Re: Holiday Exercise
On 12/07/2016 11:36 am, smitra wrote: On 12-07-2016 02:00, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 12/07/2016 2:56 am, smitra wrote: On 11-07-2016 13:49, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 11/07/2016 9:31 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: HOLIDAY EXERCISE: A guy undergoes the Washington Moscow duplication, starting again from Helsinki. Then in Moscow, but not in Washington, he (the one in Moscow of course) undergoes a similar Sidney-Beijing duplication. I write P(H->M) the probability in H to get M. In Helsinki, he tries to evaluate his chance to get Sidney. With one reasoning, he (the H-guy) thinks that P(H-M) = 1/2, and that P(M-S) = 1/2, and so conclude (multiplication of independent probability) that P(H-S) = 1/2 * 1/2 = 1/4. But with another reasoning, he thinks that the duplications give globally a triplication, leading eventually to a copy in W, a copy in S and a copy in B, and so, directly conclude P(H-S) = 1/3. So, is it 1/4 or 1/3 ? Neither. The probability that the guy starting from Helsinki gets to Sydney is unity. This is the problem with probabilities in the MWI -- how do you interpret probabilities when all possible outcomes occur with probability one? Bruce In duplication experiments the prior probability to exist at all in any of the possible states increases after the duplication, while in unitary QM this is conserved (except if one or more of the possible outcomes is death). The correct way to analyze Bruno style duplication arguments is to start with assigning some measure m to the observer before any duplication is carried out, in this case the observer at H. What has a measure got to do with it? There exists a probability to exist at all, in case of duplication experiments this is non-trivial, the probability to find yourself alive increases after duplication. The probability that you find that you exist is one. This probability is not increased by duplication. If you do not exist, the probability that you exist is zero. If you are looking to see if you exist, then the probability you exist is exactly one -- it cannot be anything else. Then H gives rises to two copies in states W and M (we can call them copies, but they are actually different observers as they have different memories stored in their brains, so they are different algorithms). The measures will be m for each of these observers. Then W is not going to be copied, while M gives rise to S and B, so we end up with 3 observers each with measure m. The probability is thus 1/3. If they are different observers (different algorithms) then the only possible answer for the prior probability is P(H->S) = 0. The original is destroyed and does not go anywhere. Yes, but then we're a bit too pedantic, what it means is that you have different observers which have the same history up to the duplication, and if they were to go to sleep, wake up and at that moment not remember where they are, then you have again identical observers for a few seconds who then will diverge again when they access their memories. But in principle, you could say that each instant always gives rise to a new observer, as I'm typing this sentence I'm constantly changing, so strictly speaking this email was written by many different people. The closest continuer theory (with new identities in the case of ties) removes this confusion. In an analogue MWI setting, the outcome is different, at each duplication the measure for a particular outcome is halved. W thus has a measure of m/2, while S and B each have a measure of m/4, the probability is thus 1/4. In MWI, P(H->S) = 1. The only way you can get P(H->S) = 1/4 is in a collapse model: H has to definitely go to M in order for S to become a possibility. In non-collapse models, H goes to both M and W, so P(H->M) = 1. Subsequent duplication in the non-collapse model leads to copies in S and B, with both probabilities equal to one. To get any probability other than unity or zero, you require either a collapse or a dualist model. (The dualist model is the implicit assumption that there is some hidden label whereby we can distinguish the observers at W, S and B -- observers have to carry a unique identity with them.) In a more reasonable interpretation of personal identity in the duplication cases, each duplication creates two new persons, so the probabilities become P(H->W) = P(H->M) = P(H->S) = P(H->B) = 0. MWI yields the same probabilities as other interpretations of QM. The concept of probability is problematic in MWI. That is why people are spending so much effort to derive the Born rule from within MWI (to avoid imposing it from outside). Probabilities only make sense if you have unique outcomes -- if all possible outcomes are realized, then the probability for any particular outcome is necessarily one. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
Re: Holiday Exercise
On 12-07-2016 02:00, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 12/07/2016 2:56 am, smitra wrote: On 11-07-2016 13:49, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 11/07/2016 9:31 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: HOLIDAY EXERCISE: A guy undergoes the Washington Moscow duplication, starting again from Helsinki. Then in Moscow, but not in Washington, he (the one in Moscow of course) undergoes a similar Sidney-Beijing duplication. I write P(H->M) the probability in H to get M. In Helsinki, he tries to evaluate his chance to get Sidney. With one reasoning, he (the H-guy) thinks that P(H-M) = 1/2, and that P(M-S) = 1/2, and so conclude (multiplication of independent probability) that P(H-S) = 1/2 * 1/2 = 1/4. But with another reasoning, he thinks that the duplications give globally a triplication, leading eventually to a copy in W, a copy in S and a copy in B, and so, directly conclude P(H-S) = 1/3. So, is it 1/4 or 1/3 ? Neither. The probability that the guy starting from Helsinki gets to Sydney is unity. This is the problem with probabilities in the MWI -- how do you interpret probabilities when all possible outcomes occur with probability one? Bruce In duplication experiments the prior probability to exist at all in any of the possible states increases after the duplication, while in unitary QM this is conserved (except if one or