RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds
Brent Meeker writes: > Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > > Le 29-janv.-07, à 18:19, Brent Meeker a écrit : > > > >> Bruno Marchal wrote: > >>> Le 28-janv.-07, à 20:21, Brent Meeker a écrit : > >>> > >>> > >>> > OK, but that means "observer moments" are not fundamental and the > "illusion" of their continuity may be provided by the continuity of > their underpinning. But I don't see how a strictly stepwise discrete > process as contemplated in the UD can provide that continuity. It > was > my understanding that it assumed consciousness could be provided by a > series of disjoint states. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> Yes. But a series of discrete states (or their godel number) has to be > >>> related by a computation for making sense. > >>> > >>> So it makes no sense to say that a sequence of number is a > >>> computation. > >>> You have to fix a "universal environment". Let us fix once and for all > >>> a godel numbering. Then it is only relative to some universal number > >>> that a sequence of number can be counted as a computation. > >> That sounds good - but I don't understand "universal environment" and > >> "universal number". We adopt a goedel numbering of arithmetic > >> expressions. Do we then represent the computation by a sequence of > >> goedel numbers, each number corresponding to a mental state (assuming > >> the computation is a simulation at a sufficient level to satisfy > >> comp)? But what number is "universal"? > > > > > > OK, remind me if I forget to comment this, but to explain what happens > > here I do say a little more on the Fi and Wi. A universal number is > > just the code of a universal machine or "interpreter" (in a nutshell). > > I will come back on this. > > > > > > > > > > > > > >>> Now, from a first person point of view, we don't know in which > >>> computation we belong. So from a first person point of view, we have > >>> to > >>> take all equivalent computations (number sequence) relative to all > >>> universal number. > >>> > >>> This is enough to explain why from first person points of view, > >>> computations seem to require a continuum. In a sense we have to be > >>> related to the continuum of computations going through our states (it > >>> includes the infinity of computations describing finer grained > >>> histories with respect to our comp level of substitution. > >> OK. So the order of computation provides the order of conscious states > >> (which may really be very complex and include more than just atoms of > >> experience); it is not inherent in the states. And this order is > >> relative to different goedel numberings? > > > > > > I am not sure to understand the relation of your quote of me and the > > idea that the order of the computations provides the order of the > > conscious state, unless you are refering to the logical order defined > > by each computational state. If you run the UD, some "internal first > > person future" could be implemented before some internal first person > > past, buut this has nothing to do with the logical or arithmetical > > order. OK? > > I intend to explain a bit more through the use of the Fi and Wi, (= the > > partial recursive functions and their domain of definition), but it > > would help me if you could explain what exactly (or more precisely) you > > mean by "order of computation". First person experiences have to be > > related to infinities of computational histories, right? > > I'm not sure. I was considering two kinds of order of computation. One is > the time order in the real world of processes in my brain or a computer > simulating me. The other was the order of generation of "states" by the UD. > I understand from your answer above that the order of generation, in either > case, is regarded as contingent and that 1st person experience is supposed to > be ordered by inherent properties of the states. > > If this is correct, it leads back to the question of how big is a > "computational state". It seems that for the inherent order to be coded in > the state, the state must be much bigger than what one is conscious of in an > "observer moment". It also implies, contra Stathis, that one cannot > subdivide a conscious state very finely in time. If you could then the finer > you divided it, the less information it contained, then the more histories it > would be consistent with. So how do you decide how big a computational state > is? If you make it big enough it may pick out a unique history, or at least > one that is unique over a significant time span (say many seconds)? You seem to be using "computational state" and "mental state" interchangeably. Even if the physical computation is necessary and sufficient for the mental state, this not the same as saying the two are identical. One point of difference between them is that the subjective order of the mental states may be unrelated to the actual order of the physical st
Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds
On Feb 1, 11:46 am, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > Le 29-janv.-07, à 18:19, Brent Meeker a écrit : > > >> Bruno Marchal wrote: > >>> Le 28-janv.-07, à 20:21, Brent Meeker a écrit : > > OK, but that means "observer moments" are not fundamental and the > "illusion" of their continuity may be provided by the continuity of > their underpinning. But I don't see how a strictly stepwise discrete > process as contemplated in the UD can provide that continuity. It > was > my understanding that it assumed consciousness could be provided by a > series of disjoint states. > > >>> Yes. But a series of discrete states (or their godel number) has to be > >>> related by a computation for making sense. > > >>> So it makes no sense to say that a sequence of number is a > >>> computation. > >>> You have to fix a "universal environment". Let us fix once and for all > >>> a godel numbering. Then it is only relative to some universal number > >>> that a sequence of number can be counted as a computation. > >> That sounds good - but I don't understand "universal environment" and > >> "universal number". We adopt a goedel numbering of arithmetic > >> expressions. Do we then represent the computation by a sequence of > >> goedel numbers, each number corresponding to a mental state (assuming > >> the computation is a simulation at a sufficient level to satisfy > >> comp)? But what number is "universal"? > > > OK, remind me if I forget to comment this, but to explain what happens > > here I do say a little more on the Fi and Wi. A universal number is > > just the code of a universal machine or "interpreter" (in a nutshell). > > I will come back on this. > > >>> Now, from a first person point of view, we don't know in which > >>> computation we belong. So from a first person point of view, we have > >>> to > >>> take all equivalent computations (number sequence) relative to all > >>> universal number. > > >>> This is enough to explain why from first person points of view, > >>> computations seem to require a continuum. In a sense we have to be > >>> related to the continuum of computations going through our states (it > >>> includes the infinity of computations describing finer grained > >>> histories with respect to our comp level of substitution. > >> OK. So the order of computation provides the order of conscious states > >> (which may really be very complex and include more than just atoms of > >> experience); it is not inherent in the states. And this order is > >> relative to different goedel numberings? > > > I am not sure to understand the relation of your quote of me and the > > idea that the order of the computations provides the order of the > > conscious state, unless you are refering to the logical order defined > > by each computational state. If you run the UD, some "internal first > > person future" could be implemented before some internal first person > > past, buut this has nothing to do with the logical or arithmetical > > order. OK? > > I intend to explain a bit more through the use of the Fi and Wi, (= the > > partial recursive functions and their domain of definition), but it > > would help me if you could explain what exactly (or more precisely) you > > mean by "order of computation". First person experiences have to be > > related to infinities of computational histories, right? > > I'm not sure. I was considering two kinds of order of computation. One is > the time order in the real world of processes in my brain or a computer > simulating me. The other was the order of generation of "states" by the UD. > I understand from your answer above that the order of generation, in either > case, is regarded as contingent and that 1st person experience is supposed to > be ordered by inherent properties of the states. > > If this is correct, it leads back to the question of how big is a > "computational state". It seems that for the inherent order to be coded in > the state, the state must be much bigger than what one is conscious of in an > "observer moment". It also implies, contra Stathis, that one cannot > subdivide a conscious state very finely in time. Is an observer any less conscious from one planck time to another? Although two consecutive planck times contain observer brains in nearly identical states, I see this as meaning over the course of a second, many subjectively indistinguishable observer moments are produced, it is only when there is a significant enough change in the state of the brain that one is able to notice it. This I think, is what sets our perceived speed of time (distinguishable observer moments/second). A simple thought experiment to determine if consciousness can be infinitely divided: If you were to freeze an observer in time, would that observer stop being conscious? I believe the representation of a mind in a certain state is conscious even if not actively changing, as it still contain
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
