Re: QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation
On Oct 25, 7:00 pm, Nick Prince nickmag.pri...@googlemail.com wrote: QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation By the end of the first evolution due to Msg, the infinite bundle of universes has partitioned into two bundles i.e. one bundle of universes that have a Z spin up electron moving upwards with a neutral detector reading and an alive cat, and another bundle of universes that have a Z spin down electron moving downwards with a neutral detector reading and an alive cat. Once you open the door to MWI, it seems like there is no point for you, as a specific outcome of specific conditions of this universe, to try to make sense of anything which includes any outcome in any other universe. I don't see why the partition would be limited to Z spin up and down. Why wouldn't each universe have already proliferates into infinite orthogonal Z spin possibilities. Z wobbles and jiggles, and hyper- Magoo slide-bounce-jumps. Each one would be a multiverse of universes based on each spin alternative and each one of those would be a multiverse with different alternatives to just 'live' and 'dead'. Life could stop and start constantly like Morse code in some. In others the apparatus will be alive and the cat will be inanimate. There could be no life at all except for one omniscient raisin on the moon of an eyelash in Prisonworld Delta... There may be other universes, I just don't see the point in thinking about them. How could we ever know anything about them? Maybe each universe has it's own infinite set of potential mutiverses that it's creatures consider plausible without ever stepping outside of the actual universe that they are in? I think all MWI scenarios suffer from a gross lack of imagination of what Multiple universes really would mean. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 25 Oct 2011, at 22:40, Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, Oct 24, 2011 at 04:08:38PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 23 Oct 2011, at 04:41, Russell Standish wrote: On Fri, Oct 21, 2011 at 02:14:48PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: So the histories, we're agreed, are uncountable in number, but OMs (bundles of histories compatible with the here and now) are surely still countable. This is not obvious for me. For any to computational states which are in a sequel when emulated by some universal UM,there are infinitely many UMs, including one dovetailing on the reals, leading to intermediate states. So I think that the computational neighborhoods are a priori uncoutable. Apriori, no. The UMs dovetailing on the reals will have only executed a finite number of steps, and read a finite number of bits for a given OM. There are only a countable number of distinct UM states making up the OM. The 3-OM. But the first person indeterminacy depends on all the (infinite) computations going through all possible intermediary 3-OMs states. So does the OM I'm referring to. But then why are you saying that they are countable? Does that still make is a 3 OM? Why would it? That fits with the topological semantics of the first person logics (S4Grz, S4Grz1, X, X*, X1, X1*). But many math problems are unsolved there. You will need to expand on this. I don't know what you mean. I have explained this to Stephen a long time ago, when explaining why the work of Pratt, although very interesting fails to address the comp mind body problem. Basically Pratt's duality is recover by the duality between Bp (G) and Bp Dt (Z1*) or Bp Dt p (X1*). You might serach what I said by looking at Pratt in the archive, with some luck. This is above my level of understanding at present. Hopefully, there will be some quiet time soon to study this, as it sounds interesting! If we take the no information ensemble, You might recall what you mean by this exactly. It is the set of all infinite binary strings (isomorphic to [0,1) ). It is described in my book. Equation (2.1) of my book (which is a variant of Ray Solomonoff's beautiful formula http://world.std.com/~rjs/index.html) gives a value of precisely zero for the information content of this set. I do still think the universal dovetailer trace, UD*, is equivalent to this set, How? UD* structure relies on computer science, and give a non random countable sets, or strings. The set of binary strings is the set of reals, and it appears in UD*, but only from a first person views, with the real playing the role of oracles. Exactly! But they are not the output of any computations? UD* has no random part. The randomness is in the mind of the observers due to the first person indterminacy, that is due to the invariance of the delay introduced by the UD by its dovetailing. but part of this thread is to understand why you might think otherwise. and transform it by applying a universal turing machine and collect just the countable output string where the machine halts, then apply another observer function that also happens to be a UTM, the final result will still be a Solomonoff-Levin distribution over the OMs. This is a bit unclear to me. Solomonof-Levin distribution are very nice, they are machine/theory independent, and that is quite in the spirit of comp, but it seems to be usable only in ASSA type approach. I do not exclude this can help for providing a role to little program, but I don't see at all how it could help for the computation of the first person indeterminacy, aka the derivation of physics from computer science needed when we assume comp in cognitive science. In the work using Solomonof-Levin, the mind-body problem is still under the rug. They don't seem aware of the first/third person description. Not even if the reference machine is the observer erself? What do you mean by the reference machine? What is an observer? How would S-L distribution be applied to the first person expectancy? The S-L distribution relies upon a universal machine for its definition, called the reference machine. But that is not the observer. Observer is exactly what you and I mean by it. ? The person with subjective experience, attaching meaning to experiential data. In the comp case, this is given by Bp p, that is the true-belief of a machine, or by the personal diary (in UDA, it is enough). I have no idea what you mean by meaning in this context. The observer map o is a map from data to meaning, the former being strings of some alphabet (eg binary), the latter being a countable set - can be modelled by the whole numbers N. I don't understand this. The S-L distribution arises naturally if you ask the question: What is the probability of a given meaning being attached to the data by an observer if the data strings were distributed uniformly ? I think it probably still arises if
