Re: MGA 1

On Fri, Nov 21, 2008 at 7:54 PM, Kory Heath <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > On Nov 21, 2008, at 9:01 AM, Jason Resch wrote: > > What you described sounds very similar to a split brain patient I > > saw on a documentary. > > It might seem similar on the surface, but it's actually very > different.

Re: MGA 1

On Nov 21, 2008, at 9:01 AM, Jason Resch wrote: > What you described sounds very similar to a split brain patient I > saw on a documentary. It might seem similar on the surface, but it's actually very different. The observers of the split-brain patient and the patient himself know that som

Re: MGA 1

On Nov 21, 2008, at 8:52 AM, Jason Resch wrote: > This is very similar to an existing thought experiment in identity > theory: > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swamp_man Cool. Thanks for that link! -- Kory --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message becaus

Re: MGA 1

On Nov 21, 2008, at 8:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > On 21 Nov 2008, at 10:45, Kory Heath wrote: >> However, the materialist-mechanist still has some grounds to say that >> there's something interestingly different about Lucky Kory than >> Original Kory. It is a physical fact of the matter that Lu

Re: Little exercise

Kory: >"...It's not that I don't believe in life"< In WHAT??? Some people believe in god, some in numbers, none can reasonably identify the target of their belief. How about you? * >"... I just that I think that molecules, bits, patterns, whatever, are the things that play the role ..."< The

Re: MGA 2

Bruno Marchal wrote: > MGA 2 > > > The second step of the MGA, consists in making a change to MGA 1 so > that we don't have to introduce that unreasonable amount of cosmic > luck, or of apparent randomness. It shows the "lucky" aspect of the > coming information is not relevant. Jason thou

Re: MGA 1

Jason Resch wrote: > > > On Fri, Nov 21, 2008 at 5:45 AM, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED] > > wrote: > > > A variant of Chalmers' "Fading Qualia" argument > (http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html) can be used to show Alice must > be conscious. > >

Re: MGA 1

Kory Heath wrote: > > On Nov 21, 2008, at 3:45 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> A variant of Chalmers' "Fading Qualia" argument >> (http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html) can be used to show Alice must >> be conscious. > > The same argument can be used to show that Empty-Headed Alice must > als

MGA 2

MGA 2 The second step of the MGA, consists in making a change to MGA 1 so that we don't have to introduce that unreasonable amount of cosmic luck, or of apparent randomness. It shows the "lucky" aspect of the coming information is not relevant. Jason thought on this sequel. Let us consid

Re: MGA 1

Kory Heath wrote: > > On Nov 20, 2008, at 10:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> I am afraid you are already too much suspect of the contradictory >> nature of MEC+MAT. >> Take the reasoning has a game. Try to keep both MEC and MAT, the game >> consists in showing the more clearly as possible what wil

Re: MGA 1

On Fri, Nov 21, 2008 at 5:45 AM, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>wrote: > > A variant of Chalmers' "Fading Qualia" argument > (http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html) can be used to show Alice must > be conscious. > > Alice is sitting her exam, and a part of her brain stops working, > let's sa

Re: MGA 1

On Fri, Nov 21, 2008 at 3:45 AM, Kory Heath <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > However, the materialist-mechanist still has some grounds to say that > there's something interestingly different about Lucky Kory than > Original Kory. It is a physical fact of the matter that Lucky Kory is > not causa

Re: MGA 1

On 21 Nov 2008, at 10:45, Kory Heath wrote: > > ... > A much closer analogy to Lucky Alice would be if the doctor > accidentally destroys me without making the copy, turns on the > receiving teleporter in desperation, and then the exact copy that > would have appeared anyway steps out, because (

Re: MGA 1

This is one of those questions were I'm not sure if I'm being relevant or missing the point entirely, but here goes: There are multiple universes which implement/contain/whatever Alice's consciousness. During the period of the experiment, that universe may no longer be amongst them but shadows alo

Re: MGA 1

On Nov 21, 2008, at 3:45 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > A variant of Chalmers' "Fading Qualia" argument > (http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html) can be used to show Alice must > be conscious. The same argument can be used to show that Empty-Headed Alice must also be conscious. (Empty-Headed A

Re: MGA 1

A variant of Chalmers' "Fading Qualia" argument (http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html) can be used to show Alice must be conscious. Alice is sitting her exam, and a part of her brain stops working, let's say the part of her occipital cortex which enables visual perception of the exam paper. In tha

Re: MGA 1

Hi Gordon, Le 20-nov.-08, à 21:40, Gordon Tsai a écrit : > Bruno: >    I think you and John touched the fundamental issues of human > rational. It's a dilemma encountered by phenomenology. Now I have a > question: In theory we can't distinguish ourselves from a Lobian > Machine. But can lobian

Re: MGA 1

Jason, Nice, you are anticipatiing on MGA 2. So if you don't mind I will "answer" your post in MGA 2, or in comments you will perhaps make afterward. ... asap. Bruno Le 20-nov.-08, à 21:27, Jason Resch a écrit : > > > On Thu, Nov 20, 2008 at 12:03 PM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >

Re: Little exercise

On Nov 20, 2008, at 11:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > On 20 Nov 2008, at 10:13, Kory Heath wrote: >> What is your definition of "mathematicalism" here? > > > Strong definition: the big "everything" is a mathematical object. > (But perhaps this is asking too much. The whole of math is already not

Re: MGA 1

On Nov 20, 2008, at 10:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > I am afraid you are already too much suspect of the contradictory > nature of MEC+MAT. > Take the reasoning has a game. Try to keep both MEC and MAT, the game > consists in showing the more clearly as possible what will go wrong. I understand