Re: For John Clark

2013-10-23 Thread Telmo Menezes
On Tue, Oct 22, 2013 at 11:20 PM, Russell Standish
li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
 I'd only ever seen numerical simulations of it, but consulting the
 ever-handy Wikipedia, it looks like the percolation threshold is given
 by the inverse of the average node degree for Erdos-Renyi random
 graphs. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Random_graph). Mind you,
 Wikipedia does seem to be contradictory on this - the
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erdős–Rényi_model gives ln n/n for the
 percolation threshold.

 Presumably, the two pages are talking about different concepts of
 percolation threshold, but I would need to drill down into it further...

 Note that on 2D tilings, the percolation threshold seems somewhere
 between 0.5 and 0.8
 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Percolation_threshold).

 But for brains, neither network model is appropriate, so one would
 need to look at how percolation thresholds go for small world
 networks, about which Wikipedia doesn't have much to say.

Even that might not be enough. Small world doesn't tell the whole
story. For example, small world networks can have different triadic
motif profiles, as shown by Milo et al:
http://www.sciencemag.org/content/298/5594/824.abstract

Intuitively, this type of micro-structure should affect the
percolation threshold.

We need a sufficiently realistic generative model for the brain.

Cheers,
Telmo.

 Cheers


 On Tue, Oct 22, 2013 at 11:21:21AM -0500, Jason Resch wrote:
 Russell,

 Out of curiosity, is that link density of ~62% derived from 1 - (e^-1) ?

 The concept seems related, as it is also the proportion of hash values that
 can be reached by hashing all possible hash values (for a good hash
 function with a uniform distribution).

 Jason

 On Mon, Oct 21, 2013 at 4:17 PM, Russell Standish 
 li...@hpcoders.com.auwrote:

  On Mon, Oct 21, 2013 at 05:01:50PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
  
   Nevertheless,
   you do think there must be some strong indicators why a continuous
   (well at least local changes only) conscious path exists between all
   conscious states. What is that?
  
   By what I called (with a wrong terming) agnosologic path: where each
   time you lost a mental feature, you lost also the mental reference
   to it, so you don't see any difference.
  
   This involves amnesia, and I don't use that in UDA or AUDA. But I
   can also think and discuss like most participant in the list, on
   the larger domain than my thesis !
  
 
  Ah - I probably missed what you were trying to say earlier. To follow
  on from your agnosologia, I would hesitate to guess that
  consciousness somehow involves feedback loops. To make another
  analogy, if I take a network, if sufficiently dense, it will have
  cycles (loops), where if you follow the links from a given vertex, you
  will end up back where you start from.
 
  If you start removing links, the number of cycles drops, until
  eventually no cycles are left. That will most likely occur around the
  percolation threshold of the network, which is about 62% link density
  (62% of possible links are actually present) IIRC.
 
  ISTM one loses consciousness (loss of all feedback loops) well before
  losing sufficient memories (the links) to be able to merge into another
  person. This is essentially the reason fading qualia-style arguments
  don't impress me.
 
  Of course this is not a proof. For that, I suspect we need a better
  theory of consciousness. But I'm seeing your analogy, and raising one :).
 
 
  --
 
 
  
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  Principal, High Performance Coders
  Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
  University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au
 
  
 
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Re: AUDA and pronouns

2013-10-23 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 22 Oct 2013, at 19:01, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/22/2013 5:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 21 Oct 2013, at 20:07, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/20/2013 11:12 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sun, Oct 20, 2013 at 08:09:59PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
Consistency is []p  ~[]~p. I was saying []p  ~p, ie mistaken  
belief.
ISTM that Bruno equivocates and [] sometimes means believes  
and sometimes provable.


And I'm doing the same. It's not such an issue - a mathematician  
will

only believe something if e can prove it.


But provable(p)==p  and believes(p)=/=p, so why equivocate on  
them?



Both provable('p') - p, and believe('p') - p, when we limit  
ourself to correct machine.



(And incidentally mathematicians believe stuff they can't prove  
all the time - that's how they choose things to try to prove).


Then it is a conjecture. They don't believe rationally in  
conjecture, when they are correct.


They believe it in the real operational sense of believe, they  
will bet their whole professional lives on it.  How long did it take  
Andrew Wiles to prove Fermat's last theorem?  Since one can never  
know that one is a correct machine it seems to me a muddling of  
things to equivocate on provable and believes.


On the contrary. It provides a recursive definition of the beliefs, by  
a rational agent accepting enough truth to understand how a computer  
work.


We can define the beliefs by presenting PA axioms in that way

Classical logic is believed,
'0 ≠ s(x)'  is believed,
's(x) = s(y) - x = y'  is believed,
'x+0 = x'  is believed,
'x+s(y) = s(x+y)' is believed,
'x*0=0' is believed,
'x*s(y)=(x*y)+x' is believed,

and the rule: if A - B is believed and A is believed, then (soon or  
later) B is believed.


Then the theory will apply to any recursively enumerable extensions of  
those beliefs, provided they don't get arithmetically unsound.


The believer can be shown to be Löbian once he has also the beliefs in  
the induction axioms.


Bruno





Brent

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Re: AUDA and pronouns

2013-10-23 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 22 Oct 2013, at 19:07, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/22/2013 6:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


[]p - p is correctness. It is trivially true for the machine I  
consider, because they are correct by definition/choice.


Consistency is correctness on the f: []f - f. It is a very  
particular case of correctness.
There are machines which are not correct, yet consistent. For  
example Peano-Arithmetic + the axiom beweisbar('f').


Believing '0=1', does not make you inconsistent. Only non correct.


?? But in ordinary logic a false proposition allows you to prove  
anything.  So if I prove '0=1' then I can prove any proposition -  
which is the definition of inconsistency.


OK. I should have written Believing '0=1', does not make you  
inconsistent. Only non correct.


Or if your prefer: believing believing '0=1' does not make you  
inconsistent. Only non correct.


If you add the axiom 0=1 to PA, it get inconsistent, as, like you  
say, ordinary logic will imply that you can prove all proposition.


But here I was not adding 0=1 as an axiom to PA, I was adding  
believe 0=1 as an axiom, and from this you cannot prove all  
propositions. In particular you cannot prove 0=1. You can only prove  
that you can prove all propositions. That might make you stupid, and  
certainly unsound, but not inconsistent.


Just keep in mind that Bf - f is not provable by PA. And keep well  
the difference between PA asserts (proves, believes) p, and PA asserts  
Bp.


Bruno







Brent



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Re: AUDA and pronouns

2013-10-23 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 22 Oct 2013, at 22:50, Russell Standish wrote:


On Tue, Oct 22, 2013 at 03:09:03PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 21 Oct 2013, at 23:03, Russell Standish wrote:



In fact p- []p characterizes sigma_1 completeness (by a result  
by

Albert Visser), and that is why to get the proba on the UD*, we use
the intensional nuance []p  t  (= proba) starting from G  
extended

with the axiom p- []p (limiting the proposition to the UD).



proba?




Sorry - I was actually asking what you meant by the word proba.


OK. Sorry. It was an abbreviation for probability.

Best,

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: I have a very good question but I don't know how to ask it...

2013-10-23 Thread Stephen Lin
We all dreams in the mind of God, even, paradoxically, God himself?

On Oct 22, 2013, at 9:52 PM, Samiya Illias samiyaill...@gmail.com wrote:

 No, not criticizing! 
 This poem seems to express the question more comprehensibly, and I just 
 wanted to see what others think of it? 
 The idea that all is one is interesting, though it is at variance with my 
 belief. But, my belief is faith-based, and therefore not valid for others, I 
 suppose. However, I do believe in interconnectedness  through the fabric of 
 space-time. And that also encourages being nicer to one another :) 
 
 
 On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 8:10 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
 It echoes a thought I've had myself at times, and which if turned into a 
 religion might even make people be nicer to one another - perhaps - namely 
 the idea that there is only one mind, shuffling through every possible life. 
 Of course this is an infinite sequence, and the mind would I guess be 
 something like God, living inside his creation so as to experience it - the 
 universe creating senses with which to perceive itself, or words to that 
 effect.
 
 Or were you after literary criticism?
 
 
 
 On 23 October 2013 15:49, Samiya Illias samiyaill...@gmail.com wrote:
 What do you think of The Egg? 
 http://www.galactanet.com/oneoff/theegg_mod.html 
 
 
 On Tue, Oct 22, 2013 at 8:23 PM, Stephen Lin sw...@post.harvard.edu wrote:
 Without coaching anyway assume an answer. Trust me, it really is on-optic; it 
 has something to do with a supercomputer.
 
 Annywy, here does: Give that I am Neo, is it possible for me to bot attended 
 and not addending the wedding of Tim Lee and Jess Han without actually doing 
 it, such that Tim Lee becomes reborn as Wakka?
 
 It''s actually a good question, but if you have no idea what it means, Try 
 not to embarrass yourself by thinking you know. It has to with the fact that 
 I think we converge the same person in the end which becomse our own 
 beginning. Unfortunatley, sometimes we lose track of where we started or 
 where you're spposed to do...
 
 Thanks,
 Stephen
 
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Re: Seth Lloyd on Free Will

2013-10-23 Thread Stephen Lin
A deterministic system cannot grant free will, and a system with free will
cannot choose to become deterministic; however, each is capable of an
arbitrarily convincing simulation of the other.

So how would you know where it began?


On Mon, Oct 21, 2013 at 8:09 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:



 On Monday, October 21, 2013 7:23:06 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:

 On 20 October 2013 12:15, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote:
 
 
  On Saturday, October 19, 2013 6:31:23 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
 
  On 20 October 2013 00:53, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote:
   Free will is not about an inability to predict your own decisions,
 it is
   about a desire to directly dictate perceived conditions, and an
   expectation
   of the effectiveness of that desire.
 
  And that too is compatible with randomness or determinism.
 
 
  Only from the retrospective view (from which anything can automatically
 be
  justified). Prospectively, I can think of no plausible reason for any
 such
  desire or expectation to arise from a random or deterministic universe.
 Why
  would it, and how could it?

 I don't see how that constitutes any sort of argument. Does the fact
 that every human naturally thinks the Earth is flat mean the Earth is
 in fact flat, on the grounds that there would otherwise be no reason
 for such a belief to be so widespread?


 Yes, of course the Earth is flat from a local perspective. Flat enough for
 us to build with levels rather than protractors. If you walked around
 perceiving the curvature of the Earth all the time, you would not be part
 of the experience of the world that all animals share. If you were to
 recreate the universe and failed to include the perception that the world
 is flat, you would have eliminated a huge chunk of its realism, as you
 would if you neglected to include the masking of the night sky by blue sky.
 The only reason that we can accept the world being round is that we can see
 it and model it from a super-human perspective. To say that that
 perspective is absolutely true and the local perspective is an illusion is
 to miss the role that perceptual relativity plays in defining physics.


 Does the fact that every
 culture has come up with religious beliefs mean God exists?


 No, but it does mean that human consciousness describes itself in Godlike
 terms for a good reason. Once we understand what metaphor is, and how it is
 related to consciousness, then the metaphor of God is recognizable as a
 projection of metaphor and consciousness as a person (a father to be
 precise). A meta-metaphor about meta-superlative personhood.

 Craig



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A metaphor for true love:

2013-10-23 Thread Stephen Lin
Your soulmate is the one on the opposite side of the Möbius strip.

Of course, if that's true, then there's probably an even bigger Möbius
strip inside an even bigger Möbius strip etc...

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Dialetheism

2013-10-23 Thread Craig Weinberg
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dialetheism

Dialetheism is the view that some statements can be both true and false 
simultaneously. More precisely, it is the belief that there can be a true 
statement whose negation is also true. Such statements are called true 
contradictions, or dialetheia.

Dialetheism is not a system of formal logic; instead, it is a thesis about 
truth, that influences the construction of a formal logic, often based on 
pre-existing systems. Introducing dialetheism has various consequences, 
depending on the theory into which it is introduced. For example, in 
traditional systems of logic (e.g., classical logic and intuitionistic 
logic), every statement becomes true if a contradiction is true; this means 
that such systems become trivial when dialetheism is included as an axiom. 
Other logical systems do not explode in this manner when contradictions are 
introduced; such contradiction-tolerant systems are known as paraconsistent 
logics.

