Re: For Evgenii: the-unavoidable-cost-of-computation-revealed
Brent, Thank you for your answer. I have thought more and I believe that now I understand the paper better. I would agree that an ideal potential barrier, provided it is created intelligently, does not inject the energy in a micro- and a macrosystem. Well, if a potential barrier has some thickness, then when we insert it, it should move the medium away. Also if we do not know the position of the bead exactly then it well might be that the wall will push the bead directly. Hence one cannot exclude that the potential wall inject the energy as well, but presumably one can neglect it. Still, I do not understand exactly how to describe the influence of the wall on the physical system. In the ideal case, it does not change the energy of the system but it definitely changes the momentum in the case with the ball. In a microsystem, provided the wall goes through the medium only, the momentum could stay the same though as the change from both sides of the wall might cancel each other. It could be. In any case, it is more interesting what happens with information. I also agree that in this case the information is processed by the controller, that is, there are some measurements, the results go into the controller, and after some processing it makes an action. Thereafter in my view, the title of the paper is misleading: "information-to-energy conversion". By the way the authors are talking about the energy, not the entropy. What happens is that we have a multidomain system where there are different interactions between different subsystems. Using some very specific vocabulary one can presumably find a meaning in such a statement "information-to-energy conversion" (or if you want it ot "information-to-entropy conversion"). As I have already mentioned, this could work if we limit the analysis for one subsystem of the whole system. Yet, then information will be context dependent, so I am not sure if it will be possible to bring a strict definition of information as a property of a physical system from such an experiment. Again, I have nothing against of the experiment as such. It looks interesting. What is missing is a good theoretical analysis when one starts from the whole system, including the controller (I guess, there are computations there) and write down all the assumptions made to come to the conclusion "information-to-energy conversion". It would be nice to understand how information emerges from the movements of atoms and molecules in the whole system including the controller. Evgenii On 27.03.2012 22:50 meekerdb said the following: On 3/27/2012 11:26 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: Brent, I have nothing against of fundamental science and I do not expect practical application for this paper. Yet, I do not see fundamental results. What is in the paper is just a change of vocabulary. I would say that we are free to choose a definition. Well, right now when free will is under question such a statement might be ill-posed but I guess that you understand what I mean. Let me start with "extracting energy from random molecular motion". Let us consider the next example. A macroscopic ball is flying in one direction. We suddenly make a potential barrier on its way and it flies back after the collision with this potential wall. Do we inject the energy in the system to change the ball trajectory or not? Not. Could you please compare this example with the experiment described in the paper? What is the difference between the wall in the example and potential walls in the experiment? To be like the experiment the ball would have it's trajectory changed again by the random heat energy of the medium. My point above is that I am not convinced yet, that the energy in the experiment is extracted from random molecular motion. As I read it, not energy was actually extracted. It was a demonstration of principle. In principle one could have a tiny shaft attached to the bead so that as it rotated the shaft could be used to do work. But of course this is impractical. It might be possible to state this but then, in my view, some change in the normal vocabulary is needed. This has been taken in the paper for granted. Hence, I am not convinced. Then "What you asked for was an example of using information to reduce entropy: not obtaining information AND using it to reduce entropy." What do you mean here? I see two statements "using information to reduce entropy" and "obtaining information AND using it to reduce entropy" What in your view has been done in the paper and what difference do you see between these two statements. The latter is of course what is done in the paper. The difference is that if you include the obtaining the information in the balance sheets that costs free energy, so even though you use information to gain free energy the second law is still upheld for the whole system. Finally when I have quoted a statement from the paper "In microscopic system
Re: Theology or not theology (Re: COMP theology)
2012/3/28 John Clark > On Wed, Mar 28, 2012 at 4:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> If 2 different consciousnesses can not be distinguished in my >> symmetrical room from the first person point of view or from the third >> person point of view then it seems pointless to insist that there are >> really 2 and not just one mind involved. >> >> > We agree on this since the beginning. >> > > Then why why why do you keep talking about things being the same from the > "3-view" but not from the "1-view". > Comp (and MWI) is a deterministic theory... 