RE: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Brent Meeker writes: > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > David Nyman writes: > > > >> I think we're in agreement, Stathis, but I'm trying to focus on a > >> problem, and what I think is a non-trivial aspect of evolved brain > >> functionality that would be required to overcome it. Of course, I agree > >> with you that each aspect of the experience '.falls perfectly into > >> position in each case by virtue of its content alone' - it's precisely > >> what I've been arguing. But there's a subtler point here also, I think, > >> that leads to the problem. Let's take the 'cat sat on the mat': now > >> 'cat' starts at t1 and 'mat' ends at t2. Let's subdivide t1t2 into > >> occasions o1-o1000, and let teleportation occur between each. Each > >> occasion o1-o1000 is as informationally closed as OMt1t2 (the > >> 'teleportation' is of course inserted precisely to make this point), > >> but now it has become implausible to believe that any individual > >> occasion, say o492, is of sufficient extent to recover any coherent > >> component whatsoever of the conscious thought 'the cat sat on the mat'. > >> And yet, we know that we *are* in fact able to routinely recover such > >> components, corresponding loosely to a 'specious present' of some 1.5 > >> seconds extent. > >> > >> Now comes the problem: how do we account for our manifest ability to do > >> this without invoking some form of illicit 'continuity' between > >> informationally separated occasions of arbitrarily fine granularity? No > >> individual occasion apparently contains all the necessary information, > >> and it seems that we almost can't stop ourselves imaginatively invoking > >> some sort of continuity over multiple occasions, in order that coherent > >> experiences can somehow be recovered by summing over the sequence. > >> > >> I think, if true, this would be a real problem in reconciling our > >> experience with the facts, and I think therefore that it requires a > >> real solution (actually an aspect of Barbour's time capsule theory > >> which I'm extrapolating a bit further). Simply, if what I'm arguing is > >> valid, it must follow that my assumption about individual occasions > >> 'not containing the necessary information' *must be wrong*. > >> Consequently, sufficient information to recover 'speciously present' > >> dynamic experiences *must* in fact be *simultaneously* represented by > >> the brain - be present on one occasion - and that this simultaneous > >> 'dynamic' presentation must be the engine that renders both the > >> duration and the dynamism of the experience. And, to complete the > >> (evolutionary) circularity, this would be precisely *why* the brain > >> would possess this capability - because without it, extended, dynamic > >> environmental presentations would simply be *unavailable* to the > >> organism. > >> > >> Does this make sense? > > > > I think I see what you mean, but it's as much a problem for the intact and > > normally functioning brain as it is for teleportation experiments, isn't > > it? For that > > matter, it's as much a problem for a computer that gets teleported around > > in the > > course of its calculations. If the teleportation time slices are of > > femtosecond > > duration, then there is nothing within a particular slice to mark it as > > part of the > > calculation 5464*2342. Yet a computer strobing in and out of existence like > > this, > > technical problems aside, will still come up with the right answer. Indeed, > > if the > > computer only materialised in the final femtosecond it would have the right > > answer > > and if a log were kept, evidence of how it arrived at the answer. Do you > > believe > > that there must be some super-computation information in each femtosecond > > slice > > that binds them all together? > > I think that's possible. The fact that the computation is realized in a > physical system which, to the best of our knowledge is continuous, may mean > that there is something more than the the computational process conceived as > discrete and finite (in the infomation sense). But surely this isn't true for a digital computer. The fact that one computer is painted a different colour or the wires have a different resistance compared to another computer cannot make a difference to how the computation "feels", if a computation can feel. > On the other hand our theories of physics tell us that physical processes, > including those that realize the computation, can also be approximated by > discrete processes - except that time and space variables are kept as > implicitly continuous. By this I mean that when simulating such a process on > a digital computer (I'm old enough to remember when we did it on analog > computers), we set the steps smaller and smaller and we're only satisfied > when making the step smaller doesn't change the answer. I think this is > going to be the case for any closed physical system. But for an open syste
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