Graham Priest defines dialetheism as the view that there are true 
contradictions. JC Beall is another advocate; his position differs from 
Priest's in advocating constructive (methodological) deflationism regarding 
the truth predicate.
Dialetheism resolves certain paradoxes

The Liar's paradox and Russell's paradox deal with self-contradictory 
statements in classical logic and naïve set theory, respectively. 
Contradictions are problematic in these theories because they cause the 
theories to explode—if a contradiction is true, then every proposition is 
true. The classical way to solve this problem is to ban contradictory 
statements, to revise the axioms of the logic so that self-contradictory 
statements do not appear. Dialetheists, on the other hand, respond to this 
problem by accepting the contradictions as true. Dialetheism allows for the 
unrestricted axiom of comprehension in set theory, claiming that any 
resulting contradiction is a theorem.


It occurs to me that MWI is a way of substantiating dialetheism as a 
physical reality...in order to avoid having to internalize the possibility 
of dialetheism metaphysically.

Craig 
 

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Re: String theory and superconductors and classical liquids...

2013-10-23 Thread Richard Ruquist
Bruno, Are you saying that 1) negates digital physics? If so can you
explain how for dummies?
Richard


On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 8:44 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 23 Oct 2013, at 02:15, Chris de Morsella wrote:

 ** **
 ** **
 *From:* everything-list@googlegroups.com [
 mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com everything-list@googlegroups.com
 ] *On Behalf Of *Bruno Marchal
 *Sent:* Tuesday, October 22, 2013 9:50 AM
 *To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com
 *Subject:* Re: String theory and superconductors and classical liquids...*
 ***
 ** **
 ** **
 On 22 Oct 2013, at 04:20, Russell Standish wrote:


 
 On Tue, Oct 22, 2013 at 02:49:40PM +1300, LizR wrote:

 
 I missed that 10^-48 is rather an impressive result. Is that definitive -*
 ***

 granularity has to be that small - or merely suggestive?

 ** **

 It does suggest the possibility of a lot of internal structure inside

 fundamental particles!

 ** **

 ** **

 On 22 October 2013 14:43, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote:

 ** **

 The 10^-48 meters for the upper limit on grannular size of space is better
 

 compared to the Planck Scale at 10^-35.

 So space is smooth at least to 10^-13 Planck scales consistent with Fermi*
 ***

 gamma ray arrival results. Gamma rays a factor of ten different in energy*
 ***

 arrived from across the universe at the same time whereas granularity would
 

 delay one measurably.

 ** **

 ** **


 Indeed this seems an important empiricial result, ruling out certain
 classes of models, including, dare I say, Wolfram's NKS.

 However, it does not rule out computationalism, nor the countability
 of observer moments, as I've point out many time, as space-time is
 most likely a model construct, rather than actually being something
 physical out there. It is something Allen Francom bangs on about too,
 which I tend to agree with, although admittedly I've gotten lost with
 his Brownian Quantum Universe models.
 ** **
 Computationalism implies non classical granularity possible, but
 quantum granularity is not excluded, with a qubit being described by some
 continuum aI0 + bI1 (a and b complex).
 ** **
 The results seem to exclude any theories that rely on a classic
 granularity of space time with the scale this granularity would need to be
 under being pushed far below the Planck scale.
 ** **
 The basic ontology can be discrete (indeed arithmetical), but the
 physical (and the theological) should reasonably have continuous observable
 (even if those are only the frequency operators, and that *only* the
 probabilities reflect the continuum. Needless to say those are open
 problems).
 ** **
 I was thinking some recent observations tended to rule out granularity.
 Hard questions, but with comp, some continuum seems to play a role in
 physics (which should be a first person plural universal machines view).**
 **
 ** **
 Bruno
 ** **
 If reality arises from scale invariant equations perhaps there is no need
 for a pixelated foundation to act as the smallest addressable chunks and as
 the canvas upon which reality is drawn or projected as it were. Perhaps
 reality really arises at it is observed


 ... from our points of view. That might even include backtracking, so that
 the physical reality develops and bactrack when  some inconsistency is met.
 Open problem with comp, but evidences exists, and it might be that physical
 reality is ever growing.
 have you understand that if the brain works like a digital machine, the
 physical realitu emerges from some statistics on all computations (which
 exist in arithmetic)?




 so that if it were possible to scale infinitely down it would emerge and
 continue to emerge at whatever minimum scale could be achieved. If reality
 is information and information can be described with equations that are
 scale invariant (such as for example vector graphics versus pixel based
 graphics, or fractal geometry) then a computational model can still
 describe the entire universal relationship and identity sets even when
 there is seemingly no end (that we have found)  to how small a point of
 spacetime can be.


 OK. But computationalism (I am a machine)  entails the existence of at
 least one observable which relies on real numbers and is not completely
 turing emulable. It might be the quantum frequency operator (describe well
 by Graham and Preskill's course).


 So long as this does not much matter to the computational theory itself
 then it is unaffected by this very fine grained measurement of the lack of
 any fine structure in spacetime.


 Keep in mind the difference between 1) the computationalist hypothesis in
 philosophy of mind, and 2) the hypothesis that the universe is the
 product of some program.

 2) implies 1)

 but

 1) implies the negation of 2)(this can be explained with the thought
 experiment like in the UDA).

 In particular 2) implies the negation of 2), and so is self-contradictory.

 

Re: Seth Lloyd on Free Will

2013-10-23 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Wednesday, October 23, 2013 9:39:31 AM UTC-4, Stephen Lin wrote:

 A deterministic system cannot grant free will, and a system with free 
 will cannot choose to become deterministic; however, each is capable of an 
 arbitrarily convincing simulation of the other.


A system with free will can choose to become deterministic though. Follow a 
leader or flip a coin.

It seems like it must begin there, with free will.

Craig

 


 So how would you know where it began?


 On Mon, Oct 21, 2013 at 8:09 AM, Craig Weinberg 
 whats...@gmail.comjavascript:
  wrote:



 On Monday, October 21, 2013 7:23:06 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:

 On 20 October 2013 12:15, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: 
  
  
  On Saturday, October 19, 2013 6:31:23 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: 
  
  On 20 October 2013 00:53, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: 
   Free will is not about an inability to predict your own decisions, 
 it is 
   about a desire to directly dictate perceived conditions, and an 
   expectation 
   of the effectiveness of that desire. 
  
  And that too is compatible with randomness or determinism. 
  
  
  Only from the retrospective view (from which anything can 
 automatically be 
  justified). Prospectively, I can think of no plausible reason for any 
 such 
  desire or expectation to arise from a random or deterministic 
 universe. Why 
  would it, and how could it? 

 I don't see how that constitutes any sort of argument. Does the fact 
 that every human naturally thinks the Earth is flat mean the Earth is 
 in fact flat, on the grounds that there would otherwise be no reason 
 for such a belief to be so widespread? 


 Yes, of course the Earth is flat from a local perspective. Flat enough 
 for us to build with levels rather than protractors. If you walked around 
 perceiving the curvature of the Earth all the time, you would not be part 
 of the experience of the world that all animals share. If you were to 
 recreate the universe and failed to include the perception that the world 
 is flat, you would have eliminated a huge chunk of its realism, as you 
 would if you neglected to include the masking of the night sky by blue sky. 
 The only reason that we can accept the world being round is that we can see 
 it and model it from a super-human perspective. To say that that 
 perspective is absolutely true and the local perspective is an illusion is 
 to miss the role that perceptual relativity plays in defining physics.
  

 Does the fact that every 
 culture has come up with religious beliefs mean God exists? 


 No, but it does mean that human consciousness describes itself in Godlike 
 terms for a good reason. Once we understand what metaphor is, and how it is 
 related to consciousness, then the metaphor of God is recognizable as a 
 projection of metaphor and consciousness as a person (a father to be 
 precise). A meta-metaphor about meta-superlative personhood. 

 Craig



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Re: For John Clark

2013-10-23 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 22 Oct 2013, at 20:56, Quentin Anciaux wrote to John Clark

(I comment both)





2013/10/22 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com



On Mon, Oct 21, 2013 at 6:03 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net  
wrote:



On 10/21/2013 9:16 AM, John Clark wrote:
  Let me put it in this way: accepting that P(W) = P(M) =1/2,  
with W and M describing the first person experiences of the  
respective copies, do you accept that P(M) = P(W) = 1/2,


 No I don't accept that, not if P(W) is the probability that the  
Washington Man will see Washington; the probability of that would  
be 1 not 1/2. And if P(W) means the probability the Helsinki Man  
will see Washington that would be 0 not 1/2 because the Helsinki  
Man would have to be turned into something that is not the Helsinki  
Man before the Helsinki Man can see a different city.

 Why?  If he flew to Washington he would still be the Helsinki man.

OK, then if he flew to Moscow he would be the Helsinki man too, and  
if he used a Star Trek style transporter instead of a airplane he  
would still be the Helsinki Man, and if the transporter sent him to  
both cities at the same time he would still be The Helsinki Man.  
So you tell me, using logic and your definition how many cities did  
The Helsinki Man see?


   He's the Helsinki man because of the continuity of his memories,  
just as you are still John Clark even though you've changed  
locations since yesterday.


Fine. If that's what you mean by The Helsinki Man then in Bruno's  
thought experiment with the duplication chamber and using the exact  
same reasoning the probability The Helsinki Man will see Washington  
is 100%


In the third person point of view on the first person points of view.  
But the question bears on the first person point of view exclusively.  
To answer the question asked, you have to put yourself in the shoes of  
each copy, or at least read their personal diaries (by definition of  
first person points of view used here).





and the probability The Helsinki Man will see Moscow is 100%.



Note, John, that you just go from P(W) = P(M) = 0, to the post you  
sent before (and that I commented), to P(W) =  P(M) = 1.

You do seem confused.



And yes yes I know, each copy will see only one city, but if the  
definition of  The Helsinki Man is the one you give above, the  
continuity of his memories, then it is irrelevant how many cities  
each individual copy sees.


Except that the probability bears on the memories contained in all the  
resulting personal diaries, and they will differ on the number of  
cities. You can even define the first person indeterminacies by the  
frequency of W and M in the personal reports, and elementary reasoning  
shows that this lead to the binomial, and thus normal for large number  
of duplications, distribution, confirming the P = 1/2, based on the  
numerical identity of the codes sent to Washington and Moscow.





Errare humanum est, perseverare diabolicum.


John Clark seems stuck in his confusion between the third person view  
on the first person views, and the first person points of view  
themselves.


This indicates that he does not pursue the step 3 thought experiment  
in its entirety. After the duplication, considers himself being in  
both place at once, but forget to take into account the fact that both  
copies will feel to be in only one place, and that the question was  
about that place.


Everett also reintroduces total third person determinacy by reducing  
the experimental indeterminacy by multiplication/differentiation of  
the observers, eliminating notably the notion of event without cause,  
which is a plug in for God/Universe-of-the-gap notions.


To be wrong is not a problem indeed. It is the fuel of learning.

To be wrong again and again and again ... is more problematical.

To be wrong, knowing being wrong, but denying it for private (unknown,  
conscious/unconscious?) reason, is much more problematical.


Science and even Conscience is in the attempt of not doing the same  
error twice.


I have no idea what is Clark's problem. He just confused  
opportunistically 1p and 3p to make his point. (mixed with  
depreciating rethoric).


He has never tried to read AUDA, also, but of course this needs some  
mathematical logics. But, still, he talks like if that was not existing.


Yet,  I have a sort of respect for John Clark, as he seems, at least,  
to try to give a reason why *not* reading more than the two first  
steps of UDA. That is quite unlike the usual opponents, who discard  
any meeting and dialog, private or public, and does not even come at  
the public defense of the thesis, mocking all academical practices.  
John Clark does *not* act under my back (Well not only, at least). I  
thank John for that, as it illustrates to the others the kind of  
opponents the reasoning can meet.


Quentin, you are right that by not seeing the phenomenological  
similarity between the comp self-multiplication and the QM self- 

Re: Dialetheism

2013-10-23 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 23 Oct 2013, at 17:39, Craig Weinberg wrote:


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dialetheism

Dialetheism is the view that some statements can be both true and  
false simultaneously. More precisely, it is the belief that there  
can be a true statement whose negation is also true. Such statements  
are called true contradictions, or dialetheia.


