Le 29-janv.-07, à 18:19, Brent Meeker a écrit :

> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Le 28-janv.-07, à 20:21, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>>> OK, but that means "observer moments" are not fundamental and the
>>> "illusion" of their continuity may be provided by the continuity of
>>> their underpinning.  But I don't see how a strictly stepwise discrete
>>> process as contemplated in the UD can provide that continuity.  It 
>>> was
>>> my understanding that it assumed consciousness could be provided by a
>>> series of disjoint states.
>> Yes. But a series of discrete states (or their godel number) has to be
>> related by a computation for making sense.
>> So it makes no sense to say that a sequence of number is a 
>> computation.
>> You have to fix a "universal environment". Let us fix once and for all
>> a godel numbering. Then it is only relative to some universal number
>> that a sequence of number can be counted as a computation.
> That sounds good - but I don't understand "universal environment" and 
> "universal number".  We adopt a goedel numbering of arithmetic 
> expressions.  Do we then represent the computation by a sequence of 
> goedel numbers, each number corresponding to a mental state (assuming 
> the computation is a simulation at a sufficient level to satisfy 
> comp)?  But what number is "universal"?

OK, remind me if I forget to comment this, but to explain what happens 
here I do say a little more on the Fi and Wi. A universal number is 
just the code of a universal machine or "interpreter" (in a nutshell). 
I will come back on this.

>> Now, from a first person point of view, we don't know in which
>> computation we belong. So from a first person point of view, we have 
>> to
>> take all equivalent computations (number sequence) relative to all
>> universal number.
>> This is enough to explain why from first person points of view,
>> computations seem to require a continuum. In a sense we have to be
>> related to the continuum of computations going through our states (it
>> includes the infinity of computations describing finer grained
>> histories with respect to our comp level of substitution.
> OK. So the order of computation provides the order of conscious states 
> (which may really be very complex and include more than just atoms of 
> experience); it is not inherent in the states.  And this order is 
> relative to different  goedel numberings?

I am not sure to understand the relation of your quote of me and the 
idea that the order of the computations provides the order of the 
conscious state, unless you are refering to the logical order defined 
by each computational state. If you run the UD, some "internal first 
person future" could be implemented before some internal first person 
past, buut this has nothing to do with the logical or arithmetical 
order. OK?
I intend to explain a bit more through the use of the Fi and Wi, (= the 
partial recursive functions and their domain of definition), but it 
would help me if you could explain what exactly (or more precisely) you 
mean by "order of computation". First person experiences have to be 
related to infinities of computational histories, right?


You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to