David Nyman wrote: > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > I think I see what you mean, but it's as much a problem for the intact and > > normally functioning brain as it is for teleportation experiments, isn't it? > > Yes, that's my point! I'm trying to argue that the brain has actually > come up with a solution to this in order to account for what we > experience. If it is in the nature of physics to spread over regions of non-zero duration, the brain doesn't *have* to solve any problems relating to zero-dimensional slices. > > For that > > matter, it's as much a problem for a computer that gets teleported around > > in the > > course of its calculations. If the teleportation time slices are of > > femtosecond > > duration, then there is nothing within a particular slice to mark it as > > part of the > > calculation 5464*2342. Yet a computer strobing in and out of existence like > > this, > > technical problems aside, will still come up with the right answer. Indeed, > > if the > > computer only materialised in the final femtosecond it would have the right > > answer > > and if a log were kept, evidence of how it arrived at the answer. Do you > > believe > > that there must be some super-computation information in each femtosecond > > slice > > that binds them all together? > > No, this is irrelevant. The calculation example is disanalogous, > because what is relevant to this is simply the 3-person process that > results in the right answer: this *entirely constitutes* the > calculation. We don't seek to make claims about any putative > 'temporally-extended pov' that the computer might possess while > performing it. What is at issue in these thought experiments, by > contrast, is *precisely* the pov - of apparently real temporal > dimension and dynamic character - that we wish to claim would be > experienced from the perspective of a given 'time-slice', however > arbitrarily fine-grained. Why do we wish to claim that? > With respect to this pov, we seem to have two alternatives: > > 1) It is supported and constrained *entirely* by whatever structure and > information is to be found within an individual time-slice (i.e. the > 'time capsule'). > > 2) Structure and information external to the individual time-slice is > in fact required to generate it (i.e. the individual slice is not a > 'time capsule'). > > Per alternative 1), any slice containing the requisite structure and > information content can potentially support a coherent 'temporally > extended' conscious experience. Per alternative 2) AFAICS this can't be > the case. > > I'm not sure that you're seeing my point here. I'm not denying that the > pov is maintained in the chopped-up version, I'm supporting this view. > But given the information constraint, I'm saying that any mechanisms > that produce conscious experiences of apparent temporal duration *must* > consequently (and counter-intuitively) depend on *instantaneously* > present structure and information. These non-sequential issues are not > relevant for 'calculation', hence the disanalogy. This leads to an > empirical claim about brain mechanism, driven by the analysis. If we > don't concede this, then AFAICS we're left with the alternative of > giving up the information constraint. That is, the apparent temporal > extension available in experience *from the pov of an individual > infinitessimal time-slice* must somehow depend on information to be > found only in other time-slices. But this then renders any notion of > slicing irrelevant and the thought experiment collapses. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Peter Jones writes: > > > Errmm.. if by "recover" we are able to replay them as > > > conscious (re)experiences. The memory-trace need > > > only contain time-stamps indicating the order > > > and timing of the contents of the experience. The > > > total structure of time-stamped-stored-experience > > > can co-exist simultaneously, just as a the frames > > > of a movie stored on a shelf co-exist simultaneously. > > > > > > The stored experience is not conscious in itself > > > any more than the stored movie involves any (ilusion of) motion. > > > > > > In both cases, that comes in with the recovery. > > > > That's not an accurate analogy. For a start, a film in the can is not > > equivalent to a film on the screen sliced up into frames because there > > is no projector and no screen in the can. > > Would it help if there were? > > > Then there is the fact that if > > you did project one frame in one cinema, the next frame in another > > cinema, and so on, the analogy would still not hold because it leaves > > out the observer. To make the analogy work, you would have to show > > one frame to an observer in one cinema, suspend his consciousness > > while you move him and the film to another cinema, show him another > > frame, supend his consciousness again while you move to a third cinema > > for the third frame, and so on. The observer would then see the whole > > film, and if the cinemas were identical, would not even know he had been > > moved, other than due to mere technical problems. > > I am not (here) arguing that time-slicing is necessarily noticeable, > I am arguing that the dynamism of a recovered memory doesn't imply > that the stored memory trace itself is dynamic. I thought we were arguing about whether the sensation of continuity of consciousness could survive this sort of time-slicing, and whether it would be possible from the inside to tell how the time slices were organised in time and space, given no external cues. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Peter Jones writes: > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > I think I see what you mean, but it's as much a problem for the intact and > > normally functioning brain as it is for teleportation experiments, isn't > > it? For that > > matter, it's as much a problem for a computer that gets teleported around > > in the > > course of its calculations. If the teleportation time slices are of > > femtosecond > > duration, then there is nothing within a particular slice to mark it as > > part of the > > calculation 5464*2342. Yet a computer strobing in and out of existence like > > this, > > technical problems aside, will still come up with the right answer. Indeed, > > if the > > computer only materialised in the final femtosecond it would have the right > > answer > > and if a log were kept, evidence of how it arrived at the answer. Do you > > believe > > that there must be some super-computation information in each femtosecond > > slice > > that binds them all together? > > > A piece of paper with 12796688 on it has the right answer. > But it didn't computer it. > > I don't have to believe that the end-state of the computation > is the result of a genuine computational process, if it > isn't underpinned by a genuine physical process. What about a computation distributed over a computer network? What about just the latter part of the computation? Do you think the computation's experience (such as it is) would be any different compared to the latter part of the computation on a single computer? Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Peter Jones writes: > > > Errmm.. if by "recover" we are able to replay them as > > conscious (re)experiences. The memory-trace need > > only contain time-stamps indicating the order > > and timing of the contents of the experience. The > > total structure of time-stamped-stored-experience > > can co-exist simultaneously, just as a the frames > > of a movie stored on a shelf co-exist simultaneously. > > > > The stored experience is not conscious in itself > > any more than the stored movie involves any (ilusion of) motion. > > > > In both cases, that comes in with the recovery. > > That's not an accurate analogy. For a start, a film in the can is not > equivalent to a film on the screen sliced up into frames because there > is no projector and no screen in the can. Would it help if there were? > Then there is the fact that if > you did project one frame in one cinema, the next frame in another > cinema, and so on, the analogy would still not hold because it leaves > out the observer. To make the analogy work, you would have to show > one frame to an observer in one cinema, suspend his consciousness > while you move him and the film to another cinema, show him another > frame, supend his consciousness again while you move to a third cinema > for the third frame, and so on. The observer would then see the whole > film, and if the cinemas were identical, would not even know he had been > moved, other than due to mere technical problems. I am not (here) arguing that time-slicing is necessarily noticeable, I am arguing that the dynamism of a recovered memory doesn't imply that the stored memory trace itself is dynamic. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Tom Caylor wrote: > Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Le 27-oct.-06, à 13:04, Quentin Anciaux a écrit : > > > > > > > > Hi Stathis, > > > > > > Le Vendredi 27 Octobre 2006 12:16, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : > > >> Here is another thought experiment. You are watching an object moving > > >> against a stationary background at a velocity of 10 m/s. Suddenly, the > > >> object seems to instantly jump 10 metres in the direction of motion, > > >> and > > >> then continues as before at 10 m/s. You are informed that one of the > > >> following three events has taken place: > > >> > > >> (a) your consciousness was suspended for 1 second, as in an absence > > >> seizure; > > >> > > >> (b) you were scanned, annihilated, and a perfect copy created in your > > >> place > > >> 1 second later; > > >> > > >> (c) nothing unusual happened to you, but the object you were watching > > >> was > > >> instantly teleported 10 metres in the direction of motion. > > >> > > >> Would you be able to guess which of the three events took place? > > >> > > >> Stathis Papaioannou > > > > > > The problem with these kind of thoughts experiments is that we don't > > > know how > > > consciousness "works", we don't know if we can make a "perfect copy", > > > we > > > can't know (currently) if such a copy would be conscious as we don't > > > know how > > > conscious experience arise. > > > > > > That is why we are proposing theories. It seems to me that the > > computationalist hypothesis entails the answer "no" to Stathis > > question. > > Are you OK with this? (Of course, other hypotheses (like some weakening > > of comp for example) could also lead to the answer no. > > > > > > > > > Taking the premises of the problem you gave, it > > > is impossible to give a (right) answer (if there is one...). You > > > presupose > > > too much on what is consciousness and how it works (not that it is a > > > bad > > > thing, but I think these examples won't convince someone who have not > > > the > > > same view on you about what is consciousness and how it works). > > > > > > I think that the point of Stathis was illustrating comp or some > > weakening of it. > > > > Is there someone in the list who find simultaneously both comp *and* a > > "yes" answer to Stathis' question plausible? > > > > > > Bruno > > Is there a difference in the answer to Stathis' question for this > thought experiment, and the answer to Stathis' question for the > equalivent thought experiment except for the following? > > (a) your consciousness was suspended for 0 seconds > > (b) you were scanned, annihilated, and a perfect copy created in your > place 0 seconds later > > (c) nothing unusual happened to you, but the object you were watching > was instantly teleported 0 metres in the direction of motion. > > At first (a) and (c) seem identical, but I take "teleported" here to > mean (for the sake of simplicity!) the same thing as was done to you in > (b). > > What is happening in (a)? Let's say that the same rigamarole as in the > original thought experiment (to keep as much as possible equal between > the two experiments!) is done, except that 1 is replaced by 0. > > I mean, why would a delay make any difference to the argument? That's > equivalent to one of the steps in Bruno's UDA. > > Actually, let's change the 0 to epsilon and let epsilon approach zero, > so instead of a "0 second" argument, we have an "epsilon second" > argument. > > Well then, what have we here in the "epsilon second" experiment? It > seems to simply argue that we don't know what the heck is happening in > our universe from one instant to the next. I can think of a lot of > TOEs that say that. > > But on the other hand, we do have some very good models in physics that > say we actually can predict with minimal uncertainty what will happen > over time. > > So the conclusion of my thought is that perhaps such thought > experiments, as well as Bruno's UDA, are just inserting white rabbits > constructively into the universe. No wonder the conclusion is that we > don't know what's happening (a la Bruno's indeterminacies). > > Tom To make my point clearer, make a change to the "epsilon second" argument wherein, during the technological rigmarole involved in (a) consciousness suspension (b) duplication with annihilation (b) teleportation, in between pushing buttons the Doctor dances a jig. Also, I realize that, as epsilon approaches zero, the speed at which the rigmarole is done (and how fast the Doctor dances) has to approach infinity. But this is just a matter of degree of prowess. Tom --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > I think I see what you mean, but it's as much a problem for the intact and > normally functioning brain as it is for teleportation experiments, isn't it? > For that > matter, it's as much a problem for a computer that gets teleported around in > the > course of its calculations. If the teleportation time slices are of > femtosecond > duration, then there is nothing within a particular slice to mark it as part > of the > calculation 5464*2342. Yet a computer strobing in and out of existence like > this, > technical problems aside, will still come up with the right answer. Indeed, > if the > computer only materialised in the final femtosecond it would have the right > answer > and if a log were kept, evidence of how it arrived at the answer. Do you > believe > that there must be some super-computation information in each femtosecond > slice > that binds them all together? A piece of paper with 12796688 on it has the right answer. But it didn't computer it. I don't have to believe that the end-state of the computation is the result of a genuine computational process, if it isn't underpinned by a genuine physical process. > Stathis Papaioannou > _ > Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. > http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > I think I see what you mean, but it's as much a problem for the intact and > normally functioning brain as it is for teleportation experiments, isn't it? Yes, that's my point! I'm trying to argue that the brain has actually come up with a solution to this in order to account for what we experience. > For that > matter, it's as much a problem for a computer that gets teleported around in > the > course of its calculations. If the teleportation time slices are of > femtosecond > duration, then there is nothing within a particular slice to mark it as part > of the > calculation 5464*2342. Yet a computer strobing in and out of existence like > this, > technical problems aside, will still come up with the right answer. Indeed, > if the > computer only materialised in the final femtosecond it would have the right > answer > and if a log were kept, evidence of how it arrived at the answer. Do you > believe > that there must be some super-computation information in each femtosecond > slice > that binds them all together? No, this is irrelevant. The calculation example is disanalogous, because what is relevant to this is simply the 3-person process that results in the right answer: this *entirely constitutes* the calculation. We don't seek to make claims about any putative 'temporally-extended pov' that the computer might possess while performing it. What is at issue in these thought experiments, by contrast, is *precisely* the pov - of apparently real temporal dimension and dynamic character - that we wish to claim would be experienced from the perspective of a given 'time-slice', however arbitrarily fine-grained. With respect to this pov, we seem to have two alternatives: 1) It is supported and constrained *entirely* by whatever structure and information is to be found within an individual time-slice (i.e. the 'time capsule'). 