Re: QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation
[NP] QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation By the end of the first evolution due to Msg, the infinite bundle of universes has partitioned into two bundles i.e. one bundle of universes that have a Z spin up electron moving upwards with a neutral detector reading and an alive cat, and another bundle of universes that have a Z spin down electron moving downwards with a neutral detector reading and an alive cat. [CW] Once you open the door to MWI, it seems like there is no point for you, as a specific outcome of specific conditions of this universe, to try to make sense of anything which includes any outcome in any other universe. I don't see why the partition would be limited to Z spin up and down. Why wouldn't each universe have already proliferates into infinite orthogonal Z spin possibilities. Z wobbles and jiggles, and hyper- Magoo slide-bounce-jumps. Each one would be a multiverse of universes based on each spin alternative and each one of those would be a multiverse with different alternatives to just 'live' and 'dead'. Life could stop and start constantly like Morse code in some. In others the apparatus will be alive and the cat will be inanimate. There could be no life at all except for one omniscient raisin on the moon of an eyelash in Prisonworld Delta... [NP] I'm thinking the partition would be limited because Initially my assumption is that the instruments (in all worlds where this experiment is being conducted) all work properly. Hence in those universes where this particular test is going on then they would be partitioned accordingly in only z spin up or z spin down (but yes it's an idealization which was my point; by relaxing this idealization you will get many more alternatives). David Deutsch covers a similar example for a tossed coin on page 280 of his book The Fabric of Reality (he even draws a picture to help understand how the heads and tails versions of the set of worlds develop. In his example he only gives two sets of world after the experiment because I think he is assuming the coin works properly i.e. is a fair one. Moreover that there is no possibility that the coin can end up landing on its edge or any other possibility. These other possibilities could be accounted for in the original state vector though and then the other branches would show up in the analysis. This is why I modified the effect of the evolution operator to reflect other possibilities but limited them so that it does not overcomplicate the argument. [CW] There may be other universes, I just don't see the point in thinking about them. How could we ever know anything about them? Maybe each universe has it's own infinite set of potential mutiverses that it's creatures consider plausible without ever stepping outside of the actual universe that they are in? I think all MWI scenarios suffer from a gross lack of imagination of what Multiple universes really would mean. [NP] As I said in my post I'm trying to get a picture of how Deutsch's idea of differentiation works and how it is reflected in the formalism of quantum mechanics. You say that we can't know anything about them but we do (according to Deutsch's interpretation of QM) experience interference from them. He goes into this in the early chapters of his book also. You say that you don't see any point in thinking about these other universes but the possibility of their reality is a frequent topic on this list so it seems as good a place as any to discuss them as a possibility in the search towards a theory of everything. If thy are there, then by thinking about how they fit with the formalism of QM it might be possible to develop our understanding of the theory in the right direction or even show MWI to be false. Surely we should explore all reasonable possibilities? I am interested to know if my development of the evolution of the state vectors in my equation (6) is a reasonable approach (say from even the copenhagen interpretation point of view if you like - or any other interpretation for that matter). Nick -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 26 Oct 2011, at 05:34, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/25/2011 4:40 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, Oct 24, 2011 at 04:08:38PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 23 Oct 2011, at 04:41, Russell Standish wrote: On Fri, Oct 21, 2011 at 02:14:48PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: So the histories, we're agreed, are uncountable in number, but OMs (bundles of histories compatible with the here and now) are surely still countable. This is not obvious for me. For any to computational states which are in a sequel when emulated by some universal UM,there are infinitely many UMs, including one dovetailing on the reals, leading to intermediate states. So I think that the computational neighborhoods are a priori uncoutable. Apriori, no. The UMs dovetailing on the reals will have only executed a finite number of steps, and read a finite number of bits for a given OM. There are only a countable number of distinct UM states making up the OM. The 3-OM. But the first person indeterminacy depends on all the (infinite) computations going through all possible intermediary 3-OMs states. So does the OM I'm referring to. Does that still make is a 3 OM? That fits with the topological semantics of the first person logics (S4Grz, S4Grz1, X, X*, X1, X1*). But many math problems are unsolved there. You will need to expand on this. I don't know what you mean. I have explained this to Stephen a long time ago, when explaining why the work of Pratt, although very interesting fails to address the comp mind body problem. Basically Pratt's duality is recover by the duality between Bp (G) and Bp Dt (Z1*) or Bp Dt p (X1*). You might serach what I said by looking at Pratt in the archive, with some luck. This is above my level of understanding at present. Hopefully, there will be some quiet time soon to study this, as it sounds interesting! Hi Russell and Bruno,, I recommend that you read Steve Vickers' Topology Via Logic first. I would not have discovered, and take seriously, the material hypostases without it, I think. I give him full credit in my