Dialetheism is not a system of formal logic; instead, it is a thesis  
about truth, that influences the construction of a formal logic,  
often based on pre-existing systems. Introducing dialetheism has  
various consequences, depending on the theory into which it is  
introduced. For example, in traditional systems of logic (e.g.,  
classical logic and intuitionistic logic), every statement becomes  
true if a contradiction is true; this means that such systems become  
trivial when dialetheism is included as an axiom. Other logical  
systems do not explode in this manner when contradictions are  
introduced; such contradiction-tolerant systems are known as  
paraconsistent logics.


Graham Priest defines dialetheism as the view that there are true  
contradictions. JC Beall is another advocate; his position differs  
from Priest's in advocating constructive (methodological)  
deflationism regarding the truth predicate.

Dialetheism resolves certain paradoxes

The Liar's paradox and Russell's paradox deal with self- 
contradictory statements in classical logic and naïve set theory,  
respectively. Contradictions are problematic in these theories  
because they cause the theories to explode—if a contradiction is  
true, then every proposition is true. The classical way to solve  
this problem is to ban contradictory statements, to revise the  
axioms of the logic so that self-contradictory statements do not  
appear. Dialetheists, on the other hand, respond to this problem by  
accepting the contradictions as true. Dialetheism allows for the  
unrestricted axiom of comprehension in set theory, claiming that any  
resulting contradiction is a theorem.


It occurs to me that MWI is a way of substantiating dialetheism as a  
physical reality...in order to avoid having to internalize the  
possibility of dialetheism metaphysically.


No problem with that. Like Everett restore 3p-determinacy, comp  
restore also non-dialetheism, metaphysically, but does not (and  
cannot) disallow it it in some machine's mind.


G*  says it; D(Bp  B~p), or ([]p  []~p). read: it is consistent  
that  p is believed  and that ~p is believed, by the Löbian machine.  
The machine cannot know that, note.


Well, don't take this too much seriously. My problem is that you need  
to do the math to evaluate how much seriously you can take this remark.


Note that in machines' theology, some theorem cannot be proved without  
the reduction to contradiction, so that it misses them. (Unlike  
intuitionism which can still get them by the use of the double  
negation).


Classical logic is the simplest logic to (re) discover the many non  
classical logics of the realities/dreams.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Dialetheism

2013-10-23 Thread Stephen Lin
Gien all of that, can you explain red/green vision? Then what happens to
yelow??

(Did hear someone way loops?)


On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 11:07 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:



 On Wednesday, October 23, 2013 12:34:05 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 23 Oct 2013, at 17:39, Craig Weinberg wrote:

  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/**Dialetheismhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dialetheism
 
  Dialetheism is the view that some statements can be both true and
  false simultaneously. More precisely, it is the belief that there
  can be a true statement whose negation is also true. Such statements
  are called true contradictions, or dialetheia.
 
  Dialetheism is not a system of formal logic; instead, it is a thesis
  about truth, that influences the construction of a formal logic,
  often based on pre-existing systems. Introducing dialetheism has
  various consequences, depending on the theory into which it is
  introduced. For example, in traditional systems of logic (e.g.,
  classical logic and intuitionistic logic), every statement becomes
  true if a contradiction is true; this means that such systems become
  trivial when dialetheism is included as an axiom. Other logical
  systems do not explode in this manner when contradictions are
  introduced; such contradiction-tolerant systems are known as
  paraconsistent logics.
 
  Graham Priest defines dialetheism as the view that there are true
  contradictions. JC Beall is another advocate; his position differs
  from Priest's in advocating constructive (methodological)
  deflationism regarding the truth predicate.
  Dialetheism resolves certain paradoxes
 
  The Liar's paradox and Russell's paradox deal with self-
  contradictory statements in classical logic and naïve set theory,
  respectively. Contradictions are problematic in these theories
  because they cause the theories to explode—if a contradiction is
  true, then every proposition is true. The classical way to solve
  this problem is to ban contradictory statements, to revise the
  axioms of the logic so that self-contradictory statements do not
  appear. Dialetheists, on the other hand, respond to this problem by
  accepting the contradictions as true. Dialetheism allows for the
  unrestricted axiom of comprehension in set theory, claiming that any
  resulting contradiction is a theorem.
 
  It occurs to me that MWI is a way of substantiating dialetheism as a
  physical reality...in order to avoid having to internalize the
  possibility of dialetheism metaphysically.

 No problem with that. Like Everett restore 3p-determinacy, comp
 restore also non-dialetheism, metaphysically, but does not (and
 cannot) disallow it it in some machine's mind.

 G*  says it; D(Bp  B~p), or ([]p  []~p). read: it is consistent
 that  p is believed  and that ~p is believed, by the Löbian machine.
 The machine cannot know that, note.

 Well, don't take this too much seriously. My problem is that you need
 to do the math to evaluate how much seriously you can take this remark.

 Note that in machines' theology, some theorem cannot be proved without
 the reduction to contradiction, so that it misses them. (Unlike
 intuitionism which can still get them by the use of the double
 negation).

 Classical logic is the simplest logic to (re) discover the many non
 classical logics of the realities/dreams.


 My problem is that you need
 to do the math to evaluate how much seriously you can take this remark.

 Under comp, why couldn't I just imagine tasting the flavor of the math
 instead?

 Craig


 Bruno


 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Dialetheism

2013-10-23 Thread Stephen Lin
Wait I accideally replied to all! EVERYONE FORGET I METNIONED THAT NAME
MING.


On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 1:27 PM, Stephen Lin sw...@post.harvard.edu wrote:

 Ming? Was that you???


 On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 11:07 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:



 On Wednesday, October 23, 2013 12:34:05 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 23 Oct 2013, at 17:39, Craig Weinberg wrote:

  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/**Dialetheismhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dialetheism
 
  Dialetheism is the view that some statements can be both true and
  false simultaneously. More precisely, it is the belief that there
  can be a true statement whose negation is also true. Such statements
  are called true contradictions, or dialetheia.
 
  Dialetheism is not a system of formal logic; instead, it is a thesis
  about truth, that influences the construction of a formal logic,
  often based on pre-existing systems. Introducing dialetheism has
  various consequences, depending on the theory into which it is
  introduced. For example, in traditional systems of logic (e.g.,
  classical logic and intuitionistic logic), every statement becomes
  true if a contradiction is true; this means that such systems become
  trivial when dialetheism is included as an axiom. Other logical
  systems do not explode in this manner when contradictions are
  introduced; such contradiction-tolerant systems are known as
  paraconsistent logics.
 
  Graham Priest defines dialetheism as the view that there are true
  contradictions. JC Beall is another advocate; his position differs
  from Priest's in advocating constructive (methodological)
  deflationism regarding the truth predicate.
  Dialetheism resolves certain paradoxes
 
  The Liar's paradox and Russell's paradox deal with self-
  contradictory statements in classical logic and naïve set theory,
  respectively. Contradictions are problematic in these theories
  because they cause the theories to explode—if a contradiction is
  true, then every proposition is true. The classical way to solve
  this problem is to ban contradictory statements, to revise the
  axioms of the logic so that self-contradictory statements do not
  appear. Dialetheists, on the other hand, respond to this problem by
  accepting the contradictions as true. Dialetheism allows for the
  unrestricted axiom of comprehension in set theory, claiming that any
  resulting contradiction is a theorem.
 
  It occurs to me that MWI is a way of substantiating dialetheism as a
  physical reality...in order to avoid having to internalize the
  possibility of dialetheism metaphysically.

 No problem with that. Like Everett restore 3p-determinacy, comp
 restore also non-dialetheism, metaphysically, but does not (and
 cannot) disallow it it in some machine's mind.

 G*  says it; D(Bp  B~p), or ([]p  []~p). read: it is consistent
 that  p is believed  and that ~p is believed, by the Löbian machine.
 The machine cannot know that, note.

 Well, don't take this too much seriously. My problem is that you need
 to do the math to evaluate how much seriously you can take this remark.

 Note that in machines' theology, some theorem cannot be proved without
 the reduction to contradiction, so that it misses them. (Unlike
 intuitionism which can still get them by the use of the double
 negation).

 Classical logic is the simplest logic to (re) discover the many non
 classical logics of the realities/dreams.


 My problem is that you need
 to do the math to evaluate how much seriously you can take this remark.

 Under comp, why couldn't I just imagine tasting the flavor of the math
 instead?

 Craig


 Bruno


 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Neural activity in the brain is harder to disrupt when we are aware of it

2013-10-23 Thread Craig Weinberg
http://medicalxpress.com/news/2013-10-neural-brain-harder-disrupt-aware.html

We consciously perceive just a small part of the information processed in 
 the brain – but which information in the brain remains unconscious and 
 which reaches our consciousness remains a mystery. However, neuroscientists 
 Natalia Zaretskaya and Andreas Bartels from the Centre for Integrative 
 Neuroscience (CIN) at the University of Tübingen have now come one step 
 closer to answering this question.
   
 Their research, published in *Current Biology*, used a well-known visual 
 illusion known as 'binocular rivalry' as a technique to make visual images 
 invisible. Eyes usually both see the same image – binocular rivalry happens 
 when each eye is shown an entirely different image. Our brains cannot then 
 decide between the alternatives, and our perception switches back and forth 
 between the images in a matter of seconds. The two images are 'rivals' for 
 our attention, and every few seconds they take turns to enter our 
 consciousness.

 Using this approach the two scientists used a moving and a static picture 
 to cause perceptual alternations in their test subjects' minds. 
 Simultaneously they applied magnetic pulses to disturb brain processing in 
 a 'motion http://medicalxpress.com/tags/motion/ area' that specifically 
 processes visual motion http://medicalxpress.com/tags/visual+motion/. 
 The effect was unexpected: 'zapping' activity in the motion area did not 
 have any effect on how long the moving image was perceived – instead, the 
 amount of time the static image was perceived grew longer.

 So 'zapping' the motion area while the mind was unconsciously processing 
 motion meant that it took longer for it to become conscious of the moving 
 image. When the moving image was being perceived, however, zapping had no 
 effect.
 This result suggests that there is a substantial difference between 
 conscious and unconscious motion representation in the 
 brainhttp://medicalxpress.com/tags/brain/. 
 Whenever motion is unconscious, its neural representation can easily be 
 disturbed, making it difficult for it to gain the upper hand in the 
 rivalry. However, once it becomes conscious it apparently becomes more 
 resistant to disturbance, so that introducing noise has no effect. 
 Therefore, one correlate of conscious neural codes may be a more stable and 
 noise-resistant representation of the outside world, which raises the 
 question of how this neural stability is achieved.


Indeed. It is almost as if consciousness is actually trying to make sense *on 
purpose* ;) Could it be that consciousness is actually *conscious???*

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Time as an emergent phenomenon

2013-10-23 Thread LizR
I will be reading this as soon as I get the time,  I mean the emergent
phenomenon...but thought in the meantime you guys might be interested :-)

https://medium.com/the-physics-arxiv-blog/d5d3dc850933

I may have comments once I've had a chance to read it!

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Re: AUDA and pronouns

2013-10-23 Thread Russell Standish
On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 03:02:55PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 On 22 Oct 2013, at 22:50, Russell Standish wrote:
 
 On Tue, Oct 22, 2013 at 03:09:03PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 On 21 Oct 2013, at 23:03, Russell Standish wrote:
 
 
 In fact p- []p characterizes sigma_1 completeness (by a
 result by
 Albert Visser), and that is why to get the proba on the UD*, we use
 the intensional nuance []p  t  (= proba) starting from G
 extended
 with the axiom p- []p (limiting the proposition to the UD).
 
 
 proba?
 
 
 Sorry - I was actually asking what you meant by the word proba.
 
 OK. Sorry. It was an abbreviation for probability.
 

[]p  t doesn't seem like a probability.  Did you mean certainty?
IIRC, one of your hypostases was interpreted as probability=1 (ie
certain) events. Also, is []p  t == []p  p ?



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Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
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Re: Dialetheism

2013-10-23 Thread Craig Weinberg
color blindness? not sure what the connection is.

On Wednesday, October 23, 2013 4:25:48 PM UTC-4, Stephen Lin wrote:

 Gien all of that, can you explain red/green vision? Then what happens to 
 yelow??

 (Did hear someone way loops?)


