Re: Aaronson/Penrose

[agrayson2000]

On Friday, September 9, 2016 at 10:38:55 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 09 Sep 2016, at 16:08, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, September 9, 2016 at 7:56:27 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Sep 9, 2016 at 7:46 AM, Bruno Marchal > > wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On 08 Sep 2016, at 21:43, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, September 8, 2016 at 1:15:15 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 08 Sep 2016, at 18:22, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:



 On Thursday, September 8, 2016 at 7:53:23 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 07 Sep 2016, at 20:06, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, September 7, 2016 at 11:16:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 06 Sep 2016, at 17:42, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 4:38:53 AM UTC-6, 
>> agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>> I understand your pov. It has but one problem. You ignore the 
>>> elephant in the room; namely, those other worlds or universes necessary 
>>> for 
>>> the outcomes not measured in this world to be realized. But you have an 
>>> out, stated in another post. They form part of your imagination. Not 
>>> good 
>>> enough from my pov. AG
>>>
>>
>>
>> I should also add that the MWI sheds no light, AFAICT, on the 
>> measurement problem; that is, why we get the outcome we get. As far as 
>> collapse contradicting SR via the result of Bell experiments, I am not 
>> sure 
>> about that conclusion. If FTL occurs, it may be the case that in some 
>> frames Alice's measurement occurs first, in other frames Bob's 
>> measurement 
>> occurs first. I tend to think this muddies the waters on the issue of 
>> FLT 
>> transmission and contradictions with relativity. AG
>>
>>
>>
>> The "MWI" explains already a part of the mind-body problem when 
>> formulated in the Digital Mechanist Frame. You don't need to even know 
>> QM 
>> to understand the high plausibility of the "many-computations".
>> If FTL occurs, and you keep both QM and SR, then an action in the 
>> future can change the past, and physical causility becomes meaningless. 
>> With mechanism, physical causality is not yet guarantied, to be sure, 
>> but I 
>> would throw digital mechanism if it could lead to future -> past 
>> physical 
>> action (it does not make sense).
>>
>> Ah, you wrote:
>>
>> Possible correction: my remark about relativity might apply to how 
>> events are seen from a frame moving FTL -- that is, a breakdown in 
>> causality -- and might not apply to Alice/Bob situation. AG
>>
>>
>> Well, OK, then. But it would apply if there were a collapse (in one 
>> universe), even if Alice needs to send two bits of information to 
>> transformed the effect (and send or get one qubit). 
>>
>> The "collapse" does not even refer to anything I can make sense of. 
>> It looks like a continuous invocation of God. As an explanation, it 
>> looks 
>> like a continuum of blasphemes (in the theology of the universal 
>> machine).
>>
>
> Here's what collapse means to me; the wf evolves from a solution of 
> SWE, namely a superposition, to a delta function centered at the 
> measurement value. No one knows, or has a model how this transformation 
> occurs.It's in the category of a TBD, possibly unknowable. It seems 
> empirically based since repeated measurements of the same system result 
> in 
> the same outcomes. I don't necessarily believe in primary matter's 
> existence. But its statistical persistence seems undeniable, whereas the 
> many worlds has yet to manifest any persistence except in the minds of 
> its 
> advocates. AG
>
>
>
> The MWI is only the SWE taken literally. 
>

 *Maybe that's the problem; taking a calculational tool too seriously. 
 AG*
  

> If an observer O observes a cat in the superposition d + a (dead + 
> alive), 
>

 *But that never happens. The state of superposition exists, if it does, 
 when the box is closed, and ceases when the box is opened. *



 Then the SWE is wrong. 

 You beg the question by postulating that QM is wrong outside the box, 
 but there are no evidence for that, given that Everett showed the 
 consistency of QM-without-collapse with the facts, using the simplest 
 known 
 antic theory of mind (mechanism)


>>> *The fact is the cat is dead OR alive when the box is opened, and 
>>> presumably alive before the box is closed. So all I am doing is refuting 
>>> your claim that any observer observes a superposition of states. AG  *
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> In QM+collapse, which assumes 

Re: Aaronson/Penrose

[Bruno Marchal]

On 09 Sep 2016, at 16:08, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:




On Friday, September 9, 2016 at 7:56:27 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:


On Fri, Sep 9, 2016 at 7:46 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 08 Sep 2016, at 21:43, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:




On Thursday, September 8, 2016 at 1:15:15 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 08 Sep 2016, at 18:22, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:




On Thursday, September 8, 2016 at 7:53:23 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 07 Sep 2016, at 20:06, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:




On Wednesday, September 7, 2016 at 11:16:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno  
Marchal wrote:


On 06 Sep 2016, at 17:42, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:




On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 4:38:53 AM UTC-6,  
agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
I understand your pov. It has but one problem. You ignore the  
elephant in the room; namely, those other worlds or universes  
necessary for the outcomes not measured in this world to be  
realized. But you have an out, stated in another post. They form  
part of your imagination. Not good enough from my pov. AG



I should also add that the MWI sheds no light, AFAICT, on the  
measurement problem; that is, why we get the outcome we get. As  
far as collapse contradicting SR via the result of Bell  
experiments, I am not sure about that conclusion. If FTL occurs,  
it may be the case that in some frames Alice's measurement  
occurs first, in other frames Bob's measurement occurs first. I  
tend to think this muddies the waters on the issue of FLT  
transmission and contradictions with relativity. AG



The "MWI" explains already a part of the mind-body problem when  
formulated in the Digital Mechanist Frame. You don't need to even  
know QM to understand the high plausibility of the "many- 
computations".
If FTL occurs, and you keep both QM and SR, then an action in the  
future can change the past, and physical causility becomes  
meaningless. With mechanism, physical causality is not yet  
guarantied, to be sure, but I would throw digital mechanism if it  
could lead to future -> past physical action (it does not make  
sense).


Ah, you wrote:

Possible correction: my remark about relativity might apply to  
how events are seen from a frame moving FTL -- that is, a  
breakdown in causality -- and might not apply to Alice/Bob  
situation. AG


Well, OK, then. But it would apply if there were a collapse (in  
one universe), even if Alice needs to send two bits of  
information to transformed the effect (and send or get one qubit).


The "collapse" does not even refer to anything I can make sense  
of. It looks like a continuous invocation of God. As an  
explanation, it looks like a continuum of blasphemes (in the  
theology of the universal machine).


Here's what collapse means to me; the wf evolves from a solution  
of SWE, namely a superposition, to a delta function centered at  
the measurement value. No one knows, or has a model how this  
transformation occurs.It's in the category of a TBD, possibly  
unknowable. It seems empirically based since repeated  
measurements of the same system result in the same outcomes. I  
don't necessarily believe in primary matter's existence. But its  
statistical persistence seems undeniable, whereas the many worlds  
has yet to manifest any persistence except in the minds of its  
advocates. AG



The MWI is only the SWE taken literally.

Maybe that's the problem; taking a calculational tool too  
seriously. AG


If an observer O observes a cat in the superposition d + a (dead +  
alive),


But that never happens. The state of superposition exists, if it  
does, when the box is closed, and ceases when the box is opened.



Then the SWE is wrong.

You beg the question by postulating that QM is wrong outside the  
box, but there are no evidence for that, given that Everett showed  
the consistency of QM-without-collapse with the facts, using the  
simplest known antic theory of mind (mechanism)



The fact is the cat is dead OR alive when the box is opened, and  
presumably alive before the box is closed. So all I am doing is  
refuting your claim that any observer observes a superposition of  
states. AG



In QM+collapse, which assumes that QM is wrong somewhere (but where?  
No unanimity of collapse-defenders agree on this).


Without collapse, the cat is in the superposition state (dead 
+alive), and when an observer look at the cat, he entangles itself  
with the cat state, and the final state is O-a alive + O-d dead  
(linearity of tensor product). Then by linearity of the SWE, O-a  
lives a *phenomenological collapse" like if the cat was reduced to  
"alive", and O-b lives a phenomenological like if the cat was  
reduced to "dead", but in the 3p picture, no reduction ever occurred.



Bruno

Sorry, but what you write makes no sense. When you look at the cat,  
presumably after box is opened, the cat is either alive or dead. You  
may be entangled with it, but at that point in time there is no  
superposition of 

Re: Aaronson/Penrose

[Alan Grayson]

On Fri, Sep 9, 2016 at 10:20 AM, Alan Grayson 
wrote:

>
>
> On Fri, Sep 9, 2016 at 8:34 AM, Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Sep 9, 2016 at 8:56 AM, Alan Grayson 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Fri, Sep 9, 2016 at 7:46 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>>

 On 08 Sep 2016, at 21:43, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:



 On Thursday, September 8, 2016 at 1:15:15 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 08 Sep 2016, at 18:22, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, September 8, 2016 at 7:53:23 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal
> wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 07 Sep 2016, at 20:06, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, September 7, 2016 at 11:16:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 06 Sep 2016, at 17:42, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 4:38:53 AM UTC-6,
>>> agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

 I understand your pov. It has but one problem. You ignore the
 elephant in the room; namely, those other worlds or universes 
 necessary for
 the outcomes not measured in this world to be realized. But you have an
 out, stated in another post. They form part of your imagination. Not 
 good
 enough from my pov. AG

