Bruno Marchal wrote:
> ...
>
> (*) Once and for all, when I say I am a modal realist, I really mean
> this "I have an argument showing that the comp theory imposes modal
> realism". I am really not defending any theory. I am just showing
> that the comp theory leads to precise and verifiabl
Kelly wrote:
>
> On May 23, 12:54 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>> Either of these ideas is definite
>> enough that they could actually be implemented (in contrast to many
>> philosophical ideas about consciousness).
>>
>
> Once you had implemented the ideas, how would you then know whether
>
OK. So, now, Kelly, just to understand what you mean by your theory, I
have to ask you what your theory predicts in case of self-
multiplication.
You have to see that, personally, I don't have a theory other than the
assumption that the brain is emulable by a Turing machine, and by
brain I
On May 23, 12:54 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> Either of these ideas is definite
> enough that they could actually be implemented (in contrast to many
> philosophical ideas about consciousness).
Once you had implemented the ideas, how would you then know whether
consciousness experience had actu
On Sat, May 23, 2009 at 8:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>> To repeat my
>> earlier Chalmers quote, "Experience is information from the inside;
>> physics is information from the outside." It is this subjective
>> experience of information that provides meaning to the otherwise
>> completely ab
On 23 May 2009, at 18:54, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> I think it is related. I'm just trying to figure out the implications
> of your theory for the problem of creating artificial, conscious
> intelligences. What I gather from the above is that you think there
> are
> degrees of consciousness ma
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 23 May 2009, at 09:08, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
>
>> But why? Why not RA without induction? Is it necessary that there be
>> infinite schema? Since you phrase your answer as "I am willing..." is
>> it a matter of your intuition or is it a matter of "degree" of
>> con
On 23 May 2009, at 09:35, Kelly Harmon wrote:
>
> Okay, below are three passages that I think give a good sense of what
> I mean by "information" when I say that "consciousness is
> information". The first is from David Chalmers' "Facing up to the
> Problem of Consciousness." The second is fro
I missed the meaning of *'conscious'* as applied in this discussion. *If we
accept* that it means 'responding to information' ( used in the wides sense:
in *responding* there is an *absorption* of the result of an observer
moment and *completenig relations thereof* and te *information* as the
*abso
On 23 May 2009, at 09:08, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>
> But why? Why not RA without induction? Is it necessary that there be
> infinite schema? Since you phrase your answer as "I am willing..." is
> it a matter of your intuition or is it a matter of "degree" of
> consciousness.
OK. I could have
Okay, below are three passages that I think give a good sense of what
I mean by "information" when I say that "consciousness is
information". The first is from David Chalmers' "Facing up to the
Problem of Consciousness." The second is from the SEP article on
"Semantic Conceptions of Information"
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 23 May 2009, at 06:39, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> On 22 May 2009, at 18:25, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
>>> ...
>>>
Do you believe if we create a computer in this physical
universe that it could be made conscious,
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