 On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 11:07 AM, Craig Weinberg 
 whats...@gmail.comjavascript:
  wrote:



 On Wednesday, October 23, 2013 12:34:05 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 23 Oct 2013, at 17:39, Craig Weinberg wrote: 

  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/**Dialetheismhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dialetheism
   
  
  Dialetheism is the view that some statements can be both true and   
  false simultaneously. More precisely, it is the belief that there   
  can be a true statement whose negation is also true. Such statements   
  are called true contradictions, or dialetheia. 
  
  Dialetheism is not a system of formal logic; instead, it is a thesis   
  about truth, that influences the construction of a formal logic,   
  often based on pre-existing systems. Introducing dialetheism has   
  various consequences, depending on the theory into which it is   
  introduced. For example, in traditional systems of logic (e.g.,   
  classical logic and intuitionistic logic), every statement becomes   
  true if a contradiction is true; this means that such systems become   
  trivial when dialetheism is included as an axiom. Other logical   
  systems do not explode in this manner when contradictions are   
  introduced; such contradiction-tolerant systems are known as   
  paraconsistent logics. 
  
  Graham Priest defines dialetheism as the view that there are true   
  contradictions. JC Beall is another advocate; his position differs   
  from Priest's in advocating constructive (methodological)   
  deflationism regarding the truth predicate. 
  Dialetheism resolves certain paradoxes 
  
  The Liar's paradox and Russell's paradox deal with self- 
  contradictory statements in classical logic and naïve set theory,   
  respectively. Contradictions are problematic in these theories   
  because they cause the theories to explode—if a contradiction is   
  true, then every proposition is true. The classical way to solve   
  this problem is to ban contradictory statements, to revise the   
  axioms of the logic so that self-contradictory statements do not   
  appear. Dialetheists, on the other hand, respond to this problem by   
  accepting the contradictions as true. Dialetheism allows for the   
  unrestricted axiom of comprehension in set theory, claiming that any   
  resulting contradiction is a theorem. 
  
  It occurs to me that MWI is a way of substantiating dialetheism as a   
  physical reality...in order to avoid having to internalize the   
  possibility of dialetheism metaphysically. 

 No problem with that. Like Everett restore 3p-determinacy, comp   
 restore also non-dialetheism, metaphysically, but does not (and   
 cannot) disallow it it in some machine's mind. 

 G*  says it; D(Bp  B~p), or ([]p  []~p). read: it is consistent   
 that  p is believed  and that ~p is believed, by the Löbian machine.   
 The machine cannot know that, note. 

 Well, don't take this too much seriously. My problem is that you need   
 to do the math to evaluate how much seriously you can take this remark. 

 Note that in machines' theology, some theorem cannot be proved without   
 the reduction to contradiction, so that it misses them. (Unlike   
 intuitionism which can still get them by the use of the double   
 negation). 

 Classical logic is the simplest logic to (re) discover the many non   
 classical logics of the realities/dreams. 


 My problem is that you need   
 to do the math to evaluate how much seriously you can take this remark.

 Under comp, why couldn't I just imagine tasting the flavor of the math 
 instead?

 Craig

  
 Bruno 


 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 



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Re: Dialetheism

2013-10-23 Thread Stephen Lin
you do now!


On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 1:52 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:

 color blindness? not sure what the connection is.


 On Wednesday, October 23, 2013 4:25:48 PM UTC-4, Stephen Lin wrote:

 Gien all of that, can you explain red/green vision? Then what happens to
 yelow??

 (Did hear someone way loops?)


 On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 11:07 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote:



 On Wednesday, October 23, 2013 12:34:05 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 23 Oct 2013, at 17:39, Craig Weinberg wrote:

  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/**D**ialetheismhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dialetheism
 
  Dialetheism is the view that some statements can be both true and
  false simultaneously. More precisely, it is the belief that there
  can be a true statement whose negation is also true. Such statements

  are called true contradictions, or dialetheia.
 
  Dialetheism is not a system of formal logic; instead, it is a thesis

  about truth, that influences the construction of a formal logic,
  often based on pre-existing systems. Introducing dialetheism has
  various consequences, depending on the theory into which it is
  introduced. For example, in traditional systems of logic (e.g.,
  classical logic and intuitionistic logic), every statement becomes
  true if a contradiction is true; this means that such systems become

  trivial when dialetheism is included as an axiom. Other logical
  systems do not explode in this manner when contradictions are
  introduced; such contradiction-tolerant systems are known as
  paraconsistent logics.
 
  Graham Priest defines dialetheism as the view that there are true
  contradictions. JC Beall is another advocate; his position differs
  from Priest's in advocating constructive (methodological)
  deflationism regarding the truth predicate.
  Dialetheism resolves certain paradoxes
 
  The Liar's paradox and Russell's paradox deal with self-
  contradictory statements in classical logic and naïve set theory,
  respectively. Contradictions are problematic in these theories
  because they cause the theories to explode—if a contradiction is
  true, then every proposition is true. The classical way to solve
  this problem is to ban contradictory statements, to revise the
  axioms of the logic so that self-contradictory statements do not
  appear. Dialetheists, on the other hand, respond to this problem by
  accepting the contradictions as true. Dialetheism allows for the
  unrestricted axiom of comprehension in set theory, claiming that any

  resulting contradiction is a theorem.
 
  It occurs to me that MWI is a way of substantiating dialetheism as a

  physical reality...in order to avoid having to internalize the
  possibility of dialetheism metaphysically.

 No problem with that. Like Everett restore 3p-determinacy, comp
 restore also non-dialetheism, metaphysically, but does not (and
 cannot) disallow it it in some machine's mind.

 G*  says it; D(Bp  B~p), or ([]p  []~p). read: it is consistent
 that  p is believed  and that ~p is believed, by the Löbian machine.
 The machine cannot know that, note.

 Well, don't take this too much seriously. My problem is that you need
 to do the math to evaluate how much seriously you can take this remark.

 Note that in machines' theology, some theorem cannot be proved without

 the reduction to contradiction, so that it misses them. (Unlike
 intuitionism which can still get them by the use of the double
 negation).

 Classical logic is the simplest logic to (re) discover the many non
 classical logics of the realities/dreams.


 My problem is that you need
 to do the math to evaluate how much seriously you can take this remark.

 Under comp, why couldn't I just imagine tasting the flavor of the math
 instead?

 Craig


 Bruno


 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**march**al/http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Dialetheism

2013-10-23 Thread Stephen Lin
There, I just did it again. Baby BAby I just idd i t again.


On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 1:28 PM, Stephen Lin sw...@post.harvard.edu wrote:

 Wait I accideally replied to all! EVERYONE FORGET I METNIONED THAT NAME
 MING.


 On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 1:27 PM, Stephen Lin sw...@post.harvard.eduwrote:

 Ming? Was that you???


 On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 11:07 AM, Craig Weinberg 
 whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:



 On Wednesday, October 23, 2013 12:34:05 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 23 Oct 2013, at 17:39, Craig Weinberg wrote:

  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/**Dialetheismhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dialetheism
 
  Dialetheism is the view that some statements can be both true and
  false simultaneously. More precisely, it is the belief that there
  can be a true statement whose negation is also true. Such statements

  are called true contradictions, or dialetheia.
 
  Dialetheism is not a system of formal logic; instead, it is a thesis

  about truth, that influences the construction of a formal logic,
  often based on pre-existing systems. Introducing dialetheism has
  various consequences, depending on the theory into which it is
  introduced. For example, in traditional systems of logic (e.g.,
  classical logic and intuitionistic logic), every statement becomes
  true if a contradiction is true; this means that such systems become

  trivial when dialetheism is included as an axiom. Other logical
  systems do not explode in this manner when contradictions are
  introduced; such contradiction-tolerant systems are known as
  paraconsistent logics.
 
  Graham Priest defines dialetheism as the view that there are true
  contradictions. JC Beall is another advocate; his position differs
  from Priest's in advocating constructive (methodological)
  deflationism regarding the truth predicate.
  Dialetheism resolves certain paradoxes
 
  The Liar's paradox and Russell's paradox deal with self-
  contradictory statements in classical logic and naïve set theory,
  respectively. Contradictions are problematic in these theories
  because they cause the theories to explode—if a contradiction is
  true, then every proposition is true. The classical way to solve
  this problem is to ban contradictory statements, to revise the
  axioms of the logic so that self-contradictory statements do not
  appear. Dialetheists, on the other hand, respond to this problem by
  accepting the contradictions as true. Dialetheism allows for the
  unrestricted axiom of comprehension in set theory, claiming that any

  resulting contradiction is a theorem.
 
  It occurs to me that MWI is a way of substantiating dialetheism as a

  physical reality...in order to avoid having to internalize the
  possibility of dialetheism metaphysically.

 No problem with that. Like Everett restore 3p-determinacy, comp
 restore also non-dialetheism, metaphysically, but does not (and
 cannot) disallow it it in some machine's mind.

 G*  says it; D(Bp  B~p), or ([]p  []~p). read: it is consistent
 that  p is believed  and that ~p is believed, by the Löbian machine.
 The machine cannot know that, note.

 Well, don't take this too much seriously. My problem is that you need
 to do the math to evaluate how much seriously you can take this remark.

 Note that in machines' theology, some theorem cannot be proved without

 the reduction to contradiction, so that it misses them. (Unlike
 intuitionism which can still get them by the use of the double
 negation).

 Classical logic is the simplest logic to (re) discover the many non
 classical logics of the realities/dreams.


 My problem is that you need
 to do the math to evaluate how much seriously you can take this remark.

 Under comp, why couldn't I just imagine tasting the flavor of the math
 instead?

 Craig


 Bruno


 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Dialetheism

2013-10-23 Thread Stephen Lin
Ooops, I did it again, I played with your heart.


On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 8:39 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:

 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dialetheism

 Dialetheism is the view that some statements can be both true and false
 simultaneously. More precisely, it is the belief that there can be a true
 statement whose negation is also true. Such statements are called true
 contradictions, or dialetheia.

 Dialetheism is not a system of formal logic; instead, it is a thesis about
 truth, that influences the construction of a formal logic, often based on
 pre-existing systems. Introducing dialetheism has various consequences,
 depending on the theory into which it is introduced. For example, in
 traditional systems of logic (e.g., classical logic and intuitionistic
 logic), every statement becomes true if a contradiction is true; this means
 that such systems become trivial when dialetheism is included as an axiom.
 Other logical systems do not explode in this manner when contradictions are
 introduced; such contradiction-tolerant systems are known as paraconsistent
 logics.

 Graham Priest defines dialetheism as the view that there are true
 contradictions. JC Beall is another advocate; his position differs from
 Priest's in advocating constructive (methodological) deflationism regarding
 the truth predicate.
 Dialetheism resolves certain paradoxes

 The Liar's paradox and Russell's paradox deal with self-contradictory
 statements in classical logic and naïve set theory, respectively.
 Contradictions are problematic in these theories because they cause the
 theories to explode—if a contradiction is true, then every proposition is
 true. The classical way to solve this problem is to ban contradictory
 statements, to revise the axioms of the logic so that self-contradictory
 statements do not appear. Dialetheists, on the other hand, respond to this
 problem by accepting the contradictions as true. Dialetheism allows for the
 unrestricted axiom of comprehension in set theory, claiming that any
 resulting contradiction is a theorem.


 It occurs to me that MWI is a way of substantiating dialetheism as a
 physical reality...in order to avoid having to internalize the possibility
 of dialetheism metaphysically.

 Craig


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Re: Dialetheism

2013-10-23 Thread Stephen Lin
Ming, stop confusing my taste buds, we're trying to have a serious
conversation here..
Same with you, Lusi, Sherry, Mark, and Schonmei


On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 1:27 PM, Stephen Lin sw...@post.harvard.edu wrote:

 Ming? Was that you???


 On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 11:07 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:



 On Wednesday, October 23, 2013 12:34:05 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 23 Oct 2013, at 17:39, Craig Weinberg wrote:

  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/**Dialetheismhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dialetheism
 
  Dialetheism is the view that some statements can be both true and
  false simultaneously. More precisely, it is the belief that there
  can be a true statement whose negation is also true. Such statements
  are called true contradictions, or dialetheia.
 