On Thursday 01 February 2007 19:34:41 Brent Meeker wrote: > Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > On Thursday 01 February 2007 19:28:07 Brent Meeker wrote: > >> Bruno Marchal wrote: > >>> Le 29-janv.-07, à 21:33, 1Z a écrit : > On 24 Jan, 11:42, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Le 23-janv.-07, à 15:59, 1Z a écrit : > >> Bruno Marchal wrote: > >>> Also, nobody has proved the existence of a primitive physical > >>> universe. > >> > >> Or of a PlatoniaCall it Platonia, God, Universe, or Glass-of-Beer, > >> we don' t care. But > > > > we have to bet on a "reality", if we want some progress. > > > > Now, here is what I do. For each lobian machine > > Where are these machines? Platonia? > >>> > >>> Where is the universe? > >> > >> Here. > > > > Where is "here" ? where are you in this "here" ? > > > > Quentin Anciaux > > I'm right here. In the same though... where are "you" where you're dead or before you're born... does it have meaning ? Or the reverse, where will be/was the universe after your death/before your birth ? Quentin --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
Quentin Anciaux wrote: > On Thursday 01 February 2007 19:34:41 Brent Meeker wrote: >> Quentin Anciaux wrote: >>> On Thursday 01 February 2007 19:28:07 Brent Meeker wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: > Le 29-janv.-07, à 21:33, 1Z a écrit : >> On 24 Jan, 11:42, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >>> Le 23-janv.-07, à 15:59, 1Z a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: > Also, nobody has proved the existence of a primitive physical > universe. Or of a PlatoniaCall it Platonia, God, Universe, or Glass-of-Beer, we don' t care. But >>> we have to bet on a "reality", if we want some progress. >>> >>> Now, here is what I do. For each lobian machine >> Where are these machines? Platonia? > Where is the universe? Here. >>> Where is "here" ? where are you in this "here" ? >>> >>> Quentin Anciaux >> I'm right here. > > Mouarf... > > I don't see you around... strange, maybe you're somewhere else. No. It's because you're not here. > > That remind me of my post about my impression of the locality of the mind > inside the body... it is right inside the phenomenal scene... the phenomenal > scene is right here or "here" is the phenomenal scene itself... Space and time are attributes of our model of the world - as is our concept of self and our locality. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
On Thursday 01 February 2007 19:34:41 Brent Meeker wrote: > Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > On Thursday 01 February 2007 19:28:07 Brent Meeker wrote: > >> Bruno Marchal wrote: > >>> Le 29-janv.-07, à 21:33, 1Z a écrit : > On 24 Jan, 11:42, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Le 23-janv.-07, à 15:59, 1Z a écrit : > >> Bruno Marchal wrote: > >>> Also, nobody has proved the existence of a primitive physical > >>> universe. > >> > >> Or of a PlatoniaCall it Platonia, God, Universe, or Glass-of-Beer, > >> we don' t care. But > > > > we have to bet on a "reality", if we want some progress. > > > > Now, here is what I do. For each lobian machine > > Where are these machines? Platonia? > >>> > >>> Where is the universe? > >> > >> Here. > > > > Where is "here" ? where are you in this "here" ? > > > > Quentin Anciaux > > I'm right here. Mouarf... I don't see you around... strange, maybe you're somewhere else. That remind me of my post about my impression of the locality of the mind inside the body... it is right inside the phenomenal scene... the phenomenal scene is right here or "here" is the phenomenal scene itself... Quentin --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
Quentin Anciaux wrote: > On Thursday 01 February 2007 19:28:07 Brent Meeker wrote: >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> Le 29-janv.-07, à 21:33, 1Z a écrit : On 24 Jan, 11:42, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Le 23-janv.-07, à 15:59, 1Z a écrit : >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> Also, nobody has proved the existence of a primitive physical >>> universe. >> Or of a PlatoniaCall it Platonia, God, Universe, or Glass-of-Beer, >> we don' t care. But > we have to bet on a "reality", if we want some progress. > > Now, here is what I do. For each lobian machine Where are these machines? Platonia? >>> Where is the universe? >> Here. > > Where is "here" ? where are you in this "here" ? > > Quentin Anciaux I'm right here. Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Searles' Fundamental Error
Brent Meeker wrote: > Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Where is the universe? > > Here. > And here (in this machine) too, of course. I thought I would just pop in and also say that I very much appreciated your recent post, Brent, where you made some very good points including the one about amoebas having values. I was s tempted to post a "me too" at that point. - Jef --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
