2012/3/28 John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com>
> On Wed, Mar 28, 2012 at 4:40 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>> >> If 2 different consciousnesses can not be distinguished in my
>> symmetrical room from the first person point of view or from the third
>> person point of view then it seems pointless to insist that there are
>> really 2 and not just one mind involved.
>> > We agree on this since the beginning.
> Then why why why do you keep talking about things being the same from the
> "3-view" but not from the "1-view".
Comp (and MWI) is a deterministic theory... 3 POV could be called the bird
view, the totality view (the view in which comp and MWI are deterministic),
1 POV the frog view (and many frogs having all there 1 POV, have 1 POV
> > It seems to me that you are playing with words.
> Words are the only means we have to communicate with and I need to know
> what they mean and that is not always obvious in very extreme and unusual
> (but not illogical) situations.
> >> But you can see there are 2 bodies of Bruno Marchal just as well as the
>>> outside observer, and you can not tell which one is you any better than the
>>> outside observer can!
>> > No. The outsider can see both necks for example. The insider cannot be
>> sure that he is not in front of some mirror, according to your own
> No, you can touch the other fellow and he does not feel like a glass
> mirror, you can shake his hand, punch him in the jaw, do whatever 2 people
> can do when they meet each other, but if I instantly exchanged the position
> of the 2 bodies you would not notice the slightest difference, not from the
> 1-view or 2-view or 3-view or any view, the very universe itself would
> notice no difference. If subjectively it makes no difference and
> objectively it makes no difference then call me crazy but I say it makes no
> > So you fail to distinguish the 1-view and the 3-view.
> Yes, the universe itself can't distinguish between them and I'm not better
> than the universe.
> > OK. So what is new with comp is a form of indeterminacy which even in
>> theory we cannot predict, and which does not rely on physical
>> experimentation and extrapolation, nor on the same anti-diagonalization
>> used by Gödel or Turing.
> So in this hypothetical non quantum mechanical non Godel-Turing universe I
> could know at least in theory with 100% certainty that I will see
> Washington provided the universe was also simple enough for me to know the
> initial conditions and simple enough for me to calculate with them to
> obtain a outcome. And because I'd know I would see Washington I would know
> with 100% certainty that I will be the Washington man. I ask again what is
> new or deep here?
Your bad faith ?
> > Never say "cannot be proven" without adding "by a specific machine M"
> There are true statements that cannot be proven by a machine that is both
> consistent and complete, and any machine powerful enough to do arithmetic
> can not be complete.
> >> You want to know what is the probability you will become the Moscow
>>> man, but the only way that can happen is if you see images of Moscow,
>>> that's what being the Moscow man means.
>> > You can apply that argument to the throwing of a coin. That contradicts
>> the statement above that you can use probability for the coin, so why can't
>> you use it for the probability of feeling to be the Moscow man?
> In common usage when you say "what is the probability I will see heads
> when I flip this coin?" there is not a 100% chance I will see heads as
> there is in the thought experiment with the cities, but even more important
> in everyday use it is not needed to make what might seem like hairsplitting
> distinctions on who "I" is, but such exactitude is needed if duplicating
> chambers are thrown into the mix.
We are talking about comp (it would also be the same if we were talking
about MWI)... the *usual everyday universe* in these settings is a
duplicating chamber. So either we can *never* talk about 'I' (but as I use
'I', this proves you're wrong), or your argument is a proof that comp (and
MWI) is false.
> And if there is any mystery and indeterminacy in this thing you call
> "first person indeterminacy" it quickly reduces out to types of
> indeterminacy we've already known about, some for many thousands of years
> and others for only about 80.
> > Given that the probability concerns the 1-views (that is the 1-view from
>> the 1-person Pov), saying 100% for Moscow and 100% for Washington entails
>> that you predict that you will *feel* to be in the two places at once.
> "You" would feel to be in two places at once except for one thing, "you"
> has been duplicated.
We know, that's not the question.
> John K Clark
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