Re: Regarding Aesthetics

[Brent Meeker]

[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> 
> 
> On Sep 10, 5:06 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> 
>> Yes there is.  In fact descriptions with fewer free parameters are 
>> automatically
>> favored by Bayesian inference.
>>
>> http://quasar.as.utexas.edu/papers/ockham.pdf
>>
>> Brent Meeker
>>
> 
> Nice try.  That's an interesting paper, but it's merely one guys
> attempt to try to define the problem in terms of Bayesianism.  It does
> not provide solutions to (a) and (b), which remain unresolved.

I didn't say it solved all problems.  I just pointed out that Bayesian 
inference 
does inherently favor simplicity.

> 
> These types of attempts to try to reduce Occam's razor to Bayes soon
> run into a big big problem, which I have already mentioned:
> 
> There is more than one meaure of complexity.  For example,
> *information* is not the same thing as *knowledge*.  Shannon
> information is simply a measure of the degree of randomness in a
> string, whereas *knowledge* is more a measure of the amount of work
> that went into producing a string (ie it is *meaningful* information).

Knowledge is usually defined as true belief that is casually connected to the 
facts that make it true.  That has nothing to do with work (free energy? 
computational steps?).  You can certainly do a lot of work and end up with a 
false belief.

> 
> Effective use of Occam's razor also requires us to judge the
> simplicity/complexity of *meaningful information* (ie knowledge), not
> just Shannon information.  Bayesianism Induction cannot possibly do
> this, since it cannot handle the *semantics* (meaning) of the
> information, only the Shannon information.  

Bayesian inference only assigns probabilities to propositions in such a way as 
to maintain a certain kind of consistency.  It already assumes that these 
propositions have meanings - otherwise it would be impossible to say what it 
meant for one to have a certain probability.  It's just an extension of logic 
to 
allow values between "true" and "false".

>This it is because it only
> deals with the *functional* aspects of information... ie patterns as
> they appear to external observers, rather than what the patterns
> signify ( the *semantic* aspects of information).

But patterns only signify (have a semantic meaning) in a context that includes 
action and goals.  How information influences those actions provides a 
functional definition of it's content.

Brent Meeker


> > 
> 


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Re: Time and Freewill

[Jason Resch]

On Wed, Sep 10, 2008 at 12:30 AM, nichomachus
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>wrote:

>
>
>
> But what I wonder about is the implication that the physics of the
> universe are themselves unfolding in a computation of some sort. I
> mean, I agree with this idea, with this model of thinking about
> physics. But I am afraid the analogy breaks down, because I am unsure
> how we can know anything about the direction in which this presumed
> computation is occurring relative to our experience of time. We all
> know that the fundamental laws of physics are time reversible. How can
> someone living in the universe tell which direction the underlying
> program is executing in relative to the evolution of the universe in
> the up entropy direction. Perhaps, for all we know, the direction of
> computation is counter to the direction in which we seem to experience
> time. Perhaps it is in some orthogonal direction. Is there any way to
> tell? Maybe not, until we can finally understand the most fundamental
> physical laws governing our existence.
>
> These are thoughts that bug me late at night. But understand that I am
> not disagreeing with anything you said.


nichomachus,

Max Tegmark had a paper recently with a good explanation of why the
relations that describe the structure of the universe might be computable,
it would be incorrect to link the time dimension of the universe with the
way computers process information linearly.  In essence, he says, the
universe is composed of computable relations but the entire structure exists
as an unchanging four-dimensional block which simply is.  After some
searching though, I could not find the paper perhaps someone else on this
list recognizes it and could provide a reference.

If the universe is a four-dimensional mathematical structure, without any
direction of computation (atleast the computation is not tied to any
particular dimension of space-time), then how come it seems we have a
progression of time?  I would say this is a property of us and our
perceptions, which in turn are a product of evolution.  Biology first
learned to process and record information through DNA, through the dimension
of time, later brains developed and they too processed and stored
information through the dimension of time, in the same direction.  But why
this dimension out of the 4, and why this direction and not the other?
Something I read once suggested that the brain encodes information in one
direction because to record information requires expenditure of energy, and
expending energy increases entropy of the universe, and entropy of the
universe is always increasing in one direction of the time dimension.

Jason

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Re: Regarding Aesthetics

[marc . geddes]

On Sep 10, 5:06 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

>
> Yes there is.  In fact descriptions with fewer free parameters are 
> automatically
> favored by Bayesian inference.
>
> http://quasar.as.utexas.edu/papers/ockham.pdf
>
> Brent Meeker
>

Nice try.  That's an interesting paper, but it's merely one guys
attempt to try to define the problem in terms of Bayesianism.  It does
not provide solutions to (a) and (b), which remain unresolved.

