> -Original Message-
> From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of David Nyman
> Sent: Monday, August 28, 2006 7:33 AM
> To: Everything List
> Subject: Re: evidence blindness
>
>
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> > We all (excuse me to use 1s
On Mon, Aug 28, 2006 at 03:41:00PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> Le 27-août-06, à 12:43, Russell Standish a écrit :
>
>
>
> > I recall reading this paper, and the followup entitled "The Random
> > Oracle Hypothesis is False" by Chang et al.
>
>
> Have you the reference? Do you know if C
1Z wrote:
>
> Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>>Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>>Peter Jones writes:
>>>
>>>
>>>
By youur definitions, it's a straight choice between metaphysics and
solipsism.
I choose metaphsyics.
We can posit the unobservable to expalint he observable.
>>>
>>>
>>>Solipsi
Brent Meeker wrote:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > Peter Jones writes:
> >
> >
> >>By youur definitions, it's a straight choice between metaphysics and
> >>solipsism.
> >>I choose metaphsyics.
> >>We can posit the unobservable to expalint he observable.
> >
> >
> > Solipsism is a metaphysical p
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
>
>>By youur definitions, it's a straight choice between metaphysics and
>>solipsism.
>>I choose metaphsyics.
>>We can posit the unobservable to expalint he observable.
>
>
> Solipsism is a metaphysical position.
>
>
>>(BTW: it it is wrong
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
>
>>>Saying that there is a material substrate which has certain properties is
>>>just a working
>>>assumption to facilitate thinking about the real world. It may turn out that
>>>if we dig into
>>>quarks very deeply there is nothing "substant
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> In both comp and the quantum, a case can be made that the
> irreversibility of memory (coming from usual thermodynamics, or big
> number law) can explain, through physical or comp-physical
> interactions, the first person feeling of irreversibility.
> But with comp we do s
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> AR eventually provides the whole comp ontology, although it has nothing
> to do with any commitment with a substantial reality.
If it makes no commitments about existence,. it can prove nothing about
ontology.
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You re
Le 28-août-06, à 07:42, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>
> Bruno marchal writes:
>
>> Le 26-août-06, à 16:35, 1Z a écrit :
>>
>>>
And since the computer may be built and programmed in an arbitrarily
complex way, because any physical
system can be mapped onto any computation with th
Le 27-août-06, à 12:43, Russell Standish a écrit :
> I recall reading this paper, and the followup entitled "The Random
> Oracle Hypothesis is False" by Chang et al.
Have you the reference? Do you know if Chang has found a math error, or
a conceptual mishandling? I would be interested to kn
Hi Stephen,
Le 28-août-06, à 04:31, Stephen Paul King a écrit :
>
> Hi Folks,
>
> I have been reading Bruno's wonderful Elsavier paper
Thanks for saying so.
> and have been
> wondering about this notion of a "Uncertainty measure". Does not the
> existence of such a measure demand the ex
Le 28-août-06, à 05:37, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>> It *has* been proved (by diagonalization) that there exist some
>> problem
>> in number theory which are soluble by a machine using a random oracle,
>> although no machine with pseudorandom oracle can sole the problem.
>
> That's intere
Le 27-août-06, à 23:17, David Nyman wrote to Peter (1Z) :
>> 1Z: But you don't really address the existence question. You just
>> loosely
>> assume it is the
>> same thing as truth.
>
> Could I appeal to Bruno at this juncture to address this point
> directly?! At several places in our own dial
Le 27-août-06, à 21:41, Brent Meeker a écrit :
> I put "working assumption" in scare quotes because I think the fact
> that we can
> create models of the world that are successful over a wide domain of
> phenomena is
> evidence for an underlying reality. It's not conclusive evidence, but
> r
Le 27-août-06, à 19:56, 1Z a écrit :
>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> Come on, I have already insist on this. Understanding what really
>> means
>> "surviving through the yes doctor" = understanding that, in *that*
>> case, we survive without doctor.
>
> "Without the doctor" is computationalism
Le 27-août-06, à 19:41, 1Z a écrit :
> But you don't really address the existence question. You just loosely
> assume it is the
> same thing as truth.
I just assume that the "existence of a number" is equivalent with the
intended truth of an existential
proposition written in a theory about
Le 27-août-06, à 19:36, 1Z a écrit :
>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Le 26-août-06, à 22:44, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>>
>>> I understand Peters objection to regarding a "mere bundle" of
>>> properties as existent. But I don't understand why one needs a
>>> propertyless
>>> substrate. Why not jus
Le 27-aot-06, 17:49, 1Z a crit :
>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Le 25-aot-06, 02:31, 1Z a crit :
>>
>>> Of course it can. Anything can be attached to a bare substrate.
>>
>> It follows from the UDA that you cannot do that, unless you put
>> explicitly actual infinite in the "bare substrat
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> There is good reason to believe that there is some sort of reality out there
> as opposed to the
> solipsistic alternative, but there is less reason to believe that there is
> some basic material substrate
> on which the various properties of physical objects are h
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
> > By youur definitions, it's a straight choice between metaphysics and
> > solipsism.
> > I choose metaphsyics.
> > We can posit the unobservable to expalint he observable.
>
> Solipsism is a metaphysical position.
A minimal one, that refuses
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
> > > Saying that there is a material substrate which has certain properties is
> > > just a working
> > > assumption to facilitate thinking about the real world. It may turn out
> > > that if we dig into
> > > quarks very deeply there is nothi
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > Brent Meeker writes:
> >
> >
> >>>Saying that there is a material substrate which has certain properties is
> >>>just a working
> >>>assumption to facilitate thinking about the real world. It may turn out
> >>>that if we dig into
> >>>quarks very deeply ther
Brent Meeker writes:
> >>>This may be coincidental, but I think not. Your PC is engineered to
> >>>avoid the effects of chaos to prevent this very thing occurring. Why
> >>>wouldn't nature do the same thing unless it were deliberately trying
> >>>to exploit randomness?
> >>
> >>In nature there's
Peter Jones writes:
> By youur definitions, it's a straight choice between metaphysics and
> solipsism.
> I choose metaphsyics.
> We can posit the unobservable to expalint he observable.
Solipsism is a metaphysical position.
> (BTW: it it is wrong to posit an unobserved substrate, why is it
>
Peter Jones writes:
> > Saying that there is a material substrate which has certain properties is
> > just a working
> > assumption to facilitate thinking about the real world. It may turn out
> > that if we dig into
> > quarks very deeply there is nothing "substantial" there at all, but solid
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