Re: Consciousness is information?
2009/5/13 John Mikes : > Bruno, > merci pour le nom Jean Cocteau. J'ai voulu montrer que je semble > vivant. > I told my young bride of 61 years (originally economist, but follows all the > plaisantries I speculate on) about the assumptions you guys speculate on and > connect to assumptions of assumptions, Torgny the zombie, Stephen Leibnitz' > Monads, you numbers, others Q-immortality/suicide and partial teleportation > at the level of highest science - and she asked - > (because she believes in her love that I am into all that, - understanding): > "What do you guys hope to achieve by all this speculation?" > I replied: it's getting late, let's go to sleep. > > Well??? (I believe this is the most meaningful word in English) Mainly it's just fun; but it's also profoundly important from a practical point of view if, for example, other people are zombies or we are all immortal (in a non-living-dead sort of way), no? -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: 3-PoV from 1 PoV?
Hi Bruno, I see the goal that you have, as best I can understand your writtings and discussions. I salute your valiant efforts. The ideas that I have expressed so far, such as those in this exchange, are merely the misgivings and thoughts that I have based on my long study of philosophy, I can claim no certification nor degree. I am merely an amateur. I still do not understand how it is conscivable to obtain a property that is not implicit as a primitive from an assumption that is its contrary. I can not obtain free energy from any machine and I can not obtain change from any static structure. While it is true that one can agrue that the property of "saltiness" can not be found in the properties of "Clorine" nor "Sodium", this does not invalidate the question of origin because we can show that there is a similarity of kind and mere difference in degree between saltiness and chemical make up. Change and Staticness are categorically different in kind. This proplem is not unique to many monists attempts. The eliminatists, such as D.C. Dennett and other to refuse the existense of consciousness as a mere epiphenomena or "illusion" tells us nothing about the unavoidability, modulo Salvia for example, of qualia. By relagating the notion of implementation, to Robinson Arithmatic, etc., one only moves the problem further away from the focus of how even the appearence of change, dynamics, etc. obtain. The basic idea that you propose, while wonderfully sophisticated and nuanced, is in essense no different from that of Bishop Berkeley or Plato; it simply does not answer the basic question: Where does the appearence of change obtain from primitives that by definition do not allow for its existence? Kindest regards, Stephen - Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal To: everything-list Sent: Wednesday, May 13, 2009 11:11 AM Subject: Re: 3-PoV from 1 PoV? Hi Stephen, On 12 May 2009, at 19:53, Stephen Paul King wrote: Falsifiable bets. ;) Not all. You bet the number zero makes sense, but you can hardly refute this. You bet there is a reality, but you can't falsify this. Falsifiability just accelerate the evolution of theories. Works by John Case and its students make this a sort of law in theoretical inductive inference: in a sense the Popper falsifiability theory has been falsified :) I agree it is a fundamental criterion of interestingness. It is not by chance that I worked on showing digital mechanism to be an experimentally refutable theory. Leibniz' Monadology is difficult to comprehend because he starts off with an inversion of the usual way of thinking about the world. By assuming that the observer's point of view is the primitive, it follows that the notions of space and time are secondary, "orderings", and not some independent substance or container. That would be too nice to be true. Leibniz would be captured by the 3h and 5th arithmetical "hypostases". I have already tried, but I fail, and I cannot conclude. A synchronization of many such 1PoV, given some simple consistensy requirements, would in the large number limit lead to a notion of a "common world of experience". Don't you need some "common world of experience" to have a notion of synchronization? [spk] No, not if all of the structure that one might attribute to a "commn world of experience" is already within the notion of a monad. A Monad, considered in isolation, is exactly like an infinite quantum mechanical system. ? It has no definite set of particular properties, it has *all properties* as possibilities. What I am considering is to replace Leibniz' notion of a "pre-ordained harmony", his version of a a priori existing measure, I propose a notion of local ongoing process. A generalized notion of information processing or computation, for example. We see this idea expressed by David Deutsch in his book, The Fabric of Reality": "...think of all of our knowledge-generating processes, , and indeed the entire evolving biosphere as well, as being a gigantic computation. The whole thing is executiong a self-motivated, self-generating computer program. ... it is a virtual-reality program in the process of rendering, with ever increasing accuracy, the whole of existence." pg. 317-318 When we consider an infinity of Monads, each, unless it is identical to some other, is at least infinitesimably different. All of the aspects of a collections of Monads that are identical collapse into a single state, a notion of a background emerges from this. This idea is not different from the notion of a "collective unconsciousness" that some thinkers like Karl Jung have proposed. This leave us with finite distinctions between monads. Finite distictions leads us to notions of distinguishing finite processes, etc.
Re: Consciousness is information?