publications. Abramski played some role too. Very nice book, but still quite abstract. I have already commented Pratt at large. The other reason to use the self-reference logics is that it distinguish automatically the quanta (sharable, communicable at least in a first person plural way) from the qualia (not sharable, purely individual), all this by the Gödel-Löb-Solovay proof/truth splitting of the modal logics. Yes - that is interesting, but is true of any modal logic (apart from S4Grz, it would appear). But how do you obtain the mutual orthogonality of observables on a quantum logic? We must address the relationship between orthocomplete lattices and Boolean algebras at some point! The ortholattice are the gluing of Boolean algebraic dreams of universal machines (the boolean algebra describing their consistent histories). It gives the differentiation/fuse structure of the local and partial boolean algebras. But dually the ortholattices can be internalized as structured subsets in Boolean algebra, or by Kripkean semantics. An apparent conspiracy of nature prevent such duality to be algebraically interesting, in the quantum case. I guess we have to live with this. In the digital case, it is an open problem. It makes interesting to solve the digital case, just to see if such conspiracy of nature is a physical law or a geographical misfortune. This can be translated mechanically into a set of arithmetical problem, but those are *very* complex (that's the weakness of the interview of the universal machine on such question). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
Craig: a redface reply I made it in reverse, when I wrote (and your answer was correct TO THAT): * *(JM: I like such distinction. Problem is: I see only how to realizethe OBJECTIVE existence? we can THINK about it. * * *CW: It may be problematic to put subjectivity in objective terms, but isn't that what we should expect? Our natural experience has no problem reconciling meaning and mechanism. Our experience does not need to be realized, because it is already real to us.* ** I DO *NOT* see, how to realize OBJECTIVE existence, because all we can perceive is our subjective absorption, even that adjusted for ourselves from the fragmental and poorly understood information we THINK we got and (in science) hold for accounting to everything. I agree with your formulation about subjectivity, a reason why I speak only about some perceived reality we may have. No claim about its connection to something that MAY BE a (real?) reality(?). If there is one. I apologize John Mikes On Tue, Oct 25, 2011 at 5:50 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: On Oct 24, 4:27 pm, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote: *I* *interjected some remarks just for keeping order on the list*.- *JM * On Sun, Oct 23, 2011 at 5:04 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Oct 23, 4:14 pm, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote: *Craig,* ** *thanks for your explanation - B U T : let us accept the term Multisense Realism (whatever that may cover) and let me ask:* *satisfactory to whom? * To whoever understands how it applies to the Hard Problem. * (JM: OK, I feel myself excluded from an explanation.)* *separation of what (OK, you call it an illusion). And I like your: range of experience as a limited term. * Separation of subjective experience and objective existence. ** *(JM: I like such distinction. Problem is: I see only how to realizethe OBJECTIVE existence? we can THINK about it. * It may be problematic to put subjectivity in objective terms, but isn't that what we should expect? Our natural experience has no problem reconciling meaning and mechanism. Our experience does not need to be realized, because it is already real to us. *Then again: to explain by our awareness? what is awareness and how does it come from the mAmps-bloodflow EKG etc data? * Awareness is primitive. It isn't explained, it is experienced first hand and cannot be explained without first hand experience. To explain is to translate something which is not experienced directly into a direct sense, so sense or awareness is always the beginning and ending - the elephant in every room. Our awareness doesn't come from physical phenomenon as much as both the physical and experiential phenomena are actually the same thing, but part of what that thing does is to make one side seem separate from the other. * JM: Newton became aware of some gravitation from physical phenomena - experienced. So I can agree. What* *I cannot see, however, how the two SIDES of the same thing can be separated? Both are primitive. See the next line. * It is the relation that is primitive. Each side arises out of it's separation from the other. There is no object until a subject becomes privately separated from its world. There is always a subject though, from the subject's perspective, and the object has no perspective. Think of how we see a single image with two separate eyes, or hear a single sound with ears on opposite sides of our head, and how that bilateral symmetry opens our perception up to a deeper realism rather than a de-coupled redundancy. It is the stereo image or sound which is primitive, but it can only be realized through the sense organs on two sides of the head. It is strange to think about the stereo image being the deeper reality if you model it in objective terms (seems more like 3D images would have to be an illusion based upon 2D images), but when you test the truth of this proposition subjectively, it makes sense. We feel that we make sense of an external world, perceiving aspects of something which exists independently of our perception, rather than a collection of unrelated illusions that we string together in a narrative. Our access to this external world is made possible by our awareness of the invariance between our senses as well as the qualitative extension which each sense channel and each individual sensor contributes. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Re: My theory of everything: everything is driven by the potential for transcendence
