Peter jones writes:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > Peter Jones writes: > > > > > > > > Here is another thought experiment. You are watching an object > > > > > > moving against a > > > > > > stationary background at a velocity of 10 m/s. Suddenly, the object > > > > > > seems to instantly > > > > > > jump 10 metres in the direction of motion, and then continues as > > > > > > before at 10 m/s. You > > > > > > are informed that one of the following three events has taken place: > > > > > > > > > > > > (a) your consciousness was suspended for 1 second, as in an absence > > > > > > seizure; > > > > > > > > > > > > (b) you were scanned, annihilated, and a perfect copy created in > > > > > > your place 1 second > > > > > > later; > > > > > > > > > > > > (c) nothing unusual happened to you, but the object you were > > > > > > watching was instantly > > > > > > teleported 10 metres in the direction of motion. > > > > > > > > > > > > Would you be able to guess which of the three events took place? > > > > > > > > > > > > Stathis Papaioannou > > > > > > > > > > Sure, it was (a). (c) violates the laws of physics. (b) might or > > > > > might not be theoretically possible, but it's practically impossible. > > > > > > > > OK, you would probably be right if you were kidnapped and subjected to > > > > this experiment > > > > tomorrow. But it's a thought experiment, and my point is that from your > > > > conscious > > > > experience alone you would be unable to distinguish between the three > > > > cases. Peter Jones' > > > > posts seem to imply that you would notice a difference. > > > > > > You have to say that, given a particular theory of consciousness, > > > would you notice a difference. If physical counterfactuals/causality > > > is important, you could in cases a) and b), since they > > > all involve an abnormal causal transition from one OM to > > > then next. Given computationalism, it is less straightforward. > > > > The question is independent of your theory of consciousness. Say > > consciousness > > is based on process C. I trust you will assume that process C is entirely > > physical, but > > suppose it involves God animating your brain with his breath. Then in case > > (a) God stops > > breathing for a second, in case (b) God destroys you and makes a perfect > > copy which he > > reanimates a second later, and case (c) is unchanged. The important point > > is, when you > > are destroyed then rebuilt, the new version of you is perfectly identical > > to the original and > > functions exactly the same as the original would have. It seems to me > > *logically* impossible > > that you could distinguish between the three cases. > > Assuming that everything necessary for consciousness at time can be > contained > in a 0-duration snapshot at time t. However, If consciousness > supervenes on a process, > however that assumption is not true. The process survives the destruction/copying cycle. Any other physical process would, given sufficient care, so if consciousness doesn't you have a problem with physical theories of consciousness. If a person was destroyed at point A and an exact copy created at point B, what do you think would actually happen? Do you think the person at B would in some way behave and think differently from the original, or do you think he would behave and think the same but still not *be* the original? Stathis Papaioannou _________________________________________________________________ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
