Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-15 Thread Craig Weinberg
nice

On Jul 15, 12:41 pm, meekerdb  wrote:
> On 7/15/2011 2:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> > Numerology is poetry. Can be very cute, but should not be taken too
> > much seriously. Are you saying that you disagree with the fact that
> > math is about immaterial relation between non material beings. Could
> > you give me an explanation that 34 is less than 36 by using a physics
> > which does not presuppose implicitly the numbers.
>
> 
> ||
>
> Brent

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-07-15 Thread Terren Suydam
Hi Bruno,

Roughly speaking, my main struggle with your wonderful arguments is
making the leap from the domain of mathematical logic to the one and
only domain we can be sure of as conscious, namely biological human
consciousness, and this without rejecting comp. Unfortunately I am
hindered by my lack of fluency in mathematical logic. See below for
comments.

On Tue, Jul 12, 2011 at 11:17 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> Hi Terren
>
> Apology  for commenting your post with some delay.

No worries about the delay. I play email chess and have had games over
a year old, so I am used to being patient :-]


>> To be sure, the
>> mathematical/logical framework you elucidate that captures aspects of
>> 1st/3rd person distinctions is remarkable, and as far as I know, the
>> first legitimate attempt to do so.  But if we're talking TOE, then an
>> explanation of consciousness is required.
>
> Right. But note that the notion of fist person experience already involved
> consciousness, and that we are assuming comp, which at the start assume that
> consciousness makes sense. The "explanation" per se comes when we have
> understand that physics emerge from numbers, and this in the double way
> imposed by the logic of self-reference. All logics (well, not all, really)
> are splitted into two parts: the provable and the non provable (by the
> machine into consideration).

I think the explanation of how physics emerges from the "number
theology" as you put it is a great contribution and certainly *part*
of an explanation of consciousness, especially in that it reduces the
mind/body problem to computer science, as you say.

But it is not enough to "merely" deal with the mind/body problem. The
hard problem of how qualia arise needs to be explained. I know you
have identified a logical framework that is capable of distinguishing
qualia and quanta from the point of view of the lobian machine, but
again, that strikes me as a description, not an explanation.

Another way to put it perhaps is that such a logical framework may
well be a *necessary* condition of a machine that can experience
qualia, but not a sufficient one. An example of a hypothesis that
takes this further towards an explanation is that an experiencing
machine needs to be embodied (a closed system) in some context (even
if in platonia) with a boundary that can be perturbed as a result of
that embodiment (i.e. what we think of as a sensory apparatus); and
that the machine synthesize these perturbations within the context of
a recursively updated model of "the world", grounded in the patterns
generated by those perturbations, and this model is the content of its
experience. Once the machine develops a model its world sophisticated
enough to include itself, it perhaps achieves Lobianity, although my
grasp of mathematical logic is too limited to say, unfortunately.

This hypothesis is what I happen to believe, but I'm not attempting to
argue for it or defend it here (if I were, I'd include much more
detail!)  My point here is only that I think there's an explanatory
gap that is possible to bridge, but that the self-references logics
that give rise to incommunicable beliefs don't bridge that gap
more on this later.

>>
>> Using the descriptor Bp to signify a machine M's ability to prove p is
>> fine. But it does not explain how it proves p.
>
> It proves p in the formal sense of the logician. "Bp" suppose a translation
> of all p, of the modal language, in formula of arithmetic. Then Bp is the
> translation of beweisbar('p'), that is provable(gödel number of p). If the
> machine, for example, is a theorem prover for Peano Arithmetic, "provable'
> is a purely arithmetical predicate. It is define entirely in term of zero
> (0), the successor function (s), and addition + multiplication, to gether
> with some part of classical logic. It is not obvious at all this can been
> done, but it is "well known" by logicians, and indeed that is done by Gödel
> in his fundamental incompleteness 1931 paper.

When you say "if the machine is a theorem prover", are you referring
to a trivial machine? Something you can assign to your students?

If yes, then I struggle to see how we can relate such a machine to the
consciousness we have access to (our own), see below. If no, then I
struggle to see how invoking a 'theorem prover' is not a "and then the
magic happens" leap of faith.


>> Löbian machines are mere descriptions, absent
>> explanations of how a machine could be constructed that would have the
>> ability to perform those operations.
>
> Those are very simple (for a computer scientist). I give this as exercise to
> the most patient of my students.