>>>
>>>
>>> I should also add that the MWI sheds no light, AFAICT, on the
>>> measurement problem; that is, why we get the outcome we get. As far as
>>> collapse contradicting SR via the result of Bell experiments, I am not 
>>> sure
>>> about that conclusion. If FTL occurs, it may be the case that in some
>>> frames Alice's measurement occurs first, in other frames Bob's 
>>> measurement
>>> occurs first. I tend to think this muddies the waters on the issue of 
>>> FLT
>>> transmission and contradictions with relativity. AG
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> The "MWI" explains already a part of the mind-body problem when
>>> formulated in the Digital Mechanist Frame. You don't need to even know 
>>> QM
>>> to understand the high plausibility of the "many-computations".
>>> If FTL occurs, and you keep both QM and SR, then an action in the
>>> future can change the past, and physical causility becomes meaningless.
>>> With mechanism, physical causality is not yet guarantied, to be sure, 
>>> but I
>>> would throw digital mechanism if it could lead to future -> past 
>>> physical
>>> action (it does not make sense).
>>>
>>> Ah, you wrote:
>>>
>>> Possible correction: my remark about relativity might apply to how
>>> events are seen from a frame moving FTL -- that is, a breakdown in
>>> causality -- and might not apply to Alice/Bob situation. AG
>>>
>>>
>>> Well, OK, then. But it would apply if there were a collapse (in one
>>> universe), even if Alice needs to send two bits of information to
>>> transformed the effect (and send or get one qubit).
>>>
>>> The "collapse" does not even refer to anything I can make sense of.
>>> It looks like a continuous invocation of God. As an explanation, it 
>>> looks
>>> like a continuum of blasphemes (in the theology of the universal 
>>> machine).
>>>
>>
>> Here's what collapse means to me; the wf evolves from a solution of
>> SWE, namely a superposition, to a delta function centered at the
>> measurement value. No one knows, or has a model how this transformation
>> occurs.It's in the category of a TBD, possibly unknowable. It seems
>> empirically based since repeated measurements of the same system result 
>> in
>> the same outcomes. I don't necessarily believe in primary matter's
>> existence. But its statistical persistence seems undeniable, whereas the
>> many worlds has yet to manifest any persistence except in the minds of 
>> its
>> advocates. AG
>>
>>
>>
>> The MWI is only the SWE taken literally.
>>
>
> *Maybe that's the problem; taking a calculational tool too seriously.
> AG*
>
>
>> If an observer O observes a cat in the superposition d + a (dead +
>> alive),
>>
>
> *But that never happens. The state of superposition exists, if it
> does, when the box is closed, and ceases when the box is opened. *
>
>
>
> Then the SWE is wrong.
>
> You beg the question by postulating that QM is wrong outside the box,
> but there are no evidence for that, given that Everett showed the
> consistency of QM-without-collapse with the facts, using the simplest 
> known
> antic theory of mind (mechanism)
>
>
 *The fact is the cat is dead OR alive when the box is opened, and
 presumably alive before the box is closed. So all I am doing is refuting

Re: Aaronson/Penrose

[Alan Grayson]

On Fri, Sep 9, 2016 at 8:34 AM, Jason Resch  wrote:

>
>
> On Fri, Sep 9, 2016 at 8:56 AM, Alan Grayson 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Sep 9, 2016 at 7:46 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On 08 Sep 2016, at 21:43, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, September 8, 2016 at 1:15:15 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 08 Sep 2016, at 18:22, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:



 On Thursday, September 8, 2016 at 7:53:23 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 07 Sep 2016, at 20:06, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, September 7, 2016 at 11:16:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal
> wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 06 Sep 2016, at 17:42, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 4:38:53 AM UTC-6,
>> agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>> I understand your pov. It has but one problem. You ignore the
>>> elephant in the room; namely, those other worlds or universes necessary 
>>> for
>>> the outcomes not measured in this world to be realized. But you have an
>>> out, stated in another post. They form part of your imagination. Not 
>>> good
>>> enough from my pov. AG
>>>
>>
>>
>> I should also add that the MWI sheds no light, AFAICT, on the
>> measurement problem; that is, why we get the outcome we get. As far as
>> collapse contradicting SR via the result of Bell experiments, I am not 
>> sure
>> about that conclusion. If FTL occurs, it may be the case that in some
>> frames Alice's measurement occurs first, in other frames Bob's 
>> measurement
>> occurs first. I tend to think this muddies the waters on the issue of FLT
>> transmission and contradictions with relativity. AG
>>
>>
>>
>> The "MWI" explains already a part of the mind-body problem when
>> formulated in the Digital Mechanist Frame. You don't need to even know QM
>> to understand the high plausibility of the "many-computations".
>> If FTL occurs, and you keep both QM and SR, then an action in the
>> future can change the past, and physical causility becomes meaningless.
>> With mechanism, physical causality is not yet guarantied, to be sure, 
>> but I
>> would throw digital mechanism if it could lead to future -> past physical
>> action (it does not make sense).
>>
>> Ah, you wrote:
>>
>> Possible correction: my remark about relativity might apply to how
>> events are seen from a frame moving FTL -- that is, a breakdown in
>> causality -- and might not apply to Alice/Bob situation. AG
>>
>>
>> Well, OK, then. But it would apply if there were a collapse (in one
>> universe), even if Alice needs to send two bits of information to
>> transformed the effect (and send or get one qubit).
>>
>> The "collapse" does not even refer to anything I can make sense of.
>> It looks like a continuous invocation of God. As an explanation, it looks
>> like a continuum of blasphemes (in the theology of the universal 
>> machine).
>>
>
> Here's what collapse means to me; the wf evolves from a solution of
> SWE, namely a superposition, to a delta function centered at the
> measurement value. No one knows, or has a model how this transformation
> occurs.It's in the category of a TBD, possibly unknowable. It seems
> empirically based since repeated measurements of the same system result in
> the same outcomes. I don't necessarily believe in primary matter's
> existence. But its statistical persistence seems undeniable, whereas the
> many worlds has yet to manifest any persistence except in the minds of its
> advocates. AG
>
>
>
> The MWI is only the SWE taken literally.
>

 *Maybe that's the problem; taking a calculational tool too seriously.
 AG*


> If an observer O observes a cat in the superposition d + a (dead +
> alive),
>

 *But that never happens. The state of superposition exists, if it does,
 when the box is closed, and ceases when the box is opened. *



 Then the SWE is wrong.

 You beg the question by postulating that QM is wrong outside the box,
 but there are no evidence for that, given that Everett showed the
 consistency of QM-without-collapse with the facts, using the simplest known
 antic theory of mind (mechanism)


>>> *The fact is the cat is dead OR alive when the box is opened, and
>>> presumably alive before the box is closed. So all I am doing is refuting
>>> your claim that any observer observes a superposition of states. AG  *
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> In QM+collapse, which assumes that QM is wrong somewhere (but where? No
>>> unanimity of collapse-defenders agree on this).
>>>
>>> Without collapse, the cat is in the superposition 

Re: Aaronson/Penrose

[Jason Resch]

On Fri, Sep 9, 2016 at 8:56 AM, Alan Grayson  wrote:

>
>
> On Fri, Sep 9, 2016 at 7:46 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>> On 08 Sep 2016, at 21:43, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, September 8, 2016 at 1:15:15 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 08 Sep 2016, at 18:22, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, September 8, 2016 at 7:53:23 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 07 Sep 2016, at 20:06, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:



 On Wednesday, September 7, 2016 at 11:16:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal
 wrote:
>
>
> On 06 Sep 2016, at 17:42, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 4:38:53 AM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com
> wrote:
>>
>> I understand your pov. It has but one problem. You ignore the
>> elephant in the room; namely, those other worlds or universes necessary 
>> for
>> the outcomes not measured in this world to be realized. But you have an
>> out, stated in another post. They form part of your imagination. Not good
>> enough from my pov. AG
>>
>
>
> I should also add that the MWI sheds no light, AFAICT, on the
> measurement problem; that is, why we get the outcome we get. As far as
> collapse contradicting SR via the result of Bell experiments, I am not 
> sure
> about that conclusion. If FTL occurs, it may be the case that in some
> frames Alice's measurement occurs first, in other frames Bob's measurement
> occurs first. I tend to think this muddies the waters on the issue of FLT
> transmission and contradictions with relativity. AG
>
>
>
> The "MWI" explains already a part of the mind-body problem when
> formulated in the Digital Mechanist Frame. You don't need to even know QM
> to understand the high plausibility of the "many-computations".
> If FTL occurs, and you keep both QM and SR, then an action in the
> future can change the past, and physical causility becomes meaningless.
> With mechanism, physical causality is not yet guarantied, to be sure, but 
> I
> would throw digital mechanism if it could lead to future -> past physical
> action (it does not make sense).
>
> Ah, you wrote:
>
> Possible correction: my remark about relativity might apply to how
> events are seen from a frame moving FTL -- that is, a breakdown in
> causality -- and might not apply to Alice/Bob situation. AG
>
>
> Well, OK, then. But it would apply if there were a collapse (in one
> universe), even if Alice needs to send two bits of information to
> transformed the effect (and send or get one qubit).
>
> The "collapse" does not even refer to anything I can make sense of. It
> looks like a continuous invocation of God. As an explanation, it looks 
> like
> a continuum of blasphemes (in the theology of the universal machine).
>

 Here's what collapse means to me; the wf evolves from a solution of
 SWE, namely a superposition, to a delta function centered at the
 measurement value. No one knows, or has a model how this transformation
 occurs.It's in the category of a TBD, possibly unknowable. It seems
 empirically based since repeated measurements of the same system result in
 the same outcomes. I don't necessarily believe in primary matter's
 existence. But its statistical persistence seems undeniable, whereas the
 many worlds has yet to manifest any persistence except in the minds of its
 advocates. AG



 The MWI is only the SWE taken literally.

