On Fri, Sep 9, 2016 at 7:46 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> > On 08 Sep 2016, at 21:43, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote: > > > > On Thursday, September 8, 2016 at 1:15:15 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 08 Sep 2016, at 18:22, agrays...@gmail.com wrote: >> >> >> >> On Thursday, September 8, 2016 at 7:53:23 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 07 Sep 2016, at 20:06, agrays...@gmail.com wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Wednesday, September 7, 2016 at 11:16:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal >>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 06 Sep 2016, at 17:42, agrays...@gmail.com wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 4:38:53 AM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com >>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> I understand your pov. It has but one problem. You ignore the elephant >>>>> in the room; namely, those other worlds or universes necessary for the >>>>> outcomes not measured in this world to be realized. But you have an out, >>>>> stated in another post. They form part of your imagination. Not good >>>>> enough >>>>> from my pov. AG >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I should also add that the MWI sheds no light, AFAICT, on the >>>> measurement problem; that is, why we get the outcome we get. As far as >>>> collapse contradicting SR via the result of Bell experiments, I am not sure >>>> about that conclusion. If FTL occurs, it may be the case that in some >>>> frames Alice's measurement occurs first, in other frames Bob's measurement >>>> occurs first. I tend to think this muddies the waters on the issue of FLT >>>> transmission and contradictions with relativity. AG >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> The "MWI" explains already a part of the mind-body problem when >>>> formulated in the Digital Mechanist Frame. You don't need to even know QM >>>> to understand the high plausibility of the "many-computations". >>>> If FTL occurs, and you keep both QM and SR, then an action in the >>>> future can change the past, and physical causility becomes meaningless. >>>> With mechanism, physical causality is not yet guarantied, to be sure, but I >>>> would throw digital mechanism if it could lead to future -> past physical >>>> action (it does not make sense). >>>> >>>> Ah, you wrote: >>>> >>>> Possible correction: my remark about relativity might apply to how >>>> events are seen from a frame moving FTL -- that is, a breakdown in >>>> causality -- and might not apply to Alice/Bob situation. AG >>>> >>>> >>>> Well, OK, then. But it would apply if there were a collapse (in one >>>> universe), even if Alice needs to send two bits of information to >>>> transformed the effect (and send or get one qubit). >>>> >>>> The "collapse" does not even refer to anything I can make sense of. It >>>> looks like a continuous invocation of God. As an explanation, it looks like >>>> a continuum of blasphemes (in the theology of the universal machine). >>>> >>> >>> Here's what collapse means to me; the wf evolves from a solution of SWE, >>> namely a superposition, to a delta function centered at the measurement >>> value. No one knows, or has a model how this transformation occurs.It's in >>> the category of a TBD, possibly unknowable. It seems empirically based >>> since repeated measurements of the same system result in the same outcomes. >>> I don't necessarily believe in primary matter's existence. But its >>> statistical persistence seems undeniable, whereas the many worlds has yet >>> to manifest any persistence except in the minds of its advocates. AG >>> >>> >>> >>> The MWI is only the SWE taken literally. >>> >> >> *Maybe that's the problem; taking a calculational tool too seriously. AG* >> >> >>> If an observer O observes a cat in the superposition d + a (dead + >>> alive), >>> >> >> *But that never happens. The state of superposition exists, if it does, >> when the box is closed, and ceases when the box is opened. * >> >> >> >> Then the SWE is wrong. >> >> You beg the question by postulating that QM is wrong outside the box, but >> there are no evidence for that, given that Everett showed the consistency >> of QM-without-collapse with the facts, using the simplest known antic >> theory of mind (mechanism) >> >> > *The fact is the cat is dead OR alive when the box is opened, and > presumably alive before the box is closed. So all I am doing is refuting > your claim that any observer observes a superposition of states. AG * > > > > In QM+collapse, which assumes that QM is wrong somewhere (but where? No > unanimity of collapse-defenders agree on this). > > Without collapse, the cat is in the superposition state (dead+alive), and > when an observer look at the cat, he entangles itself with the cat state, > and the final state is O-a alive + O-d dead (linearity of tensor product). > Then by linearity of the SWE, O-a lives a *phenomenological collapse" like > if the cat was reduced to "alive", and O-b lives a phenomenological like if > the cat was reduced to "dead", but in the 3p picture, no reduction ever > occurred. > > > Bruno > Sorry, but what you write makes no sense. When you look at the cat, presumably after box is opened, the cat is either alive or dead. You may be entangled with it, but at that point in time there is no superposition of alive and dead. AG > > > >> >> *Maybe you have a fundamental