Peter jones writes:

> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > Peter Jones writes:
> >
> > > > > > Here is another thought experiment. You are watching an object 
> > > > > > moving against a
> > > > > > stationary background at a velocity of 10 m/s. Suddenly, the object 
> > > > > > seems to instantly
> > > > > > jump 10 metres in the direction of motion, and then continues as 
> > > > > > before at 10 m/s. You
> > > > > > are informed that one of the following three events has taken place:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > (a) your consciousness was suspended for 1 second, as in an absence 
> > > > > > seizure;
> > > > > >
> > > > > > (b) you were scanned, annihilated, and a perfect copy created in 
> > > > > > your place 1 second
> > > > > > later;
> > > > > >
> > > > > > (c) nothing unusual happened to you, but the object you were 
> > > > > > watching was instantly
> > > > > > teleported 10 metres in the direction of motion.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Would you be able to guess which of the three events took place?
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Stathis Papaioannou
> > > > >
> > > > > Sure, it was (a).  (c) violates the laws of physics.  (b) might or 
> > > > > might not be theoretically possible, but it's practically impossible.
> > > >
> > > > OK, you would probably be right if you were kidnapped and subjected to 
> > > > this experiment
> > > > tomorrow. But it's a thought experiment, and my point is that from your 
> > > > conscious
> > > > experience alone you would be unable to distinguish between the three 
> > > > cases. Peter Jones'
> > > > posts seem to imply that you would notice a difference.
> > >
> > > You have to say that, given a particular theory of consciousness,
> > > would you notice a difference. If physical counterfactuals/causality
> > > is important, you could in  cases a) and b), since they
> > > all involve an abnormal causal transition from one OM to
> > > then next. Given computationalism, it is less straightforward.
> >
> > The question is independent of your theory of consciousness. Say 
> > consciousness
> > is based on process C. I trust you will assume that process C is entirely 
> > physical, but
> > suppose it involves God animating your brain with his breath. Then in case 
> > (a) God stops
> > breathing for a second, in case (b) God destroys you and makes a perfect 
> > copy which he
> > reanimates a second later, and case (c) is unchanged. The important point 
> > is, when you
> > are destroyed then rebuilt, the new version of you is perfectly identical 
> > to the original and
> > functions exactly the same as the original would have. It seems to me 
> > *logically* impossible
> > that you could distinguish between the three cases.
> 
> Assuming that everything necessary for consciousness at time can be
> contained
> in  a 0-duration snapshot at time t. However, If consciousness
> supervenes on a process,
> however that assumption is not true.

The process survives the destruction/copying cycle. Any other physical process 
would, given sufficient care, so if consciousness doesn't you have a problem 
with 
physical theories of consciousness. If a person was destroyed at point A and an 
exact copy created at point B, what do you think would actually happen? Do you 
think the person at B would in some way behave and think differently from the 
original, or do you think he would behave and think the same but still not *be* 
the 
original? 

Stathis Papaioannou
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