>>>
>>> *Maybe that's the problem; taking a calculational tool too seriously. AG*
>>>
>>>
 If an observer O observes a cat in the superposition d + a (dead +
 alive),

>>>
>>> *But that never happens. The state of superposition exists, if it does,
>>> when the box is closed, and ceases when the box is opened. *
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Then the SWE is wrong.
>>>
>>> You beg the question by postulating that QM is wrong outside the box,
>>> but there are no evidence for that, given that Everett showed the
>>> consistency of QM-without-collapse with the facts, using the simplest known
>>> antic theory of mind (mechanism)
>>>
>>>
>> *The fact is the cat is dead OR alive when the box is opened, and
>> presumably alive before the box is closed. So all I am doing is refuting
>> your claim that any observer observes a superposition of states. AG  *
>>
>>
>>
>> In QM+collapse, which assumes that QM is wrong somewhere (but where? No
>> unanimity of collapse-defenders agree on this).
>>
>> Without collapse, the cat is in the superposition state (dead+alive), and
>> when an observer look at the cat, he entangles itself with the cat state,
>> and the final state is O-a alive + O-d dead (linearity of tensor product).
>> Then by linearity of the SWE, O-a lives a 

Re: Aaronson/Penrose

[agrayson2000]

On Friday, September 9, 2016 at 7:46:58 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 08 Sep 2016, at 21:43, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, September 8, 2016 at 1:15:15 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 08 Sep 2016, at 18:22, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, September 8, 2016 at 7:53:23 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 07 Sep 2016, at 20:06, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, September 7, 2016 at 11:16:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal 
>>> wrote:


 On 06 Sep 2016, at 17:42, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:



 On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 4:38:53 AM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
 wrote:
>
> I understand your pov. It has but one problem. You ignore the elephant 
> in the room; namely, those other worlds or universes necessary for the 
> outcomes not measured in this world to be realized. But you have an out, 
> stated in another post. They form part of your imagination. Not good 
> enough 
> from my pov. AG
>


 I should also add that the MWI sheds no light, AFAICT, on the 
 measurement problem; that is, why we get the outcome we get. As far as 
 collapse contradicting SR via the result of Bell experiments, I am not 
 sure 
 about that conclusion. If FTL occurs, it may be the case that in some 
 frames Alice's measurement occurs first, in other frames Bob's measurement 
 occurs first. I tend to think this muddies the waters on the issue of FLT 
 transmission and contradictions with relativity. AG



 The "MWI" explains already a part of the mind-body problem when 
 formulated in the Digital Mechanist Frame. You don't need to even know QM 
 to understand the high plausibility of the "many-computations".
 If FTL occurs, and you keep both QM and SR, then an action in the 
 future can change the past, and physical causility becomes meaningless. 
 With mechanism, physical causality is not yet guarantied, to be sure, but 
 I 
 would throw digital mechanism if it could lead to future -> past physical 
 action (it does not make sense).

 Ah, you wrote:

 Possible correction: my remark about relativity might apply to how 
 events are seen from a frame moving FTL -- that is, a breakdown in 
 causality -- and might not apply to Alice/Bob situation. AG


 Well, OK, then. But it would apply if there were a collapse (in one 
 universe), even if Alice needs to send two bits of information to 
 transformed the effect (and send or get one qubit). 

 The "collapse" does not even refer to anything I can make sense of. It 
 looks like a continuous invocation of God. As an explanation, it looks 
 like 
 a continuum of blasphemes (in the theology of the universal machine).