2) Structure and information external to the individual time-slice is in fact required to generate it (i.e. the individual slice is not a 'time capsule'). Per alternative 1), any slice containing the requisite structure and information content can potentially support a coherent 'temporally extended' conscious experience. Per alternative 2) AFAICS this can't be the case. I'm not sure that you're seeing my point here. I'm not denying that the pov is maintained in the chopped-up version, I'm supporting this view. But given the information constraint, I'm saying that any mechanisms that produce conscious experiences of apparent temporal duration *must* consequently (and counter-intuitively) depend on *instantaneously* present structure and information. These non-sequential issues are not relevant for 'calculation', hence the disanalogy. This leads to an empirical claim about brain mechanism, driven by the analysis. If we don't concede this, then AFAICS we're left with the alternative of giving up the information constraint. That is, the apparent temporal extension available in experience *from the pov of an individual infinitessimal time-slice* must somehow depend on information to be found only in other time-slices. But this then renders any notion of slicing irrelevant and the thought experiment collapses. David > David Nyman writes: > > > I think we're in agreement, Stathis, but I'm trying to focus on a > > problem, and what I think is a non-trivial aspect of evolved brain > > functionality that would be required to overcome it. Of course, I agree > > with you that each aspect of the experience '.falls perfectly into > > position in each case by virtue of its content alone' - it's precisely > > what I've been arguing. But there's a subtler point here also, I think, > > that leads to the problem. Let's take the 'cat sat on the mat': now > > 'cat' starts at t1 and 'mat' ends at t2. Let's subdivide t1t2 into > > occasions o1-o1000, and let teleportation occur between each. Each > > occasion o1-o1000 is as informationally closed as OMt1t2 (the > > 'teleportation' is of course inserted precisely to make this point), > > but now it has become implausible to believe that any individual > > occasion, say o492, is of sufficient extent to recover any coherent > > component whatsoever of the conscious thought 'the cat sat on the mat'. > > And yet, we know that we *are* in fact able to routinely recover such > > components, corresponding loosely to a 'specious present' of some 1.5 > > seconds extent. > > > > Now comes the problem: how do we account for our manifest ability to do > > this without invoking some form of illicit 'continuity' between > > informationally separated occasions of arbitrarily fine granularity? No > > individual occasion apparently contains all the necessary information, > > and it seems that we almost can't stop ourselves imaginatively invoking > > some sort of continuity over multiple occasions, in order that coherent > > experiences can somehow be recovered by summing over the sequence. > > > > I think, if true, this would be
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Bruno Marchal wrote: > Le 27-oct.-06, à 13:04, Quentin Anciaux a écrit : > > > > > Hi Stathis, > > > > Le Vendredi 27 Octobre 2006 12:16, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : > >> Here is another thought experiment. You are watching an object moving > >> against a stationary background at a velocity of 10 m/s. Suddenly, the > >> object seems to instantly jump 10 metres in the direction of motion, > >> and > >> then continues as before at 10 m/s. You are informed that one of the > >> following three events has taken place: > >> > >> (a) your consciousness was suspended for 1 second, as in an absence > >> seizure; > >> > >> (b) you were scanned, annihilated, and a perfect copy created in your > >> place > >> 1 second later; > >> > >> (c) nothing unusual happened to you, but the object you were watching > >> was > >> instantly teleported 10 metres in the direction of motion. > >> > >> Would you be able to guess which of the three events took place? > >> > >> Stathis Papaioannou > > > > The problem with these kind of thoughts experiments is that we don't > > know how > > consciousness "works", we don't know if we can make a "perfect copy", > > we > > can't know (currently) if such a copy would be conscious as we don't > > know how > > conscious experience arise. > > > That is why we are proposing theories. It seems to me that the > computationalist hypothesis entails the answer "no" to Stathis > question. > Are you OK with this? (Of course, other hypotheses (like some weakening > of comp for example) could also lead to the answer no. > > > > > Taking the premises of the problem you gave, it > > is impossible to give a (right) answer (if there is one...). You > > presupose > > too much on what is consciousness and how it works (not that it is a > > bad > > thing, but I think these examples won't convince someone who have not > > the > > same view on you about what is consciousness and how it works). > > > I think that the point of Stathis was illustrating comp or some > weakening of it. > > Is there someone in the list who find simultaneously both comp *and* a > "yes" answer to Stathis' question plausible? > > > Bruno Is there a difference in the answer to Stathis' question for this thought experiment, and the answer to Stathis' question for the equalivent thought experiment except for the following? (a) your consciousness was suspended for 0 seconds (b) you were scanned, annihilated, and a perfect copy created in your place 0 seconds later (c) nothing unusual happened to you, but the object you were watching was instantly teleported 0 metres in the direction of motion. At first (a) and (c) seem identical, but I take "teleported" here to mean (for the sake of simplicity!) the same thing as was done to you in (b). What is happening in (a)? Let's say that the same rigamarole as in the original thought experiment (to keep as much as possible equal between the two experiments!) is done, except that 1 is replaced by 0. I mean, why would a delay make any difference to the argument? That's equivalent to one of the steps in Bruno's UDA. Actually, let's change the 0 to epsilon and let epsilon approach zero, so instead of a "0 second" argument, we have an "epsilon second" argument. Well then, what have we here in the "epsilon second" experiment? It seems to simply argue that we