These types of attempts to try to reduce Occam's razor to Bayes soon
run into a big big problem, which I have already mentioned:

There is more than one meaure of complexity.  For example,
*information* is not the same thing as *knowledge*.  Shannon
information is simply a measure of the degree of randomness in a
string, whereas *knowledge* is more a measure of the amount of work
that went into producing a string (ie it is *meaningful* information).

Effective use of Occam's razor also requires us to judge the
simplicity/complexity of *meaningful information* (ie knowledge), not
just Shannon information.  Bayesianism Induction cannot possibly do
this, since it cannot handle the *semantics* (meaning) of the
information, only the Shannon information.  This it is because it only
deals with the *functional* aspects of information... ie patterns as
they appear to external observers, rather than what the patterns
signify ( the *semantic* aspects of information).
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Re: Time and Freewill

[Brent Meeker]

Jason Resch wrote:
> 
> 
> On Tue, Sep 9, 2008 at 7:44 PM, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> > wrote:
> 
> 
> 2008/9/10 Jason Resch <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> >:
>  > Uv,
>  >
>  > One of the concerns people have with free will or the lack
> thereof is that
>  > if physics is deterministic, one's future actions can predicted
> beforehand,
>  > without them even having to exist.  However, an interesting
> consequence of
>  > computationalism is this: One's future actions cannot be
> predicted without a
>  > simulation that goes into enough detail to instantiate that person's
>  > consciousness.  As conscious creatures, our wills cannot be
> calculated
>  > without our consciousness being invoked by the calculations, just
> as the
>  > physics of this universe is doing now.
> 
> Hm, sounds good, but is that true?
> 
> 
> I think it is, if you ignoring unpredictability due to QM, measurement 
> problems, need to simulate the environment etc.  We can set aside the 
> debate on these other issues for the purposes of this thought experiment 
> by saying there exists a simulated mind and environment together inside 
> a computer and both the mind and environment evolve according to 
> deterministic rules which can be computed in finite time.
> 
> Within that situation, it is clear that there is no way to leap to 
> future states of the system other than having the computer compute each 
> intermediate step, skipping or abridging finer details of the system 
> (environment or the mind) will lead to ever growing inaccuracies later 
> down the road, as Rich mentioned a sensitive dependence on initial 
> conditions.  The only sure way to _know_ with certainty what the future 
> holds is to process every instruction of the program.  Unless you 
> believe in the possibility of philosophical zombies, a conscious being 
> cannot be accurately simulated without simulating its mind in enough 
> detail for that being to be conscious.
> 
> Jason

The impossibility of a philosphical zombie means that if you simulate the 
behavior of a conscious being you must thereby also instantiate consciousness. 
But Stathis is questioning the converse.  Is it possible to instantiate 
consciousness without simulating everything about the behavior?  And I'd say 
this question is different than the question of predicting behavior.  We might 
be able to instantiate consciousness and yet fail in predictions because of the 
sensitivity to initial conditions and/or quantum noise.

Brent Meeker

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Re: Time and Freewill

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2008/9/10 nichomachus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:

> But what I wonder about is the implication that the physics of the
> universe are themselves unfolding in a computation of some sort. I
> mean, I agree with this idea, with this model of thinking about
> physics. But I am afraid the analogy breaks down, because I am unsure
> how we can know anything about the direction in which this presumed
> computation is occurring relative to our experience of time. We all
> know that the fundamental laws of physics are time reversible. How can
> someone living in the universe tell which direction the underlying
> program is executing in relative to the evolution of the universe in
> the up entropy direction. Perhaps, for all we know, the direction of
> computation is counter to the direction in which we seem to experience
> time. Perhaps it is in some orthogonal direction. Is there any way to
> tell? Maybe not, until we can finally understand the most fundamental
> physical laws governing our existence.

