On 31 Mar 2012, at 18:29, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 3/31/2012 3:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Comp is just the assumption that we are machine, to said it
shortly. Then it is shown as a consequence that not only we cannot
neglect the physical reality, but that we have to retrieve it from
arithmetic, without using any probabilistic *selection*. Comp is
the problem, not the solution. Only the materialist believe wrongly
that comp solves the mind problem, and *they* take matter for
granted. Pretending that comp neglects problem is contrary to the
facts, because comp just shows precisely where the problems come
from (the taking granted of the physical reality).
I wish I could feel comfortable with such a focused area so that
we can neglect all other considerations. I agree with your judgement
about materialists, but am not so sanguine about the idealist as
having all the answers.
Nobody said that the idealist has all answers. If comp is true, he has
only all questions, really, so to speak.
What is said is that IF comp is true, then we are necessarily lead to
arithmetical (or equivalent) idealism. That's the result.
Idealism is not part of the comp assumption. It is part of the
theorem. Comp has to be idealist.
If you belief, for whatever reason, that idealism is false, then COMP
is false. You can't survive with a digital, even material, brain, by
virtue of a physical computer emulating your brain at some level.
My motivations are different from yours. I am wrestling with the
ontological implications of physics and so our interests cross in
Only if comp is part of your theory. I have not yet seen any real,
precise, non comp theory, so I cannot judge them.
I have proposed an alternative ontology theory that appears to solve
the mind-body problem without having to resort to epiphenomena,
which by your own admission infects both materialism and idealism.
You forget many of our discussions. Comp, + the usual Occam, leads to
the disappearance of matter. Matter does not become an epiphenomenon,
for its observation becomes a psychological or biological or (better
imo) theological phenomenon. There are no epiphenomena.
Materialists which are not eliminating consciousness makes often it
into an epiphenomenon, because they admit it exists. But comp makes
primitive matter into pure and simple non existence. You can
reintroduce it logically, and that would make it into an
"epinoumenon", like invisible horses driving car, or ether, or
phlogistic. That's different.
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