On Thursday 01 February 2007 19:28:07 Brent Meeker wrote: > Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Le 29-janv.-07, à 21:33, 1Z a écrit : > >> On 24 Jan, 11:42, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > >>> Le 23-janv.-07, à 15:59, 1Z a écrit : > Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Also, nobody has proved the existence of a primitive physical > > universe. > > Or of a PlatoniaCall it Platonia, God, Universe, or Glass-of-Beer, > we don' t care. But > >>> > >>> we have to bet on a "reality", if we want some progress. > >>> > >>> Now, here is what I do. For each lobian machine > >> > >> Where are these machines? Platonia? > > > > Where is the universe? > > Here. Where is "here" ? where are you in this "here" ? Quentin Anciaux --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Le 29-janv.-07, à 21:33, 1Z a écrit : > >> >> >> On 24 Jan, 11:42, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >>> Le 23-janv.-07, à 15:59, 1Z a écrit : >>> >>> >>> Bruno Marchal wrote: > Also, nobody has proved the existence of a primitive physical > universe. Or of a PlatoniaCall it Platonia, God, Universe, or Glass-of-Beer, we don' t care. But >>> we have to bet on a "reality", if we want some progress. >>> >>> Now, here is what I do. For each lobian machine >> Where are these machines? Platonia? > > > > Where is the universe? Here. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds
Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Le 29-janv.-07, à 18:19, Brent Meeker a écrit : > >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> Le 28-janv.-07, à 20:21, Brent Meeker a écrit : >>> >>> >>> OK, but that means "observer moments" are not fundamental and the "illusion" of their continuity may be provided by the continuity of their underpinning. But I don't see how a strictly stepwise discrete process as contemplated in the UD can provide that continuity. It was my understanding that it assumed consciousness could be provided by a series of disjoint states. >>> >>> >>> >>> Yes. But a series of discrete states (or their godel number) has to be >>> related by a computation for making sense. >>> >>> So it makes no sense to say that a sequence of number is a >>> computation. >>> You have to fix a "universal environment". Let us fix once and for all >>> a godel numbering. Then it is only relative to some universal number >>> that a sequence of number can be counted as a computation. >> That sounds good - but I don't understand "universal environment" and >> "universal number". We adopt a goedel numbering of arithmetic >> expressions. Do we then represent the computation by a sequence of >> goedel numbers, each number corresponding to a mental state (assuming >> the computation is a simulation at a sufficient level to satisfy >> comp)? But what number is "universal"? > > > OK, remind me if I forget to comment this, but to explain what happens > here I do say a little more on the Fi and Wi. A universal number is > just the code of a universal machine or "interpreter" (in a nutshell). > I will come back on this. > > > > > > >>> Now, from a first person point of view, we don't know in which >>> computation we belong. So from a first person point of view, we have >>> to >>> take all equivalent computations (number sequence) relative to all >>> universal number. >>> >>> This is enough to explain why from first person points of view, >>> computations seem to require a continuum. In a sense we have to be >>> related to the continuum of computations going through our states (it >>> includes the infinity of computations describing finer grained >>> histories with respect to our comp level of substitution. >> OK. So the order of computation provides the order of conscious states >> (which may really be very complex and include more than just atoms of >> experience); it is not inherent in the states. And this order is >> relative to different goedel numberings? > > > I am not sure to understand the relation of your quote of me and the > idea that the order of the computations provides the order of the > conscious state, unless you are refering to the logical order defined > by each computational state. If you run the UD, some "internal first > person future" could be implemented before some internal first person > past, buut this has nothing to do with the logical or arithmetical > order. OK? > I intend to explain a bit more through the use of the Fi and Wi, (= the > partial recursive functions and their domain of definition), but it > would help me if you could explain what exactly (or more precisely) you > mean by "order of computation". First person experiences have to be > related to infinities of computational histories, right? I'm not sure. I was considering two kinds of order of computation. One is the time order in the real world of processes in my brain or a computer simulating me. The other was the order of generation of "states" by the UD. I understand from your answer above that the order of generation, in either case, is regarded as contingent and that 1st person experience is supposed to be ordered by inherent properties of the states. If this is correct, it leads back to the question of how big is a "computational state". It seems that for the inherent order to be coded in the state, the state must be much bigger than what one is conscious of in an "observer moment". It also implies, contra Stathis, that one cannot subdivide a conscious state very finely in time. If you could then the finer you divided it, the less information it contained, then the more histories it would be consistent with. So how do you decide how big a computational state is? If you make it big enough it may pick out a unique history, or at least one that is unique over a significant time span (say many seconds)? Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds
Le 29-janv.-07, à 18:19, Brent Meeker a écrit : > > Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> Le 28-janv.-07, à 20:21, Brent Meeker a écrit : >> >> >> >>> OK, but that means "observer moments" are not fundamental and the >>> "illusion" of their continuity may be provided by the continuity of >>> their underpinning. But I don't see how a strictly stepwise discrete >>> process as contemplated in the UD can provide that continuity. It >>> was >>> my understanding that it assumed consciousness could be provided by a >>> series of disjoint states. >> >> >> >> >> Yes. But a series of discrete states (or their godel number) has to be >> related by a computation for making sense. >> >> So it makes no sense to say that a sequence of number is a >> computation. >> You have to fix a "universal environment". Let us fix once and for all >> a godel numbering. Then it is only relative to some universal number >> that a sequence of number can be counted as a computation. > > That sounds good - but I don't understand "universal environment" and > "universal number". We adopt a goedel numbering of arithmetic > expressions. Do we then represent the computation by a sequence of > goedel numbers, each number corresponding to a mental state (assuming > the computation is a simulation at a sufficient level to satisfy > comp)? But what number is "universal"? OK, remind me if I forget to comment this, but to explain what happens here I do say a little more on the Fi and Wi. A universal number is just the code of a universal machine or "interpreter" (in a nutshell). I will come back on this. > >> >> Now, from a first person point of view, we don't know in which >> computation we belong. So from a first person point of view, we have >> to >> take all equivalent computations (number sequence) relative to all >> universal number. >> >> This is enough to explain why from first person points of view, >> computations seem to require a continuum. In a sense we have to be >> related to the continuum of computations going through our states (it >> includes the infinity of computations describing finer grained >> histories with respect to our comp level of substitution. > > OK. So the order of computation provides the order of conscious states > (which may really be very complex and include more than just atoms of > experience); it is not inherent in the states. And this order is > relative to different goedel numberings? I am not sure to understand the relation of your quote of me and the idea that the order of the computations provides the order of the conscious state, unless you are refering to the logical order defined by each computational state. If you run the UD, some "internal first person future" could be implemented before some internal first person past, buut this has nothing to do with the logical or arithmetical order. OK? I intend to explain a bit more through the use of the Fi and Wi, (= the partial recursive functions and their domain of definition), but it would help me if you could explain what exactly (or more precisely) you mean by "order of computation". First person experiences have to be related to infinities of computational histories, right? Bruno --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error (was: rep: rep: the meaning of life)
Le 29-janv.-07, à 21:33, 1Z a écrit : > > > > On 24 Jan, 11:42, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> Le 23-janv.-07, à 15:59, 1Z a écrit : >> >> >> >>> Bruno Marchal wrote: >> Also, nobody has proved the existence of a primitive physical universe. >> >>> Or of a PlatoniaCall it Platonia, God, Universe, or Glass-of-Beer, >>> we don' t care. But >> we have to bet on a "reality", if we want some progress. >> >> Now, here is what I do. For each lobian machine > > Where are these machines? Platonia? Where is the universe? > I prefer to assume what I can see. Fair enough. I think we can sum up the main difference between Platonists and Aristotelians like that: Aristotelians believe in what they see, measure, etc. But platonists believe that what they see is the shadow of the shadow of the shadow ... of what could *perhaps* ultimately exists. The deeper among the simplest argument for platonism, is the dream argument. Indeed, dreaming can help us to take some distance with the idea that seeing justifies beliefs. Put in another way, I believe in what I understand, and I am agnostic (and thus open minded) about everything else. Now to be sure, I am not convinced that someone has ever "seen" *primary matter*. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds
Stathis, If you answer better your own question than me, I will lose my job here :-) You put your finger on the very reason why "primary matter" is incompatible with computationalism. Concreteness can make histories singular only by adding actual infinities into it. Then from inside we have to take into account all interpretations, which, with church thesis, can be defined through one interpretation, and it can be shown it does not matter which one (for reason quite similar to those justifying that notions like Kolmogorov complexity are "machine independent"). I was preparing an answer to your post, but your own is clearer than mine. I will say more in an answer to Brent I intend to write tomorrow or this week-end. Hope the others will read and meditate this post ... Bruno Le 31-janv.-07, à 14:37, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : > On second thoughts, my objection below is invalid. My argument has > been that under the right interpretation, any string or any physical > system could be seen as implementing any meaning or computation: you > reverse the usual order and write the dictionary to match the symbols. > This only appears strange when the interpretation is not available: > however erratic-seeming the internal workings of a physical machine, > if it interacts with the environment in an appropriate way, and if it > follows the same protocols interacting with a virtual environment, we > can accept that it is carrying out a computation. But what if we > chanced upon the inputless version of this same computer in ignorance > of its function? We might discern patterns in its behaviour (provided > that it had not been deliberately designed to obscure pattern, like a > message encoded with a one-time pad) but we could attribute any > interpretation to these patterns that the designers *might* have > chosen, as there is no way to favour one over another. This means that > a given physical computer cannot be fixed as implementing one > computation unless taken in conjunction with a particular > interpretation, which is problematic when multiple interpretations > exist or might exist; that is, it shouldn't make any difference to an > inputless machine if the interpretation is contained in a printed > manual that is waved in front of it or if it exists as an abstract > possibility. > > The problem is solved in the case of abstract machines because there > is no mismatch between a single physical device and all the possible > interpretations. We can, as you say, fix an abstract machine or string > against a particular environment and consider just that combination. > In the physical world, someone may come along at any time and insist > that "cat" means "dog" in his language, but in Platonia you can simply > consider the cat-string/ cat-meaning combination, as it would be > logically inconsistent to say that the combination might mean > something else. > > Stathsi Papaioannou >> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com >> Subject: RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds >> Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2007 09:49:00 +1100 >> >> >> Bruno Marchal writes: >> >> > Le 28-janv.-07, à 20:21, Brent Meeker a écrit : >> > >> > > OK, but that means "observer moments" are not fundamental and the >> > > "illusion" of their continuity may be provided by the continuity >> of >> > > their underpinning. But I don't see how a strictly stepwise >> discrete >> > > process as contemplated in the UD can provide that continuity. It >> was >> > > my understanding that it assumed consciousness could be provided >> by a >> > > series of disjoint states. >> > >> > Yes. But a series of discrete states (or their godel number) has to >> be >> > related by a computation for making sense. >> > >> > So it makes no sense to say that a sequence of number is a >> computation. >> > You have to fix a "universal environment". Let us fix once and for >> all >> > a godel numbering. Then it is only relative to some universal number >> > that a sequence of number can be counted as a computation. >> >> This sounds a bit strange, as if you have the sequence of numbers, >> then you set their meaning, and thereby create the computation. How >> can you "fix once and for all a Godel numbering" in Platonia? How do >> you exclude all the other possible interpretations? >> >> > Now, from a first person point of view, we don't know in which >> > computation we belong. So from a first person point of view, we >> have to >> > take all equivalent computations (number sequence) relative to all >> > universal number. >> > >> > This is enough to explain why from first person points of view, >> > computations seem to require a continuum. In a sense we have to be >> > related to the continuum of computations going through our states >> (it >> > includes the infinity of computations describing finer grained >> > histories with respect to our comp level of substitution. >> > >> > Consciousness is typically a first