We can't actually know what relationship subjective time has to
machine time: whether the machine implementing our consciousness is
running faster or slower, whether it stops completely for aeons then
restarts, whether the moments of our lives are run in reverse order or
all jumbled up, it will all seem the same to us, because there isn't a
little window in our peripheral vision showing what's going on in the
"real" world.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Time and Freewill

[nichomachus]

On Sep 9, 11:30 pm, "Jason Resch" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 9, 2008 at 7:44 PM, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>wrote:
> > 2008/9/10 Jason Resch <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> > > Uv,
>
> > > One of the concerns people have with free will or the lack thereof is
> > that
> > > if physics is deterministic, one's future actions can predicted
> > beforehand,
> > > without them even having to exist.  However, an interesting consequence
> > of
> > > computationalism is this: One's future actions cannot be predicted
> > without a
> > > simulation that goes into enough detail to instantiate that person's
> > > consciousness.  As conscious creatures, our wills cannot be calculated
> > > without our consciousness being invoked by the calculations, just as the
> > > physics of this universe is doing now.
>
> > Hm, sounds good, but is that true?
>
> I think it is, if you ignoring unpredictability due to QM, measurement
> problems, need to simulate the environment etc.  We can set aside the debate
> on these other issues for the purposes of this thought experiment by saying
> there exists a simulated mind and environment together inside a computer and
> both the mind and environment evolve according to deterministic rules which
> can be computed in finite time.
>
> Within that situation, it is clear that there is no way to leap to future
> states of the system other than having the computer compute each
> intermediate step, skipping or abridging finer details of the system
> (environment or the mind) will lead to ever growing inaccuracies later down
> the road, as Rich mentioned a sensitive dependence on initial conditions.
> The only sure way to _know_ with certainty what the future holds is to
> process every instruction of the program.  Unless you believe in the
> possibility of philosophical zombies, a conscious being cannot be accurately
> simulated without simulating its mind in enough detail for that being to be
> conscious.

Jason,

I agree with what you say about simulating minds. It seems very
reasonable to me that attempting to simulate a consciousness in detail
that is sufficient to reproduce behavior of that consciousness with
arbitrary precision would require processing of all intermediate time
steps. Also the point about identifying such a simulation with the
original consciousness. If it worked precisely the same, and received
exactly the same sensory input, the simulated consciousness and the
original would be one and the same. (And, since this assumes
determinism, free will must be an illusion, though choice most
definitely is not.)

But what I wonder about is the implication that the physics of the
universe are themselves unfolding in a computation of some sort. I
mean, I agree with this idea, with this model of thinking about
physics. But I am afraid the analogy breaks down, because I am unsure
how we can know anything about the direction in which this presumed
computation is occurring relative to our experience of time. We all
know that the fundamental laws of physics are time reversible. How can
someone living in the universe tell which direction the underlying
program is executing in relative to the evolution of the universe in
the up entropy direction. Perhaps, for all we know, the direction of
computation is counter to the direction in which we seem to experience
time. Perhaps it is in some orthogonal direction. Is there any way to
tell? Maybe not, until we can finally understand the most fundamental
physical laws governing our existence.

These are thoughts that bug me late at night. But understand that I am
not disagreeing with anything you said.
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Re: Regarding Aesthetics

[Brent Meeker]

[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Gunther,
> 
> Let me further clarify:
> 
> The problem with Bayesianism is that there is no precise definition of
> 'simplicity' and 'complexity' for finite strings, which is needed to
> effectively apply the principle of Occam's razor.  To elaborate:
> 
> (a)  There is no measure of simplicity/complexity for finite strings
> (b)  There is no way to justify why compressed descriptions of
> theories should be favored (Occam's razor)

Yes there is.  In fact descriptions with fewer free parameters are 
automatically 
favored by Bayesian inference.

http://quasar.as.utexas.edu/papers/ockham.pdf

Brent Meeker

> 
> We then apply Schmidhuber's theory of beauty.  According to
> Schmidhuber:
> 
> "Schmidhuber's Beauty Postulate (1994-2006): Among several patterns
> classified as "comparable" by some subjective observer, the
> subjectively most beautiful is the one with the simplest (shortest)
> description, given the observer's particular method for encoding and
> memorizing it. See refs [1-5]"
> 
>  http://www.idsia.ch/~juergen/beauty.html
> 
> Then, its clear that (a) and (b) are in fact being resolved via
> aesthetic judgements.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On Sep 9, 6:09 pm, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>> On Sep 9, 9:04 am, Günther Greindl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>>
>>> Here is a pertinent paper, just published:
>>> Unmasking the Truth Beneath the Beauty: Why the Supposed Aesthetic
>>> Judgements Made in Science May Not Be Aesthetic at All
>>> Cain S. Todd
>>> International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 22, Issue 1
>>> March 2008 , pages 61 - 79
>>> DOI: 10.1080/02698590802280910
>>> Cheers,
>>> Günther
>> If it comes down to an argument , between a computer scientist and a
>> philosopher, never trust the philosopher.
>>
>> It's time for me to call in my big guns Jürgen 
>> Schmidhuberhttp://www.idsia.ch/~juergen/beauty.html
>>
>> Cheers
> > 
> 