Then as above, I struggle to see how we can interpret the biological
machines we are familiar with (namely, us) in terms of Löbian logic.
Is human language an adequate substitute for the precise logical
domain of arithmetic and Gödelian numbering of propositions?  Natural
language is so messy and imprecise, but I may be missing the poin

Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-15 Thread meekerdb

On 7/15/2011 2:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Numerology is poetry. Can be very cute, but should not be taken too 
much seriously. Are you saying that you disagree with the fact that 
math is about immaterial relation between non material beings. Could 
you give me an explanation that 34 is less than 36 by using a physics 
which does not presuppose implicitly the numbers. 



||

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: bruno list

2011-07-15 Thread Craig Weinberg
>Could you define "perpendicular topologies"? You say you don't study
>math, so why use mathematical terms (which seems non sensical for a
>mathematicians, unless you do a notion of set of topologies with some
>scalar products, but then you should give it.

Yeah, I'm not sure if I mean it literally or figuratively. Maybe
better to say a pseudo-dualistic, involuted topological continuum?
Stephen was filling me in on some of the terminology. I'm looking at a
continuum of processes which range from discrete, [dense, public,
exterior, generic, a-signifying, literal...at the extreme would be
local existential stasis, fixed values, occidentialism (Only Material
Matter Matters)] to the compact [diffuse, private, interior,
proprietary, signifying, figurative...at the extreme would be non
local essential exstasis, orientalism (Anything Can Mean Everything)].
They are perpendicular because it's not as if there is a one to one
correspondence between each neuron and a single feeling, feelings are
chords of entangled sensorimotive events which extend well beyond the
nervous system.

Since the duality is polarized in every possible way, I want to make
it clear that to us, they appear perfectly opposite in their nature,
so I say perpendicular. Topology because it's a continuum with an XY
axis (Y being quantitative magnitude of literal scale on the
occidental side; size/scale, density, distance, and qualitative
magnitude on the oriental side; greatness/significance, intensity,
self-referentiality...these aren't an exhaustive list, I'm just
throwing out adjectives.). I'm not averse to studying the concepts of
mathematics, I'm just limited in how I can make sense of them and how
much I want to use them. I'm after more of an F=ma nugget of
simplicity than a fully explicated field equation. I want the most
elementary possible conception of what the cosmos seems to be.

>What do you mean by interior of electromagnetism.

The subjective correlate of all phenomena which we consider
electromagnetic. It could be more of an ontological interiority -
throughput.. I'm saying that energy is a flow of experiences contained
by the void of energy - and energy, all energy is change or difference
in what is sensed or intended. Negentropy. If there is no change in
what something experiences, there is no time. So it makes sense that
what we observe in the brain as being alterable with electromagnetism
translates as changes in sensorimotor experience.

>> Quantum Mechanics is a misinterpretation of atomic quorum sensing.
>This seems like non sense.

Didn't mean to be inflammatory there. What I mean to say is that the
popular layman's understanding of QM as how the microcosm works - the
Standard Model of literal particles in a vacuum with strange
behaviors, is inside out. What we are actually detecting is
particulate moods of sensorimotive events shared by our measuring
equipment (including ourselves) and the thing that we think is being
measured.

>>> Time, space, and gravity are void. Their effects are explained by
>> perceptual relativity and sensorimotor electromagnetism.

>?

Time is just the dialectic of change and the cumulative density of
it's own change residue carried forward. Space is just the
singularity's way of dividing itself existentially. If you have a
universe of one object, there is no space. Space is only the relation
of objects to each other. No relation, no space. Perceptual relativity
is meta-coherence, how multiple levels and scales of sensorimotor
electromagnetic patterns are recapitulated (again cumulative
entanglement...retention of pattern through iconicized
representation).

>> The "speed of light" c is not a speed it's a condition of
>> nonlocality or absolute velocity, representing a third state of
>> physical relation as the opposite of both stillness and motion.

>?
Stillness is a state which appears unchanging from the outside, and
from the inside the universe is changing infinitely fast. Motion is
the state of change relative to other phenomena, the faster you move
the more time slows down for you relative to other index phenomena. c
is the state of absolute change - being change+non change itself so
that it appears non-local from the outside, ubiquitous and absent, and
from the inside the cosmos is still.

Any better?