compscicrackpot wrote: Consciousness is the heuristic of the universal search algorithm. To say that nature is the blind watchmaker is to forget that watchmakers are nature too, evolution has feelings, technological evolution is the conscious phase of evolution which is in acceleration towards an attractor of maximal transcendence which I will call god but you might like to call biologically transcendent man, I like to believe I have found the only true form of God that is compatible with rationalism/science. The universe is a search algorithm. In the first half of the process, biological evolution, it is a meta-search for a search system, the resulting search system is consciousness. The brain is a vast complexity which gives rise to the simplicity of being conscious, which is the prime example of what the search is ultimately for: transcendent simplicity, complexity is deeper or higher simplicity trying to emerge. The next half of the process is the conscious search of technological evolution which is the search for the deep stability that is collective conscious calm, the transcendent simplicity of effortless existence, effort being part of the old evolutionary paradigm. Another way of putting it is: The universe is a vast boiling chaos gradually cooling down, calming and crystallising, therefore the essence of existence is the attainment of calm and tranquillity, everything follows the path of least resistance except consciousness, human effort is the final desperate struggle to end all effort, to be calm, as conscious calm is the deepest level of calm, a tranquil human soul is the chaos cooled to the most beautiful and stable crystalline structure possible, we are driven towards effortless existence. The universe is a search for god and heaven, by god I mean consciousness that has transcended physical and intellectual biological limitations, by heaven I mean a world free from problems, this is all the inevitable evolution of god and heaven in progress, and god and heaven do exist as an attractive point towards which we are inexorably accelerating, god is the evolutionary attractor of transcendent man. Interesting ideas, I agree with the idea that evolution is going towards God/transcendence/heaven/simplicity and manifesting simplicity in complexity. But I think that technology is not the road to there, even though it may play a minor part (as our gigantically extended rational brains). For the simple reason that it is too complicated, and too bound to our designs of it. All technology is designed, or - if it is able to evolve to some extent - stems from design, and design can never reach the ultimate simplicity that arises from direct self-awareness, no matter how flexible it is. I can't prove that, but right now, we can clearly see the differences between the amazing intuitive and flexible intelligence of nature, and the amazingly reliable and accurate, but limited and cold, relatively inflexible intelligence of technology. Transcendence does, in my view, mainly involve transcendence of ego (restricted sense of self; opposition of self vs other) - realizing ourselves as God itself - and subsequently the body and physical reality. By transcendence I do not mean totally leaving it behind, just going beyond its restrictions. I do not think that there is any inherent limitation for the universe that prohibits magical feats like ESP and traveling on the spiritual plane (in a way that we can meet us there and have stable structures etc...). It's just that as God is true to himself, he can't allow himself to do that, as long as we are in ignorance of our true nature, which may lead to abuse of this feats, attachment to them - both which could be extremely dangerous. And he can not allow just a minority full access to them, either, as God necessarily works as one. So right now, just very few individual have those feats beyond extended/unreasonable effective intuition (I think we all do have this, to some extent), and those that do have them, can't demonstrate them reliably (they are quite uncontrollable, and demonstrating them verifiably wouldn't be good for the evolution of our collective consciousness), and they are quite minor feats. But as we evolve spiritually (which mainly means collective enlightenment), I am confident we will regularly experience supernatural (actually they are natural) events, even though some limitation of it is needed for creative constrainment (limitation enforces simplicity and prevents confusion). It is clear to me that no reasonably possible technology can do that, and honestly, no technology could be as beautiful as directly transcending the physical when it comes to transcending the most pressing limitations (technology is wonderful, though, for many more practically oriented things - even if we could, in principle, teleport ourselves, it might be too confusing to regularly use that instead of more convential means of
Re: SINGULARITY SUMMIT 2011, Melbourne Australia
Dear Colin, I hope the Singularity Conference was a singular success and by now the material is - sort of - sorted. Is there a URL where I can get the main points to? (you may know that I push 90 -am semi paraplegic and a heart patient, no chance to travel. IMO singularity (as I learned in the early 40s) is something that does not connect to anything, e.g. we cannot get info about it. A Black Hole started as one, bu then (first) got relaxed in surface-accessibility etc. and philosophers made a mess of singularities. It cannot have a size, because that would mean borders and measures. You see, I am perplexed and would like to read what the smarties said. Best regards John Mikes (a fan of your mini-solipsism). On Sun, Aug 7, 2011 at 7:27 PM, Colin Geoffrey Hales cgha...@unimelb.edu.au wrote: ** ‘THE FUTURE OF TECHNOLOGY’ SINGULARITY SUMMIT 2011 AUGUST 20-21 RMIT UNIVERSITY Melbourne http://summit.singinst.org.au/ This August, leading scientists, inventors and philosophers will gather in Melbourne to discuss the upcoming ‘intelligence explosion’ that many now refer to as ‘The Singularity’- a technological breakthrough that promises to eclipse previous computing developments with the creation of super-human machines. If present trends are to continue, computers will have more advanced and powerful ‘brains’ than humans within 25 years; the result will be a further explosion of computer power and other technologies such as biotechnology, nanotechnology and health technology beyond our current ability to predict. The ‘Singularity Summit’ - a part of National Science Week - is an unprecedented opportunity to engage with today's leading experts on emerging technologies like Artificial Intelligence (AI), robotics, nanotechnology and brain-computer interfaces - right here in Melbourne. As a pre-summit launch, the Australian premiere of documentary ‘Transcendent Man’ - featuring leading futurist, singularity advocate and recent Time Magazine cover star ‘Ray Kurzweil’ - will be held at Nova Cinemas, Carlton on August 19. The screening will also feature a prerecorded address to Australia from Ray Kurzweil and producer Barry Ptolemy, and a QA session with documentary participants and Internationally renowned Artificial Intelligence (AI) experts - Dr Ben Goertzel, Dr Steve Omohundro and Dr Hugo De Garis. The highly successful 2010 Singularity Summit drew over a hundred local, interstate and international enthusiasts to hear first-rate speakers from a range of fields. The 2011 Summit again offers a stellar line-up, including leading Artificial Intelligence experts Dr Ben Goertzel and Professor Steve Omohundro, popular scientist Dr Lawrence Krauss and renowned philosopher of consciousness Dr David Chalmers. This year’s summit will also feature demonstrations of recent robotics advances by Professor Raymond Jarvis and others. The summit will explore the important ethical and philosophical dimensions of the Singularity - whilst sharing the very latest scientific and technological breakthroughs. There is simply no better way to glimpse the future of these exciting technologies. Besides talks and demonstrations, panels will offer the opportunity to interact with the speakers and to contribute to the conversation about these important issues. Seating is limited, so Secure your tickets for the 2011 Summit Here The conference will be held at Casey Plaza at RMIT. http://summit2011.singinst.org.au/ Speakers and subjects include: David Chalmers Leading Philosopher of Consciousness “The Singularity – A Philosophical Analysis” Lawrence Krauss - Leading physicist and best-selling author of The Physics of Star Trek - “The Future of Life in the Universe” Ben Goertzel - Renowned AI researcher and leader of the OpenCog project – “AI Roadmaps” Steve Omohundro - Renowned AI researcher - “Minds Making Minds: Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Humanity” Ray Jarvis – “The Envy of Roboticists - the Future of AI in the Material World” Alan Hájek – “A Plea for the Improbable” Ian Robinson – “Rationality Transhumanism” Kevin B. Korb – “Bayesian Artificial Intelligence” Ben Goertzel Leading AI researcher – “Artificial General Intelligence” James Newton-Thomas Machine Intelligence Engineer – “Advances in Science and Technology” Burkard Polster – The Problem With Probability David Dowe - Artificial Intelligence - “Bayesian/Algorithmic) Information theory, one- and two-part compression, and measures of intelligence” and many more... This conference is brought to you by Humanity+ @ Melbourne (Victoria, Australia). Humanity+ explores how society might use and profit from a variety of creative and innovative thought. Join in an exciting weekend as we explore the surprising future. See you there! Please feel free to pass this on. --
Re: Blindsight crushes absent qualia?
On Oct 26, 3:14 pm, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote: Craig: a redface reply I made it in reverse, when I wrote (and your answer was correct TO THAT): I DO *NOT* see, how to realize OBJECTIVE existence, because all we can perceive is our subjective absorption, even that adjusted for ourselves from the fragmental and poorly understood information we THINK we got and (in science) hold for accounting to everything. I agree with your formulation about subjectivity, a reason why I speak only about some perceived reality we may have. No claim about its connection to something that MAY BE a (real?) reality(?). If there is one. I apologize Oh, no problem, haha. I think that just as we cannot expect to be able to transcend our own subjectivity, so too can we not discount the subjective significance of objectivity. There is a degree of veridicality in our participation within physical reality which is not matched merely by realistic perception (as suggested by blindsight and synesthesia, our sensemaking capacity extends beyond our presumed channels of sense). The fact that there is a difference between dream and reality, fact and fiction, suggests a natural connection to a distal reality, at least in a loose overlapping sense, is not ruled out. If everything were just solipsistic fantasy to one degree or another, why so much elaborate pretense to the contrary? Our connection to any real reality may be questionable, but the feeling of authenticity is certainly potent enough that the distinction between direct noumenal participation and indirect phenomenal perception is really academic. Within our own perceptual frame of reference, our reality is real enough. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation
On Oct 26, 11:29 am, Nick Prince nickmag.pri...@googlemail.com wrote: [NP] QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation By the end of the first evolution due to Msg, the infinite bundle of universes has partitioned into two bundles i.e. one bundle of universes that have a Z spin up electron moving upwards with a neutral detector reading and an alive cat, and another bundle of universes that have a Z spin down electron moving downwards with a neutral detector reading and an alive cat. [CW] Once you open the door to MWI, it seems like there is no point for you, as a specific outcome of specific conditions of this universe, to try to make sense of anything which includes any outcome in any other universe. I don't see why the partition would be limited to Z spin up and down. Why wouldn't each universe have already proliferates into infinite orthogonal Z spin possibilities. Z wobbles and jiggles, and hyper- Magoo slide-bounce-jumps. Each one would be a multiverse of universes based on each spin alternative and each one of those would be a multiverse with different alternatives to just 'live' and 'dead'. Life could stop and start constantly like Morse code in some. In others the apparatus will be alive and the cat will be inanimate. There could be no life at all except for one omniscient raisin on the moon of an eyelash in Prisonworld Delta... [NP] I'm thinking the partition would be limited because Initially my assumption is that the instruments (in all worlds where this experiment is being conducted) all work properly. Hence in those universes where this particular test is going on then they would be partitioned accordingly in only z spin up or z spin down (but yes it's an idealization which was my point; by relaxing this idealization you will get many more alternatives). David Deutsch covers a similar example for a tossed coin on page 280 of his book The Fabric of Reality (he even draws a picture