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10 Big Cog-Sci/AGI ideas

[marc . geddes]

*NM*
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Re: Regarding Aesthetics

[marc . geddes]

Gunther,

Let me further clarify:

The problem with Bayesianism is that there is no precise definition of
'simplicity' and 'complexity' for finite strings, which is needed to
effectively apply the principle of Occam's razor.  To elaborate:

(a)  There is no measure of simplicity/complexity for finite strings
(b)  There is no way to justify why compressed descriptions of
theories should be favored (Occam's razor)

We then apply Schmidhuber's theory of beauty.  According to
Schmidhuber:

"Schmidhuber's Beauty Postulate (1994-2006): Among several patterns
classified as "comparable" by some subjective observer, the
subjectively most beautiful is the one with the simplest (shortest)
description, given the observer's particular method for encoding and
memorizing it. See refs [1-5]"

 http://www.idsia.ch/~juergen/beauty.html

Then, its clear that (a) and (b) are in fact being resolved via
aesthetic judgements.




On Sep 9, 6:09 pm, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> On Sep 9, 9:04 am, Günther Greindl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > Here is a pertinent paper, just published:
>
> > Unmasking the Truth Beneath the Beauty: Why the Supposed Aesthetic
> > Judgements Made in Science May Not Be Aesthetic at All
>
> > Cain S. Todd
> > International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 22, Issue 1
> > March 2008 , pages 61 - 79
> > DOI: 10.1080/02698590802280910
>
> > Cheers,
> > Günther
>
> If it comes down to an argument , between a computer scientist and a
> philosopher, never trust the philosopher.
>
> It's time for me to call in my big guns Jürgen 
> Schmidhuberhttp://www.idsia.ch/~juergen/beauty.html
>
> Cheers
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Re: Time and Freewill

[Jason Resch]

On Tue, Sep 9, 2008 at 7:44 PM, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>wrote:

>
> 2008/9/10 Jason Resch <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> > Uv,
> >
> > One of the concerns people have with free will or the lack thereof is
> that
> > if physics is deterministic, one's future actions can predicted
> beforehand,
> > without them even having to exist.  However, an interesting consequence
> of
> > computationalism is this: One's future actions cannot be predicted
> without a
> > simulation that goes into enough detail to instantiate that person's
> > consciousness.  As conscious creatures, our wills cannot be calculated
> > without our consciousness being invoked by the calculations, just as the
> > physics of this universe is doing now.
>
> Hm, sounds good, but is that true?
>
>
I think it is, if you ignoring unpredictability due to QM, measurement
problems, need to simulate the environment etc.  We can set aside the debate
on these other issues for the purposes of this thought experiment by saying
there exists a simulated mind and environment together inside a computer and
both the mind and environment evolve according to deterministic rules which
can be computed in finite time.

Within that situation, it is clear that there is no way to leap to future
states of the system other than having the computer compute each
intermediate step, skipping or abridging finer details of the system
(environment or the mind) will lead to ever growing inaccuracies later down
the road, as Rich mentioned a sensitive dependence on initial conditions.
The only sure way to _know_ with certainty what the future holds is to
process every instruction of the program.  Unless you believe in the
possibility of philosophical zombies, a conscious being cannot be accurately
simulated without simulating its mind in enough detail for that being to be
conscious.

Jason

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Re: Time and Freewill

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2008/9/10 Jason Resch <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> Uv,
>
> One of the concerns people have with free will or the lack thereof is that
> if physics is deterministic, one's future actions can predicted beforehand,
> without them even having to exist.  However, an interesting consequence of
> computationalism is this: One's future actions cannot be predicted without a
> simulation that goes into enough detail to instantiate that person's
> consciousness.  As conscious creatures, our wills cannot be calculated
> without our consciousness being invoked by the calculations, just as the
> physics of this universe is doing now.

Hm, sounds good, but is that true?



-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Time and Freewill

[Rich Winkel]

On Tue, Sep 09, 2008 at 01:21:43PM -0500, Jason Resch wrote:
> One of the concerns people have with free will or the lack thereof is that
> if physics is deterministic, one's future actions can predicted beforehand,
> without them even having to exist.  However, an interesting consequence of
> computationalism is this: One's future actions cannot be predicted without a
> simulation that goes into enough detail to instantiate that person's
> consciousness.  As conscious creatures, our wills cannot be calculated
> without our consciousness being invoked by the calculations, just as the
> physics of this universe is doing now.