>>>
>>> Here's what collapse means to me; the wf evolves from a solution of SWE, 
>>> namely a superposition, to a delta function centered at the measurement 
>>> value. No one knows, or has a model how this transformation occurs.It's in 
>>> the category of a TBD, possibly unknowable. It seems empirically based 
>>> since repeated measurements of the same system result in the same outcomes. 
>>> I don't necessarily believe in primary matter's existence. But its 
>>> statistical persistence seems undeniable, whereas the many worlds has yet 
>>> to manifest any persistence except in the minds of its advocates. AG
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> The MWI is only the SWE taken literally. 
>>>
>>
>> *Maybe that's the problem; taking a calculational tool too seriously. AG*
>>  
>>
>>> If an observer O observes a cat in the superposition d + a (dead + 
>>> alive), 
>>>
>>
>> *But that never happens. The state of superposition exists, if it does, 
>> when the box is closed, and ceases when the box is opened. *
>>
>>
>>
>> Then the SWE is wrong. 
>>
>> You beg the question by postulating that QM is wrong outside the box, but 
>> there are no evidence for that, given that Everett showed the consistency 
>> of QM-without-collapse with the facts, using the simplest known antic 
>> theory of mind (mechanism)
>>
>>
> *The fact is the cat is dead OR alive when the box is opened, and 
> presumably alive before the box is closed. So all I am doing is refuting 
> your claim that any observer observes a superposition of states. AG  *
>
>
>
> In QM+collapse, which assumes that QM is wrong somewhere (but where? No 
> unanimity of collapse-defenders agree on this).
>
> Without collapse, the cat is in the superposition state (dead+alive), and 
> when an observer look at the cat, he entangles itself with the cat state, 
> and the final state is O-a alive + O-d dead (linearity of tensor product). 
> Then by linearity of the SWE, O-a lives a *phenomenological collapse" like 
> if the cat was reduced to "alive", and O-b lives a phenomenological like if 
> the cat was reduced to "dead", but in the 3p picture, no 

Re: Aaronson/Penrose

[agrayson2000]

On Friday, September 9, 2016 at 7:56:27 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
>
>
> On Fri, Sep 9, 2016 at 7:46 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>> On 08 Sep 2016, at 21:43, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, September 8, 2016 at 1:15:15 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 08 Sep 2016, at 18:22, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, September 8, 2016 at 7:53:23 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 07 Sep 2016, at 20:06, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:



 On Wednesday, September 7, 2016 at 11:16:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal 
 wrote:
>
>
> On 06 Sep 2016, at 17:42, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 4:38:53 AM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
> wrote:
>>
>> I understand your pov. It has but one problem. You ignore the 
>> elephant in the room; namely, those other worlds or universes necessary 
>> for 
>> the outcomes not measured in this world to be realized. But you have an 
>> out, stated in another post. They form part of your imagination. Not 
>> good 
>> enough from my pov. AG
>>
>
>
> I should also add that the MWI sheds no light, AFAICT, on the 
> measurement problem; that is, why we get the outcome we get. As far as 
> collapse contradicting SR via the result of Bell experiments, I am not 
> sure 
> about that conclusion. If FTL occurs, it may be the case that in some 
> frames Alice's measurement occurs first, in other frames Bob's 
> measurement 
> occurs first. I tend to think this muddies the waters on the issue of FLT 
> transmission and contradictions with relativity. AG
>
>
>
> The "MWI" explains already a part of the mind-body problem when 
> formulated in the Digital Mechanist Frame. You don't need to even know QM 
> to understand the high plausibility of the "many-computations".
> If FTL occurs, and you keep both QM and SR, then an action in the 
> future can change the past, and physical causility becomes meaningless. 
> With mechanism, physical causality is not yet guarantied, to be sure, but 
> I 
> would throw digital mechanism if it could lead to future -> past physical 
> action (it does not make sense).
>
> Ah, you wrote:
>
> Possible correction: my remark about relativity might apply to how 
> events are seen from a frame moving FTL -- that is, a breakdown in 
> causality -- and might not apply to Alice/Bob situation. AG
>
>
> Well, OK, then. But it would apply if there were a collapse (in one 
> universe), even if Alice needs to send two bits of information to 
> transformed the effect (and send or get one qubit). 
>
> The "collapse" does not even refer to anything I can make sense of. It 
> looks like a continuous invocation of God. As an explanation, it looks 
> like 
> a continuum of blasphemes (in the theology of the universal machine).
>

 Here's what collapse means to me; the wf evolves from a solution of 
 SWE, namely a superposition, to a delta function centered at the 
 measurement value. No one knows, or has a model how this transformation 
 occurs.It's in the category of a TBD, possibly unknowable. It seems 
 empirically based since repeated measurements of the same system result in 
 the same outcomes. I don't necessarily believe in primary matter's 
 existence. But its statistical persistence seems undeniable, whereas the 
 many worlds has yet to manifest any persistence except in the minds of its 
 advocates. AG



 The MWI is only the SWE taken literally. 