3 POV could be called the bird view, the totality view (the view in which comp and MWI are deterministic), 1 POV the frog view (and many frogs having all there 1 POV, have 1 POV plural/shared) > > > It seems to me that you are playing with words. >> > > Words are the only means we have to communicate with and I need to know > what they mean and that is not always obvious in very extreme and unusual > (but not illogical) situations. > > >> But you can see there are 2 bodies of Bruno Marchal just as well as the >>> outside observer, and you can not tell which one is you any better than the >>> outside observer can! >>> >> >> > No. The outsider can see both necks for example. The insider cannot be >> sure that he is not in front of some mirror, according to your own >> analysis. > > > No, you can touch the other fellow and he does not feel like a glass > mirror, you can shake his hand, punch him in the jaw, do whatever 2 people > can do when they meet each other, but if I instantly exchanged the position > of the 2 bodies you would not notice the slightest difference, not from the > 1-view or 2-view or 3-view or any view, the very universe itself would > notice no difference. If subjectively it makes no difference and > objectively it makes no difference then call me crazy but I say it makes no > difference. > > > So you fail to distinguish the 1-view and the 3-view. >> > > Yes, the universe itself can't distinguish between them and I'm not better > than the universe. > > > OK. So what is new with comp is a form of indeterminacy which even in >> theory we cannot predict, and which does not rely on physical >> experimentation and extrapolation, nor on the same anti-diagonalization >> used by Gödel or Turing. >> > > So in this hypothetical non quantum mechanical non Godel-Turing universe I > could know at least in theory with 100% certainty that I will see > Washington provided the universe was also simple enough for me to know the > initial conditions and simple enough for me to calculate with them to > obtain a outcome. And because I'd know I would see Washington I would know > with 100% certainty that I will be the Washington man. I ask again what is > new or deep here? > Your bad faith ? > > > Never say "cannot be proven" without adding "by a specific machine M" >> > > There are true statements that cannot be proven by a machine that is both > consistent and complete, and any machine powerful enough to do arithmetic > can not be complete. > > >> You want to know what is the probability you will become the Moscow >>> man, but the only way that can happen is if you see images of Moscow, >>> that's what being the Moscow man means. >>> >> >>> >> > You can apply that argument to the throwing of a coin. That contradicts >> the statement above that you can use probability for the coin, so why can't >> you use it for the probability of feeling to be the Moscow man? >> > > In common usage when you say "what is the probability I will see heads > when I flip this coin?" there is not a 100% chance I will see heads as > there is in the thought experiment with the cities, but even more important > in everyday use it is not needed to make what might seem like hairsplitting > distinctions on who "I" is, but such exactitude is needed if duplicating > chambers are thrown into the mix. > We are talking about comp (it would also be the same if we were talking about MWI)... the *usual everyday universe* in these settings is a duplicating chamber. So either we can *never* talk about 'I' (but as I use 'I', this proves you're wrong), or your argument is a proof that comp (and MWI) is false. Quentin > And if there is any mystery and indeterminacy in this thing you call > "first person indeterminacy" it quickly reduces out to types of > indeterminacy we've already known about, some for many thousands of years > and others for only about 80. > > > Given that the probability concerns the 1-views (that is the 1-view from >> the 1-person Pov), saying 100% for Moscow and 100% for Washington entails >> that you predict that you will *feel* to be in the two places at once. >> > > "You" would feel to be in two places at once except for one thing, "you" > has been duplicated. > We know, that's not the question. > > John K Clark > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to ever
Re: Theology or not theology (Re: COMP theology)
On Wed, Mar 28, 2012 at 4:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> If 2 different consciousnesses can not be distinguished in my > symmetrical room from the first person point of view or from the third > person point of view then it seems pointless to insist that there are > really 2 and not just one mind involved. > > > We agree on this since the beginning. > Then why why why do you keep talking about things being the same from the "3-view" but not from the "1-view". > It seems to me that you are playing with words. > Words are the only means we have to communicate with and I need to know what they mean and that is not always obvious in very extreme and unusual (but not illogical) situations. >> But you can see there are 2 bodies of Bruno Marchal just as well as the >> outside observer, and you can not tell which one is you any better than the >> outside observer can! >> > > > No. The outsider can see both necks for example. The insider cannot be > sure that he is not in front of some mirror, according to your own > analysis. No, you can touch the other fellow and he does not feel like a glass mirror, you can shake his hand, punch him in the jaw, do whatever 2 people can do when they meet each other, but if I instantly exchanged the position of the 2 bodies you would not notice the slightest difference, not from the 1-view or 2-view or 3-view or any view, the very universe itself would notice no difference. If subjectively it makes no difference and objectively it makes no difference then call me crazy but I say it makes no difference. > So you fail to distinguish the 1-view and the 3-view. > Yes, the universe itself can't distinguish between them and I'm not better than the universe. > OK. So what is new with comp is a form of indeterminacy which even in > theory we cannot predict, and which does not rely on physical > experimentation and extrapolation, nor on the same anti-diagonalization > used by Gödel or Turing. > So in this hypothetical non quantum mechanical non Godel-Turing universe I could know at least in theory with 100% certainty that I will see Washington provided the universe was also simple enough for me to know the initial conditions and simple enough for me to calculate with them to obtain a outcome. And because I'd know I would see Washington I would know with 100% certainty that I will be the Washington man. I ask again what is new or deep here? > Never say "cannot be proven" without adding "by a specific machine M" > There are true statements that cannot be proven by a machine that is both consistent and complete, and any machine powerful enough to do arithmetic can not be complete. >> You want to know what is the probability you will become the Moscow man, >> but the only way that can happen is if you see images of Moscow, that's >> what being the Moscow man means. >> > >> > > You can apply that argument to the throwing of a coin. That contradicts > the statement above that you can use probability for the coin, so why can't > you use it for the probability of feeling