Sorry I haven't been following the thread, but I assume people have
also brought up issues like measurement error, sensitive dependence
on initial conditions and quantum uncertainty.

The next question I would have is: assuming such a program could
be fully realized and accurately initialized, would it have to have a
partitioned structure which would simulate the environment as well
as the internal mind of the individual, and would such a program
be capable of deducing logical shortcuts to the internal's next
state which are not already incorporated into the internal (and our
biological neural nets) at the corresponding point in "time".

Are we in some logical way an optimal expression of ourselves?
If so, it would seem we have free will at least in the sense of not
being predictable.

Rich


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Re: Time and Freewill

[Brent Meeker]

Jason Resch wrote:
> Uv,
> 
> One of the concerns people have with free will or the lack thereof is 
> that if physics is deterministic, one's future actions can predicted 
> beforehand, without them even having to exist.  However, an interesting 
> consequence of computationalism is this: One's future actions cannot be 
> predicted without a simulation that goes into enough detail to 
> instantiate that person's consciousness.  

I don't think this is true.  First, it is often possible to predict someone's 
actions in a particular situation, yet this clearly is not done by duplicating 
their consciousness.  So the amount of computation required to predict a 
conscious beings actions a little into future may not be that great.  To 
actually predict their behavior far into the future would also require 
simulating a very large part of their environment; stuff we don't normally 
consider part of their consciousness.  So conversely the computation required 
to 
instantiate consciousness, given the environment as input, may be fairly small.

Brent Meeker

> As conscious creatures, our 
> wills cannot be calculated without our consciousness being invoked by 
> the calculations, just as the physics of this universe is doing now.
> 
> Jason
> 
> 
> 
> On Tue, Sep 9, 2008 at 9:28 AM, John Mikes <[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> > wrote:
> 
> "uv"(??) wrote a well crafted post on concepts well endowed in our
> physical (reductionist, figmentous) science-terminology.
> I try to point to some other aspect.
> Free will is a figment of the religious etc. mindset to help people
> get into remorse and guilt feelings according to the tenets of the
> particular religion
> (patriotic, ethnic, racial, loyalty etc. domains).
> It comes with the negation of entailment in total interconnectedness
> - a sort of 1-way determinism in lieu of causality-framing from
> WITHIN the model of the actual considerations -
> akin to 'random' (the 'absolut' one, not the 'little random',
> mentioned earlier by Russell in defence of the 'random generating
> machines') which would inevitably lead to parallel "natures" and
> make the 'physical laws' meaningless.
> (I appologize for swinging between views, 'uv' seems to speak about
> concepts handled in the  'physical world' science-view).
> *
> Time I consider a coordinative help for us in THIS universe (I don't
> know about the others) but to make 'a' universe-startup more
> palatable for our human common sense than the Q-related Big Bang
> tale, I ended up in my "narrative" with a not knowable origin (I
> called it 'Plenitude' -plagierizing Plato's word) in a timeless -
> spaceless setup. So OUR poorly educated (historically spread)
> observations and their reductionist explanations (similarly upon the
> actual levels of thinking) i.e. sciences as we know them even today,
> work in time and space, while the projection into the Plenitude are
> - both -
> a-temporal and a-spatial.
> *
> Paradoxes and logically hard-to-follow complimentarity I consider as
> results from poorly observed and explained phenomena and their
> fitting into a system based on such. "uv" quotes some of these.
>  
> John M
> On Mon, Sep 8, 2008 at 7:58 PM, uv <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > wrote:
> 
> 
> You may have noted the increasing overlap between physics,
> mathematics, philosophy and neuroscience. Many people are still
> primarily focussed on quantum and gravitational matters which may be
> less relevant to some aspects of fundamental physics than
> experimental
> philosophy and logic. Bayesian reasoning is also becoming more and
> more the norm.
> 
> I have tried to update matters as far as possible in a paper
> available
> at Yates J., (2008)."Category theory applied to a radically new but
> logically essential description of time and space", Philica.com,
> Article number 135,  and in PDF format in the Cogprints archive at
> http://cogprints.org/6176/ and finally also in my blog at
> http://ttjohn.blogspot.com/ . I would be happy also to download
> a copy
> of this paper to the group. on request.
> 
> Later work will be likely to include experiments on the reverse
> Stickgold effect and the potential use of Global Workspace Theory in
> the MBI and such work effectively follows up my original UK
> patent now
> allowed to expire and publically available.
> 
> Very briefly my present theory allows most of quantum theory and
> gravity but introduces The Many Bubble Interpretation, which derives
> from McTaggart's ideas, and various examples of its use and
> effectiveness are referred to. The Schrodinger Cat paradox is
> essentially resolve

Re: Time and Freewill

[uv]

 "John Mikes" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes
>
I try to point to some other aspect.