>>>
>>> *Maybe that's the problem; taking a calculational tool too seriously. AG*
>>>  
>>>
 If an observer O observes a cat in the superposition d + a (dead + 
 alive), 

>>>
>>> *But that never happens. The state of superposition exists, if it does, 
>>> when the box is closed, and ceases when the box is opened. *
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Then the SWE is wrong. 
>>>
>>> You beg the question by postulating that QM is wrong outside the box, 
>>> but there are no evidence for that, given that Everett showed the 
>>> consistency of QM-without-collapse with the facts, using the simplest known 
>>> antic theory of mind (mechanism)
>>>
>>>
>> *The fact is the cat is dead OR alive when the box is opened, and 
>> presumably alive before the box is closed. So all I am doing is refuting 
>> your claim that any observer observes a superposition of states. AG  *
>>
>>
>>
>> In QM+collapse, which assumes that QM is wrong somewhere (but where? No 
>> unanimity of collapse-defenders agree on this).
>>
>> Without collapse, the cat is in the superposition state (dead+alive), and 
>> when an observer look at the cat, he entangles itself with the cat state, 
>> and the final state is O-a alive + O-d dead (linearity of tensor 

Re: Aaronson/Penrose

[Alan Grayson]

On Fri, Sep 9, 2016 at 7:46 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 08 Sep 2016, at 21:43, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, September 8, 2016 at 1:15:15 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 08 Sep 2016, at 18:22, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, September 8, 2016 at 7:53:23 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 07 Sep 2016, at 20:06, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, September 7, 2016 at 11:16:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal
>>> wrote:


 On 06 Sep 2016, at 17:42, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:



 On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 4:38:53 AM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com
 wrote:
>
> I understand your pov. It has but one problem. You ignore the elephant
> in the room; namely, those other worlds or universes necessary for the
> outcomes not measured in this world to be realized. But you have an out,
> stated in another post. They form part of your imagination. Not good 
> enough
> from my pov. AG
>


 I should also add that the MWI sheds no light, AFAICT, on the
 measurement problem; that is, why we get the outcome we get. As far as
 collapse contradicting SR via the result of Bell experiments, I am not sure
 about that conclusion. If FTL occurs, it may be the case that in some
 frames Alice's measurement occurs first, in other frames Bob's measurement
 occurs first. I tend to think this muddies the waters on the issue of FLT
 transmission and contradictions with relativity. AG



 The "MWI" explains already a part of the mind-body problem when
 formulated in the Digital Mechanist Frame. You don't need to even know QM
 to understand the high plausibility of the "many-computations".
 If FTL occurs, and you keep both QM and SR, then an action in the
 future can change the past, and physical causility becomes meaningless.
 With mechanism, physical causality is not yet guarantied, to be sure, but I
 would throw digital mechanism if it could lead to future -> past physical
 action (it does not make sense).

 Ah, you wrote:

 Possible correction: my remark about relativity might apply to how
 events are seen from a frame moving FTL -- that is, a breakdown in
 causality -- and might not apply to Alice/Bob situation. AG


 Well, OK, then. But it would apply if there were a collapse (in one
 universe), even if Alice needs to send two bits of information to
 transformed the effect (and send or get one qubit).

 The "collapse" does not even refer to anything I can make sense of. It
 looks like a continuous invocation of God. As an explanation, it looks like
 a continuum of blasphemes (in the theology of the universal machine).

>>>
>>> Here's what collapse means to me; the wf evolves from a solution of SWE,
>>> namely a superposition, to a delta function centered at the measurement
>>> value. No one knows, or has a model how this transformation occurs.It's in
>>> the category of a TBD, possibly unknowable. It seems empirically based
>>> since repeated measurements of the same system result in the same outcomes.
>>> I don't necessarily believe in primary matter's existence. But its
>>> statistical persistence seems undeniable, whereas the many worlds has yet
>>> to manifest any persistence except in the minds of its advocates. AG
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> The MWI is only the SWE taken literally.
>>>
>>
>> *Maybe that's the problem; taking a calculational tool too seriously. AG*
>>
>>
>>> If an observer O observes a cat in the superposition d + a (dead +
>>> alive),
>>>
>>
>> *But that never happens. The state of superposition exists, if it does,
>> when the box is closed, and ceases when the box is opened. *
>>
>>
>>
>> Then the SWE is wrong.
>>
>> You beg the question by postulating that QM is wrong outside the box, but
>> there are no evidence for that, given that Everett showed the consistency
>> of QM-without-collapse with the facts, using the simplest known antic
>> theory of mind (mechanism)
>>
>>
> *The fact is the cat is dead OR alive when the box is opened, and
> presumably alive before the box is closed. So all I am doing is refuting
> your claim that any observer observes a superposition of states. AG  *
>
>
>
> In QM+collapse, which assumes that QM is wrong somewhere (but where? No
> unanimity of collapse-defenders agree on this).
>
> Without collapse, the cat is in the superposition state (dead+alive), and
> when an observer look at the cat, he entangles itself with the cat state,
> and the final state is O-a alive + O-d dead (linearity of tensor product).
> Then by linearity of the SWE, O-a lives a *phenomenological collapse" like
> if the cat was reduced to "alive", and O-b lives a phenomenological like if
> the cat was reduced to "dead", but in the 3p picture, no reduction ever
> occurred.
>
>
> Bruno
>

