31, 2011 8:52 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Is QTI false?
On 31 Mar 2011, at 13:53, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 9:15 AM, Nic
-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal
Sent: Thursday, March 31, 2011 12:33 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Is QTI false?
On 31 Mar 2011, at 15:35, Stephen Paul King wrote:
snip
***
Hi!
There seems to be a conflation of the ideas of the continuity of 1st
p
On Mar 31, 1:43 am, Russell Standish wrote:
> The observation that other people never seem to live beyond a certain
> age is not evidence against the NCDSC. Only logical
> impossibility can count. Even physical impossibility is insufficient,
> because there is always the possibility of mind upl
>Bruno wrote
> With both QTI and COMP-TI we cannot go from being very old to being a
> baby. We can may be get slowly younger and younger in a more
> continuous way, by little backtracking. We always survive in the most
> normal world compatible with our states. But some kind of jumps are
>
Stathis wrote
> That we don't see extremely old people is consistent with QTI, since
> from the third person perspective rare events such as living to a
> great age happen only rarely. However, from the first person
> perspective you will live to a great age, and this will happen in the
> most pr
On Fri, Apr 1, 2011 at 8:42 AM, Nick Prince
wrote:
> Stathis wrote
>
>
>> That we don't see extremely old people is consistent with QTI, since
>> from the third person perspective rare events such as living to a
>> great age happen only rarely. However, from the first person
>> perspective you wil
On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Or something like that. Quantum logic (and also its arithmetical form) has
> many notion of implication. The one above is the closer to the Sazaki Hook
> which Hardegree used to show that orthomodularity in quantum ortholattice is
> related
On 03/31/11, Nick Prince wrote:>Bruno wrote> With both QTI and COMP-TI we cannot go from being very old to being a > baby. We can may be get slowly younger and younger in a more > continuous way, by little backtracking. We always survive in the most > normal world compatible with our states.
On Mar 31, 8:10 pm, meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
>
>
> On 03/31/11,Nick Princewrote:>Bruno wrote
> > With both QTI and COMP-TI we cannot go from being very old to being a
> > baby. We can may be get slowly younger and younger in a more
> > continuous way, by little backtracking. We always surv
On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 02:52:44PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> It is here that if we apply Bayes' theorem (like in the Doomday
> argument), we should be astonished not being already very old (from
> our first person perspective). But Bayes cannot be applied in this
> setting, as we have alread
On 3/31/2011 5:58 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 02:52:44PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
It is here that if we apply Bayes' theorem (like in the Doomday
argument), we should be astonished not being already very old (from
our first person perspective). But Bayes cannot be
On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 09:52:25PM -0500, meekerdb wrote:
> >Standish, and weighted by the universal prior, giving more weight to
> >being a baby than an adult.
> Is that assuming that QM uncertainty increases to the future but not
> the past:?
>
> Brent
In QM, the state evolves unitarily, which
On 3/31/2011 10:08 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 09:52:25PM -0500, meekerdb wrote:
Standish, and weighted by the universal prior, giving more weight to
being a baby than an adult.
Is that assuming that QM uncertainty increases to the future but not
the past:?
On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 10:20:58PM -0500, meekerdb wrote:
>
> Couldn't the person have been born at different times too? QM
> Hamiltonians are time symmetric. If you try to infer the past you
> also have unitary evolution - just in the other direction. So I'm
> wondering where the arrow of time
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