Free will is a figment of the religious etc. mindset to help people
get into remorse and guilt feelings according to the tenets of the
particular religion (patriotic, ethnic, racial, loyalty etc. domains).
>

A reasonable overall view, but of course we are not essentially led to
it. We are covering an enormous spectrum of human endeavour. For
example there is a political view also, such as that of George Lakoff
who writes on freedom in "The Political Mind". And that has great
stature too but it still does not necessarily imply that we must vote
Democrat. That won't necessarily improve our scientific theory.

We need to take all the factors into consideration, but we can take
individual personal subjective factors into consideration as and when
we need to and see if they can relate to (relatively) objective fact.

>
(but) 'uv' seems to speak about concepts handled in the  'physical
world' science-view
>

Yes, up to a point.

uv



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Re: Time and Freewill

[Quentin Anciaux]

Hi,

2008/9/9 Jason Resch <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> Uv,
>
> One of the concerns people have with free will or the lack thereof is that
> if physics is deterministic, one's future actions can predicted beforehand,
> without them even having to exist.

Well the (m)u(n)(lt)iverse can be deterministic yet intractable to be
predicted, means it already uses the shortest algorithm to get there
so an accurate prediction should run this algorithm which cannot be
faster than what is simulated/predicted.

Quentin

> However, an interesting consequence of
> computationalism is this: One's future actions cannot be predicted without a
> simulation that goes into enough detail to instantiate that person's
> consciousness.  As conscious creatures, our wills cannot be calculated
> without our consciousness being invoked by the calculations, just as the
> physics of this universe is doing now.
>
> Jason
>
>
>
> On Tue, Sep 9, 2008 at 9:28 AM, John Mikes <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>>
>> "uv"(??) wrote a well crafted post on concepts well endowed in our
>> physical (reductionist, figmentous) science-terminology.
>> I try to point to some other aspect.
>> Free will is a figment of the religious etc. mindset to help people get
>> into remorse and guilt feelings according to the tenets of the particular
>> religion
>> (patriotic, ethnic, racial, loyalty etc. domains).
>> It comes with the negation of entailment in total interconnectedness - a
>> sort of 1-way determinism in lieu of causality-framing from WITHIN the model
>> of the actual considerations -
>> akin to 'random' (the 'absolut' one, not the 'little random', mentioned
>> earlier by Russell in defence of the 'random generating machines') which
>> would inevitably lead to parallel "natures" and make the 'physical laws'
>> meaningless.
>> (I appologize for swinging between views, 'uv' seems to speak about
>> concepts handled in the  'physical world' science-view).
>> *
>> Time I consider a coordinative help for us in THIS universe (I don't know
>> about the others) but to make 'a' universe-startup more palatable for our
>> human common sense than the Q-related Big Bang tale, I ended up in my
>> "narrative" with a not knowable origin (I called it 'Plenitude'
>> -plagierizing Plato's word) in a timeless - spaceless setup. So OUR poorly
>> educated (historically spread) observations and their reductionist
>> explanations (similarly upon the actual levels of thinking) i.e. sciences as
>> we know them even today, work in time and space, while the projection into
>> the Plenitude are - both -
>> a-temporal and a-spatial.
>> *
>> Paradoxes and logically hard-to-follow complimentarity I consider as
>> results from poorly observed and explained phenomena and their fitting into
>> a system based on such. "uv" quotes some of these.
>>
>> John M
>> On Mon, Sep 8, 2008 at 7:58 PM, uv <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>>>
>>> You may have noted the increasing overlap between physics,
>>> mathematics, philosophy and neuroscience. Many people are still
>>> primarily focussed on quantum and gravitational matters which may be
>>> less relevant to some aspects of fundamental physics than experimental
>>> philosophy and logic. Bayesian reasoning is also becoming more and
>>> more the norm.
>>>
>>> I have tried to update matters as far as possible in a paper available
>>> at Yates J., (2008)."Category theory applied to a radically new but
>>> logically essential description of time and space", Philica.com,
>>> Article number 135,  and in PDF format in the Cogprints archive at
>>> http://cogprints.org/6176/ and finally also in my blog at
>>> http://ttjohn.blogspot.com/ . I would be happy also to download a copy
>>> of this paper to the group. on request.
>>>
>>> Later work will be likely to include experiments on the reverse
>>> Stickgold effect and the potential use of Global Workspace Theory in
>>> the MBI and such work effectively follows up my original UK patent now
>>> allowed to expire and publically available.
>>>
>>> Very briefly my present theory allows most of quantum theory and
>>> gravity but introduces The Many Bubble Interpretation, which derives
>>> from McTaggart's ideas, and various examples of its use and
>>> effectiveness are referred to. The Schrodinger Cat paradox is
>>> essentially resolved in principle, the quantum Zeno effect
>>> interpretable, Kwiat's recent result referred to, and the newly
>>> discovered reverse Stickgold effect described. The reverse Stickgold
>>> effect may require the results of experimental philosophy to further
>>> it. Despite the name, the MBI ("Many bubble Interpretation")  is
>>> mostly good in neutral monism, despite having derived to some extent
>>> partly originated from the work of Kohler and Wertheimer.
>>>
>>> Freewill is certainly an important topic nowadays as fMRI results have
>>> sometimes been said to suggest that freewill does not exist. Haynes'
>>> work perhaps suggests that mental decisions may be made much earlier
>>> they are knowingly

