Interesting stuff. I had a marathon info download with Stephen and he's helping me access your theory more. Still scratching the surface but at least getting a better idea of how to approach it.
What you call UDA I think of as 'Runtime' in comparison to the hardware which I think of as the Singularity. The interior of the singularity is the interior of the cosmos with all of the spacetime vacuumed out of it. Spacetime is what exteriorizes the big bang (meaning it's more of a Big Break, where the void of space rushes inward. There is no exterior to the big bang since it prefigures timespace, therefore it can only be conceived of accurately from the interior perspective. explicates matter as volume and the void of time explicates 'energy' (the experience of matter) as sequence-memory. The Singularity then is always happening and never happening, since it is outside timespace, the hub of the wheel of Runtime/UD. I get what you are saying about Mickey Mouse as far as an Inception/ Matrix/Maya sense of value-weighted coherence within a semiotic frame of reference, although I think there is something good there that you are over looking. Something about the density of the simulated universe which, by definition, can only be realized in comparison to the experience of a denser, more discrete version of the simulation. It's qualia of density/mass but there's something unique - it's the qualia that pretends not to be qualia. I'm not seduced by the promise of the Higgs or Einsteinian curved space (a brilliantly useful metaphor, but the opposite of what is literally true) - more at a concept of Cumulative Entanglement, where the sensotimotive relation of processes separated by space is warped such that scale and density is respected. Motive power is inversely proportionate to the difference in the scale of the two densities, so that it's not gravity exerting a field of force holding you to the ground, it's the magnitude of the Earth, (and the momentum of it's rotation and revolution? or no? Not an astrophysicist, haha) which weakens your motive power to escape becoming part of it. So yes, I am certainly willing to entertain comp as far as the cosmos not being a concrete stuff but rather principles having an experience of concreteness (by pretending they are the opposite end of what they essentially are - ie chasing their tail, thus becoming existential and completing the sensorimotive circuit of the singularity to become the opposite of the singularity: not just everything and anything, but finite, coherent things which come and go into existence, as well is less coherent non-things that are literally felt out of insistence). I don't want to limit comp to numbers though. I see that numbers have an interior topology as well. That's qualia, and that's what numerology tries to tap into. You're right, it is poetry, but that is the interior of the cosmos. It insists. One has a personality. It's the first, the only, the new, the solitary, etc. It's bold yet timid (it's only frame of reference is 0 and 2). Two is a whole emergent identity, coupling, relation, cooperation, equality, inequality, etc. So any definition of comp to me would have to include the qualitative interiority of numbers, the potential feelings, figurative, metaphorical evocations which tie in the echo of the future by subtracting from the singularity interior. Poetry pulls it down from 'heaven'. Happy day-after-the-full moon Bruno. My head is banging on too many cylinders right now but I look forward to continuing this soon. We should trade tips on how to lower the control rods into our own psychic fission pile and turn off the machine. On Jul 15, 5:15 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > On 15 Jul 2011, at 00:42, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > >> The experience of seeing yellow might be, although its stability will > >> needs the global structure of all computations. > >> If you believe the contrary, you need to speculate on an unknown > >> physics. > > > I don't consider it an unknown physics, just a physics that doesn't > > disqualify 1p phenomena. > > So either you naturalize the quale, which can't work (it is a base on > a category error), or you introduce an identity thesis, which is ad > hoc, and logically incompatible with the comp. assumption. > > > I don't get why yellow is any less stable > > than a number. > > Yellow, or any qualia. This is a consequence of the UDA. Are you > willing to imagine that comp *might* be true for studying its > consequence? > > > > >> Neither computer nor brain can think. Persons think. > >> And a computer has nothing to do with electronic, or anything > >> physical. > > > I get what you're saying, but you could put a drug in your brain that > > affects your thinking, and your thinking can be affected by chemistry > > in your brain that you cannot control with your thoughts. In my > > sensorimotive electromagnetism schema, everything physical has an > > experiential aspect and vice versa. > > That's a form of pantheism, which does not explain what is matter, nor > mind. > > > Bruno: > > It is more an information pattern which can emulate all > > computable pattern evolution. It has been discovered in math. It > > exists by virtue of elementary arithmetic. We can implement it in > > the > > physical reality, but this shows only that physical reality is at > > least Turing universal. > > > CW: It sounds like what you're suggesting is that numbers exist > > independently of physical matter, whereas I would say that numbers > > insist through the experiences within physical matter. > > I find natural to suppose that 17 is prime independently of universes > and human beings. I need it if only to grasp actual theories of matter > which presuppose them logically. I don't need to know what numbers > are. I need only some agreement on some axioms, like "for all natural > numbers x we have that s(x) is different from 0", etc. Then I can > explain the appearances of matter and mind from the relations > inherited by only addition and multiplication. It is amazing (for non > logician) but if comp is true, we don't need more than elementary > arithmetic. We don't need to postulate a physical universe, nor > consciousness. > > > > >> The point is that the universe is not made of anything. Neither > >> physical primitive stuff, nor mathematical stuff. You have to study > >> the argument to make sense of this. So you have to accept the comp > >> hypothesis at least for the sake of the argument. > > > Hmm. If the universe isn't made of anything than your point isn't made > > of anything either. I don't get it. > > The game of bridge is not made of quarks and electron. No mathematical > object is made of something. My point is a reasoning, you have to > cjeck his validity. It is non sense to assume a logical point has to > be made of something. You are confusing software and hardware (and > with comp, the difference is relative, and eventually hardware does > not exist: it is "in the head of the