Sorry, but what you write makes 

Re: Aaronson/Penrose

[Bruno Marchal]

On 08 Sep 2016, at 21:43, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:




On Thursday, September 8, 2016 at 1:15:15 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 08 Sep 2016, at 18:22, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:




On Thursday, September 8, 2016 at 7:53:23 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 07 Sep 2016, at 20:06, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:




On Wednesday, September 7, 2016 at 11:16:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno  
Marchal wrote:


On 06 Sep 2016, at 17:42, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:




On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 4:38:53 AM UTC-6,  
agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
I understand your pov. It has but one problem. You ignore the  
elephant in the room; namely, those other worlds or universes  
necessary for the outcomes not measured in this world to be  
realized. But you have an out, stated in another post. They form  
part of your imagination. Not good enough from my pov. AG



I should also add that the MWI sheds no light, AFAICT, on the  
measurement problem; that is, why we get the outcome we get. As  
far as collapse contradicting SR via the result of Bell  
experiments, I am not sure about that conclusion. If FTL occurs,  
it may be the case that in some frames Alice's measurement occurs  
first, in other frames Bob's measurement occurs first. I tend to  
think this muddies the waters on the issue of FLT transmission  
and contradictions with relativity. AG



The "MWI" explains already a part of the mind-body problem when  
formulated in the Digital Mechanist Frame. You don't need to even  
know QM to understand the high plausibility of the "many- 
computations".
If FTL occurs, and you keep both QM and SR, then an action in the  
future can change the past, and physical causility becomes  
meaningless. With mechanism, physical causality is not yet  
guarantied, to be sure, but I would throw digital mechanism if it  
could lead to future -> past physical action (it does not make  
sense).


Ah, you wrote:

Possible correction: my remark about relativity might apply to  
how events are seen from a frame moving FTL -- that is, a  
breakdown in causality -- and might not apply to Alice/Bob  
situation. AG


Well, OK, then. But it would apply if there were a collapse (in  
one universe), even if Alice needs to send two bits of information  
to transformed the effect (and send or get one qubit).


The "collapse" does not even refer to anything I can make sense  
of. It looks like a continuous invocation of God. As an  
explanation, it looks like a continuum of blasphemes (in the  
theology of the universal machine).


Here's what collapse means to me; the wf evolves from a solution  
of SWE, namely a superposition, to a delta function centered at  
the measurement value. No one knows, or has a model how this  
transformation occurs.It's in the category of a TBD, possibly  
unknowable. It seems empirically based since repeated measurements  
of the same system result in the same outcomes. I don't  
necessarily believe in primary matter's existence. But its  
statistical persistence seems undeniable, whereas the many worlds  
has yet to manifest any persistence except in the minds of its  
advocates. AG



The MWI is only the SWE taken literally.

Maybe that's the problem; taking a calculational tool too  
seriously. AG


If an observer O observes a cat in the superposition d + a (dead +  
alive),


But that never happens. The state of superposition exists, if it  
does, when the box is closed, and ceases when the box is opened.



Then the SWE is wrong.

You beg the question by postulating that QM is wrong outside the  
box, but there are no evidence for that, given that Everett showed  
the consistency of QM-without-collapse with the facts, using the  
simplest known antic theory of mind (mechanism)



The fact is the cat is dead OR alive when the box is opened, and  
presumably alive before the box is closed. So all I am doing is  
refuting your claim that any observer observes a superposition of  
states. AG



In QM+collapse, which assumes that QM is wrong somewhere (but where?  
No unanimity of collapse-defenders agree on this).


Without collapse, the cat is in the superposition state (dead+alive),  
and when an observer look at the cat, he entangles itself with the cat  
state, and the final state is O-a alive + O-d dead (linearity of  
tensor product). Then by linearity of the SWE, O-a lives a  
*phenomenological collapse" like if the cat was reduced to "alive",  
and O-b lives a phenomenological like if the cat was reduced to  
"dead", but in the 3p picture, no reduction ever occurred.



Bruno





Maybe you have a fundamental misunderstanding of Schrodinger's Cat.  
AG



It is the measurement problem, and you talk like if the collapse  
solves it, but then tell me precisely the range of QM.
I read de Broglie who suggested that entanglement would no more  
operate at the distance of an atom diameter. People give criteria  
for the collapse, but the experience refutes them. I share Feynman's  
idea that the collapse is a