misunderstanding of Schrodinger's Cat. AG* >> >> >> >> It is the measurement problem, and you talk like if the collapse solves >> it, but then tell me precisely the range of QM. >> I read de Broglie who suggested that entanglement would no more operate >> at the distance of an atom diameter. People give criteria for the collapse, >> but the experience refutes them. I share Feynman's idea that the collapse >> is a collective hallucination, and the math shows that if comp is true then >> that hallucination is somehow necessary. >> >> With computationalism we have to generalize Everett's embedding of the >> physicist in the physical reality to the embedding of the mathematician in >> arithmetic (which is actually what Gödel begun). >> >> Mechanism explains both the origin of consciousness and the origin of the >> appearance of matter, and this in a way enough precise so that we can test >> it, and thanks to QM, mechanism is not (yet) refuted, and is, I think, the >> only theory explaining consciousness, including why it cannot be completely >> explained in any first person convincing way (the so called hard problem, >> which is only the antic mind-body problem after mechanism solved the "easy >> part" (AI)). >> >> I do not defend any theory. You should not been able to guess what I >> might believe true or not. Computationalism has an advantage in philosophy, >> which is that it can rely on theoretical computer science which is a branch >> of both mathematical logic and number theory. It is a good lantern to >> search the key around, not more. >> >> My main point is that we can study the highly non trivial relation >> between machines' belief and diverse notion of truth they can discover and >> guess. They got a theology closer to Plotinus (300 after C., neoplatonism) >> and Moderatus of Gades (neopythagoreanism, 2 centuries before Plotinus) >> than the materialist Aristotelians. >> >> I say this being aware that some scientists still take the Aristotelian >> metaphysics for granted, but of course science is just beginning to be able >> to formulate the problem (which of Plato or Aristotle is closer to >> reality). The discovery of the universal machine/number is still a very >> recent event and few get really the Church-Turing idea and their relation >> with Gödel's completeness and incompleteness fundamental results. >> >> I can suggest you some good books if you are interested. But if you >> dislike Everett, it might take some work before liking the consequences of >> the digital mechanist hypothesis. The bible is Martin Davis >> "Undecidability", and its own introduction to computability and logic (both >> published by Dover) is excellent if you are enough mathematically minded. >> >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> we know that, before interaction, the physical state is well described >>> by the expression O(a + d), with the tensor product noted multiplicatively, >>> and that it is equivalent with Oa + Od. So even at this stage the "O" can >>> be considered being in a superposition state. That is what I called the >>> linearity of the tensor product. Now, by the linearity of the wave >>> evolution we get O-a a + O-b b, that is each branch behaves classically >>> (P-i = O with i in its memory. And both 0-a and O-b can repeat their >>> measurement, and the linearity of the wave evolution implies that they will >>> always find the same measurement result. So the MWI explains the >>> persistence as much well as classical physics, or QM+collapse (if that >>> means something precise). >>> >>> My point is that at this stage, QM (without collapse) is compatible with >>> Mechanism (used implicitly above) only insofar as the persistence is >>> explained from a statistics on *all* computations (which exist once you >>> agree that 2+2=4 independently of you and me). >>> >>> My technical point is that this work in the sense that we can derive >>> quantum logic (and normally physics) from the logical structure that the >>> computations inherit from the logic of (machine) self-reference. >>> >>> That is elegant because at this stage the "theory of everything" needs >>> no less and no more than very elementary axioms (and mechanism in the >>> meta-background). >>> >>> The only axiom that I use are the following: >>> >>> 0 ≠ (x + 1) >>> ((x + 1) = (y + 1)) -> x = y >>> x = 0 v Ey(x = y + 1) >>> x + 0 = x >>> x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1 >>> x * 0 = 0 >>> x * (y + 1) = (x * y) + x >>> >>> Actually I could even just use the two combinators axioms: >>> >>> Kxy = x >>> Sxyz = xz(yz) >>> >>> Such axioms are Turing complete, and you can prove the existence of the >>> UD from them (and *in* them if you add some induction axioms, but I prefer >>> to put them in the epistemology of the observers). >>> >>> The Turing-Church thesis rehabilit the neopythagorean theology, and we >>> get physics exactly when we use the antic definition of knowledge and >>> matter provided by them (notably by Moderatus of Gades). >>> >>> On the contrary, if primary matter or if physicalism would be true, we >>> remain with the task of explaining what is their role for consciousness (or >>> just first person experience). >>> >>> Aristotle idea of naturalism or (weak) materialism (the existence of a >>> physical primary reality) has only been a tool for letting the mind-body >>> problem sleep a bit, and that has been a very fertile simplifying >>> hypothesis, but now, with mechanism, and plausibly with only