universal machines": that is > enough to derive physics (which becomes a first person plural measure > on possible computational histories). > > > > >> Also, we are not made of math. math is not a stuffy thing. It is just > >> a collection of true fact about immaterial beings. > > > Have you read any numerology? > > Numerology is poetry. Can be very cute, but should not be taken too > much seriously. Are you saying that you disagree with the fact that > math is about immaterial relation between non material beings. Could > you give me an explanation that 34 is less than 36 by using a physics > which does not presuppose implicitly the numbers. > > > > >> Relatively to universal number, number do many things. we know now > >> that their doing escape any complete theories. We know now why > >> numbers > >> have unbounded behavior complexity. It seems to me that you can > >> already intuit this when looking at the Mandelbrot set, where a very > >> simple mathematical operation defines a montruously complex object. > > > The complexity is in the eye of the perceiver. Your human visual sense > > is what unites the Mandelbrot set into a fractal pattern. There is no > > independent 'pattern' there unless what you are made of can relate to > > it as a coherent whole rather than a million unrelated pixels as your > > video card sees it, or maybe as a nondescript moving blur as a gopher > > might see it. > > OK, but I don't take "human" as primitive. I explain "human" by > (special) universal machine (a purely mathematical notion whose > existence is a consequence of addition and multiplication). That > explain matter, too. Indeed, that makes physics completely derivable > (not derived!) from arithmetic. So we can test the comp. hyp. by > comparing the comp physics, and empiric data. > > > > >> I cannot be satisfied with this, because it put what I want to > >> explain > >> (mind and matter) in the starting premises. > >> Then I show that comp leads to a precise (and mathematical) > >> reformulation of the mind-body problem. > > > Are you more interested in satisfying your premise, > > By definition of premise, I am not. > > > or discovering a > > true model of the cosmos? > > That makes no sense. We can only propose a theory, and refute it, or > doubt it forever. > > > > >>> You're not saying that Mickey Mouse has mass and velocity though, > >>> right? I don't get it. > > >> It depends on the context. Mickey Mouse is a fiction. as such it > >> has a > >> mass, relatively to its fictive world. That world is not complex > >> enough to attribute meaning to physical attribute, nor mental one, so > >> that your question does not make much sense. > > > How does Mickey Mouse have mass? > > Walt Disney attributes him a mass, in the sense that Mickey Mouse > obeys to the laws that it does not fly, and can take objects. he has a > mass in that fictive world. Like hero have houses and friends. I talk > "in" the fictive worlds. > > > Whoever is drawing the cartoon can > > make the universe he is in be whatever they want. > > Not really. The cartoon will not be published if the physical laws are > too much fictive. That would be too easy for the super hero, and the > story line would get boring. Humans real fictions obeys to Earth real > economy, and to human psychology, etc. > > > It doesn't have to > > have pseudophysical laws like gravity. He can just teleport around a > > Mandelbrot set. > > But it usually does not. Even if it does, it is a fictionist nonsense > to compare Mickey Mouse and prime numbers. The existence, even > fictive, of Mickey mouse needs a long computational history. The prime > numbers needs very short history. It is plausible that the actual > (Walt Disney) Mickey Mouse stories even needs the physical world, and > with comp, this one arise from long histories (number computations). > > Bruno > > > > > > > > > On Jul 13, 5:43 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >> On 13 Jul 2011, at 01:49, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > >>>>> Not sure what you mean in either sentence. A plastic flower > >>>>> behaves > >>>>> differently than a biological plant. > > >>>> Sure. But they have not the same function. > > >>> They both decorate a vase. How do we know when we build a chip that > >>> it's performing the same function that a neuron performs and not > >>> just > >>> what we think it performs, especially considering that neurology > >>> produces qualitative phenomena which cannot be detected at all > >>> outside > >>> of our personal experience. Maybe the brain is a haunted house built > >>> of prehistoric stones under layers of medieval catacombs and the > >>> chip > >>> is a brand new suburban tract home made to look like a grand old > >>> mansion but it's made of drywall and stucco and ghosts aren't > >>> interested. > > >>>> Because all known laws of nature, even their approximations, which > >>>> can > >>>> still function at some high level, are Turing emulable. > > >>> But consciousness isn't observable in nature, outside of our own > >>> interiority. Is yellow Turing emulable? > > >> The experience of seeing yellow might be, although its stability will > >> needs the global structure of all computations. > >> If you believe the contrary, you need to speculate on an unknown > >> physics. > > >>>> By computers I mean universal > >>>> machine, and this is a mathematical notion. > > >>> I don't know, man. I think computers are just gigantic electronic > >>> abacuses. They don't feel anything, but you can arrange their beads > >>> into patterns which act as a vessel for us to feel, see, know, > >>> think, > >>> etc. > > >> Neither computer nor brain can think. Persons think. > >> And a computer has nothing to do with electronic, or anything > >> physical. It is more an information pattern which can emulate all > >> computable pattern evolution. It has been discovered in math. It > >> exists by virtue of elementary arithmetic. We can implement it in the > >> physical reality, but this shows only that physical reality is at > >> least Turing universal. > > >>>> That's a bad note! What is the first 5th % that you don't > >>>> understand? > > >>> Each sentence is a struggle for me. I could go through each one if > >>> you > >>> want: > > >>> "I will first present a non constructive argument showing that the > >>> mechanist > >>> hypothesis in cognitive science gives enough constraints to decide > >>> what a "physical reality" > >>> can possibly consist in." > > >> This is the abstract. The paper explains its meaning. > > >>> I read that as "I will first present a theoretical argument showing > >>> that the hypothesis of consciousness arising from purely mechanical > >>> interactions in the brain is sufficient to support a physical > >>> reality. > > >> Not to support. To derive. I mean physics is a branch of machine's > >> theology. > > >>> Right away I'm not sure what you're talking about. I'm guessing that > > ... > > read more » -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.