On 28/11/2008, at 3:12 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I have just finished the explanation of an argument
(the movie graph argument, MGA) showing that Mechanism (the idea that
I am machine) is incompatible with Materialism, the idea that there is
some primitive stuffy universe from which
A representation of a thing (say MGA) is as good (ie as authentic) as
the thing being represented.
Yes?
Autrement dit:
there is no especial difference between the movie and the subject (of
the movie) - where the movie is a more or less complete (whatever
that means) representation of
Thanks, Brent,
at least you read through my blurb. Of course I am vague - besides I wrote
the post in a jiffy - not premeditatedly, I am sorry. Also there is no
adequate language to those things I want to refer to, not even 'in situ',
the ideas and terms about interefficient totality (IMO more
Hi Kim,
On 28 Nov 2008, at 09:54, Kim Jones wrote:
On 28/11/2008, at 3:12 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I have just finished the explanation of an argument
(the movie graph argument, MGA) showing that Mechanism (the idea that
I am machine) is incompatible with Materialism, the idea that
Hi Bruno,
So, basically, you are saying that I'm offering an alternative
argument against materialism, correct?
It seems to me you were going in that direction, yes.
Well, *I* was suggesting that we run up against the problem of time in
*either* direction (physical reality / mathematical
I guess I haven't read those papers, so sorry if I was leading you up
the garden path re GTMs.
It sounds interesting that the universal prior could work for
generalisation of the Turing machine, although I'm not sure what the
implications would be. Anyway, it sounds like you've got a research
Bruno,
I have done some thinking, and decided that I don't think this last
step of the argument works for me. You provided two arguments, and so
I provide two refutations.
1. (argument by removal of unnecessary parts): Suppose Alice lives in
a cave all her life, with bread and water tossed down
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