John, On 12 May 2009, at 22:42, John Mikes wrote: > (because she believes in her love that I am into all that, - > understanding): > "What do you guys hope to achieve by all this speculation?" I think there is a difference between speculating on the truth on some theories, and trying just to make as clear as possible those theories so that we can derive some observable consequences, so that we can make a test to luckily be able to abandon an erroneous speculation/ theory. And normally UDA shows that we cannot be consistent and still speculate on primary substance and on mechanism simultaneously, like we tend to do since a long time. And AUDA shows a way to test mechanism indeed. I don't like too much the word "speculation", because it can be used pejoratively, and people, when attributing it to you, believes that you are making some new extraordinary assumption, when, personally, I try to show the amazing things arrive already quickly with very simple common assumption believed by almost everybody (that our bodies obeys computable laws). Comp is a speculation, but it is far less speculative than any non- comp theory, which has to postulate actual infinities in the mind. Of course on this list we are ambitious in the spectrum of what we want to figure out. It is fundamental research. But many are just modestly searching. I guess most knows that theories are just ways to put some light on some part of the unknown, so that we can continue the exploration. What we hope? No more no less than those who have put Hubble in space. We hope to see big and beautiful things. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Victor Korotkikh
Thanks Russell, I will take a look. At first sight he makes the same "error" with numbers that Wolfram makes with cellular automata. Those are still mathematical form of physicalism, incompatible with the mechanist thesis in the cognitive science. Of course we converge toward rather similar (recursively isomorphic or weakened) ontologies. But they seems to believe they can recover some physics from that, where, saying "yes" to the surgeon requires to abandon that very idea. Physics, like in Plato and Plotinus, is not a mathematical structure among others, it is a mathematical structure which relate all mathematical structures in a precise way. Physics is somehow much more fundamental than being a thing completely describable by a set of mechanical laws. Pu in another way, such theories are unaware of the mind-body problem and still use an identity relation between a mind and a implementation of a program which UDA forces to abandon, to be frank. This does not mean those works are uninteresting of course, and they may play some role in the unravelling of the Minds and Bodies problems. Sure. Bruno On 13 May 2009, at 01:15, russell standish wrote: > > Hi Bruno, > > Have you come across Victor Korotkikh's stuff? He's got a recent > article out in Complexity: > > http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/121426751/abstract?CRETRY=1&SRETRY=0 > > (Complexity, 14, 40-46) > > It basically explores the organisational properties of the integers, > prime numbers etc. Which is kind of interesting in a pure mathematical > way, but he then uses this to model real complex systems, emergent > properties and so on. If you can't get the above paper, here is a much > earlier one that is not behind a paywall: > http://www.complexity.org.au/ci/vol03/victor2/ > > > I've met him a few times over the years - he's based in Townsville, > about 2000km north of here. He's an intense Russian who's presentation > is almost impenetrable - but there are people I respect who consider > him a genius. > > It struck me this morning how similar in many ways his programme is to > yours. I suppose you both share a strong neo-platonic viewpoint for > starters. > > Cheers > > -- > > > Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > Mathematics > UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpco...@hpcoders.com.au > Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: 3-PoV from 1 PoV?
Hi Stephen, On 12 May 2009, at 19:53, Stephen Paul King wrote: > > Falsifiable bets. ;) Not all. You bet the number zero makes sense, but you can hardly refute this. You bet there is a reality, but you can't falsify this. Falsifiability just accelerate the evolution of theories. Works by John Case and its students make this a sort of law in theoretical inductive inference: in a sense the Popper falsifiability theory has been falsified :) I agree it is a fundamental criterion of interestingness. It is not by chance that I worked on showing digital mechanism to be an experimentally refutable theory. > > Leibniz' Monadology is difficult to comprehend because he starts > off with an inversion of the usual way of thinking about the world. > By assuming that the observer's point of view is the primitive, it > follows that the notions of space and time are secondary, > "orderings", and not some independent substance or container. That would be too nice to be true. Leibniz would be captured by the 3h and 5th arithmetical "hypostases". I have already tried, but I fail, and I cannot conclude. > >> A synchronization of many such 1PoV, given some simple consistensy >> requirements, would in the large number limit lead to a notion of a >> "common world of experience". > > Don't you need some "common world of experience" to have a notion of > synchronization? > > [spk] > > No, not if all of the structure that one might attribute to a > "commn world of experience" is already within the notion of a monad. > A Monad, considered in isolation, is exactly like an infinite > quantum mechanical system. ? > It has no definite set of particular properties, it has *all > properties* as possibilities. > What I am considering is to replace Leibniz' notion of a "pre- > ordained harmony", his version of a a priori existing measure, I > propose a notion of local ongoing process. A generalized notion of > information processing or computation, for example. We see this idea > expressed by David Deutsch in his book, The Fabric of Reality": > "...think of all of our knowledge-generating processes, , and > indeed the entire evolving biosphere as well, as being a gigantic > computation. The whole thing is executiong a self-motivated, self- > generating computer program. ... it is a virtual-reality program in > the process of rendering, with ever increasing accuracy, the whole > of existence." pg. 317-318 > When we consider an infinity of Monads, each, unless it is > identical to some other, is at least infinitesimably different. All > of the aspects of a collections of Monads that are identical > collapse into a single state, a notion of a background emerges from > this. This idea is not different from the notion of a "collective > unconsciousness" that some thinkers like Karl Jung have proposed. > This leave us with finite distinctions between monads. Finite > distictions leads us to notions of distinguishing finite processes, > etc. > The notion of "synchronization" is a figure of speach, a stand > in, for that is called "decoherence" in QM theory. By seeing that > the phase relations of many small QM systems tend to become > entangled and no longed localizable, we get the notion of a > classical finite world. This is a "bottom up" explanation. Remember that with comp we just cannot take physics for granted. It is the whole point. > > > BTW: Notions, such as finitism, might be explained by > intensionally neglecting any continuance of thought that takes one > to the conclusion that infinities might actually exist! Comp is the most finitist theory possible in which you can still give a name to the natural numbers. It is not ultrafinitist in the sense that it shows machines can speed-up relatively to each other by giving name to infinities. But the infinities are epistemological, yet fundamental (physics is also epistemological here!). > > But here is the problem I have, merely "agreeing" that "all > dynamics are contained in the "block-arithmatic truth" will require > me to neglect the computational complexity of that "Block Truth". It is not so much a question of "agreement" than of "seeing the point". I don't see either why accepting that the dynamics are just emerging from some statistical relations between numbers (as treated by numbers) would in any way require you to neglect the computational complexity. On the contrary the realities are explicitly emerging from that complexity, but not ONLY from that complexity, it arises from the topologies of each "self-referencial" modalities and other mathematical constraints. Of course this makes the work technic. > > > The idea of a Platonic Universe of Arithmetical truth is a > notion that is only coherent given the tacit assumption to some non- > static process, such as that implicit in thought, al
Re: Consciousness is information?
Jason, thanks for your reply. Those BIG questions? IMO: typical "SO WHAT" ones. AND if we know? There is one (practical?) point though: knowing some 'right(?)' answer will reduce our danger to succumb to underhanded assumptions that mostly involve pressure to do what otherwise we wouldn't do. (Like killing the religiously 'infidel', or a gynecologist, and the like. Pay our church-tax and vote as the pastor/political leader said) And "the truth"? whose? we live in our 1-pov's mini-solipsism, limited to our own perceived reality plus the genetic- and experience- formed ways to interpret what we got as enrichment in the epistemic cognitive inventory and call it 'truth'. Any further learned information is stored(?) as interpreted into our own ways. No two persons have identical knowledge, belief, or thinking. John M On Tue, May 12, 2009 at 10:17 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > John, > > Great question I am glad you asked it. I think I was driven to this > list because of big questions, especially those which most people seem > to believe are unanswerable. Questions such as: Where did this > universe come from? Why are we here and why am I me? Is there a God? > What is responsible for consciousness? What is time? Is there life > after death? Etc. After much reading and thought I am now mostly > satisfied with the answers I have arrived at, and keeping up with this > list and the issues people raise on various topics helps me to keep > updating my models of reality to hopefully become more correct. I > think it is good mental exercise to ponder the questions people on > this list raise, and despite all the disagreement, chains of > assumptions, and inability to test many of the conjectures I think > this list is slowly making progress toward truth. > > Jason > > > On Tue, May 12, 2009 at 3:42 PM, John Mikes wrote: > > Bruno, > > merci pour le nom Jean Cocteau. J'ai voulu montrer que je semble > > vivant. > > I told my young bride of 61 years (originally economist, but follows all > the > > plaisantries I speculate on) about the assumptions you guys speculate on > and > > connect to assumptions of assumptions, Torgny the zombie, Stephen > Leibnitz' > > Monads, you numbers, others Q-immortality/suicide and partial > teleportation > > at the level of highest science - and she asked - > > (because she believes in her love that I am into all that, > - understanding): > > "What do you guys hope to achieve by all this speculation?" > > I replied: it's getting late, let's go to sleep. > > > > Well??? (I believe this is the most meaningful word in English) > > > > John M > > > > > > On Tue, May 12, 2009 at 11:22 AM, Bruno Marchal > wrote: > >> > >> Hi John, > >> > >> > >> > >> On 11 May 2009, at 22:49, John Mikes wrote: > >> > >> > > >> > who was that French poet who made puns after death? > >> > > >> >> ... > >> > A french poet said, after he died (!) : "friends, pretend only to > >> > cry because poet pretends only to dye". (Faites semblant de pleurer > >> > mes amis puisque les poètes font semblant de mourrir"). > >> > > >> > > >> > >> It is Jean Cocteau. > >> > >> In "Le Testament d'Orphée". A movie, made by Jean Cocteau, where he > >> plays the role of the dying poet. I am not entirely sure of the total > >> correctness of the quote. It could be "Faites semblant de pleurer mes > >> amis puisque les poètes ne font que semblant d'être mort". > >> > >> Best, > >> > >> Bruno > >> > >> > >> > >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > > > > > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