quantum >>> mechanics, we get the (predicted by the Platonist) problem of justifying >>> the relation between first person discourse and third person discourse. We >>> can't use the simple mind-brain identity theory, because we have an >>> infinity of quasi identical brains in arithmetic, and we can't use a >>> selection principle based on a substance without damaging the mechanist >>> hypothesis. >>> >>> Keep in mind that my origianl goal is to solve the mind-body problem, >>> and with mechanism, we have no choice other than justifying the appearance >>> of physicalness from a statistic based on the mix of "*all* computations + >>> machine self-reference when distributed in those computations. It works >>> (till now). Non-mechanism does not work, and it is well known that the >>> mind-body problem has been put under the rug since Aristotle (except by the >>> Platonists, who were just banned from our civilisation 1500 years ago). >>> >>> In Soccer terms: Plato 1, Aristotle 0. I don't pretend it is the last >>> match. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 2:23:39 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 05 Sep 2016, at 19:31, agrays...@gmail.com wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Monday, September 5, 2016 at 8:08:12 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 04 Sep 2016, at 20:27, agrays...@gmail.com wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Bruno, thank you for a detailed response. Most of it is above my pay >>>>>>> grade, but I will check some of your links and see what I can make of >>>>>>> them. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> OK. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> As for the MWI, I have a simple approach. If I went to LV and played >>>>>>> a slot machine for a single trial or outcome, and someone asked me what >>>>>>> happened to the other thousands of outcomes I didn't get, I'd think that >>>>>>> would be a crazy question. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I mainly agree, because there is no unanimity on which >>>>>>> counterfactual or conditional non standard logic to use. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> *Isn't it really much simpler? Just because something *could* exist, >>>>>> like those thousands of other outcomes of the slot machine, doesn't mean >>>>>> they *must* exist. The MWI insists all outcomes MUST exist. I see no >>>>>> necessity for that. AG * >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> You need it to get the interference between the terms of the wave. I >>>>>> agree with Deutsch: QM is the science of multiple interfering histories. >>>>>> The collapse is an addition to avoid that multiplication/differentiation >>>>>> consequence. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> But that's the question some physicists ask when they are confronted >>>>>>> with the non-linearity of collapse in the Copenhagen Interpretation. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I tend to disagree here. The quantum situation is different because >>>>>>> with quantum mechanics, different outcomes can interfere and thus have >>>>>>> some >>>>>>> physical underpinning which is hard to avoid, especially without >>>>>>> assuming >>>>>>> the collapse of the wave. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> *How can you disagree? Many prominent physicists -- Greene, Deutsch, >>>>>> Carroll -- when confronted with the non-linearity of collapse, believe >>>>>> the >>>>>> MWI avoids or solves this problem. AG* >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> ? >>>>>> I agree with them. MWI entails no-collapse, and the evolution is >>>>>> purely linear. Just a "rotation" in the Hilbert space. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> Accepting non linearity >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> There are work by Steinberg and Plaga which shows that if the QM >>>>>>> wave is slightly non linear, then we get the WW with a revenge: >>>>>>> interactions becomes possible in between terms of the wave. This makes >>>>>>> wrong special relativity, but also thermodynamics, etc. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> *The wf before measurement is linear insofar as it satisfies a linear >>>>>> DE, and relativity is well tested. So I don't see any issue here. AG * >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> OK, but then there is no collapse. We agree, then, only the collapse >>>>>> leads to non-linearity. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> So I guess you mean that there is a (non linear) collapse, and that, >>>>>>> strictly speaking the SWR is false. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> SWR = ? >>>>>> >>>>>> *Why does a non-linear collapse falsify SR? AG* >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> By Bell's violation, if there is a collapse, it affects elements >>>>>> which are space-separated. Einstein explained this already at the Solvay >>>>>> congress. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> You introduce a duality between observer and observed, or between >>>>>>> macro and micro-physics. And, you assume non-mechanism in cognitive >>>>>>> science. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> H*ow can we test our models without the duality of observer and >>>>>> observed? You demand the impossible. * >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Read the book by Hans Primas on the foundation of chemistery. It >>>>>> explains well why Everett restores monism in the philosophy of mind (but >>>>>> he >>>>>> missed this happens directly with Mechanism). >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> *What "non mechanism" have I assumed? QM just gives us probabilities. >>>>>> It's not a causal theory. AG* >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> With the collapse. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> That is lot of things for which we don't have evidence. >>>>>>> Cosmologists applies QM on very big object, like black holes, if not the >>>>>>> entire universe, and people trying to justify a physical collapse get a >>>>>>> lot >>>>>>> of problem, like non-locality, to cite the one Einstein disliked the >>>>>>> most, >>>>>>> and I share a bit that opinion. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> and actual time irreversibility (not FAPP) is an easier concept to >>>>>>> accept than the real or fictional other worlds necessary to support the >>>>>>> MWI. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Well, with mechanism, in all case (with or without QM) we get the >>>>>>> many histories/dreams/computations, and they exist like natural >>>>>>> numbers. We >>>>>>> don't have to take the "worlds" as primitive ontological reality. I >>>>>>> tend to >>>>>>> not really believe in *any* world. Those belongs to the imagination of >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> relative universal numbers, whose proof of existence can already be >>>>>>> done in >>>>>>> elementary arithmetic. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> *Physics is about constructing and testing models of physical >>>>>> reality, not about dreams. * >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Assuming there is a physical reality per se, but with Mechanism, the >>>>>> physical reality is "only" a persistent statisticl illusion emerging from >>>>>> all computational histories. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> *You can call the MWI a dream, but for me it's a nightmare. LOL. AG * >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> BTW, the time irreversibility is not FAPP since the collapsed wf, >>>>>>> when inserted back into the SWE, recovers only itself exactly at an >>>>>>> earlier >>>>>>> time, but not the original wf which collapsed. AG >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Yes, OK. If there is such a collapse, but I don't see evidence. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> *If you measure a system repeatedly, you get the same measurement. >>>>>> That's the evidence for collapse; * >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Not at all. That is what Everett explains in all details. You don't >>>>>> need the collapse to explain, using only the SWE that in each branch the >>>>>> observer feel like there has been a collapse, using only a notion similar >>>>>> to the First Person Indeterminacy that we have anyway in arithmetic. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> *that the system remains in the same eigenstate after measurement, >>>>>> not in the original superposition. AG* >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Yes, with a collapse which is not explained, nor even well defined, >>>>>> and which contradicts the SWE. >>>>>> Computationalism and QM without collapse leads to immaterial monism, >>>>>> which is nice as we don't have any evidence for primary matter. >>>>>> >>>>>> Bruno >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> I think it is human coquetry (grin). Nature loves to do things in >>>>>>> many exemplars, and elementary arithmetic loves that to. Personal >>>>>>> uniqueness is an illusion (provably so in the mechanist theory of mind). >>>>>>> The evidences are more on the side of reversibility, and unitary >>>>>>> evolution. >>>>>>> But of course that might be false, and is still an open problem in the >>>>>>> computationalist theory. But there too, we already got some evidence for >>>>>>> linearity and a core symmetrical physical structure. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Bruno >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Sunday, September 4, 2016 at 8:16:48 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 03 Sep 2016, at 21:02, agrays...@gmail.com wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Friday, September 2, 2016 at 11:52:55 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 11:27 AM, <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Friday, September 2, 2016 at 11:07:09 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On 31 Aug 2016, at 20:30, agrays...@gmail.com wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Wednesday, August 31, 2016 at 11:17:22 AM UTC-6, Bruno >>>>>>>>>>> Marchal wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On 30 Aug 2016, at 18:23, Alan Grayson wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Friday, June 10, 2016 at 6:10:41 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On 11/06/2016 3:56 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> > On 10 Jun 2016, at 03:02, Bruce Kellett wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> On 10/06/2016 1:41 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> On 09 Jun 2016, at 01:28, Bruce Kellett wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> In other words, FPI is just the statement that Alice and >>>>>>>>>>>>> Bob have >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> to look to find out which of the (+,+'), (+,-'), (-,+'), >>>>>>>>>>>>> or (-,-') >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> worlds they are in. I don't think that actually adds >>>>>>>>>>>>> anything >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> significant to the discussion. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> That eliminates the physical spooky action at a distance >>>>>>>>>>>>> which are >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> necessarily there in QM+collapse. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> You have yet to prove that -- assertion is not proof. >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > By defining world by "closed for interaction", locality >>>>>>>>>>>>> follows from >>>>>>>>>>>>> > linearity. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Bruno, you specialize in these oracular pronouncements that >>>>>>>>>>>>> mean >>>>>>>>>>>>> absolutely nothing. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> This is just insulting, and add nothing but confusion. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Avoid ad hominem patronizing tone and focus on what you do not >>>>>>>>>>>> understand or disagree with. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> "locality follows from linearity" -- what a load of >>>>>>>>>>>>> total nonsense. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> OK, I was quick there, but I provided more details in *many* >>>>>>>>>>>> other posts. Please read most of a thread, not just a a sentence >>>>>>>>>>>> here and >>>>>>>>>>>> there and then adding to the prejudices. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> To be slightly less short, and explain, I was talking in the >>>>>>>>>>>> frame of the non collapse formulation of QM, and I was just saying >>>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>> without any collapse, the linearity of the tensor product with the >>>>>>>>>>>> linearity of the SWE ensure that at any time everything is local, >>>>>>>>>>>> even >>>>>>>>>>>> computable, in the global third person picture. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Basically, "physical non locality" needs to put some amount of >>>>>>>>>>>> 3p sense in the collapse of the wave, where in the MWI (and in >>>>>>>>>>>> arithmetic) >>>>>>>>>>>> the indeterminacies and the non local appearances are purely >>>>>>>>>>>> epistemic >>>>>>>>>>>> (first person or first person plural). >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> > There are 1p statistical interference, but Bell's inequality >>>>>>>>>>>>> violation >>>>>>>>>>>>> > is accounted without FTL, which is not the case with >>>>>>>>>>>>> collapse, or >>>>>>>>>>>>> > Bohmian particules. >>>>>>>>>>>>> > I gave the proof with others, and eventually you admitted >>>>>>>>>>>>> that there >>>>>>>>>>>>> > was no real action at a distance. But with one world, those >>>>>>>>>>>>> are real >>>>>>>>>>>>> > action at a distance. So I think the point has been made. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> There is no FTL mechanism in action in one world or many: Bell >>>>>>>>>>>>> non-locality obeys the no-signalling theorem. You have to get >>>>>>>>>>>>> over >>>>>>>>>>>>> thinking that non-locality means FTL action. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Here's an article of interest. FWIW, I don't believe the >>>>>>>>>>>> no-signalling theorem puts this issue >>>>>>>>>>>> to rest. AG >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> In all the thread we (me and Bruce) were agreeing with this, >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I haven't read every post in this thread, but from Bruce's >>>>>>>>>>> remark above, he apparently believes that you believe in FTL >>>>>>>>>>> transmission >>>>>>>>>>> of information, and that since the no-signal theorem denies that, >>>>>>>>>>> your >>>>>>>>>>> claim (or any claim of FTL transmission) is falsified. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Guess what, you were completely wrong. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I was the one who denies the FTL. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> *My text may have confused you. I thought you went to the MWI to >>>>>>>>>> deny FTL in this one-world. That's what I meant. But Bruce seems to >>>>>>>>>> deny >>>>>>>>>> FTL in this world, by saying the phenomenon is just a property of >>>>>>>>>> the wf, >>>>>>>>>> and in his appeal to the no-signalling theorem; as if to say, if you >>>>>>>>>> can't >>>>>>>>>> send information, there can't be FTL. But here "send information" in >>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> context of no-signalling theorem just means you can't send a message >>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>> choice. AG * >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> *What does FPI stand for? TIA, AG* >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> The article I posted denies that the apparent contradiction >>>>>>>>>>> between relativity and non locality can be resolved simply by >>>>>>>>>>> appealing to >>>>>>>>>>> the non-signalling theorem, which Bruce seems to assert. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I was the one asserting that with the MWI, even the Bell's >>>>>>>>>>> violation does not force FTL, even without signalling possible. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> My point, shared by others in the thread, was that with the MWI >>>>>>>>>>> restores both 3p determinacy, and 3p locality. The point of Clark >>>>>>>>>>> and Bruce >>>>>>>>>>> is that even with the MWI, Bell's inequality violation proves that >>>>>>>>>>> nature >>>>>>>>>>> is 3p non local, and that action at a distance exists. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I can only go by his words. So I don't see that the article I >>>>>>>>>>> posted is irrelevant to the discussion. AG >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> It was Bruce who claims that Bell's inequality violation shows >>>>>>>>>>> that FTL exists, even without possible signalling. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> *Then why does he tell you to "get over it", it being FTL? AG* >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> *Maybe he means that FTL exists in this world, so why resort to >>>>>>>>> the MWI to deny it. But then why does he bring up the no-signalling >>>>>>>>> theorem? AG * >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> *Hope I didn't offend any true believers in the MWI, * >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> MWI is a theory. I have often explain, as a logician, that MWI is >>>>>>>> not an interpretation but a different theory than Copenhagen. MWI = >>>>>>>> wave-function postulate. Copenhagen-QM = wave function postulate + >>>>>>>> collapse >>>>>>>> postulate. Of course both have some problem of interpretation (like all >>>>>>>> theories). I tend to not accept the notion of "physical world", and >>>>>>>> working >>>>>>>> in arithmetic I use only the notion of computation. Indeed, my result >>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>> that both the collapse of the wave and the wave itself are universal >>>>>>>> number's First Person phenomenologies, when we assume a form of >>>>>>>> Mechanist >>>>>>>> Hypothesis in cognitive science. Mechanism makes physicalism wrong. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> *but in extensive discussions about this on another MB, none of the >>>>>>>> true believers could give a coherent account of these other worlds; for >>>>>>>> example, where the energy comes from, * >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Energy is a "one-world" notion, but anyway, I don't believe in >>>>>>>> worlds, at least not until someone explains what they mean. For me, it >>>>>>>> is a >>>>>>>> convenient fiction. With Mechanism, a world is an extrapolation made by >>>>>>>> numbers sharing sheaves of computation verifying some measure weight, >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>> such measure weighting must be explained through the logic of >>>>>>>> self-reference. You might take a look at my papers, like this one: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHA >>>>>>>> LAbstract.html >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Or this one, if you can access it: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pbiomolbio.2013.03.014 >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> *and whether an observer in this world is reproduced in other >>>>>>>> worlds, and if so, with what memories. The MWI seems like a desperate >>>>>>>> attempt to avoid non-locality and/or non-linearity of QM. AG * >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Well, it avois the non linearity of the collapse, and its dualism. >>>>>>>> OK. But the "other worlds" are only a consequence of the contagion of >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> superposition of the particle (say) to the observer. If you look at a >>>>>>>> cat >>>>>>>> in the dead+alive state, you end yourself looking at a dead cat + >>>>>>>> looking >>>>>>>> at a alive cat. The given brain states are orthogonal and do not >>>>>>>> interact, >>>>>>>> but can still interfere statistically. This list is for people >>>>>>>> believing >>>>>>>> that "everything" is a simpler conceptual notion than any particular >>>>>>>> thing, >>>>>>>> and so welcome both the MWI in quantum physics, and the >>>>>>>> "many-computations" >>>>>>>> in arithmetic, that we get from Mechanism. I predicted the >>>>>>>> *appearance* of >>>>>>>> "many-worlds" before knowing about quantum physics measurement problem. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> About Bruce's points, maybe you should ask Bruce, as the cited post >>>>>>>> is a bit out of the context of the thread. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> You asked in another post what is the FPI. >>>>>>>> It is an acronym for First Person Indeterminacy, and it is the >>>>>>>> subjective indeterminacy that you get in the (classical) >>>>>>>> self-duplication. >>>>>>>> Again, look at the paper sane04 cited above, where this is made >>>>>>>> precise and >>>>>>>> explained. The FPI is the building brick of the argument showing that >>>>>>>> Mechanism and Physicalism are incompatible, and that physics is >>>>>>>> conceptually reduced to arithmetic when we assume mechanism. I show >>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>> this leads to testable consequences, and some are tested >>>>>>>> retrospectively >>>>>>>> with QM. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> <div style="word >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the > Google Groups "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/ > topic/everything-list/SJdbZNPRALg/unsubscribe. > To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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