Craig

On Jul 15, 4:39 am, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> On 14 Jul 2011, at 14:39, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> > I don't want to talk about inner experience. I want to talk about my  
> > fundamental reordering of the cosmos, which if it were correct,  
> > would be staggeringly important and I have not seen anywhere else:
> > Mind and body are not merely separate, but perpendicular topologies  
> > of the same ontological continuum of sense.
>
> Could you define "perpendicular topologies"? You say you don't study  
> math, so why use mathematical terms (which seems non sensical for a  
> mathematicians, unless you do a notion of set of topologies with some  
> scalar products, but then you should giv

Re: bruno list

2011-07-15 Thread m.a.
You should get work helping Rachel collect material. You'd be a natural.m


  - Original Message - 
  From: Bruno Marchal 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Sent: Friday, July 15, 2011 4:39 AM
  Subject: Re: bruno list




  On 14 Jul 2011, at 14:39, Craig Weinberg wrote:


I don't want to talk about inner experience. I want to talk about my 
fundamental reordering of the cosmos, which if it were correct, would be 
staggeringly important and I have not seen anywhere else:

  1.. Mind and body are not merely separate, but perpendicular topologies 
of the same ontological continuum of sense. 
  Could you define "perpendicular topologies"? You say you don't study math, so 
why use mathematical terms (which seems non sensical for a mathematicians, 
unless you do a notion of set of topologies with some scalar products, but then 
you should give it.






  2.. The interior of electromagnetism is sensorimotive, the interior of 
determinism is free will, and the interior of general relativity is perception. 
  What do you mean by interior of electromagnetism.




  3.. Quantum Mechanics is a misinterpretation of atomic quorum sensing.
  This seems like non sense.






  4.. Time, space, and gravity are void. Their effects are explained by 
perceptual relativity and sensorimotor electromagnetism.
  ?




  5.. The "speed of light" c is not a speed it's a condition of nonlocality 
or absolute velocity, representing a third state of physical relation as the 
opposite of both stillness and motion.
  ?






It's not about meticulous logical deduction, it's about grasping the 
largest, broadest description of the cosmos possible which doesn't leave 
anything out. I just want to see if this map flies, and if not, why not? 




  Anyway, you seem to presuppose some physicalness, and so by the UDA 
reasoning, you need a physics and a cognitive science with (very special) 
infinities. This seems to make the mind body problem (MB), and its formulation, 
artificially more complex, without motivation. Without an attempt to make 
things clearer I can hardly add anything. Perhaps understanding the MB problem 
in the comp context might help you to formulate it in some non-comp context.

  Bruno




  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/







  -- 
  You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
  To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
  To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
  For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-15 Thread Craig Weinberg
Interesting stuff. I had a marathon info download with Stephen and
he's helping me access your theory more. Still scratching the surface
but at least getting a better idea of how to approach it.

What you call UDA I think of as 'Runtime' in comparison to the
hardware which I think of as the Singularity. The interior of the
singularity is the interior of the cosmos with all of the spacetime
vacuumed out of it. Spacetime is what exteriorizes the big bang
(meaning it's more of a Big Break, where the void of space rushes
inward. There is no exterior to the big bang since it prefigures
timespace, therefore it can only be conceived of accurately from the
interior perspective. explicates matter as volume and the void of time
explicates 'energy' (the experience of matter) as sequence-memory. The
Singularity then is always happening and never happening, since it is
outside timespace, the hub of the wheel of Runtime/UD.

I get what you are saying about Mickey Mouse as far as an Inception/
Matrix/Maya sense of value-weighted coherence within a semiotic frame
of reference, although I think there is something good there that you
are over looking. Something about the density of the simulated
universe which, by definition, can only be realized in comparison to
the experience of a denser, more discrete version of the simulation.
It's qualia of density/mass but there's something unique - it's the
qualia that pretends not to be qualia. I'm not seduced by the promise
of the Higgs or Einsteinian curved space (a brilliantly useful
metaphor, but the opposite of what is literally true) - more at a
concept of Cumulative Entanglement, where the sensotimotive relation
of processes separated by space is warped such that scale and density
is respected. Motive power is inversely proportionate to the
difference in the scale of the two densities, so that it's not gravity
exerting a field of force holding you to the ground, it's the
magnitude of the Earth, (and the momentum of it's rotation and
revolution? or no? Not an astrophysicist, haha) which weakens your
motive power to escape becoming part of it.

