2012/3/28 John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> > On Wed, Mar 28, 2012 at 4:40 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >> >> If 2 different consciousnesses can not be distinguished in my >> symmetrical room from the first person point of view or from the third >> person point of view then it seems pointless to insist that there are >> really 2 and not just one mind involved. >> >> > We agree on this since the beginning. >> > > Then why why why do you keep talking about things being the same from the > "3-view" but not from the "1-view". >
Comp (and MWI) is a deterministic theory... 3 POV could be called the bird view, the totality view (the view in which comp and MWI are deterministic), 1 POV the frog view (and many frogs having all there 1 POV, have 1 POV plural/shared) > > > It seems to me that you are playing with words. >> > > Words are the only means we have to communicate with and I need to know > what they mean and that is not always obvious in very extreme and unusual > (but not illogical) situations. > > >> But you can see there are 2 bodies of Bruno Marchal just as well as the >>> outside observer, and you can not tell which one is you any better than the >>> outside observer can! >>> >> >> > No. The outsider can see both necks for example. The insider cannot be >> sure that he is not in front of some mirror, according to your own >> analysis. > > > No, you can touch the other fellow and he does not feel like a glass > mirror, you can shake his hand, punch him in the jaw, do whatever 2 people > can do when they meet each other, but if I instantly exchanged the position > of the 2 bodies you would not notice the slightest difference, not from the > 1-view or 2-view or 3-view or any view, the very universe itself would > notice no difference. If subjectively it makes no difference and > objectively it makes no difference then call me crazy but I say it makes no > difference. > > > So you fail to distinguish the 1-view and the 3-view. >> > > Yes, the universe itself can't distinguish between them and I'm not better > than the universe. > > > OK. So what is new with comp is a form of indeterminacy which even in >> theory we cannot predict, and which does not rely on physical >> experimentation and extrapolation, nor on the same anti-diagonalization >> used by Gödel or Turing. >> > > So in this hypothetical non quantum mechanical non Godel-Turing universe I > could know at least in theory with 100% certainty that I will see > Washington provided the universe was also simple enough for me to know the > initial conditions and simple enough for me to calculate with them to > obtain a outcome. And because I'd know I would see Washington I would know > with 100% certainty that I will be the Washington man. I ask again what is > new or deep here? > Your bad faith ? > > > Never say "cannot be proven" without adding "by a specific machine M" >> > > There are true statements that cannot be proven by a machine that is both > consistent and complete, and any machine powerful enough to do arithmetic > can not be complete. > > >> You want to know what is the probability you will become the Moscow >>> man, but the only way that can happen is if you see images of Moscow, >>> that's what being the Moscow man means. >>> >> >>> >> > You can apply that argument to the throwing of a coin. That contradicts >> the statement above that you can use probability for the coin, so why can't >> you use it for the probability of feeling to be the Moscow man? >> > > In common usage when you say "what is the probability I will see heads > when I flip this coin?" there is not a 100% chance I will see heads as > there is in the thought experiment with the cities, but even more important > in everyday use it is not needed to make what might seem like hairsplitting > distinctions on who "I" is, but such exactitude is needed if duplicating > chambers are thrown into the mix. > We are talking about comp (it would also be the same if we were talking about MWI)... the *usual everyday universe* in these settings is a duplicating chamber. So either we can *never* talk about 'I' (but as I use 'I', this proves you're wrong), or your argument is a proof that comp (and MWI) is false. Quentin > And if there is any mystery and indeterminacy in this thing you call > "first person indeterminacy" it quickly reduces out to types of > indeterminacy we've already known about, some for many thousands of years > and others for only about 80. > > > Given that the probability concerns the 1-views (that is the 1-view from >> the 1-person Pov), saying 100% for Moscow and 100% for Washington entails >> that you predict that you will *feel* to be in the two places at once. >> > > "You" would feel to be in two places at once except for one thing, "you" > has been duplicated. > We know, that's not the question. > > John K Clark > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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