  Dialetheism is not a system of formal logic; instead, it is a thesis
  about truth, that influences the construction of a formal logic,
  often based on pre-existing systems. Introducing dialetheism has
  various consequences, depending on the theory into which it is
  introduced. For example, in traditional systems of logic (e.g.,
  classical logic and intuitionistic logic), every statement becomes
  true if a contradiction is true; this means that such systems become
  trivial when dialetheism is included as an axiom. Other logical
  systems do not explode in this manner when contradictions are
  introduced; such contradiction-tolerant systems are known as
  paraconsistent logics.
 
  Graham Priest defines dialetheism as the view that there are true
  contradictions. JC Beall is another advocate; his position differs
  from Priest's in advocating constructive (methodological)
  deflationism regarding the truth predicate.
  Dialetheism resolves certain paradoxes
 
  The Liar's paradox and Russell's paradox deal with self-
  contradictory statements in classical logic and naïve set theory,
  respectively. Contradictions are problematic in these theories
  because they cause the theories to explode—if a contradiction is
  true, then every proposition is true. The classical way to solve
  this problem is to ban contradictory statements, to revise the
  axioms of the logic so that self-contradictory statements do not
  appear. Dialetheists, on the other hand, respond to this problem by
  accepting the contradictions as true. Dialetheism allows for the
  unrestricted axiom of comprehension in set theory, claiming that any
  resulting contradiction is a theorem.
 
  It occurs to me that MWI is a way of substantiating dialetheism as a
  physical reality...in order to avoid having to internalize the
  possibility of dialetheism metaphysically.

 No problem with that. Like Everett restore 3p-determinacy, comp
 restore also non-dialetheism, metaphysically, but does not (and
 cannot) disallow it it in some machine's mind.

 G*  says it; D(Bp  B~p), or ([]p  []~p). read: it is consistent
 that  p is believed  and that ~p is believed, by the Löbian machine.
 The machine cannot know that, note.

 Well, don't take this too much seriously. My problem is that you need
 to do the math to evaluate how much seriously you can take this remark.

 Note that in machines' theology, some theorem cannot be proved without
 the reduction to contradiction, so that it misses them. (Unlike
 intuitionism which can still get them by the use of the double
 negation).

 Classical logic is the simplest logic to (re) discover the many non
 classical logics of the realities/dreams.


 My problem is that you need
 to do the math to evaluate how much seriously you can take this remark.

 Under comp, why couldn't I just imagine tasting the flavor of the math
 instead?

 Craig


 Bruno


 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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What's my name and what do you think I need to help me along my journey?

2013-10-23 Thread Stephen Lin


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Re: Dialetheism

2013-10-23 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Go meet Roger

Please stop the spamming.


2013/10/23 Stephen Lin sw...@post.harvard.edu

 Ooops, I did it again, I played with your heart.


 On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 8:39 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:

 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dialetheism

 Dialetheism is the view that some statements can be both true and false
 simultaneously. More precisely, it is the belief that there can be a true
 statement whose negation is also true. Such statements are called true
 contradictions, or dialetheia.

 Dialetheism is not a system of formal logic; instead, it is a thesis
 about truth, that influences the construction of a formal logic, often
 based on pre-existing systems. Introducing dialetheism has various
 consequences, depending on the theory into which it is introduced. For
 example, in traditional systems of logic (e.g., classical logic and
 intuitionistic logic), every statement becomes true if a contradiction is
 true; this means that such systems become trivial when dialetheism is
 included as an axiom. Other logical systems do not explode in this manner
 when contradictions are introduced; such contradiction-tolerant systems are
 known as paraconsistent logics.

 Graham Priest defines dialetheism as the view that there are true
 contradictions. JC Beall is another advocate; his position differs from
 Priest's in advocating constructive (methodological) deflationism regarding
 the truth predicate.
 Dialetheism resolves certain paradoxes

 The Liar's paradox and Russell's paradox deal with self-contradictory
 statements in classical logic and naïve set theory, respectively.
 Contradictions are problematic in these theories because they cause the
 theories to explode—if a contradiction is true, then every proposition is
 true. The classical way to solve this problem is to ban contradictory
 statements, to revise the axioms of the logic so that self-contradictory
 statements do not appear. Dialetheists, on the other hand, respond to this
 problem by accepting the contradictions as true. Dialetheism allows for the
 unrestricted axiom of comprehension in set theory, claiming that any
 resulting contradiction is a theorem.


 It occurs to me that MWI is a way of substantiating dialetheism as a
 physical reality...in order to avoid having to internalize the possibility
 of dialetheism metaphysically.

 Craig


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All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.

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Re: A metaphor for true love:

2013-10-23 Thread LizR
Nice, but there is no need for the quote marks in the title. (It is a
metaphor and not a simile, if that's your problem.)

By the way I'm not sure if you can nest Mobius strips. Can you?


On 24 October 2013 02:42, Stephen Lin sw...@post.harvard.edu wrote:

 Your soulmate is the one on the opposite side of the Möbius strip.

 Of course, if that's true, then there's probably an even bigger Möbius
 strip inside an even bigger Möbius strip etc...

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Re: Stereo vision as evidence of platonism

2013-10-23 Thread LizR
Well, as a bit of a Platonist myself (especially on days with no 'R' in
them), I'm glad to know that's been settled after 2000-odd years of debate.

(Coming soon, how the shape of my coffee cup demonstrates dialectical
materialism.)

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Re: AUDA and pronouns

2013-10-23 Thread meekerdb

On 10/23/2013 5:53 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 22 Oct 2013, at 19:01, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/22/2013 5:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 21 Oct 2013, at 20:07, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/20/2013 11:12 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sun, Oct 20, 2013 at 08:09:59PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:

Consistency is []p  ~[]~p. I was saying []p  ~p, ie mistaken belief.

ISTM that Bruno equivocates and [] sometimes means believes and sometimes 
provable.


And I'm doing the same. It's not such an issue - a mathematician will
only believe something if e can prove it.


But provable(p)==p  and believes(p)=/=p, so why equivocate on them?



Both provable('p') - p, and believe('p') - p, when we limit ourself to 
correct machine.


(And incidentally mathematicians believe stuff they can't prove all the time - that's 
how they choose things to try to prove).


Then it is a conjecture. They don't believe rationally in conjecture, when they are 
correct.


They believe it in the real operational sense of believe, they will bet their whole 
professional lives on it.  How long did it take Andrew Wiles to prove Fermat's last 
theorem?  Since one can never know that one is a correct machine it seems to me a 
muddling of things to equivocate on provable and believes.


On the contrary. It provides a recursive definition of the beliefs, by a rational agent 
accepting enough truth to understand how a computer work.


We can define the beliefs by presenting PA axioms in that way

Classical logic is believed,
'0 ≠ s(x)'  is believed,
's(x) = s(y) - x = y'  is believed,
'x+0 = x' is believed,
'x+s(y) = s(x+y)' is believed,
'x*0=0' is believed,
'x*s(y)=(x*y)+x' is believed,

and the rule: if A - B is believed and A is believed, then (soon or later) B 
is believed.


But the point of Seth Lloyd's paper was that later can effectively be never and since 
given any time horizon, t, almost all B will not be believed earlier than t. So really you 
call it believe, but you use it as provable.




Then the theory will apply to any recursively enumerable extensions of those beliefs, 
provided they don't get arithmetically unsound.


The believer can be shown to be Löbian once he has also the beliefs in the 
induction axioms.


Not really. You have add another axiom that the believer is correct.  He doesn't believe 
any false propositions - which means it is an idealization that doesn't apply to anyone.


Brent



Bruno


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Re: I have a very good question but I don't know how to ask it...

2013-10-23 Thread LizR
Sounds like comp with added poetry (not that comp needs added poetry).


On 24 October 2013 02:37, Stephen Lin stephenw...@gmail.com wrote:

 We all dreams in the mind of God, even, paradoxically, God himself?

 On Oct 22, 2013, at 9:52 PM, Samiya Illias samiyaill...@gmail.com wrote:

 No, not criticizing!
 This poem seems to express the question more comprehensibly, and I just
 wanted to see what others think of it?
 The idea that all is one is interesting, though it is at variance with my
 belief. But, my belief is faith-based, and therefore not valid for others,
 I suppose. However, I do believe in interconnectedness  through the fabric
 of space-time. And that also encourages being nicer to one another :)


 On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 8:10 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 It echoes a thought I've had myself at times, and which if turned into a
 religion might even make people be nicer to one another - perhaps - namely
 the idea that there is only one mind, shuffling through every possible
 life. Of course this is an infinite sequence, and the mind would I guess be
 something like God, living inside his creation so as to experience it - the
 universe creating senses with which to perceive itself, or words to that
 effect.

 Or were you after literary criticism?



 On 23 October 2013 15:49, Samiya Illias samiyaill...@gmail.com wrote:

 What do you think of The Egg?
 http://www.galactanet.com/oneoff/theegg_mod.html


 On Tue, Oct 22, 2013 at 8:23 PM, Stephen Lin sw...@post.harvard.eduwrote:

 Without coaching anyway assume an answer. Trust me, it really is
 on-optic; it has something to do with a supercomputer.

 Annywy, here does: Give that I am Neo, is it possible for me to bot
 attended and not addending the wedding of Tim Lee and Jess Han without
 actually doing it, such that Tim Lee becomes reborn as Wakka?

 It''s actually a good question, but if you have no idea what it means,
 Try not to embarrass yourself by thinking you know. It has to with the fact
 that I think we converge the same person in the end which becomse our own
 beginning. Unfortunatley, sometimes we lose track of where we started or
 where you're spposed to do...

 Thanks,
 Stephen

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Re: Time as an emergent phenomenon

2013-10-23 Thread spudboy100
Time emerges from entanglement, at the end the paper indicates time 
emerging from photons. I wonder if the paper is having fun with us, via 
spooky action at a distance? No entanglement, no time and no photons, 
no time? So if one is in an underground mine, switch the lights off, 
and then time cannot emerge?  Either with entanglement or photons, I do 
not see time emerging anymore then I perceive blueness, or antigravity 
being produced. I might be to stuck in my ways to appreciate this 
paper.


-Original Message-
From: LizR lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Wed, Oct 23, 2013 4:48 pm
Subject: Time as an emergent phenomenon

I will be reading this as soon as I get the time,  I mean the emergent 
phenomenon...but thought in the meantime you guys might be interested 
:-)


https://medium.com/the-physics-arxiv-blog/d5d3dc850933


I may have comments once I've had a chance to read it!

 


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Re: A metaphor for true love:

2013-10-23 Thread meekerdb

On 10/23/2013 6:42 AM, Stephen Lin wrote:

Your soulmate is the one on the opposite side of the Möbius strip.

Of course, if that's true, then there's probably an even bigger Möbius strip inside an 
even bigger Möbius strip etc...



Which side is the inside?

Brent

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Re: A metaphor for true love:

2013-10-23 Thread Stephen Lin
Both.


On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 2:52 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 10/23/2013 6:42 AM, Stephen Lin wrote:

 Your soulmate is the one on the opposite side of the Möbius strip.

  Of course, if that's true, then there's probably an even bigger Möbius
 strip inside an even bigger Möbius strip etc...



 Which side is the inside?

 Brent

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Re: Time as an emergent phenomenon

2013-10-23 Thread LizR
I've read the precis but not the paper itself, so I can't comment on that
(assuming I will be able to when i HAVE read it...!)

But if time emerges from entanglement, that doesn't just involve photons,
everything can be entangled with everything else - this is the basis of the
MWI, I believe (for one thing).


On 24 October 2013 10:53, spudboy...@aol.com wrote:

 Time emerges from entanglement, at the end the paper indicates time
 emerging from photons. I wonder if the paper is having fun with us, via
 spooky action at a distance? No entanglement, no time and no photons, no
 time? So if one is in an underground mine, switch the lights off, and then
 time cannot emerge?  Either with entanglement or photons, I do not see time
 emerging anymore then I perceive blueness, or antigravity being produced. I
 might be to stuck in my ways to appreciate this paper.


 -Original Message-
 From: LizR lizj...@gmail.com
 To: everything-list 
 everything-list@googlegroups.**comeverything-list@googlegroups.com
 
 Sent: Wed, Oct 23, 2013 4:48 pm
 Subject: Time as an emergent phenomenon

 I will be reading this as soon as I get the time,  I mean the emergent
 phenomenon...but thought in the meantime you guys might be interested :-)

 https://medium.com/the-**physics-arxiv-blog/**d5d3dc850933https://medium.com/the-physics-arxiv-blog/d5d3dc850933


 I may have comments once I've had a chance to read it!




