Re: Free Will Theorem

2005-04-11 Thread Jesse Mazer
Norman Samish wrote: To have free will, the actions of a SAO cannot be completely predictable. To be free of complete predictability, at least some of the SAO's actions must ultimately depend on some kind of random event. At the most fundamental level, this must be quantum indeterminacy. This is

RE: Free Will Theorem

2005-04-11 Thread Jonathan Colvin
Norman Samish wrote: If free will simply means self-determination then Jonathan is right, and to the extent we are self-determined we have free will. He says, the only relevant question as to whether our will is free is whether our conscious minds (our selves) determine our actions.

Re: Free Will Theorem

2005-04-11 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 11-avr.-05, à 08:08, Jesse Mazer a écrit : Norman Samish wrote: To have free will, the actions of a SAO cannot be completely predictable. To be free of complete predictability, at least some of the SAO's actions must ultimately depend on some kind of random event. At the most fundamental

Re: Free Will Theorem

2005-04-11 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Norman Samish wrote: But what about the sufferers of schizophrenia who Stathis Papaioannou referred to? They exercise self-determination, and their mental state is such that their actions, at least in some cases, are completely predictable. Do they have free will? Another example might be a

Re: John Conway, Free Will Theorem

2005-04-11 Thread John M
Stathis: it is always dangerous (wrong!) to mix deviated cases (sick patients) with the general (non sick) human (behavioral etc.) concepts. One thing is even worse: to draw conclusions of such. I wrote some comments in this thread lately and did not see them being included in the list-posts. Am I

Re: Free Will Theorem

2005-04-11 Thread Hal Ruhl
Bruno wrote: Actually I am not sure I can put any meaning on the word free-will. My old defense (in this and other list) was just a defense of the notion of will. If someone can explain me how he/she distinguish free-will from will, I would be glad. Bruno I currently consider Free Will to be a

Re: John Conway, Free Will Theorem

2005-04-11 Thread Russell Standish
I got something from you yesterday ... maybe you had an errant email relay like I suffered yesterday. On Mon, Apr 11, 2005 at 11:25:29AM -0400, John M wrote: I wrote some comments in this thread lately and did not see them being included in the list-posts. Am I banned from writing to the list?

Re: John Conway, Free Will Theorem

2005-04-11 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
John Mikes wrote: The question of (in)determinacy within our judgement is model-related. A distinction: ...free will to refer to conscious entities making indeterminate choices... is as well the judgement of reasonability in our limited views. There may be (hidden? undiscovered?) 'reasons'

Re: Free Will Theorem

2005-04-11 Thread Jonathan Colvin
Norman Samish wrote: If free will simply means self-determination then Jonathan is right, and to the extent we are self-determined we have free will. He says, the only relevant question as to whether our will is free is whether our conscious minds (our selves) determine our actions.

RE: Free Will Theorem

2005-04-11 Thread Jonathan Colvin
Apologies for double-posting. My dial-up account is rather unreliable. Jonathan Colvin Norman Samish wrote: If free will simply means self-determination then Jonathan is right, and to the extent we are self-determined we have free will. He says, the only relevant question as to

Re: Free Will Theorem

2005-04-11 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, Apr 11, 2005 at 10:41:53PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: It may be the case that quantum indeterminacy adds a random element which contributes to our experience of free will, but you are dismissing the other theoretical possibility, which is that our brains

Re: Free Will Theorem

2005-04-11 Thread Norman Samish
I have somewhat arbitrarily defined free will as voluntary actions that are both self-determined by a Self-Aware Object, and are not predictable. My reasoning is that if something is completely predictable, then there is no option for change, hence no free will.. On this issue, Jonathan Colvin

Re: Free Will Theorem

2005-04-11 Thread Russell Standish
On Tue, Apr 12, 2005 at 01:26:46PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: I think this situation is essentially hypothetical. No machine is completely deterministic - computers are designed to be as deterministic as possible, but still suffer bit errors through chance. Human brains, however,

Re: John Conway, Free Will Theorem

2005-04-11 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
John Mikes wrote: Stathis: it is always dangerous (wrong!) to mix deviated cases (sick patients) with the general (non sick) human (behavioral etc.) concepts. One thing is even worse: to draw conclusions of such. I disagree with this, in general. In medical science, in particular, one of the most