Hi Bruno,

    I see the goal that you have, as best I can understand your writtings and 
discussions. I salute your valiant efforts. The ideas that I have expressed so 
far, such as those in this exchange, are merely the misgivings and thoughts 
that I have based on my long study of philosophy, I can claim no certification 
nor degree. I am merely an amateur. 
    I still do not understand how it is conscivable to obtain a property that 
is not implicit as a primitive from an assumption that is its contrary. I can 
not obtain free energy from any machine and I can not obtain change from any 
static structure. While it is true that one can agrue that the property of 
"saltiness" can not be found in the properties of "Clorine" nor "Sodium", this 
does not invalidate the question of origin because we can show that there is a 
similarity of kind  and mere difference in degree between saltiness and 
chemical make up. Change and Staticness are categorically different in kind.

    This proplem is not unique to many monists attempts. The eliminatists, such 
as D.C. Dennett and other to refuse the existense of consciousness as a mere 
epiphenomena or "illusion" tells us nothing about the unavoidability, modulo 
Salvia for example, of qualia.
    By relagating the notion of implementation, to Robinson Arithmatic, etc., 
one only moves the problem further away from the focus of how even the 
appearence of change, dynamics, etc. obtain. The basic idea that you propose, 
while wonderfully sophisticated and nuanced, is in essense no different from 
that of Bishop Berkeley or Plato; it simply does not answer the basic question: 

            Where does the appearence of change obtain from primitives that by 
definition do not allow for its existence? 
  Kindest regards,

  ----- Original Message ----- 
  From: Bruno Marchal 
  To: everything-list 
  Sent: Wednesday, May 13, 2009 11:11 AM
  Subject: Re: 3-PoV from 1 PoV?

  Hi Stephen,

  On 12 May 2009, at 19:53, Stephen Paul King wrote:

        Falsifiable bets. ;)

  Not all. You bet the number zero makes sense, but you can hardly refute this. 
You bet there is a reality, but you can't falsify this. Falsifiability just 
accelerate the evolution of theories.

  Works by John Case and its students make this a sort of law in theoretical 
inductive inference: in a sense the Popper falsifiability theory has been 
falsified :)

  I agree it is a fundamental criterion of interestingness. It is not by chance 
that I worked on showing digital mechanism to be an experimentally refutable 

        Leibniz' Monadology is difficult to comprehend because he starts off 
with an inversion of the usual way of thinking about the world. By assuming 
that the observer's point of view is the primitive, it follows that the notions 
of space and time are secondary, "orderings", and not some independent 
substance or container.

  That would be too nice to be true. Leibniz would be captured by the 3h and 
5th arithmetical "hypostases". I have already tried, but I fail, and I cannot 

        A synchronization of many such 1PoV, given some simple consistensy 
requirements, would in the large number limit lead to a notion of a "common 
world of experience". 

      Don't you need some "common world of experience" to have a notion of 


        No, not if all of the structure that one might attribute to a "commn 
world of experience" is already within the notion of a monad. A Monad, 
considered in isolation, is exactly like an infinite quantum mechanical system.


    It has no definite set of particular properties, it has *all properties* as 
        What I am considering is to replace Leibniz' notion of a "pre-ordained 
harmony", his version of a a priori existing measure, I propose a notion of 
local ongoing process. A generalized notion of information processing or 
computation, for example. We see this idea expressed by David Deutsch in his 
book, The Fabric of Reality": "...think of all of our knowledge-generating 
processes, ...., and indeed the entire evolving biosphere as well, as being a 
gigantic computation. The whole thing is executiong a self-motivated, 
self-generating computer program. ... it is a virtual-reality program in the 
process of rendering, with ever increasing accuracy, the whole of existence." 
pg. 317-318
        When we consider an infinity of Monads, each, unless it is identical to 
some other, is at least infinitesimably different.  All of the aspects of a 
collections of Monads that are identical collapse into a single state, a notion 
of a background emerges from this. This idea is not different from the notion 
of a "collective unconsciousness" that some thinkers like Karl Jung have 
proposed. This leave us with finite distinctions between monads. Finite 
distictions leads us to notions of distinguishing finite processes, etc.
        The notion of "synchronization" is a figure of speach, a stand in, for 
that is called "decoherence" in QM theory. By seeing that the phase relations 
of many small QM systems tend to become entangled and no longed localizable, we 
get the notion of a classical finite world. This is a "bottom up" explanation.

  Remember that with comp we just cannot take physics for granted. It is the 
whole point.


        BTW: Notions, such as finitism, might be explained by intensionally 
neglecting any continuance of thought that takes one to the conclusion that 
infinities might actually exist!

  Comp is the most finitist theory possible in which you can still give a name 
to the natural numbers. It is not ultrafinitist in the sense that it shows 
machines can speed-up relatively to each other by giving name to infinities. 
But the infinities are epistemological, yet fundamental (physics is also 
epistemological here!).

        But here is the problem I have, merely "agreeing" that "all dynamics 
are contained in the "block-arithmatic truth" will require me to neglect the 
computational complexity of that "Block Truth".

  It is not so much a question of "agreement" than of "seeing the point". 
  I don't see either why accepting that the dynamics are just emerging from 
some statistical relations between numbers (as treated by numbers) would in any 
way require you to neglect the computational complexity. On the contrary the 
realities are explicitly emerging from that complexity, but not ONLY from that 
complexity, it arises from the topologies of each "self-referencial" modalities 
and other mathematical constraints. Of course this makes the work technic.

        The idea of a Platonic Universe of Arithmetical truth is a notion that 
is only coherent given the tacit assumption to some non-static process, such as 
that implicit in thought, also co-exists. A What requires a To Whom. Being is 
the Fixed-Point of Becoming.

  To avoid confusion I would like to insist that what I call "Arithmetical 
Realism or Platonism" is just the very common belief that the principle of the 
excluded middle applies on the closed arithmetical sentences. (And I truly need 
only this on the Sigma_1 sentences, so it works in Intuitionist Mathematics 


        The problem is that all notions such as "substitute", "misunderstood", 
"understanding", "emerge", etc. all require some form of non-staticness. 

  I need the Robinson Axioms of Arithmetic for the ontology.
  I need the Peano Arithmetic induction axioms and/or infinitely others for the 
(internal and relative) epistemologies. I treat the case of the ideally 
self-referentially correct machines.

  If you understand UDA, you can understand that, except once for the "yes 
doctor", I never go out of arithmetic. Indeed, that is what is made explicit in 
AUDA. The appearance of dynamics in the machines' discourse is given by 
computations, and they have purely arithmetical representations.

    Simple existence, "necessary possibility", is not enough. The comp model is 
wonderfull, but it requires an engine of implementation.

  I give it. Robinson Arithmetic is the engine of implementation. Although I 
could have taken any first order logical specification of any universal system. 
I could have taken a Diophantine equation, or a base of combinators, or the 
game of life of Conway. Physics emerge internally in a way not depending on the 
ontological basic implementation system, and in a manner enough precise so that 
we can compare the comp-physics and nature. Quantum physics, up to now, 
confirms some weird aspect of comp (symmetry, many-worlds below the 
substitution level, non locality, indeterminacies, non boolean logics fro 
yes/no experiment, etc.). 




You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to