On 4/1/2012 4:43 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sun, Apr 01, 2012 at 02:33:44PM +0100, David Nyman wrote:
Bruno, when you talk about the doctor offering one a replacement brain
you usually describe the substitute as digital, although I think you
have sometimes just said that it is artificial. M
On 4/2/2012 00:43, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sun, Apr 01, 2012 at 02:33:44PM +0100, David Nyman wrote:
Bruno, when you talk about the doctor offering one a replacement brain
you usually describe the substitute as digital, although I think you
have sometimes just said that it is artificial. My
On Sun, Apr 01, 2012 at 02:33:44PM +0100, David Nyman wrote:
> Bruno, when you talk about the doctor offering one a replacement brain
> you usually describe the substitute as digital, although I think you
> have sometimes just said that it is artificial. My recent remarks
> about "game physics" go
On 4/1/2012 1:28 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 1 April 2012 21:02, meekerdb wrote:
I'm all in favor of epistemology first. But that means point-of-view comes
first, and only some things happen comes second. The primitive,
micro-physical ensemble is an ontological assumption way down the line.
N
On 1 April 2012 21:02, meekerdb wrote:
> I'm all in favor of epistemology first. But that means point-of-view comes
> first, and only some things happen comes second. The primitive,
> micro-physical ensemble is an ontological assumption way down the line.
No argument from me on that! But, in
On 4/1/2012 6:33 AM, David Nyman wrote:
Bruno, when you talk about the doctor offering one a replacement brain
you usually describe the substitute as digital, although I think you
have sometimes just said that it is artificial. My recent remarks
about "game physics" got me thinking about this di
On 4/1/2012 4:55 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 31 March 2012 01:09, meekerdb wrote:
That seems like conjuring a mystery out of nothing. Is your question why is
my observational perspective associated with my brain?
It's only "a mystery out of nothing" if you have already accepted as
unproblematic
On 01 Apr 2012, at 18:12, David Nyman wrote:
On 1 April 2012 16:48, Bruno Marchal wrote:
David, if Dick does not have the impression that Harry has became a
sort of
zombie of some kind, for a time, I would suggest he trusts Harry
and his
doctor. If he is prepared to bet on comp. Once he b
Hello Stephen,
On 31 Mar 2012, at 18:29, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 3/31/2012 3:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Comp is just the assumption that we are machine, to said it
shortly. Then it is shown as a consequence that not only we cannot
neglect the physical reality, but that we have to ret
On 1 April 2012 16:48, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> David, if Dick does not have the impression that Harry has became a sort of
> zombie of some kind, for a time, I would suggest he trusts Harry and his
> doctor. If he is prepared to bet on comp. Once he bet on comp, the nature of
> the ultimate consit
David, acw,
On 01 Apr 2012, at 16:36, acw wrote:
On 4/1/2012 14:33, David Nyman wrote:
Bruno, when you talk about the doctor offering one a replacement
brain
you usually describe the substitute as digital, although I think you
have sometimes just said that it is artificial. My recent remark
On 31 Mar 2012, at 18:24, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Mar 29, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote:
> You should care to be able to answer the simple question: "what do
you expect to feel in the multiplication-movie experience"
I would expect to feel exactly the same as if duplicating chambers
and
On 4/1/2012 14:33, David Nyman wrote:
Bruno, when you talk about the doctor offering one a replacement brain
you usually describe the substitute as digital, although I think you
have sometimes just said that it is artificial. My recent remarks
about "game physics" got me thinking about this dist
Bruno, when you talk about the doctor offering one a replacement brain
you usually describe the substitute as digital, although I think you
have sometimes just said that it is artificial. My recent remarks
about "game physics" got me thinking about this distinction, if indeed
there is one.
Suppos
On 31 March 2012 01:09, meekerdb wrote:
> That seems like conjuring a mystery out of nothing. Is your question why is
> my observational perspective associated with my brain?
It's only "a mystery out of nothing" if you have already accepted as
unproblematic the primitive existence of "my brain".
On 1 April 2012 07:04, meekerdb wrote:
> I think he just proposes pruning the density matrix cross-terms by some
> mechanism. Once they are gone then the realized branch is just 'selected'
> stochasitcally per the Born rule. I've often contemplated such a move
> based on the idea that there be
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