Re: MGA 3
Hi Jason, Le 03-déc.-08, à 17:20, Jason Resch a écrit : On Wed, Dec 3, 2008 at 9:53 AM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: and that by virtue of this imposed order, defines relations between particles. Computation depends on relations, be it electrons in silicon, Chinese with radios or a system of beer cans and ping-pong balls; Here you are talking about instantiations of computations relatively to our most probable computations, which have a physical look. But strictly speaking computations are only relation between numbers. Bruno, Thanks for your reply, I am curious what exactly you mean by the most probable computations going through our state if these computations cannot be part of a larger (shared universe) computation. Hmmm... It means you have still a little problem with step seven. I wish we share a computable environment, but we cannot decide this at will. I agree we have empirical evidence that here is such (partially) computable environment, and I am willing to say I trust nature for this. Yet, the fact is that to predict my next first person experience I have to take into account ALL computations which exist in the arithmetical platonia or in the universal dovetailing. Where does the data provided to the senses come from if not from a computation which also includes that of the environment as well? You don't know that. The data and their statistics come from all computational histories going through my state. The game is to take completely seriously the comp hyp, and if it contradicts facts, we will abandon it. But that day has not yet come Until then we have to derive the partial computability of our observable enviroment from a statistic on all computations made by the UD. Also, why does the computation have to be between numbers specifically, They don't. Sometimes I use the combinators. They have to be finite objects, and this comes from the *digital* aspect of the comp. hyp. could a program in the deployment that calculates the evolution of a universe This is something you have to define. If you do it I bet you will find a program equivalent to a universal dovetailer, a bit like Everett universal quantum wave. perform the necessary computations to generate an observer? Sure. The problem is that there will be an infinity of program generating the same observer, in the same state, and the observer cannot know in which computations it belongs. Never? Measurement particularizes, but never get singular. If they can, then it stands other mathematical objects besides pure turing machines and besides the UD could implement computations capable of generating observers. Not really. Those objects are internam construction made by programs relatively to trheir most probable history. I noticed in a previous post of yours you mentioned 'Kleene predicates' as a way of deriving computations from true statements, do you know of any good sources where I could learn more about Kleene predicates? A very good introduction is the book by N.J. Cutland. See the reference in my thesis. There are other books. I will think to make a list with some comments. Actually I really love Kleene's original Introduction to Metamathematics, but the notations used are a bit old fashioned. Hope I am not too short. I am a bit busy today, Best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: MGA 3
Brent, I try to single out where you depart from the comp hyp, to focus on the essential. I could add comments later on other paragraphs of your posts. Le 03-déc.-08, à 19:22, Brent Meeker a écrit : But there is causality. The sequence of events in the movie are directly caused by the projector, but they have a causal linkage back to Alice and the part of her environment that is captured in the movie. I see no principled reason to consider only the immediate cause and not refer back further in the chain of causation. If this were true, I don't see why I could say yes to a doctor for an artificial brain. I have to take account of the traceability of all part of the artificial brain. You have a problem with the qua computatio part of the MEC+MAT hypotheses, I think. This is coherent with the fact that you have still some shyness with the step six, if I remember well. They will be opportunity to come back. I have to go now. Bruno PS Abram. I think I will have to meditate a bit longer on your (difficult) post. You may have a point (hopefully only pedagogical :) http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: MGA 3
PS Abram. I think I will have to meditate a bit longer on your (difficult) post. You may have a point (hopefully only pedagogical :) A little bit more commentary may be in order then... I think my point may be halfway between pedagogical and serious... What I am saying is that people will come to the argument with some vague idea of which computations (or which physical entities) they pick out as conscious. They will compare this to the various hypotheses that come along during the argument-- MAT, MEC, MAT + MEC, Lucky Alice is conscious, Lucky Alice is not conscious, et cetera... These notions are necessarily 3rd-person in nature. It seems like there is a problem there. Your argument is designed to talk about 1st-person phenomena. If a 1st-person-perspective is a sort of structure (computational and/or physical), what type of structure is it? If we define it in terms of behavior only, then a recording is fine. If we define it in terms of inner workings, then a recording is probably not fine, but we introduce magical dependence on things that shouldn't matter to us... ie, we should not care if we are interacting with a perfectly orchestrated recording, so long as to us the result is the same. It seems like this is independent of the differences between pure-comp / comp+mat. --Abram --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Consciousness and free will