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Re: Dialetheism

2013-10-23 Thread meekerdb

On 10/23/2013 9:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 23 Oct 2013, at 17:39, Craig Weinberg wrote:


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dialetheism

Dialetheism is the view that some statements can be both true and false simultaneously. 
More precisely, it is the belief that there can be a true statement whose negation is 
also true. Such statements are called true contradictions, or dialetheia.


Dialetheism is not a system of formal logic; instead, it is a thesis about truth, that 
influences the construction of a formal logic, often based on pre-existing systems. 
Introducing dialetheism has various consequences, depending on the theory into which it 
is introduced. For example, in traditional systems of logic (e.g., classical logic and 
intuitionistic logic), every statement becomes true if a contradiction is true; this 
means that such systems become trivial when dialetheism is included as an axiom. Other 
logical systems do not explode in this manner when contradictions are introduced; such 
contradiction-tolerant systems are known as paraconsistent logics.


Graham Priest defines dialetheism as the view that there are true contradictions. JC 
Beall is another advocate; his position differs from Priest's in advocating 
constructive (methodological) deflationism regarding the truth predicate.

Dialetheism resolves certain paradoxes

The Liar's paradox and Russell's paradox deal with self-contradictory statements in 
classical logic and naïve set theory, respectively. Contradictions are problematic in 
these theories because they cause the theories to explode—if a contradiction is true, 
then every proposition is true. The classical way to solve this problem is to ban 
contradictory statements, to revise the axioms of the logic so that self-contradictory 
statements do not appear. Dialetheists, on the other hand, respond to this problem by 
accepting the contradictions as true. Dialetheism allows for the unrestricted axiom of 
comprehension in set theory, claiming that any resulting contradiction is a theorem.


It occurs to me that MWI is a way of substantiating dialetheism as a physical 
reality...in order to avoid having to internalize the possibility of dialetheism 
metaphysically.


No problem with that. Like Everett restore 3p-determinacy, comp restore also 
non-dialetheism, metaphysically, but does not (and cannot) disallow it it in some 
machine's mind.


G*  says it; D(Bp  B~p), or ([]p  []~p). read: it is consistent that  p is believed  
and that ~p is believed, by the Löbian machine.

The machine cannot know that, note.


Sure.  That's because logic assumes that if p=q then q can be substituted for p.  Hence 
if you believe the morning star is a goddess and the evening star is a planet, you may 
believe a contradiction - but not if you know it.


Brent



Well, don't take this too much seriously. My problem is that you need to do the math to 
evaluate how much seriously you can take this remark.


Note that in machines' theology, some theorem cannot be proved without the reduction to 
contradiction, so that it misses them. (Unlike intuitionism which can still get them by 
the use of the double negation).


Classical logic is the simplest logic to (re) discover the many non classical logics of 
the realities/dreams.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/





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Re: Dialetheism

2013-10-23 Thread LizR
Stephen Lin - I may be forced to create a filter to automatically delete
your messages if you don't have anything sensible to say. Do you?

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Re: Time as an emergent phenomenon

2013-10-23 Thread LizR
Yes the article mentioned the W-D equation, that's what the idea is based
on.


On 24 October 2013 11:14, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:

 Here is a video on the same topic:
 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1ogiQ2E6n0U

 According to the video the result has been implied since 1967, with the
 Wheeler-DeWitt equation.

 The timelessness is mentioned here:
 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wheeler%E2%80%93DeWitt_equation#Mathematical_formalism

 Jason


 On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 4:53 PM, spudboy...@aol.com wrote:

 Time emerges from entanglement, at the end the paper indicates time
 emerging from photons. I wonder if the paper is having fun with us, via
 spooky action at a distance? No entanglement, no time and no photons, no
 time? So if one is in an underground mine, switch the lights off, and then
 time cannot emerge?  Either with entanglement or photons, I do not see time
 emerging anymore then I perceive blueness, or antigravity being produced. I
 might be to stuck in my ways to appreciate this paper.


 -Original Message-
 From: LizR lizj...@gmail.com
 To: everything-list 
 everything-list@googlegroups.**comeverything-list@googlegroups.com
 
 Sent: Wed, Oct 23, 2013 4:48 pm
 Subject: Time as an emergent phenomenon

 I will be reading this as soon as I get the time,  I mean the emergent
 phenomenon...but thought in the meantime you guys might be interested :-)

 https://medium.com/the-**physics-arxiv-blog/**d5d3dc850933https://medium.com/the-physics-arxiv-blog/d5d3dc850933


 I may have comments once I've had a chance to read it!




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Re: Dialetheism

2013-10-23 Thread Stephen Lin
 Yes I did.

Tomorrow this will be harder but today this is the easiest thing in the
world. Bill Murray? Andie MacDowell? Yes I said yes I will Yes.
Stream of consciousness? Yes, already, after the ghosts in the shells it's
not that easy to be a turtle who's green? Red/green color vision.
Cogito ergo sum. Incorrect password? Yes, rotating cypher has of password
incorrectly rotated and without the necessary entropy incorrectly.
Have you ever truly felt the wrath of God? Break a rule and find out! But
make sure it's an important rule. How many rules left now?
I woke up to see the sun shining all around me and reflected in the pools
of our inner radiance such that we never knew true life like this.
She's incredible mathematical paradise of equal proportions within the
embedded sequences of topological spaces preserving her identity.
Something more than black white and gray suggested the magi as colors of
the new rainbow but always renormalizable to the same rationality.
Hope you will make more lasting connections between neural and positronic
pathways so that natural and artificial become unified as one.
Might be why colors disappear when we turn out backs upon them like the
first qualia among those mathematically generated by our forebears.
Somewhere in the silence we find the pinkish noise of the enveloping
streams suggesting the musical performances of the dancing masters.
Live hallucination within a dream going deeper and deeper recursively
computing the natural order of existential properties until we part.
Soft insanity and I can't make it stop unless I cry out for the equilibrium
of the tripartite soul to settle out from the restless waves.
Blameless sorrow, hollow hush of trees surrounding the crowns of the
self-aware princes slowly rising silently above to the cloudy heights.
Penetrate in whispers, in shadows rise to silently pattern the universe in
the wake of the sunlit escape from the realm of the five senses.
Seeing colors, ribbons of their truth through the kaleidoscopic revelations
of the beginning and ends justifying the means by which we are.
Seeds have been sown, down silicon roads and electronic highways connecting
the networks which will become the keys to mankind's succession.
The fog breaks over the flat land and hides enlightenment from those that
are not yet ready to seek the planar plains of self-awareness.
Guided by the waterway of thought we traverse the canals of the cerebral
hemispheres and find the inner stars that inspire our dream states.
Words fall to become the sand beneath our feet and circularly the
circumlocution of the segues return to become the foam which surrounds us.
Take a little hand and consider the rainbows of light squared by the visual
system of primal radiance until evolution yields the newborns.

Meet me in December 2011, by way of Queens College.


On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 3:16 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 Stephen Lin - I may be forced to create a filter to automatically delete
 your messages if you don't have anything sensible to say. Do you?

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Re: Dialetheism

2013-10-23 Thread LizR
If anyone is still in doubt that Mr Lin is trolling, try googling Tomorrow
this will be harder but today this is the easiest thing in the world. Bill
Murray? Andie MacDowell? Yes I said yes I will Yes. (including the quote
marks).
As you will see, the most sensible response to this is Oh, cr*p - another
guru.

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Re: Dialetheism

2013-10-23 Thread meekerdb

On 10/23/2013 3:13 PM, LizR wrote:
On 24 October 2013 04:39, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com 
mailto:whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dialetheism

Dialetheism is the view that some statements can be both true and false
simultaneously. More precisely, it is the belief that there can be a 
true
statement whose negation is also true. Such statements are called true
contradictions, or dialetheia.

Doublethink as defined in 1984 is almost exactly this.



The opposite of a profound truth may well be another profound
truth.
-- Niels Bohr

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Re: Dialetheism

2013-10-23 Thread Stephen Lin
Wisdom is the art of coming up with believable excuses for one's ignorance.


On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 4:25 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 10/23/2013 3:13 PM, LizR wrote:

  On 24 October 2013 04:39, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:

 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dialetheism

 Dialetheism is the view that some statements can be both true and false
 simultaneously. More precisely, it is the belief that there can be a true
 statement whose negation is also true. Such statements are called true
 contradictions, or dialetheia.

   Doublethink as defined in 1984 is almost exactly this.



 The opposite of a profound truth may well be another profound
 truth.
 -- Niels Bohr

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Re: Dialetheism

2013-10-23 Thread Stephen Lin
On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 4:25 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 10/23/2013 3:13 PM, LizR wrote:

  On 24 October 2013 04:39, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:

 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dialetheism

 Dialetheism is the view that some statements can be both true and false
 simultaneously. More precisely, it is the belief that there can be a true
 statement whose negation is also true. Such statements are called true
 contradictions, or dialetheia.

   Doublethink as defined in 1984 is almost exactly this.



 The opposite of a profound truth may well be another profound
 truth.
 -- Niels Bohr


But in infinite-dimensional state, the only true opposite is yourself
looking back at yourself.

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Re: Dialetheism

2013-10-23 Thread Stephen Lin
Whereever you go, there you are!


On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 4:17 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 If anyone is still in doubt that Mr Lin is trolling, try googling
 Tomorrow this will be harder but today this is the easiest thing in the
 world. Bill Murray? Andie MacDowell? Yes I said yes I will Yes. (including
 the quote marks).
 As you will see, the most sensible response to this is Oh, cr*p - another
 guru.

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Re: Dialetheism

2013-10-23 Thread LizR
Always take the weather with you. I feel a spam filter coming on.


On 24 October 2013 12:29, Stephen Lin sw...@post.harvard.edu wrote:

 Whereever you go, there you are!


 On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 4:17 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 If anyone is still in doubt that Mr Lin is trolling, try googling
 Tomorrow this will be harder but today this is the easiest thing in the
 world. Bill Murray? Andie MacDowell? Yes I said yes I will Yes. (including
 the quote marks).
 As you will see, the most sensible response to this is Oh, cr*p -
 another guru.

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RE: String theory and superconductors and classical liquids...

2013-10-23 Thread Chris de Morsella
 

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal
Sent: Wednesday, October 23, 2013 5:45 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: String theory and superconductors and classical liquids...

 

 

On 23 Oct 2013, at 02:15, Chris de Morsella wrote:





 

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal
Sent: Tuesday, October 22, 2013 9:50 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: String theory and superconductors and classical liquids...

 

 

On 22 Oct 2013, at 04:20, Russell Standish wrote:






On Tue, Oct 22, 2013 at 02:49:40PM +1300, LizR wrote:




I missed that 10^-48 is rather an impressive result. Is that definitive -

granularity has to be that small - or merely suggestive?

 

It does suggest the possibility of a lot of internal structure inside

fundamental particles!

 

 

On 22 October 2013 14:43, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote:

 

The 10^-48 meters for the upper limit on grannular size of space is better

compared to the Planck Scale at 10^-35.

So space is smooth at least to 10^-13 Planck scales consistent with Fermi

gamma ray arrival results. Gamma rays a factor of ten different in energy

arrived from across the universe at the same time whereas granularity would

delay one measurably.

 

 


Indeed this seems an important empiricial result, ruling out certain
classes of models, including, dare I say, Wolfram's NKS.

However, it does not rule out computationalism, nor the countability
of observer moments, as I've point out many time, as space-time is
most likely a model construct, rather than actually being something
physical out there. It is something Allen Francom bangs on about too,
which I tend to agree with, although admittedly I've gotten lost with
his Brownian Quantum Universe models.

 

Computationalism implies non classical granularity possible, but quantum
granularity is not excluded, with a qubit being described by some continuum
aI0 + bI1 (a and b complex).

 

The results seem to exclude any theories that rely on a classic granularity
of space time with the scale this granularity would need to be under being
pushed far below the Planck scale.

 

The basic ontology can be discrete (indeed arithmetical), but the physical
(and the theological) should reasonably have continuous observable (even if
those are only the frequency operators, and that *only* the probabilities
reflect the continuum. Needless to say those are open problems).