So yes, I am certainly willing to entertain comp as far as the cosmos
not being a concrete stuff but rather principles having an experience
of concreteness (by pretending they are the opposite end of what they
essentially are - ie chasing their tail, thus becoming existential and
completing the sensorimotive circuit of the singularity to become the
opposite of the singularity: not just everything and anything, but
finite, coherent things which come and go into existence, as well is
less coherent non-things that are literally felt out of insistence). I
don't want to limit comp to numbers though. I see that numbers have an
interior topology as well. That's qualia, and that's what numerology
tries to tap into. You're right, it is poetry, but that is the
interior of the cosmos. It insists. One has a personality. It's the
first, the only, the new, the solitary, etc. It's bold yet timid (it's
only frame of reference is 0 and 2). Two is a whole emergent identity,
coupling, relation, cooperation, equality, inequality, etc. So any
definition of comp to me would have to include the qualitative
interiority of numbers, the potential feelings, figurative,
metaphorical evocations which tie in the echo of the future by
subtracting from the singularity interior. Poetry pulls it down from
'heaven'.

Happy day-after-the-full moon Bruno. My head is banging on too many
cylinders right now but I look forward to continuing this soon. We
should trade tips on how to lower the control rods into our own
psychic fission pile and turn off the machine.



On Jul 15, 5:15 am, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> On 15 Jul 2011, at 00:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> >> The experience of seeing yellow might be, although its stability will
> >> needs the global structure of all computations.
> >> If you believe the contrary, you need to speculate on an unknown
> >> physics.
>
> > I don't consider it an unknown physics, just a physics that doesn't
> > disqualify 1p phenomena.
>
> So either you naturalize the quale, which can't work (it is a base on  
> a category error), or you introduce an identity thesis, which is ad  
> hoc, and logically incompatible with the comp. assumption.
>
> > I don't get why yellow is any less stable
> > than a number.
>
> Yellow, or any qualia. This is a consequence of the UDA. Are you  
> willing to imagine that comp *might* be true for studying its  
> consequence?
>
>
>
> >> Neither computer nor brain can think. Persons think.
> >> And a computer has nothing to do with electronic, or anything
> >> physical.
>
> > I get what you're saying, but you could put a drug in your brain that
> > affects your thinking, and your thinking can be affected by chemistry
> > in your brain that you cannot control with your thoughts. In my
> > sensorimotive electromagnetism schema, everything physical has an
> > experiential aspect and vice versa.
>
> That's a form of pant

Re: Bruno's blasphemy.

2011-07-15 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 15 Jul 2011, at 00:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:


The experience of seeing yellow might be, although its stability will
needs the global structure of all computations.
If you believe the contrary, you need to speculate on an unknown
physics.


I don't consider it an unknown physics, just a physics that doesn't
disqualify 1p phenomena.


So either you naturalize the quale, which can't work (it is a base on  
a category error), or you introduce an identity thesis, which is ad  
hoc, and logically incompatible with the comp. assumption.






I don't get why yellow is any less stable
than a number.


Yellow, or any qualia. This is a consequence of the UDA. Are you  
willing to imagine that comp *might* be true for studying its  
consequence?






Neither computer nor brain can think. Persons think.
And a computer has nothing to do with electronic, or anything
physical.


I get what you're saying, but you could put a drug in your brain that
affects your thinking, and your thinking can be affected by chemistry
in your brain that you cannot control with your thoughts. In my
sensorimotive electromagnetism schema, everything physical has an
experiential aspect and vice versa.


That's a form of pantheism, which does not explain what is matter, nor  
mind.





Bruno:
It is more an information pattern which can emulate all
computable pattern evolution. It has been discovered in math. It
exists by virtue of elementary arithmetic. We can implement it in
the
physical reality, but this shows only that physical reality is at
least Turing universal.

CW: It sounds like what you're suggesting is that numbers exist
independently of physical matter, whereas I would say that numbers
insist through the experiences within physical matter.


I find natural to suppose that 17 is prime independently of universes  
and human beings. I need it if only to grasp actual theories of matter  
which presuppose them logically. I don't need to know what numbers  
are. I need only some agreement on some axioms, like "for all natural  
numbers x we have that s(x) is different from 0", etc. Then I can  
explain the appearances of matter and mind from the relations  
inherited by only addition and multiplication. It is amazing (for non  
logician) but if comp is true, we don't need more than elementary  
arithmetic. We don't need to postulate a physical universe, nor  
consciousness.








 The point is that the universe is not made of anything. Neither
physical primitive stuff, nor mathematical stuff. You have to study
the argument to make sense of this. So you have to accept the comp
hypothesis at least for the sake of the argument.


