> Date: Mon, 11 Sep 2006 13:10:52 -0700
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Subject: Re: computationalism and supervenience
>
>
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > Brent Meeker writes:
> >
> >
> >>I think we need to say
Brent meeker writes:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > Peter Jones writes:
> >
> >
> >>Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>>Like Bruno, I am not claiming that this is definitely the case, just that
> >>>it is the case if
> >>>computationalism is true. Several philosophers (eg. Searle) have
Colin Hales wrote:
>
> Stathis Papaioannou
>
>
>>Maybe this is a copout, but I just don't think it is even logically
>>possible to explain what consciousness
>>*is* unless you have it. It's like the problem of explaining vision to a
>>blind man: he might be the world's
>>greatest scientific exp
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
> Brent meeker writes:
>
>
>>I could make a robot that, having suitable thermocouples, would quickly
>>withdraw it's
>>hand from a fire; but not be conscious of it. Even if I provide the
>>robot with
>>"feelings", i.e. judgements about go
Stathis Papaioannou
> Maybe this is a copout, but I just don't think it is even logically
> possible to explain what consciousness
> *is* unless you have it. It's like the problem of explaining vision to a
> blind man: he might be the world's
> greatest scientific expert on it but still have zer
Brent meeker writes:
> I could make a robot that, having suitable thermocouples, would quickly
> withdraw it's
> hand from a fire; but not be conscious of it. Even if I provide the
> robot with
> "feelings", i.e. judgements about good/bad/pain/pleasure I'm not sure it
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
>
>>>I think it goes against standard computationalism if you say that a
>>>conscious
>>>computation has some inherent structural property. Opponents of
>>>computationalism
>>>have used the absurdity of the conclusion that anything implemen
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
>
Why not? Can't we map bat conscious-computation to human
conscious-computation;
since you suppose we can map any computation to any other. But, you're
thinking,
since there a practical infinity of maps (even a counta
> -Original Message-
Stathis Papaioannou
>
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
> > >>Why not? Can't we map bat conscious-computation to human conscious-
> computation;
> > >>since you suppose we can map any computation to any other. But,
> you're thinking,
> > >>since there a practical infinity
Brent Meeker writes:
> > I think it goes against standard computationalism if you say that a
> > conscious
> > computation has some inherent structural property. Opponents of
> > computationalism
> > have used the absurdity of the conclusion that anything implements any
> > conscious
> > co
Brent Meeker writes:
> >>Why not? Can't we map bat conscious-computation to human
> >>conscious-computation;
> >>since you suppose we can map any computation to any other. But, you're
> >>thinking,
> >>since there a practical infinity of maps (even a countable infinity if you
> >>allow
>
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Tom, thanks, you said it as I will try to spell it out interjected in your
> reply.
> John
> - Original Message -
> From: "Tom Caylor" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> To: "Everything List"
> Sent: Monday, September 11, 2006 12:21 PM
> Subject: Re: ROADMAP (SHORT)
>
>
> >
Tom, thanks, you said it as I will try to spell it out interjected in your
reply.
John
- Original Message -
From: "Tom Caylor" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Everything List"
Sent: Monday, September 11, 2006 12:21 PM
Subject: Re: ROADMAP (SHORT)
>
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> > - Origina
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
>
>>I think we need to say what it means for a computation to be
>>self-interpreting. Many
>>control programs are written with self-monitoring functions and logging
>>functions.
>>Why would we not attribute consciousness to them?
>
>
> W
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
>
>>Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>
>>>Like Bruno, I am not claiming that this is definitely the case, just that it
>>>is the case if
>>>computationalism is true. Several philosophers (eg. Searle) have used the
>>>self-evident
>>>absurdity of
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> - Original Message -
> From: "Tom Caylor" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> To: "Everything List"
> Sent: Wednesday, September 06, 2006 3:23 PM
> Subject: Re: ROADMAP (SHORT)
>
>
>
> You wrote:
> What is the non-mathematical part of UDA? The part that uses Church
> Thesis?
Brent Meeker wrote (through many posts):
> I won't insist, because you might be right, but I don't think that is
> proven. It may
> be that interaction with the environment is essential to continued
> consciousness.
Assuming comp, I think that this is a red herring. To make this clear I
Brent Meeker writes:
> I think we need to say what it means for a computation to be
> self-interpreting. Many
> control programs are written with self-monitoring functions and logging
> functions.
> Why would we not attribute consciousness to them?
Well, why not? Some people don't even thin
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[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] För Brent Meeker
Skickat: den 11 september 2006 08:44
Till: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Ämne: Re: SV: computationalism and supervenience
Lennart Nilsson wrote:
...
> But my point is that thi
Peter Jones writes:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> > Like Bruno, I am not claiming that this is definitely the case, just that
> > it is the case if
> > computationalism is true. Several philosophers (eg. Searle) have used the
> > self-evident
> > absurdity of the idea as an argument demonst
On Sun, Sep 10, 2006 at 11:43:48PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> Lennart Nilsson wrote:
> ...
> > But my point is that this may come down to what we would mean by a computer
> > being
> > conscious. Bruno has an answer in terms of what the computer can prove.
> > Jaynes (and
> > probably John
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