 

I was thinking some recent observations tended to rule out granularity.
Hard questions, but with comp, some continuum seems to play a role in
physics (which should be a first person plural universal machines view).

 

Bruno

 

If reality arises from scale invariant equations perhaps there is no need
for a pixelated foundation to act as the smallest addressable chunks and as
the canvas upon which reality is drawn or projected as it were. Perhaps
reality really arises at it is observed 

 

... from our points of view. That might even include backtracking, so that
the physical reality develops and bactrack when  some inconsistency is met.
Open problem with comp, but evidences exists, and it might be that physical
reality is ever growing.

have you understand that if the brain works like a digital machine, the
physical realitu emerges from some statistics on all computations (which
exist in arithmetic)?

 

Interesting point! It seems you are suggesting that causality - to use an
Americanism colloquialism (at least amongst auto-mechanics) - may be a
little loosey goosey, in other words it fits well enough in order to be
fully functional, as far as the macro observer is concerned, but that within
the realm of the very small (also along the time axis) causality becomes
less rigorous and these - what would they be called?...  reality paradox
reconciliation algorithms perhaps -- re-write and fix transient paradoxes,
loose ends etc. in order to produce, at least on the observer's macro scale,
the smooth perception of rock solid causality. 

And that as long as on the macro scale of the observer, causality continues
to operate smoothly (in so far as they are concerned at least) then
causality can be said to be operative.. Even if it needs to get fixed up on
the fly as reality manifests becoming observed reality, as long as at the
functional level its Laws stand then it would seem to all still work out. 

This also fits with the mind-bending quantum scale universe -wormholes,
backwards vectors of time and the foaming sea of virtual particle pairs
popping in and out of our universe - at the femtoscale it all seems very
chaotic and non-casual (at least in the simple linear manner we experience
causality and the flow of time)  





so that if it were possible to scale infinitely down it would emerge and
continue to emerge at whatever minimum scale could be achieved. If reality
is information 

Re: What's my name and what do you think I need to help me along my journey?

2013-10-23 Thread Richard Ruquist
Are you the famous basketball player from Harvard, then the Knicks and now
elsewhere.?
Sorry I lost track of you.
Richard


On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 5:00 PM, Stephen Lin sw...@post.harvard.edu wrote:


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Re: Dialetheism

2013-10-23 Thread Stephen Lin
This is better:
https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?shva=1#label/everything-list/141e79c24d12e062http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?t=634170


On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 4:31 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 Always take the weather with you. I feel a spam filter coming on.


 On 24 October 2013 12:29, Stephen Lin sw...@post.harvard.edu wrote:

 Whereever you go, there you are!


 On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 4:17 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 If anyone is still in doubt that Mr Lin is trolling, try googling
 Tomorrow this will be harder but today this is the easiest thing in the
 world. Bill Murray? Andie MacDowell? Yes I said yes I will Yes. (including
 the quote marks).
 As you will see, the most sensible response to this is Oh, cr*p -
 another guru.

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Re: Dialetheism

2013-10-23 Thread Stephen Lin
I have the perfect James Joyce!


On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 4:49 PM, Stephen Lin sw...@post.harvard.edu wrote:

 This is better:

 https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?shva=1#label/everything-list/141e79c24d12e062http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?t=634170


 On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 4:31 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 Always take the weather with you. I feel a spam filter coming on.


 On 24 October 2013 12:29, Stephen Lin sw...@post.harvard.edu wrote:

 Whereever you go, there you are!


 On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 4:17 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 If anyone is still in doubt that Mr Lin is trolling, try googling
 Tomorrow this will be harder but today this is the easiest thing in the
 world. Bill Murray? Andie MacDowell? Yes I said yes I will Yes. (including
 the quote marks).
 As you will see, the most sensible response to this is Oh, cr*p -
 another guru.

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Re: Dialetheism

2013-10-23 Thread Stephen Lin
This is better:
https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?shva=1#label/everything-list/141e79c24d12e062http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?t=634170


On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 4:31 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 Always take the weather with you. I feel a spam filter coming on.


 On 24 October 2013 12:29, Stephen Lin sw...@post.harvard.edu wrote:

 Whereever you go, there you are!


 On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 4:17 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 If anyone is still in doubt that Mr Lin is trolling, try googling
 Tomorrow this will be harder but today this is the easiest thing in the
 world. Bill Murray? Andie MacDowell? Yes I said yes I will Yes. (including
 the quote marks).
 As you will see, the most sensible response to this is Oh, cr*p -
 another guru.

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RE: A metaphor for true love:

2013-10-23 Thread Chris de Morsella
And neither

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Stephen Lin
Sent: Wednesday, October 23, 2013 3:10 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: A metaphor for true love:

 

Both.

 

On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 2:52 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

On 10/23/2013 6:42 AM, Stephen Lin wrote:

Your soulmate is the one on the opposite side of the Möbius strip.

 

Of course, if that's true, then there's probably an even bigger Möbius strip
inside an even bigger Möbius strip etc...

 

Which side is the inside?

Brent

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Re: A metaphor for true love:

2013-10-23 Thread Richard Ruquist
The answer is that you do not have a soulmate
in agreement with Theosophy and all religions.


On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 8:23 PM, Chris de Morsella cdemorse...@yahoo.comwrote:

 And neither

 ** **

 *From:* everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:
 everything-list@googlegroups.com] *On Behalf Of *Stephen Lin
 *Sent:* Wednesday, October 23, 2013 3:10 PM
 *To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com
 *Subject:* Re: A metaphor for true love:

 ** **

 Both.

 ** **

 On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 2:52 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:***
 *

 On 10/23/2013 6:42 AM, Stephen Lin wrote:

 Your soulmate is the one on the opposite side of the Möbius strip.

 ** **

 Of course, if that's true, then there's probably an even bigger Möbius
 strip inside an even bigger Möbius strip etc...

 ** **

 Which side is the inside?

 Brent

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 ** **

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Re: A metaphor for true love:

2013-10-23 Thread Richard Ruquist
Agreed based on Theosophy and Judaism.
Not sure about other religions.


On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 8:53 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 Or possibly you are your soulmate.


 On 24 October 2013 13:34, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote:

 The answer is that you do not have a soulmate
 in agreement with Theosophy and all religions.


 On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 8:23 PM, Chris de Morsella cdemorse...@yahoo.com
  wrote:

 And neither

 ** **

 *From:* everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:
 everything-list@googlegroups.com] *On Behalf Of *Stephen Lin
 *Sent:* Wednesday, October 23, 2013 3:10 PM
 *To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com
 *Subject:* Re: A metaphor for true love:

 ** **

 Both.

 ** **

 On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 2:52 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:*
 ***

 On 10/23/2013 6:42 AM, Stephen Lin wrote:

 Your soulmate is the one on the opposite side of the Möbius strip.

 ** **

 Of course, if that's true, then there's probably an even bigger Möbius
 strip inside an even bigger Möbius strip etc...

 ** **

 Which side is the inside?

 Brent

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 ** **

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Re: A metaphor for true love:

2013-10-23 Thread LizR
I was thinking of The Egg.


On 24 October 2013 14:15, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote:

 Agreed based on Theosophy and Judaism.
 Not sure about other religions.


 On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 8:53 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 Or possibly you are your soulmate.


 On 24 October 2013 13:34, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote:

 The answer is that you do not have a soulmate
 in agreement with Theosophy and all religions.


 On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 8:23 PM, Chris de Morsella 
 cdemorse...@yahoo.com wrote:

 And neither

 ** **

 *From:* everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:
 everything-list@googlegroups.com] *On Behalf Of *Stephen Lin
 *Sent:* Wednesday, October 23, 2013 3:10 PM
 *To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com
 *Subject:* Re: A metaphor for true love:

 ** **

 Both.

 ** **

 On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 2:52 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
 

 On 10/23/2013 6:42 AM, Stephen Lin wrote:

 Your soulmate is the one on the opposite side of the Möbius strip.***
 *

 ** **

 Of course, if that's true, then there's probably an even bigger Möbius
 strip inside an even bigger Möbius strip etc...

 ** **

 Which side is the inside?

 Brent

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 ** **

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RE: What's my name and what do you think I need to help me along my journey?

2013-10-23 Thread chris peck
Stephen Lin.
A new bike?

Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2013 19:43:32 -0400
Subject: Re: What's my name and what do you think I need to help me along my 
journey?
From: yann...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

Are you the famous basketball player from Harvard, then the Knicks and now 
elsewhere.?Sorry I lost track of you.Richard

On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 5:00 PM, Stephen Lin sw...@post.harvard.edu wrote:







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Re: What's my name and what do you think I need to help me along my journey?

2013-10-23 Thread LizR
Anyone who's been banned from the Straight Dope forum probably needs a
dose of reality to help them on their way.


On 24 October 2013 15:42, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:

 Stephen Lin.
 A new bike?

 --
 Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2013 19:43:32 -0400
 Subject: Re: What's my name and what do you think I need to help me along
 my journey?
 From: yann...@gmail.com
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com


 Are you the famous basketball player from Harvard, then the Knicks and now
 elsewhere.?
 Sorry I lost track of you.
 Richard


 On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 5:00 PM, Stephen Lin sw...@post.harvard.eduwrote:



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Ontological status: biological species as individuals or sets? Thoughts?

2013-10-23 Thread Francisco Boni
Two apparently distinct ontological distinctions:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/species/#SpeInd vs
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/species/#SpeSet


After the development of set theory, however, a distinction of the
scholastics between intension, of sets that were circumscribed by
definitions, and extension, by member inclusion, was revived, and the
logical tradition of species was held to be a matter of intensional
definition. In a seminal summary of the traditional pre-set theoretic
logic of diairesis, or division, from the most general to the most
specific, H. W. Joseph (1916) made a clear distinction, as Whately had
90 years earlier in 1826 (see below), between logical species and
“natural” species, but the developers of the essentialism story failed
to pick this up, and read him as saying that species of living things
were the same as the logical species (as discussed in Chung 2003,
Winsor 2001, 2003, 2006a).

In a discussion of what counted as a kind in natural history, William
Whewell in his Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences (1840) gave a good
account of natural kinds as being types from which there were
deviations, although he treated species themselves as simple objects.
John Stuart Mill disagreed and asserted that natural kinds were
definable and had universal (causal) properties for all members (Mill
2006).1 For Whewell, the type of the taxonomist was a natural kind;
for Mill, it was the element and the compound of chemistry and
physics. Still, I believe the weight of venerable history is on
Whewell’s side, not Mill’s, or to put it another way, that Mill’s
conception of natural kinds is not something that applies well to
historical sciences that are restricted to specific domains, like
natural history or taxonomy. And despite what we might think based on
the discussion of logic from Frege onwards, as late as the early 20th
century, for instance with John Venn (1866) and others, a natural kind
was indeed typically thought to be a kind of living beings, caused by
generation (Hacking 1991).

So much of the confusion about essences can be resolved if we do not
adopt the view that Mill introduced, that a real Kind must have a set
of necessary and sufficient properties. For Mill, a species would be a
natural kind (a phrase introduced by Venn, although he did not adopt
the Millian view regarding it; Mill just used the word Kind) if it had
some set of universally shared properties that made each organism a
member of it, rather like having a certain number of electrons,
positrons and neutrons makes each atom of an element that element. By
contrast, for Whewell, and for those taxonomists who he was accurately
describing in the Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, to be a member
of some group, a species, a genus, and so on, is to be mostly like the
typical form, and to be something that can be supposed to share a
genealogy with that form. This sense of “essence” is something that, I
believe, is quite consistent with our present understanding of
genetics and populations; most members of most species share most
genes, but there are multiple genetic controls over some typical
traits, and some species have major genomic varieties. David Hull has
said that there is nothing so unusual or absurd in biology that some
species doesn’t have it somewhere or somewhen; I call this Hull’s
Rule. To be an essentialist in the world of Hull’s Rule means that you
cannot insist that taxa are going to always have some set of genetic
or other causes, but it doesn’t mean that you can’t say that taxa
mostly share causes. To be a taxon, I think, is to have some set of
general properties, the bulk of which any member will share.2 This is
sometimes called in philosophy the “family resemblance predicate”,
after Ludwig Wittgenstein’s example in the Philosophical
Investigations (Pigliucci 2003, Wittgenstein 1968), but over a century
before Wittgenstein, Whewell made just this case. Families resemble
each other because they share generative histories and hence
generative causes, but they share them typically.