Hmm. If the universe isn't made of anything than your point isn't made
of anything either. I don't get it.


The game of bridge is not made of quarks and electron. No mathematical  
object is made of something. My point is a reasoning, you have to  
cjeck his validity. It is non sense to assume a logical point has to  
be made of something. You are confusing software and hardware (and  
with comp, the difference is relative, and eventually hardware does  
not exist: it is "in the head of the universal machines": that is  
enough to derive physics (which becomes a first person plural measure  
on possible computational histories).







Also, we are not made of math. math is not a stuffy thing. It is just
a collection of true fact about immaterial beings.


Have you read any numerology?


Numerology is poetry. Can be very cute, but should not be taken too  
much seriously. Are you saying that you disagree with the fact that  
math is about immaterial relation between non material beings. Could  
you give me an explanation that 34 is less than 36 by using a physics  
which does not presuppose implicitly the numbers.







Relatively to universal number, number do many things. we know now
that their doing escape any complete theories. We know now why  
numbers

have unbounded behavior complexity. It seems to me that you can
already intuit this when looking at the Mandelbrot set, where a very
simple mathematical operation defines a montruously complex object.


The complexity is in the eye of the perceiver. Your human visual sense
is what unites the Mandelbrot set into a fractal pattern. There is no
independent 'pattern' there unless what you are made of can relate to
it as a coherent whole rather than a million unrelated pixels as your
video card sees it, or maybe as a nondescript moving blur as a gopher
might see it.


OK, but I don't take "human" as primitive. I explain "human" by  
(special) universal machine (a purely mathematical notion whose  
existence is a consequence of addition and multiplication). That  
explain matter, too. Indeed, that makes physics completely derivable  
(not derived!) from arithmetic. So we can test the comp. hyp. by  
comparing the comp physics, and empiric data.






I cannot be satisfied with this, because it put what I want to  
explain

(mind and matter) in the starting

Re: bruno list

2011-07-15 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 14 Jul 2011, at 14:39, Craig Weinberg wrote:

I don't want to talk about inner experience. I want to talk about my  
fundamental reordering of the cosmos, which if it were correct,  
would be staggeringly important and I have not seen anywhere else:
Mind and body are not merely separate, but perpendicular topologies  
of the same ontological continuum of sense.
Could you define "perpendicular topologies"? You say you don't study  
math, so why use mathematical terms (which seems non sensical for a  
mathematicians, unless you do a notion of set of topologies with some  
scalar products, but then you should give it.




The interior of electromagnetism is sensorimotive, the interior of  
determinism is free will, and the interior of general relativity is  
perception.

What do you mean by interior of electromagnetism.



Quantum Mechanics is a misinterpretation of atomic quorum sensing.

This seems like non sense.



Time, space, and gravity are void. Their effects are explained by  
perceptual relativity and sensorimotor electromagnetism.

?


The "speed of light" c is not a speed it's a condition of  
nonlocality or absolute velocity, representing a third state of  
physical relation as the opposite of both stillness and motion.

?



It's not about meticulous logical deduction, it's about grasping the  
largest, broadest description of the cosmos possible which doesn't  
leave anything out. I just want to see if this map flies, and if  
not, why not?



Anyway, you seem to presuppose some physicalness, and so by the UDA  
reasoning, you need a physics and a cognitive science with (very  
special) infinities. This seems to make the mind body problem (MB),  
and its formulation, artificially more complex, without motivation.  
Without an attempt to make things clearer I can hardly add anything.  
Perhaps understanding the MB problem in the comp context might help  
you to formulate it in some non-comp context.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



DVD alloys help make computers that think like us

2011-07-15 Thread Evgenii Rudnyi

http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21128205.200-dvd-alloys-help-make-computers-that-think-like-us.html

"A brain-like computer is one that can learn and adapt without external 
programming. Such an ability would allow machines to become far better 
at tasks like face and speech recognition. They could also process and 
store data in the same location - just as nerve cells do. Conventional 
computing loses efficiency by keeping these functions separate."


"In the UK, David Wright and colleagues at the University of Exeter have 
created a GST neuron (Advanced Materials, DOI: 10.1002/adma.201101060), 
while at Stanford University in California, Philip Wong's group have 
created a nanoscale electronic synapse. The junction even mimics the way 
synapses can change their connection strength (Nano Letters, DOI: 
10.1021/nl201040y)."


Well, they do say if the GST allay will generate qualia as well.

Evgenii

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.