Bruno: I am aware of Everett's many worlds universe, which is predicted on the wavefunction not collapsing. So far, that seems to be experientally so. Not many Physicists take consciousness into account, althought there is a paper I just found today you may be interested in:http:// arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/0812/0812.0418v1.pdf Finally what is the computer simulating the multiverse running on? Ronald --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Consciousness and free will
Ronald, Bruno, and others: I am the 'old naive commonsesicle guy' who considers 'everything' as 'everything'. Not curtailed into mathematical, physical, or other human invented topical restrictions, not even into the possible as WE think about it today. I go with Hal Ruhl in washing away the limit to nothing, since we (humanly restricted minds) cannot fathom what we cannot fathom, but it may be included into REAL(?) everything. Maybe the list-name is thought as less than that? John M On Wed, Dec 3, 2008 at 9:14 AM, ronaldheld [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Bruno: We may be talking different thing but the TOE for Physics does not exist yet. I would think it would be QM and General Relativity and other things we do not know. Could this program be running an evolving mathematical structure or maybe you prefer evolving block universe/multiverse? Ronald --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: MGA 3
On Thu, Dec 4, 2008 at 5:19 AM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Hmmm... It means you have still a little problem with step seven. I wish we share a computable environment, but we cannot decide this at will. I agree we have empirical evidence that here is such (partially) computable environment, and I am willing to say I trust nature for this. Yet, the fact is that to predict my next first person experience I have to take into account ALL computations which exist in the arithmetical platonia or in the universal dovetailing. Bruno, I am with you that none of us can decide which of the infinite number of histories contain/compute us; when I talk about a universe I refer to just a single such history. Perhaps you use history to refer only to the computational history that implements the observer's mind where I use it to mean an object which computes the mind of one or more observers in a consistent and fully definable way. What I am not clear on with regards to your position is whether or not you believe most observers (if we could locate them in platonia from a 3rd person view) exist in environments larger than their brains, and likely containing numerous other observers or if you believe the mind is the only thing reified by computation and it is meaningless to discuss the environments they perceive because they don't exist. The way I see it, using the example of this physical universe only, it is far more probable for a mind to come about from the self-ordering properties of a universe such as this than for there to be a computation where the mind is an initial condition. The program that implements the physics of this universe is likely to be far smaller than the program that implements our minds, or so my intuition leads me to believe. I noticed in a previous post of yours you mentioned 'Kleene predicates' as a way of deriving computations from true statements, do you know of any good sources where I could learn more about Kleene predicates? A very good introduction is the book by N.J. Cutland. See the reference in my thesis. There are other books. I will think to make a list with some comments. Actually I really love Kleene's original Introduction to Metamathematics, but the notations used are a bit old fashioned. Thanks Bruno, I will look into those. Jason --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: MGA 3
On Wed, Dec 03, 2008 at 04:53:11PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I really don't know. I expect that the mathematical structure, as seen
from inside, is so big that Platonia cannot have it neither as element
nor as subpart. (Ah, well, I am aware that this is counter-intuitive,
but here mathematical logic can help to see the consistency, and the
quasi necessity with formal version of comp).
This point rather depends on what Platonia contains. If it contains
all sets of cardinality 2^{\aleph_0}, then the inside view of the
deployment will be conatained in it.
I do understand that your concept of Platonia (Arithmetic Realism I
believe you call it) is a Kronecker-like God made the integers, all
the rest was made by man, and so what you say would be true of that.
Cheers
--
A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au
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