Re: Time and Freewill

[Jason Resch]

Uv,

One of the concerns people have with free will or the lack thereof is that
if physics is deterministic, one's future actions can predicted beforehand,
without them even having to exist.  However, an interesting consequence of
computationalism is this: One's future actions cannot be predicted without a
simulation that goes into enough detail to instantiate that person's
consciousness.  As conscious creatures, our wills cannot be calculated
without our consciousness being invoked by the calculations, just as the
physics of this universe is doing now.

Jason



On Tue, Sep 9, 2008 at 9:28 AM, John Mikes <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> "uv"(??) wrote a well crafted post on concepts well endowed in our physical
> (reductionist, figmentous) science-terminology.
> I try to point to some other aspect.
> Free will is a figment of the religious etc. mindset to help people get
> into remorse and guilt feelings according to the tenets of the particular
> religion
> (patriotic, ethnic, racial, loyalty etc. domains).
> It comes with the negation of entailment in total interconnectedness - a
> sort of 1-way determinism in lieu of causality-framing from WITHIN the model
> of the actual considerations -
> akin to 'random' (the 'absolut' one, not the 'little random', mentioned
> earlier by Russell in defence of the 'random generating machines') which
> would inevitably lead to parallel "natures" and make the 'physical laws'
> meaningless.
> (I appologize for swinging between views, 'uv' seems to speak about
> concepts handled in the  'physical world' science-view).
> *
> Time I consider a coordinative help for us in THIS universe (I don't know
> about the others) but to make 'a' universe-startup more palatable for our
> human common sense than the Q-related Big Bang tale, I ended up in my
> "narrative" with a not knowable origin (I called it 'Plenitude'
> -plagierizing Plato's word) in a timeless - spaceless setup. So OUR poorly
> educated (historically spread) observations and their reductionist
> explanations (similarly upon the actual levels of thinking) i.e. sciences as
> we know them even today, work in time and space, while the projection into
> the Plenitude are - both -
> a-temporal and a-spatial.
> *
> Paradoxes and logically hard-to-follow complimentarity I consider as
> results from poorly observed and explained phenomena and their fitting into
> a system based on such. "uv" quotes some of these.
>
> John M
> On Mon, Sep 8, 2008 at 7:58 PM, uv <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>>
>> You may have noted the increasing overlap between physics,
>> mathematics, philosophy and neuroscience. Many people are still
>> primarily focussed on quantum and gravitational matters which may be
>> less relevant to some aspects of fundamental physics than experimental
>> philosophy and logic. Bayesian reasoning is also becoming more and
>> more the norm.
>>
>> I have tried to update matters as far as possible in a paper available
>> at Yates J., (2008)."Category theory applied to a radically new but
>> logically essential description of time and space", Philica.com,
>> Article number 135,  and in PDF format in the Cogprints archive at
>> http://cogprints.org/6176/ and finally also in my blog at
>> http://ttjohn.blogspot.com/ . I would be happy also to download a copy
>> of this paper to the group. on request.
>>
>> Later work will be likely to include experiments on the reverse
>> Stickgold effect and the potential use of Global Workspace Theory in
>> the MBI and such work effectively follows up my original UK patent now
>> allowed to expire and publically available.
>>
>> Very briefly my present theory allows most of quantum theory and
>> gravity but introduces The Many Bubble Interpretation, which derives
>> from McTaggart's ideas, and various examples of its use and
>> effectiveness are referred to. The Schrodinger Cat paradox is
>> essentially resolved in principle, the quantum Zeno effect
>> interpretable, Kwiat's recent result referred to, and the newly
>> discovered reverse Stickgold effect described. The reverse Stickgold
>> effect may require the results of experimental philosophy to further
>> it. Despite the name, the MBI ("Many bubble Interpretation")  is
>> mostly good in neutral monism, despite having derived to some extent
>> partly originated from the work of Kohler and Wertheimer.
>>
>> Freewill is certainly an important topic nowadays as fMRI results have
>> sometimes been said to suggest that freewill does not exist. Haynes'
>> work perhaps suggests that mental decisions may be made much earlier
>> they are knowingly decided. Haynes does go a lot further than Libet's
>> work and my experiments and theory will give us some answers finally.
>>
>> uv
>>
>> >>
>>