to help understand how the heads and tails versions of the set of worlds develop. In his example he only gives two sets of world after the experiment because I think he is assuming the coin works properly i.e. is a fair one. Moreover that there is no possibility that the coin can end up landing on its edge or any other possibility. These other possibilities could be accounted for in the original state vector though and then the other branches would show up in the analysis. This is why I modified the effect of the evolution operator to reflect other possibilities but limited them so that it does not overcomplicate the argument. I don't know, it seems really arbitrary to me. MWI is already overcomplicated. Why would there be some clause that prevents universes from spawning in which the coin works differently? I'm just saying that the logic of MWI does not impress me enough to begin with to really consider it seriously. [CW] There may be other universes, I just don't see the point in thinking about them. How could we ever know anything about them? Maybe each universe has it's own infinite set of potential mutiverses that it's creatures consider plausible without ever stepping outside of the actual universe that they are in? I think all MWI scenarios suffer from a gross lack of imagination of what Multiple universes really would mean. [NP] As I said in my post I'm trying to get a picture of how Deutsch's idea of differentiation works and how it is reflected in the formalism of quantum mechanics. You say that we can't know anything about them but we do (according to Deutsch's interpretation of QM) experience interference from them. He goes into this in the early chapters of his book also. You say that you don't see any point in thinking about these other universes but the possibility of their reality is a frequent topic on this list so it seems as good a place as any to discuss them as a possibility in the search towards a theory of everything. Oh, absolutely. I'm not trying to say that nobody should think about these possibilities, I'm just giving you my personal objection to the theory in case there is something that I'm missing. If thy are there, then by thinking about how they fit with the formalism of QM it might be possible to develop our understanding of the theory in the right direction or even show MWI to be false. Surely we should explore all reasonable possibilities? I am interested to know if my development of the evolution of the state vectors in my equation (6) is a reasonable approach (say from even the copenhagen interpretation point of view if you like - or any other interpretation for that matter). I can't help with that unfortunately. My own TOE explains why QM may be a misinterpretation to begin with (even though the observations and predictions of QM are of course valid). Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group,
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 10/26/2011 12:44 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 26 Oct 2011, at 05:34, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/25/2011 4:40 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, Oct 24, 2011 at 04:08:38PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 23 Oct 2011, at 04:41, Russell Standish wrote: On Fri, Oct 21, 2011 at 02:14:48PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: So the histories, we're agreed, are uncountable in number, but OMs (bundles of histories compatible with the here and now) are surely still countable. This is not obvious for me. For any to computational states which are in a sequel when emulated by some universal UM,there are infinitely many UMs, including one dovetailing on the reals, leading to intermediate states. So I think that the computational neighborhoods are a priori uncoutable. Apriori, no. The UMs dovetailing on the reals will have only executed a finite number of steps, and read a finite number of bits for a given OM. There are only a countable number of distinct UM states making up the OM. The 3-OM. But the first person indeterminacy depends on all the (infinite) computations going through all possible intermediary 3-OMs states. So does the OM I'm referring to. Does that still make is a 3 OM? That fits with the topological semantics of the first person logics (S4Grz, S4Grz1, X, X*, X1, X1*). But many math problems are unsolved there. You will need to expand on this. I don't know what you mean. I have explained this to Stephen a long time ago, when explaining why the work of Pratt, although very interesting fails to address the comp mind body problem. Basically Pratt's duality is recover by the duality between Bp (G) and Bp Dt (Z1*) or Bp Dt p (X1*). You might serach what I said by looking at Pratt in the archive, with some luck. This is above my level of understanding at present. Hopefully, there will be some quiet time soon to study this, as it sounds interesting! Hi Russell and Bruno,, I recommend that you read Steve Vickers' Topology Via Logic first. I would not have discovered, and take seriously, the material hypostases without it, I think. I give him full credit in my publications. Abramski played some role too. Very nice book, but still quite abstract. I have already commented Pratt at large. The other reason to use the self-reference logics is that it distinguish automatically the quanta (sharable, communicable at least in a first person plural way) from the qualia (not sharable, purely individual), all this by the Gödel-Löb-Solovay proof/truth splitting of the modal logics. Yes - that is interesting, but is true of any modal logic (apart from S4Grz, it would appear). But how do you obtain the mutual orthogonality of observables on a quantum logic? We must address the relationship between orthocomplete lattices and Boolean algebras at some point! The ortholattice are the gluing of Boolean algebraic dreams of universal machines (the boolean algebra describing their consistent histories). It gives the differentiation/fuse structure of the local and partial boolean algebras. But dually the ortholattices can be internalized as structured subsets in Boolean algebra, or by Kripkean semantics. An apparent conspiracy of nature prevent such duality to be algebraically interesting, in the quantum case. I guess we have to live with this. In the digital case, it is an open problem. It makes interesting to solve the digital case, just to see if such conspiracy of nature is a physical law or a geographical misfortune. This can be translated mechanically into a set of arithmetical problem, but those are *very* complex (that's the weakness of the interview of the universal machine on such question). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ Hi Bruno, From what I can tell so far, ortholattices have Boolean algebras in an orthogonal relationship, similar to the independent unit vectors in a linear vector space. Does non-distributivity follow from this? I can see the relation they have to Kripkean semantics but do cannot act as contractuals. I am still studying. Have you written any new papers covering more detail of the material hypostases? I was unable to find your detailed discussion of Pratt's duality in the List archive... Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation
On Tue, Oct 25, 2011 at 6:00 PM, Nick Prince nickmag.pri...@googlemail.comwrote: QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation I’m trying to get a picture of how David Deutsch’s idea of differentiation works – especially in relation to QTI. With a standard treatment it looks as if there might be cul de sacs for a dying cat. However I think I can see why this conclusion could be wrong. Maybe someone could check my reasoning for this and tell me if there are any flaws. Nick, I think such cul de sacs exist only from third person perspectives. E.g., the experimenter's view of what happens to the cat. When considering the perspective from the first person (cat) perspective, there are no cul de sacs for a much simpler reason: The cat might be mistaken, dreaming, or even an altogether different being choosing to temporarily experience a cat's point of view. No matter how foolproof a setup an experimenter designs, it is impossible to capture and terminate the cat's continued consciousness as seen from the perspective of the cat. The lower the chance the cat has of surviving through some malfunction of the device, the more likely it becomes that the cat survives via improbable extensions. For the same reasons, I think it is more probable that you will wake up as some trans- or post-human playing a realistic sim ancestor game than for you to live to 200 by some QTI accident (not counting medical advances). Eventually, those alternatives just become more probable. Jason I’ve entered this on both the FOR and the Everything list because I hope it is relevant to both Forums. Firstly I am adopting the position that consciousness supervenes on all identical worldlines and where the multiverse differentiates, the first person experience is indeterminate. Secondly I assume local causality applies. Thirdly (to begin with anyway) I assume that all “measuring” systems function as they should do to obtain “correct measurements/outcomes” (I’ll drop this part later though). Now suppose a SINGLE electron is prepared so that its spin is aligned in the x - right direction ( |Xr – for x spin in the right direction) is sent through a SG device and that, whether the electron comes out spinning up in the z direction or down determines the triggering of a device which breaks the flask of gas – (let’s say it is the electron with spin up and moving upwards which is the lethal combination) which kills the cat. On the other hand, an electron emerging with spin down, and moving down in the z direction leaves the measuring device triggered in the down state but this does nothing to the flask) So there is a 50% chance of the cat being killed for each electron fired through. This means there would be interaction Hamiltonians which would make up unitary evolution operators of the form M = exp(-iHt/hbar) which would act on states as follows: (Mc) (Mdev) ( Msg) |Ca |Dn |moves to right |Xr Msg = stern gerlach interaction evolution operator Mdev = triggering and flask breaking evolution operator Mc = cat /poisonous gas evolution operator. |Dn = neutral detector state |Ca = alive cat state etc. Now standard QM gives |Xr = (1/sqrt2)(|Zu +|Zd) Notice how I have put operators in time order so that the rightmost operator is implied to operate earlier than those to the left. The order of the state vectors reflects this too. Msg is the unitary operator which causes an evolution from |moves to right to either moves up |moves up or moves down |moves down. Mdev allows evolution of the detector device plus flask smashing mechanism which, if it causes evolution to |Du, breaks open the flask of poisonous gas. |Dd leaves the flask intact. Finally the interaction of the gas with the cat due to the evolution operator Mc leaves the cat either dead |Cd or alive |Ca. Now, assuming a causally functioning system, then we can write: (Mc) (Mdev) ( Msg) |Ca |Dn |moves to right |Xr =(Mc) |Ca (Mdev) |Dn ( Msg) |moves to right (1/sqrt2)(|Zu +|Zd) =(Mc) |Ca (Mdev) |Dn(1/sqrt2) [|moves up|Zu+|moves down|Zd] =(Mc) |Ca (1/sqrt2) [|Du|moves up|Zu+Dd|moves down|Zd] = (1/sqrt2) [|Cd|Du|moves up|Zu+|Ca|Dd|moves down|Zd] All this is just the standard Schrödinger’s cat problem. However note that if one thinks in terms of a differentiated multiverse we begin with an infinite number of identical experiments in identical universes. By the end of the first evolution due to Msg, the infinite bundle of universes has partitioned into two bundles i.e. one bundle of universes that have a Z spin up electron moving upwards with a neutral detector reading and an alive cat, and another bundle of universes that have a Z spin down electron moving downwards with a neutral detector reading and an alive cat. As time progresses the partition is communicated through the system and by the end of the period during which operator Md operates we have two bundles that are even more differentiated because
Re: QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation
On Tue, Oct 25, 2011 at 04:00:56PM -0700, Nick Prince wrote: QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation I’m trying to get a picture of how David Deutsch’s idea of differentiation works – especially in relation to QTI. With a standard treatment it looks as if there might be cul de sacs for a dying cat. However I think I can see why this conclusion could be wrong. Maybe someone could check my reasoning for this and tell me if there are any flaws. I’ve entered this on both the FOR and the Everything list because I hope it is relevant to both Forums. I'm persona non grata on FOR, so must respond on the everything-list. In section 8.1.3 of my book, I characterised David Deutsch's position as a single tracks through the multiverse. Namely that there is a fact of which future history you will have (preordained as it were), even if it is impossible to know it. There has been quite a bit of discussion of fungibility recently, and I'm now up to the section of BoI where David discusses this. I'm inclined to think that the concept of fungibility really changes the picture - namely one should think of the single tracks through the multiverse as being fungible up until the point where they differentiate. Being fungible, would entail the supervention of consciousness on all fungible histories, and the full force of the QTI conclusion. It would be interesting to hear (from David, or other people) whether: a) What David's position is now (are our futures determined or not?) b) Was my characterisation of David's position was ever valid? c) If so, and David's position has changed, what persuaded him to change? Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation
On Wed, Oct 26, 2011 at 06:58:15PM -0500, Jason Resch wrote: Nick, I think such cul de sacs exist only from third person perspectives. E.g., the experimenter's view of what happens to the cat. When considering the perspective from the first person (cat) perspective, there are no cul de sacs for a much simpler reason: The cat might be mistaken, dreaming, or even an altogether different being choosing to temporarily experience a cat's point of view. That is not what a cul de sac world means. It means a world with no possible subjective futures (ie you die in all futures). -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation
On Wed, Oct 26, 2011 at 7:14 PM, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.auwrote: On Wed, Oct 26, 2011 at 06:58:15PM -0500, Jason Resch wrote: Nick, I think such cul de sacs exist only from third person perspectives. E.g., the experimenter's view of what happens to the cat. When considering the perspective from the first person (cat) perspective, there are no cul de sacs for a much simpler reason: The cat might be mistaken, dreaming, or even an altogether different being choosing to temporarily experience a cat's point of view. That is not what a cul de sac world means. It means a world with no possible subjective futures (ie you die in all futures). I don't think it is possible to define personal discontinuation (death) in terms of a local event or configuration that is setup in some corner of a universe. For instance, if the universe is infinitely big, one could recur infinitely often in an infinite number of places. Without taking into account what happens in (in the past or future), one cannot say definitively that the cat will never be resurrected. In fact, one cannot rule out resurrection without knowing what happens even in altogether different universes. Given this, it seems senseless to use the concept of no cul de sac in regards to worlds. In some places of some worlds a person either dies or doesn't; but its not possible to set things up such that someone dies in all their futures, without being able to control everything that happens throughout all of reality. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation
On 10/26/2011 5:10 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Tue, Oct 25, 2011 at 04:00:56PM -0700, Nick Prince wrote: QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation I’m trying to get a picture of how David Deutsch’s idea of differentiation works – especially in relation to QTI. With a standard treatment it looks as if there might be cul de sacs for a dying cat. However I think I can see why this conclusion could be wrong. Maybe someone could check my reasoning for this and tell me if there are any flaws. I’ve entered this on both the FOR and the Everything list because I hope it is relevant to both Forums. I'm persona non grata on FOR, so must respond on the everything-list. In section 8.1.3 of my book, I characterised David Deutsch's position as a single tracks through the multiverse. Namely that there is a fact of which future history you will have (preordained as it were), even if it is impossible to know it. There has been quite a bit of discussion of fungibility recently, and I'm now up to the section of BoI where David discusses this. I'm inclined to think that the concept of fungibility really changes the picture - namely one should think of the single tracks through the multiverse as being fungible up until the point where they differentiate. Being fungible, would entail the supervention of consciousness on all fungible histories, and the full force of the QTI conclusion. It would be interesting to hear (from David, or other people) whether: a) What David's position is now (are our futures determined or not?) b) Was my characterisation of David's position was ever valid? c) If so, and David's position has changed, what persuaded him to change? Cheers I have just read the Multiverse chapter of The Beginning of Infinity. It seems to me that Deutsch is just reinventing probability theory with different names fungible = possible and multiverse = Borel sets. And he hasn't (up to where I have read) really solved the measure problem; he keeps giving examples which are simple binary alternatives. I also wonder about his sphere of differentiation. In Hilbert space there is no sphere of differentiation; entangled states are non-local. So is Deutsch using it as a just-so story, to be cleared up later? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation
On Wed, Oct 26, 2011 at 08:02:02PM -0500, Jason Resch wrote: I don't think it is possible to define personal discontinuation (death) in terms of a local event or configuration that is setup in some corner of a universe. For instance, if the universe is infinitely big, one could recur infinitely often in an infinite number of places. Without taking into account what happens in (in the past or future), one cannot say definitively that the cat will never be resurrected. In fact, one cannot rule out resurrection without knowing what happens even in altogether different universes. Given this, it seems senseless to use the concept of no cul de sac in regards to worlds. In some places of some worlds a person either dies or doesn't; but its not possible to set things up such that someone dies in all their futures, without being able to control everything that happens throughout all of reality. Jason This is an argument from incredulity in favour of the no cul de sac conjecture. It is not a rigourous proof, AFAICT. BTW - I'm not disagreeing with you - just stating that you don't have a proof. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