to be the Moscow man? > In common usage when you say "what is the probability I will see heads when I flip this coin?" there is not a 100% chance I will see heads as there is in the thought experiment with the cities, but even more important in everyday use it is not needed to make what might seem like hairsplitting distinctions on who "I" is, but such exactitude is needed if duplicating chambers are thrown into the mix. And if there is any mystery and indeterminacy in this thing you call "first person indeterminacy" it quickly reduces out to types of indeterminacy we've already known about, some for many thousands of years and others for only about 80. > Given that the probability concerns the 1-views (that is the 1-view from > the 1-person Pov), saying 100% for Moscow and 100% for Washington entails > that you predict that you will *feel* to be in the two places at once. > "You" would feel to be in two places at once except for one thing, "you" has been duplicated. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Theology or not theology (Re: COMP theology)
On 27 Mar 2012, at 02:42, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Mar 26, 11:41 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 25 Mar 2012, at 22:59, Craig Weinberg wrote: What is it you think my theory wants you not to ask? Where does matter come from? Matter comes from sense, as does 'where' and 'come from'. I can agree with that, because it is the comp answer, except that this is not done in your non-comp "theory". Where does sense come from? Everywhere This does not help. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Theology or not theology (Re: COMP theology)
On 28 Mar 2012, at 06:07, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Mar 27, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote: > so you do get the point of the difference of the 3-view and the 1- view, Truer words were never spoken. If 2 different consciousnesses can not be distinguished in my symmetrical room from the first person point of view or from the third person point of view then it seems pointless to insist that there are really 2 and not just one mind involved. We agree on this since the beginning. You are unclear if this means or not if you get the difference between the 1-view and the 3-view, given that I was commenting a paragraph were you were disagreeing with that difference. >> If this thing you call "1-comp indeterminacy" were untrue then we would always know what the environment was going to throw at us next and we could always predict our actions, > This does not follow logically. Of course it follows logically! All "1-comp indeterminacy" means is you never know what's coming next, a fact that is as true as it is trivial. ? >> very obviously this is untrue so of course "1-comp indeterminacy" is not controversial. It's not new or deep either. > You fail to give me the reference, Reference? How can I give a reference when the term "1-comp indeterminacy" is your own invention? The only reference I can give you is Forest Gump, "life is like a box of chocolates, you never know what you're going to get". ? It seems to me that you are playing with words. > he usual coin is indeterminate by classical ignorance, but not for the Laplacean God. It's irrelevant if the coin is deterministic or not because either way I don't know what the coin is going to do so the best I can do is use probabilities. Different theories explains probabilities differently. >> but so does the copy (or maybe he really is the original and you are the copy), you raise your right hand and you see on the video monitor the both images do too, you jump up and down but you see both images jump up and down. Not only can't you tell if you are the copy or the original you can't even tell which image on that video screen is you and which is the other fellow. If subjectively there is no difference and objectively there is no difference then there is no difference between "3-you" and "1-you". > OK. Here you are clearly wrong, and this by your own argument. An outside observer can see that there are two bodies Yes two bodies, but we're not talking about bodies, we were talking about points of view and consciousness. On the contrary, we are talking on both. Indeed we are interested in the relation between the two. > where the 1-view is unique, as you insist (and are right). So, there are two "3-you", and only one "1-you", and this makes them obviously different notion. But you can see there are 2 bodies of Bruno Marchal just as well as the outside observer, and you can not tell which one is you any better than the outside observer can! No. The outsider can see both necks for example. The insider cannot be sure that he is not in front of some mirror, according to your own analysis. The third party sees the 2 bodies behave and answer questions in exactly the same way, the third party can not distinguish between the 2 consciousness, so it would make it meaningless to say there are two; the observer sees 2 chunks of matter but they are both behaving in a Brunomarchalian way. And you Bruno Marchal can not determine which of the 2 bodies is you either, if I instantly exchanged the position of the 2 bodies you would not notice the slightest change, nor could the very universe itself. None of this should be surprising if we understand that Bruno Marchal is not a noun but a adjective. Words play. Have you read step 2? It is the step which explains more easily the difference between the 1-view and the 3-view, already without duplication. > The difference between the 1-view and the 3-view is the difference between a body and the private experience of the owner of that body, or bodies in case of identical bodies. The outside observer can not distinguish 2 conscious beings inside that cylindrical symmetrical room but only one, and the exact same thing is true of you Bruno Marchal, looking at the live video from the camera in the center of the ceiling of that room you can not distinguish which body is you nor could you be expected to as both chunks of matter are behaving in a Brunomarchalian way. So you fail to distinguish the 1-view and the 3-view. (Re)read step 2, and tell me if you agree or not. >> This thing you call "first person indeterminacy" just means a person doesn’t always know what they will see or what they will do next, that's it; and people had discovered this fact of life many thousands of years before Heisenberg or Godel or Turing or you were born. > You betray yourself here. Yo