don't know what the heck is happening in our universe from one instant to the next. I can think of a lot of TOEs that say that. But on the other hand, we do have some very good models in physics that say we actually can predict with minimal uncertainty what will happen over time. So the conclusion of my thought is that perhaps such thought experiments, as well as Bruno's UDA, are just inserting white rabbits constructively into the universe. No wonder the conclusion is that we don't know what's happening (a la Bruno's indeterminacies). Tom --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > David Nyman writes: > >> I think we're in agreement, Stathis, but I'm trying to focus on a >> problem, and what I think is a non-trivial aspect of evolved brain >> functionality that would be required to overcome it. Of course, I agree >> with you that each aspect of the experience '.falls perfectly into >> position in each case by virtue of its content alone' - it's precisely >> what I've been arguing. But there's a subtler point here also, I think, >> that leads to the problem. Let's take the 'cat sat on the mat': now >> 'cat' starts at t1 and 'mat' ends at t2. Let's subdivide t1t2 into >> occasions o1-o1000, and let teleportation occur between each. Each >> occasion o1-o1000 is as informationally closed as OMt1t2 (the >> 'teleportation' is of course inserted precisely to make this point), >> but now it has become implausible to believe that any individual >> occasion, say o492, is of sufficient extent to recover any coherent >> component whatsoever of the conscious thought 'the cat sat on the mat'. >> And yet, we know that we *are* in fact able to routinely recover such >> components, corresponding loosely to a 'specious present' of some 1.5 >> seconds extent. >> >> Now comes the problem: how do we account for our manifest ability to do >> this without invoking some form of illicit 'continuity' between >> informationally separated occasions of arbitrarily fine granularity? No >> individual occasion apparently contains all the necessary information, >> and it seems that we almost can't stop ourselves imaginatively invoking >> some sort of continuity over multiple occasions, in order that coherent >> experiences can somehow be recovered by summing over the sequence. >> >> I think, if true, this would be a real problem in reconciling our >> experience with the facts, and I think therefore that it requires a >> real solution (actually an aspect of Barbour's time capsule theory >> which I'm extrapolating a bit further). Simply, if what I'm arguing is >> valid, it must follow that my assumption about individual occasions >> 'not containing the necessary information' *must be wrong*. >> Consequently, sufficient information to recover 'speciously present' >> dynamic experiences *must* in fact be *simultaneously* represented by >> the brain - be present on one occasion - and that this simultaneous >> 'dynamic' presentation must be the engine that renders both the >> duration and the dynamism of the experience. And, to complete the >> (evolutionary) circularity, this would be precisely *why* the brain >> would possess this capability - because without it, extended, dynamic >> environmental presentations would simply be *unavailable* to the >> organism. >> >> Does this make sense? > > I think I see what you mean, but it's as much a problem for the intact and > normally functioning brain as it is for teleportation experiments, isn't it? > For that > matter, it's as much a problem for a computer that gets teleported around in > the > course of its calculations. If the teleportation time slices are of > femtosecond > duration, then there is nothing within a particular slice to mark it as part > of the > calculation 5464*2342. Yet a computer strobing in and out of existence like > this, > technical problems aside, will still come up with the right answer. Indeed, > if the > computer only materialised in the final femtosecond it would have the right > answer > and if a log were kept, evidence of how it arrived at the answer. Do you > believe > that there must be some super-computation information in each femtosecond > slice > that binds them all together? I think that's possible. The fact that the computation is realized in a physical system which, to the best of our knowledge is continuous, may mean that there is something more than the the computational process conceived as discrete and finite (in the infomation sense). On the other hand our theories of physics tell us that physical processes, including those that realize the computation, can also be approximated by discrete processes - except that time and space variables are kept as implicitly continuous. By this I mean that when simulating such a process on a digital computer (I'm old enough to remember when we did it on analog computers), we set the steps smaller and smaller and we're only satisfied when making the step smaller doesn't change the answer. I think this is going to be the case for any closed physical system. But for an open system, you+universe, I'm not so sure. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > We've debated whether a computer, a recording, the computations in Platonia > etc. can be conscious, but I think we can almost all agree on at least this > minimal > functionalism: that if you could copy a person by placing all the atoms in > position > accurately enough, then you would end up with a person who looked, behaved, > thought just like the original, had all the original's memories, and > identified as being > the original. After all, this sort of thing is happening in our bodies all > the time as bits > break off cells and are replaced by identical (or near-identical) parts > manufactured by > the automated cellular repair mechanisms. If you accept this idea that the > brain is just > a complex machine, I don't see how it is even *logically* possible that a > copy of a person > made mid-thought would not experience continuity of consciousness, provided > of course > that the technical problems could be overcome and the copy was sufficiently > accurate. > It would be like expecting that a perfect copy of an electronic calculator in > the middle of > multiplying two numbers would somehow forget what it was doing, or a perfect > copy of a > mechanical clock would show a different time or run at a different rate. > > Stathis Papaioannou > _ > Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. > http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d The copying process would have to include some dynamic information, information about how the physical state is evolving. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Peter jones writes: > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > Peter Jones writes: > > > > > > > > Here is another thought experiment. You are watching an object > > > > > > moving against a > > > > > > stationary background at a velocity of 10 m/s. Suddenly, the object > > > > > > seems to instantly > > > > > > jump 10 metres in the direction of motion, and then continues as > > > > > > before at 10 m/s. You > > > > > > are informed that one of the following three events has taken place: > > > > > > > > > > > > (a) your consciousness was suspended for 1 second, as in an absence > > > > > > seizure; > > > > > > > > > > > > (b) you were scanned, annihilated, and a perfect copy created in > > > > > > your place 1 second > > > > > > later; > > > > > > > > > > > > (c) nothing unusual happened to you, but the object you were > > > > > > watching was instantly > > > > > > teleported 10 metres in the direction of motion. > > > > > > > > > > > > Would you be able to guess which of the three events took place? > > > > > > > > > > > > Stathis Papaioannou > > > > > > > > > > Sure, it was (a). (c) violates the laws of physics. (b) might or > > > > > might not be theoretically possible, but it's practically impossible. > > > > > > > > OK, you would probably be right if you were kidnapped and subjected to > > > > this experiment > > > > tomorrow. But it's a thought experiment, and my point is that from your > > > > conscious > > > > experience alone you would be unable to distinguish between the three > > > > cases. Peter Jones' > > > > posts seem to imply that you would notice a difference. > > > > > > You have to say that, given a particular theory of consciousness, > > > would you notice a difference. If physical counterfactuals/causality > > > is important, you could in cases a) and b), since they > > > all involve an abnormal causal transition from one OM to > > > then next. Given computationalism, it is less straightforward. > > > > The question is independent of your theory of consciousness. Say > > consciousness > > is based on process C. I trust you will assume that process C is entirely > > physical, but > > suppose it involves God animating your brain with his breath. Then in case > > (a) God stops > > breathing for a second, in case (b) God destroys you and makes a perfect > > copy which he > > reanimates a second later, and case (c) is unchanged. The important point > > is, when you > > are destroyed then rebuilt, the new version of you is perfectly identical > > to the original and > > functions exactly the same as the original would have. It seems to me > > *logically* impossible > > that you could distinguish between the three cases. > > Assuming that everything necessary for consciousness at time can be > contained > in a 0-duration snapshot at time t. However, If consciousness > supervenes on a process, > however that assumption is not true. The process survives the destruction/copying cycle. Any other physical process would, given sufficient care, so if consciousness doesn't you have a problem with physical theories of consciousness. If a person was destroyed at point A and an exact copy created at point B, what do you think would actually happen? Do you think the person at B would in some way behave and think differently from the original, or do you think he would behave and think the same but still not *be* the original? Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Peter Jones writes: > > I suppose you could say that there is no feeling of continuity from one > > microsecond to the next in a normally functioning brain either, because it > > takes many microseconds to make a thought. My point is that whatever it > > takes to make a thought and however vague the distinction between one > > thought and the next is, arbitrarily slicing up the physical activity > > underlying consciousness should not make a difference to the sense of > > continuity, > > Should not, assuming physicalism? Should not, assuming > computationalism? Assuming a minimal form of functionalism: that at the very least, a perfect physical copy of a person will behave, think and have the same kinds of mental states as the original. A computationalist would add that a computer analogue of a person would also have the same mental states, but this is more controversial. > > and no explicit ordering is necessary. The counting sequence "one, two, > > three" may involve millions of slices of brain activity or computer > > emulation activity spread throughout space and time, and it may take many > > of these slices to form a moment of consciousness just as it takes many > > milliseconds of normal brain activity to form a moment of consciousness, > > but the feeling of continuity should be preserved. > > Why? Maybe it supervenes on whatever propels one physical state > to evolve into another. A perfect copy will include that as well. A perfect copy of a mechanical clock will include the same position of the hands and gears, the same geometry, metallurgy and tension in the spring, the same amount of oxidation on each metal part, and every other detail the same. Do you think it is possible that such a copy would not show or keep the same time even though it is physically exactly identical? Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Brent Meeker writes: > >> Suppose that being conscious is something a brain does. Then a > >> Observer-second would be one second of that brain activity. When > >> this OS was magically initiated it would already include potentials > >> traveling down axons, etc, the residue of the previous OS and the > >> precursors of later milliseconds in this OS. But those underlying > >> physical processes are not what we generally think of as conscious. > >> They are not things we would report if asked what we are thinking. > >> Nevertheless they may be necessary for the continuity of > >> consciousness, where consciousness here means the inner narrative - > >> the story I tell myself in my head. In these thought experiments > >> about OMs there seem to be two contrary implicit assumptions: > >> > >> (1) that just the content of the inner narrative constitutes > >> consciousness, as in the analogy of cutting up a book and then > >> reconstructing it's order from the content of the segments, > >> > >> (2) the feeling of continuity remains in a segment 1sec or 0.1sec > >> or 0.01sec even if that is too short a segment to allow > >> reconstruction of the order from the content. > > > > I suppose you could say that there is no feeling of continuity from > > one microsecond to the next in a normally functioning brain either, > > because it takes many microseconds to make a thought. My point is > > that whatever it takes to make a thought and however vague the > > distinction between one thought and the next is, arbitrarily slicing > > up the physical activity underlying consciousness should not make a > > difference to the sense of continuity, > > But that's exactly the point I find dubious. Continuity in mathematics > always involves taking infinite limits in sets that are already ordered > (Dedekind cuts for example). And per all our best theories, the universe is > instantiates continuous processes in a continuous spacetime. Though there > have been many attempts, no one has shown with mathematical rigor how a > continuous spacetime can emerge as an approximation of a discrete one. > Physicists mostly think it is true, but mathematicians think they're hand > waving. The difficulties of numerically solving partial differential > equations in computers don't give much comfort. > > We use the instantaneous states as in the solution of differential equations, > but those generally include the values of derivatives and hence implicitly a > time variation. I'm not sure of your point here. If time is discrete then you can't slice up an interval smaller than the time quantum, and if it is continuous then you can. Or are you just saying that it would be very difficult technically to record and then reproduce a sufficiently accurate copy of a brain at a particular instant in time in order to ensure that the activity of the copy does not deviate too much from what the activity of the original would have been given similar inputs? > >and no explicit ordering is > > necessary. The counting sequence "one, two, three" may involve > > millions of slices of brain activity or computer emulation activity > > spread throughout space and time, and it may take many of these > > slices to form a moment of consciousness just as it takes many > > milliseconds of normal brain activity to form a moment of > > consciousness, but the feeling of continuity should be preserved. > > It's the "should" that worries me. If consciousness is just some digital > information process that can exist in Platonia, then the underlying > continuity of brain processes is irrelevant. But the relevance of brain > processes is the point in question. When it is assumed that the conscious > thought is not affected by slicing up the physical process, I'm concerned > that we are implicitly assuming what was to be proved. We've debated whether a computer, a recording, the computations in Platonia etc. can be conscious, but I think we can almost all agree on at least this minimal functionalism: that if you could copy a person by placing all the atoms in position accurately enough, then you would end up with a person who looked, behaved, thought just like the original, had all the original's memories, and identified as being the original. After all, this sort of thing is happening in our bodies all the time as bits break off cells and are replaced by identical (or near-identical) parts manufactured by the automated cellular repair mechanisms. If you accept this idea that the brain is just a complex machine, I don't see how it is even *logically* possible that a copy of a person made mid-thought would not experience continuity of consciousness, provided of course that the technical problems could be overcome and the copy was sufficiently accurate. It would be like expecting that a perfect copy of an electronic calculator in the middle of multiplying two numbers would somehow forget what it was doing, o