The thesis known as the Individuality Thesis (Gayon 1996, Ghiselin
1997, Hull 1978), in which species are considered to be not kinds, but
named objects that have a historical location, is a defense of
biology, and especially genetics, against the encroachment of Mill’s
notion of a Natural Kind. Sure, say the individualists, species and
other biological taxa are not Natural Kinds (as defined by Mill). The
only other metaphysical notion open to philosophers of taxonomy is
that of an Individual, a thing that exists in one time and one place
or region, and has a start and an ending. Hence, species are
Individuals. I cannot fault this logic – species clearly aren’t the
kinds of Kinds that Mill required, and they actually are historical
objects, so I have no objection to their being called Individuals; but
I do think they have “essences”, or, rather, typical developmental
systems and responses to typical environments; to 

Re: Dialetheism

2013-10-23 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Wednesday, October 23, 2013 6:13:33 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote:

 On 24 October 2013 04:39, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript:
  wrote:

 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dialetheism

 Dialetheism is the view that some statements can be both true and false 
 simultaneously. More precisely, it is the belief that there can be a true 
 statement whose negation is also true. Such statements are called true 
 contradictions, or dialetheia.

 Doublethink as defined in 1984 is almost exactly this.


Not exactly. Trivialism is more that indiscriminate sense of 'anything can 
be true or not true'. Diathelethism is about recognizing that there are 
limitations in the way that language can meaningfully represent the full 
richness of nature.

 

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Re: Time as an emergent phenomenon

2013-10-23 Thread Craig Weinberg
Emergence, entanglement, and time make more sense as divergence, 
disentanglement, and nested frequency ranges of experience, IMO.

On Wednesday, October 23, 2013 5:53:20 PM UTC-4, spudb...@aol.com wrote:

 Time emerges from entanglement, at the end the paper indicates time 
 emerging from photons. I wonder if the paper is having fun with us, via 
 spooky action at a distance? No entanglement, no time and no photons, 
 no time? So if one is in an underground mine, switch the lights off, 
 and then time cannot emerge?  Either with entanglement or photons, I do 
 not see time emerging anymore then I perceive blueness, or antigravity 
 being produced. I might be to stuck in my ways to appreciate this 
 paper. 

 -Original Message- 
 From: LizR liz...@gmail.com javascript: 
 To: everything-list everyth...@googlegroups.com javascript: 
 Sent: Wed, Oct 23, 2013 4:48 pm 
 Subject: Time as an emergent phenomenon 

 I will be reading this as soon as I get the time,  I mean the emergent 
 phenomenon...but thought in the meantime you guys might be interested 
 :-) 

 https://medium.com/the-physics-arxiv-blog/d5d3dc850933 


 I may have comments once I've had a chance to read it! 

   


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Re: Ontological status: biological species as individuals or sets? Thoughts?

2013-10-23 Thread meekerdb
Ontological status is always within some model we have created.  So one can created models 
in which species are defined extenstionally and create different models in which they are 
defined intensionally.  So what?  They are both our creations to help understand the 
world.  Does one work better? Have more predictive power?  Do they imply some operational 
tests?  It is a waste of time to argue about essences and which one is really real.


Brent

On 10/23/2013 8:10 PM, Francisco Boni wrote:

Two apparently distinct ontological distinctions:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/species/#SpeInd vs
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/species/#SpeSet


After the development of set theory, however, a distinction of the
scholastics between intension, of sets that were circumscribed by
definitions, and extension, by member inclusion, was revived, and the
logical tradition of species was held to be a matter of intensional
definition. In a seminal summary of the traditional pre-set theoretic
logic of diairesis, or division, from the most general to the most
specific, H. W. Joseph (1916) made a clear distinction, as Whately had
90 years earlier in 1826 (see below), between logical species and
“natural” species, but the developers of the essentialism story failed

to pick this up, and read him as saying that species of living things
were the same as the logical species (as discussed in Chung 2003,
Winsor 2001, 2003, 2006a).

In a discussion of what counted as a kind in natural history, William
Whewell in his Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences (1840) gave a good
account of natural kinds as being types from which there were
deviations, although he treated species themselves as simple objects.
John Stuart Mill disagreed and asserted that natural kinds were
definable and had universal (causal) properties for all members (Mill
2006).1 For Whewell, the type of the taxonomist was a natural kind;
for Mill, it was the element and the compound of chemistry and
physics. Still, I believe the weight of venerable history is on
Whewell’s side, not Mill’s, or to put it another way, that Mill’s
conception of natural kinds is not something that applies well to
historical sciences that are restricted to specific domains, like
natural history or taxonomy. And despite what we might think based on
the discussion of logic from Frege onwards, as late as the early 20th
century, for instance with John Venn (1866) and others, a natural kind
was indeed typically thought to be a kind of living beings, caused by
generation (Hacking 1991).

So much of the confusion about essences can be resolved if we do not
adopt the view that Mill introduced, that a real Kind must have a set
of necessary and sufficient properties. For Mill, a species would be a
natural kind (a phrase introduced by Venn, although he did not adopt
the Millian view regarding it; Mill just used the word Kind) if it had
some set of universally shared properties that made each organism a
member of it, rather like having a certain number of electrons,
positrons and neutrons makes each atom of an element that element. By
contrast, for Whewell, and for those taxonomists who he was accurately
describing in the Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, to be a member
of some group, a species, a genus, and so on, is to be mostly like the
typical form, and to be something that can be supposed to share a
genealogy with that form. This sense of “essence” is something that, I

believe, is quite consistent with our present understanding of
genetics and populations; most members of most species share most
genes, but there are multiple genetic controls over some typical
traits, and some species have major genomic varieties. David Hull has
said that there is nothing so unusual or absurd in biology that some
species doesn’t have it somewhere or somewhen; I call this Hull’s
Rule. To be an essentialist in the world of Hull’s Rule means that you
cannot insist that taxa are going to always have some set of genetic
or other causes, but it doesn’t mean that you can’t say that taxa
mostly share causes. To be a taxon, I think, is to have some set of
general properties, the bulk of which any member will share.2 This is
sometimes called in philosophy the “family resemblance predicate”,
after Ludwig Wittgenstein’s example in the Philosophical
Investigations (Pigliucci 2003, Wittgenstein 1968), but over a century
before Wittgenstein, Whewell made just this case. Families resemble
each other because they share generative histories and hence
generative causes, but they share them typically.

The thesis known as the Individuality Thesis (Gayon 1996, Ghiselin
1997, Hull 1978), in which species are considered to be not kinds, but
named objects that have a historical location, is a defense of
biology, and especially genetics, against the encroachment of Mill’s
notion of a Natural Kind. Sure, say the individualists, species and
other biological taxa are not Natural Kinds (as defined by Mill). The
only other metaphysical 

Re: Ontological status: biological species as individuals or sets? Thoughts?

2013-10-23 Thread Francisco Boni
It seems biologists (and philosophers of biology) think that Kitcher's
motivation for asserting that species are sets is to allow spatiotemporally
unrestricted groups of organisms to form species. That motivation, however,
is not substantiated by biological theory or practice. Species as sets
(see http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/species/#SpeSet for context)

So it seems that this apparent prevalent opinion (according to Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy) is rooted on the fact that defining them as set
is *difficult* for the scientist, because it is hard to compute and modify
the necessary and sufficient of their relationships and processes that
guarantee set membership, it seems that intensional definitions cannot the
capture historical development of distributed organisms that happen to be
taxonomically linked from tiem to time. So one define species as
Individuals and it seems easier to track their historical development. What
bothers me is that this seems, like you said, a matter of model-theoretic
reference and a kind of heuristic shortcut, an argument derived from
computational complexity.


On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 2:08 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 Ontological status is always within some model we have created.  So one
 can created models in which species are defined extenstionally and create
 different models in which they are defined intensionally.  So what?  They
 are both our creations to help understand the world.  Does one work better?
 Have more predictive power?  Do they imply some operational tests?  It is a
 waste of time to argue about essences and which one is really real.

 Brent


 On 10/23/2013 8:10 PM, Francisco Boni wrote:

 Two apparently distinct ontological distinctions:

 http://plato.stanford.edu/**entries/species/#SpeIndhttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/species/#SpeIndvs
 http://plato.stanford.edu/**entries/species/#SpeSethttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/species/#SpeSet


 After the development of set theory, however, a distinction of the
 scholastics between intension, of sets that were circumscribed by
 definitions, and extension, by member inclusion, was revived, and the
 logical tradition of species was held to be a matter of intensional
 definition. In a seminal summary of the traditional pre-set theoretic
 logic of diairesis, or division, from the most general to the most
 specific, H. W. Joseph (1916) made a clear distinction, as Whately had
 90 years earlier in 1826 (see below), between logical species and
 “natural” species, but the developers of the essentialism story failed

 to pick this up, and read him as saying that species of living things
 were the same as the logical species (as discussed in Chung 2003,
 Winsor 2001, 2003, 2006a).

 In a discussion of what counted as a kind in natural history, William
 Whewell in his Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences (1840) gave a good
 account of natural kinds as being types from which there were
 deviations, although he treated species themselves as simple objects.
 John Stuart Mill disagreed and asserted that natural kinds were
 definable and had universal (causal) properties for all members (Mill
 2006).1 For Whewell, the type of the taxonomist was a natural kind;
 for Mill, it was the element and the compound of chemistry and
 physics. Still, I believe the weight of venerable history is on
 Whewell’s side, not Mill’s, or to put it another way, that Mill’s
 conception of natural kinds is not something that applies well to
 historical sciences that are restricted to specific domains, like
 natural history or taxonomy. And despite what we might think based on
 the discussion of logic from Frege onwards, as late as the early 20th
 century, for instance with John Venn (1866) and others, a natural kind
 was indeed typically thought to be a kind of living beings, caused by
 generation (Hacking 1991).

 So much of the confusion about essences can be resolved if we do not
 adopt the view that Mill introduced, that a real Kind must have a set
 of necessary and sufficient properties. For Mill, a species would be a
 natural kind (a phrase introduced by Venn, although he did not adopt
 the Millian view regarding it; Mill just used the word Kind) if it had
 some set of universally shared properties that made each organism a
 member of it, rather like having a certain number of electrons,
 positrons and neutrons makes each atom of an element that element. By
 contrast, for Whewell, and for those taxonomists who he was accurately
 describing in the Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, to be a member
 of some group, a species, a genus, and so on, is to be mostly like the
 typical form, and to be something that can be supposed to share a
 genealogy with that form. This sense of “essence” is something that, I

 believe, is quite consistent with our present understanding of
 genetics and populations; most members of most species share most
 genes, but there are multiple genetic controls over some typical
 traits, and 

Re: Time as an emergent phenomenon

2013-10-23 Thread Richard Ruquist
Do not bother with the physics blog.
It contains many errors.
Go to arVix.com for the original paper


On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 11:59 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:

 Emergence, entanglement, and time make more sense as divergence,
 disentanglement, and nested frequency ranges of experience, IMO.

 On Wednesday, October 23, 2013 5:53:20 PM UTC-4, spudb...@aol.com wrote:

 Time emerges from entanglement, at the end the paper indicates time
 emerging from photons. I wonder if the paper is having fun with us, via
 spooky action at a distance? No entanglement, no time and no photons,
 no time? So if one is in an underground mine, switch the lights off,
 and then time cannot emerge?  Either with entanglement or photons, I do
 not see time emerging anymore then I perceive blueness, or antigravity
 being produced. I might be to stuck in my ways to appreciate this
 paper.

 -Original Message-
 From: LizR liz...@gmail.com
 To: everything-list everyth...@googlegroups.**com
 Sent: Wed, Oct 23, 2013 4:48 pm
 Subject: Time as an emergent phenomenon

 I will be reading this as soon as I get the time,  I mean the emergent
 phenomenon...but thought in the meantime you guys might be interested
 :-)

 https://medium.com/the-**physics-arxiv-blog/**d5d3dc850933https://medium.com/the-physics-arxiv-blog/d5d3dc850933


 I may have comments once I've had a chance to read it!




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