Bayes Destroyed?

2009-08-27 Thread marc.geddes
That which can be destroyed by the truth should be. -- P.C. Hodgell Today, among logicians, Bayesian Inference seems to be the new dogma for all encompassing theory of rationality. But I have different ideas, so I'm going to present an argument suggesting an alternative form of reasoning. In

Re: Bayes Destroyed?

2009-08-27 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 27 Aug 2009, at 08:19, marc.geddes wrote: But is there a form of math more powerful than algebra? Yes, Category/ Set Theory! Unlike algebra, Category/Set theory really *can* fully reason about itself, since Sets/categories can contain other Sets/ Categories. Greg Cantor first

Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-27 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2009/8/26 David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com: 2009/8/26 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com: With the example of the light, you alter the photoreceptors in the retina so that they respond the same way when to a blue light that they would have when exposed to a red light. Ah, so the

Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-27 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2009/8/27 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: Does functionalism mean nothing more than if the same inputs produce the same outputs then the experience will be the same?  I think this is to simplistic.  To reduce it to a really simple example, suppose your brain functions so that: You

Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-27 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2009/8/27 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: You are right. A simpler example is a dreamer and a rock, and the whole universe. They have locally the same input and output: none!  So they are functionally identical, yet very different from the first person perspective. This is why in comp I

Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-27 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2009/8/27 David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com: There's something trickier here, too.  When you say unless you are the system, this masks an implicit - and dualistic - assumption in addition to PM monism.  It is axiomatic that any properly monistic materialist account must hold all properties

Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-27 Thread David Nyman
2009/8/27 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com: This is because if consciousness is a computational process then it is independant of the (physical or ... virtual) implementation. If I perfom the computation on an abacus or within my head or with stones on the ground... it is the same (from

Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-27 Thread David Nyman
2009/8/27 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com: Perhaps not, but it's just words. Materialists use dualism as a term of abuse, and some materialists will call anyone who thinks a lot about consciousness a dualist, while some of those who think a lot about consciousness will do anything to

Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-27 Thread Flammarion
On 24 Aug, 16:23, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 22 Aug 2009, at 21:10, Brent Meeker wrote: But you see Brent, here you confirm that materialist are religious in the way they try to explain, or explain away the mind body problem. I can imagine that your consciousness supervene

Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-27 Thread Flammarion
On 26 Aug, 01:00, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: Just so. To recapitulate the (approximate) history of this part of the discussion, Peter and I had been delving into the question - posed by him - of whether a complete scan of a brain at the subatomic level could in principle

Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-27 Thread Flammarion
On 27 Aug, 01:35, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/8/27 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: The idea of 'being' somebody (or thing) else already assumes dualism. It assumes some 'I' that could move to be Stathis or a bat and yet retain some identity. But on a

Re: Bayes Destroyed?

2009-08-27 Thread Brent Meeker
marc.geddes wrote: That which can be destroyed by the truth should be. -- P.C. Hodgell Today, among logicians, Bayesian Inference seems to be the new dogma for all encompassing theory of rationality. But I have different ideas, so I'm going to present an argument suggesting an

Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-27 Thread Brent Meeker
Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2009/8/26 David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com: 2009/8/26 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com: With the example of the light, you alter the photoreceptors in the retina so that they respond the same way when to a blue light that they would have when exposed to a red

Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-27 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/8/27 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: Does functionalism mean nothing more than if the same inputs produce the same outputs then the experience will be the same? I think this is to simplistic. To reduce it to a really simple example, suppose your

Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-27 Thread Flammarion
On 21 Aug, 16:39, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/8/21 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: Do you concede that many aspects of mind -- cognition, memory and so on -- are not part of any Hard Problem? Yes, absolutely. But I think our basic divergence is that I say you can't

Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-27 Thread Flammarion
On 21 Aug, 21:01, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Flammarion wrote: Do you think that if you scanned my brain right down to the atomic level, you still wouldn't have captured all the information? That's an interesting question and one that I think relates to the

Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-27 Thread Flammarion
On 21 Aug, 20:40, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 21 Aug 2009, at 17:39, David Nyman wrote: With UDA alone, of course not. But AUDA does provides a a theory of qualia which explains why no 1- person can and will ever explain the qualitative feature of its qualia. It treats

Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-27 Thread David Nyman
2009/8/27 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: and hence that it can't in and of itself tell us anything fundamental about ontology. I don't think it revelas it sown ontology. OTOH, it must somehow be taken accounto fi in any succesful ontology because everything must. I've considered the

Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-27 Thread Flammarion
On 26 Aug, 17:58, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 26 Aug 2009, at 17:58, Brent Meeker wrote: What about lower levels? Surely it doesn't matter whether 10,000 K+ cross the axon membrane or 10,001 cross. So somehow looking at just the right level matters in the hypothesis of

Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-27 Thread Flammarion
On 27 Aug, 08:54, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/8/26 David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com: This is because if consciousness is a computational process then it is independant of the (physical or ... virtual) implementation. If I perfom the computation on an abacus or within my

Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-27 Thread Brent Meeker
David Nyman wrote: 2009/8/27 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: and hence that it can't in and of itself tell us anything fundamental about ontology. I don't think it revelas it sown ontology. OTOH, it must somehow be taken accounto fi in any succesful ontology because

Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-27 Thread Brent Meeker
Flammarion wrote: On 21 Aug, 21:01, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Flammarion wrote: Do you think that if you scanned my brain right down to the atomic level, you still wouldn't have captured all the information? That's an interesting question and one that I think relates