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Re: Time and Freewill

[John Mikes]

"uv"(??) wrote a well crafted post on concepts well endowed in our physical
(reductionist, figmentous) science-terminology.
I try to point to some other aspect.
Free will is a figment of the religious etc. mindset to help people get into
remorse and guilt feelings according to the tenets of the particular
religion
(patriotic, ethnic, racial, loyalty etc. domains).
It comes with the negation of entailment in total interconnectedness - a
sort of 1-way determinism in lieu of causality-framing from WITHIN the model
of the actual considerations -
akin to 'random' (the 'absolut' one, not the 'little random', mentioned
earlier by Russell in defence of the 'random generating machines') which
would inevitably lead to parallel "natures" and make the 'physical laws'
meaningless.
(I appologize for swinging between views, 'uv' seems to speak about concepts
handled in the  'physical world' science-view).
*
Time I consider a coordinative help for us in THIS universe (I don't know
about the others) but to make 'a' universe-startup more palatable for our
human common sense than the Q-related Big Bang tale, I ended up in my
"narrative" with a not knowable origin (I called it 'Plenitude'
-plagierizing Plato's word) in a timeless - spaceless setup. So OUR poorly
educated (historically spread) observations and their reductionist
explanations (similarly upon the actual levels of thinking) i.e. sciences as
we know them even today, work in time and space, while the projection into
the Plenitude are - both -
a-temporal and a-spatial.
*
Paradoxes and logically hard-to-follow complimentarity I consider as results
from poorly observed and explained phenomena and their fitting into a system
based on such. "uv" quotes some of these.

John M
On Mon, Sep 8, 2008 at 7:58 PM, uv <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

>
> You may have noted the increasing overlap between physics,
> mathematics, philosophy and neuroscience. Many people are still
> primarily focussed on quantum and gravitational matters which may be
> less relevant to some aspects of fundamental physics than experimental
> philosophy and logic. Bayesian reasoning is also becoming more and
> more the norm.
>
> I have tried to update matters as far as possible in a paper available
> at Yates J., (2008)."Category theory applied to a radically new but
> logically essential description of time and space", Philica.com,
> Article number 135,  and in PDF format in the Cogprints archive at
> http://cogprints.org/6176/ and finally also in my blog at
> http://ttjohn.blogspot.com/ . I would be happy also to download a copy
> of this paper to the group. on request.
>
> Later work will be likely to include experiments on the reverse
> Stickgold effect and the potential use of Global Workspace Theory in
> the MBI and such work effectively follows up my original UK patent now
> allowed to expire and publically available.
>
> Very briefly my present theory allows most of quantum theory and
> gravity but introduces The Many Bubble Interpretation, which derives
> from McTaggart's ideas, and various examples of its use and
> effectiveness are referred to. The Schrodinger Cat paradox is
> essentially resolved in principle, the quantum Zeno effect
> interpretable, Kwiat's recent result referred to, and the newly
> discovered reverse Stickgold effect described. The reverse Stickgold
> effect may require the results of experimental philosophy to further
> it. Despite the name, the MBI ("Many bubble Interpretation")  is
> mostly good in neutral monism, despite having derived to some extent
> partly originated from the work of Kohler and Wertheimer.
>
> Freewill is certainly an important topic nowadays as fMRI results have
> sometimes been said to suggest that freewill does not exist. Haynes'
> work perhaps suggests that mental decisions may be made much earlier
> they are knowingly decided. Haynes does go a lot further than Libet's
> work and my experiments and theory will give us some answers finally.
>
> uv
>
>
> >
>

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