more of the possible outcomes is death). The correct way to analyze Bruno style duplication arguments is to start with assigning some measure m to the observer before any duplication is carried out, in this case the observer at H. What has a measure got to do with it? There exists a probability to exist at all, in case of duplication experiments this is non-trivial, the probability to find yourself alive increases after duplication. Then H gives rises to two copies in states W and M (we can call them copies, but they are actually different observers as they have different memories stored in their brains, so they are different algorithms). The measures will be m for each of these observers. Then W is not going to be copied, while M gives rise to S and B, so we end up with 3 observers each with measure m. The probability is thus 1/3. If they are different observers (different algorithms) then the only possible answer for the prior probability is P(H->S) = 0. The original is destroyed and does not go anywhere. Yes, but then we're a bit too pedantic, what it means is that you have different observers which have the same history up to the duplication, and if they were to go to sleep, wake up and at that moment not remember where they are, then you have again identical observers for a few seconds who then will diverge again when they access their memories. But in principle, you could say that each instant always gives rise to a new observer, as I'm typing this sentence I'm constantly changing, so strictly speaking this email was written by many different people. In an analogue MWI setting, the outcome is different, at each duplication the measure for a particular outcome is halved. W thus has a measure of m/2, while S and B each have a measure of m/4, the probability is thus 1/4. In MWI, P(H->S) = 1. The only way you can get P(H->S) = 1/4 is in a collapse model: H has to definitely go to M in order for S to become a possibility. In non-collapse models, H goes to both M and W, so P(H->M) = 1. Subsequent duplication in the non-collapse model leads to copies in S and B, with both probabilities equal to one. To get any probability other than unity or zero, you require either a collapse or a dualist model. (The dualist model is the implicit assumption that there is some hidden label whereby we can distinguish the observers at W, S and B -- observers have to carry a unique identity with them.) In a more reasonable interpretation of personal identity in the duplication cases, each duplication creates two new persons, so the probabilities become P(H->W) = P(H->M) = P(H->S) = P(H->B) = 0. MWI yields the same probabilities as other interpretations of QM. Saibal -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Holiday Exercise
On 12/07/2016 2:56 am, smitra wrote: On 11-07-2016 13:49, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 11/07/2016 9:31 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: HOLIDAY EXERCISE: A guy undergoes the Washington Moscow duplication, starting again from Helsinki. Then in Moscow, but not in Washington, he (the one in Moscow of course) undergoes a similar Sidney-Beijing duplication. I write P(H->M) the probability in H to get M. In Helsinki, he tries to evaluate his chance to get Sidney. With one reasoning, he (the H-guy) thinks that P(H-M) = 1/2, and that P(M-S) = 1/2, and so conclude (multiplication of independent probability) that P(H-S) = 1/2 * 1/2 = 1/4. But with another reasoning, he thinks that the duplications give globally a triplication, leading eventually to a copy in W, a copy in S and a copy in B, and so, directly conclude P(H-S) = 1/3. So, is it 1/4 or 1/3 ? Neither. The probability that the guy starting from Helsinki gets to Sydney is unity. This is the problem with probabilities in the MWI -- how do you interpret probabilities when all possible outcomes occur with probability one? Bruce In duplication experiments the prior probability to exist at all in any of the possible states increases after the duplication, while in unitary QM this is conserved (except if one or more of the possible outcomes is death). The correct way to analyze Bruno style duplication arguments is to start with assigning some measure m to the observer before any duplication is carried out, in this case the observer at H. What has a measure got to do with it? Then H gives rises to two copies in states W and M (we can call them copies, but they are actually different observers as they have different memories stored in their brains, so they are different algorithms). The measures will be m for each of these observers. Then W is not going to be copied, while M gives rise to S and B, so we end up with 3 observers each with measure m. The probability is thus 1/3. If they are different observers (different algorithms) then the only possible answer for the prior probability is P(H->S) = 0. The original is destroyed and does not go anywhere. In an analogue MWI setting, the outcome is different, at each duplication the measure for a particular outcome is halved. W thus has a measure of m/2, while S and B each have a measure of m/4, the probability is thus 1/4. In MWI, P(H->S) = 1. The only way you can get P(H->S) = 1/4 is in a collapse model: H has to definitely go to M in order for S to become a possibility. In non-collapse models, H goes to both M and W, so P(H->M) = 1. Subsequent duplication in the non-collapse model leads to copies in S and B, with both probabilities equal to one. To get any probability other than unity or zero, you require either a collapse or a dualist model. (The dualist model is the implicit assumption that there is some hidden label whereby we can distinguish the observers at W, S and B -- observers have to carry a unique identity with them.) In a more reasonable interpretation of personal identity in the duplication cases, each duplication creates two new persons, so the probabilities become P(H->W) = P(H->M) = P(H->S) = P(H->B) = 0. There is no sensible model in which all three probabilities equal 1/3. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Holiday Exercise (was: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit
On Mon, Jul 11, 2016, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> 1) Each >> >> copy saw only one city. > > > > > Excellent! That is the correct 1-view description. Now, you just need to > interview each copy about the prediction made in Helsinki and written in > the diary to evaluate the better one. > How? Which turned out to be the better prediction, Moscow or Washington? And was the prediction about John Clark or was it about some mysterious figure named "you"? 2) All the copies together saw 2 cities. > > > > > Correct 3p description of the experiences of all copies. That is the 3-1 > view. We need it to get the correct "1)", but "all the copies" is not a > person, > Then asking the Helsinki Person "what city will *you* see?" or "how many cities will *you *see?" is a nonsense question because this is a world with people duplicating machines. > > that is why you correctly add "together" > > (which is the 3-1 view, in which we are not interested). > I know, you're interested in "THE 1p view" but as you just pointed out in a world with people duplicating machine "THE 1p view" is meaningless, there is only "A 1p view". > > > we are asked about the 1-views. > You are asking about what one and only one city was seen by " the 1-views " and that is a incoherent question with no coherent answer. Garbage in garbage out. >> >> 4) The statement "John Clark will see two cities" turned out to be >> unambiguously true. > > > > > In the 3-1 view, sure. > If they were logical it would be true from true from ANYBODIES view, Helsinki man Moscow Man Washington man you name it; John Clark will see two cities. > > > But we asked about the 1-views. > There are 2 "1-views", and Bruno Marchal demands to know which *ONE* and only *ONE* *you* will see, and that demand is pure gibberish. >> >> So which one was right? > > > > > Trivially both when in Helsinki the prediction written in the diary was "W > v M", > But what exactly was the prediction about? If it was about how many cities John Clark will see there would be universal agreement that answer turned out to be 2, but if was about how many cities you will see there will never be universal agreement on what the answer turned out to be because in a world with people duplicating machines the personal pronoun used will be ambiguous. *> Holiday Exercise: [...]* > Adding more cities and more duplicates of "you" will not clarify the situation about what one and only one thing will happen to "you". > > So, is it 1/4 or 1/3 ? > > Can you modify a bit the protocol so that we get any of those results? > Bruno, as long as the question has a personal pronoun in it any probability for getting the right answer can be cranked out, and they're all meaningless. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit
On Mon, Jul 11, 2016 at 1:05 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > I think John Clark's religion has a name, Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never heard that one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12. John K Clark > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit
On Mon, Jul 11, 2016 Telmo Menezes wrote: > >> > >> I'll tell you what I'm sick of, I'm not sick of arguing with you, that's >> >> fun, but I'm sick of Bruno's acting as if his silly homemade acronyms >> should >> >> be well known to every educated person when even Google doesn't know what >> >> the hell he's talking about. > > > > > I think this gets to the root of the problem, and it's all in your > > head. Yes, I find that if it's not in my head it's not worth saying. > > > You pride yourself in your scientific culture Yes > > > so you feel > > personally insulted when someone uses some obscure acronym that you > > don't know about. That is irrational. > It's not irrational if the acronym in question is obscure because the person just made it up and when there is already a short word that every English speaker in the world knows that means exactly the same thing. And yes, when somebody uses pompous language instead of logic I feel insulted > > People have been discussing Bruno's Universal Dovetailer Argument for > > many years on this mailing list. And nowhere else. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uda By now I know what a Universal Dovetailer is but I still don't know what "UDA" means because the "A" in it is not clear, I've never found any coherent "argument" in UDA. > > This is not an exercise in > > self-importance I think it is. Nobody would say "3p" instead of "your" unless they wanted to sound deeper and more profound than they really are. And although I can figure out what "*A *1p view" means I have no idea what "*THE* 1p view" means, and that's the one Bruno talks about. > > > it's just how acronyms are born anywhere. Those acronyms are still in the womb and will never be born. > > > Bruno's > > argument has not reached the mainstream, And why do you suppose that is? > > > so it's fairly normal that > > wikipedia does contain an entry about it. Not only does Google not know what "UDA" is neither does Bing. They don't know what "1p" is either , or "3p, much less "1-1p". > > The Universal Dovetailer is a perfectly well defined (and quite > > interesting) concept in computer science. > > I do think this one is > > mentioned in wikipedia, by the way. No, Wikipedia doesn't know what a "Universal Dovetailer" is either . B ut I have no problem with the fact that one type of P HYSICAL computer can always simulate another type of computer or that a PHYSICAL computer if properly programmed and if given sufficient energy and time . and could compute everything that is c omputable and thus be able simulate reality, but Turing figured that out 85 years ago. I also have no problem with something that can compute intelligent behavior will also be conscious, Darwin proved that (or at least provided an astronomical amount of evidence in favor of it) over 150 years ago. So what's new thing does Bruno's " Universal Dovetailer " bring to the table? Mathematics can't tell us what is, it can't tell us the truth or even the approximate truth, mathematics can only tell us what will result from certain assumptions. Physics can't tell us the truth either but at least it can come close. > > You can check the definition of "Bad Faith" on Wikipedia: > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bad_faith But you can't check Universal Dovetailer or UDA or 1p or 3p or 1-1p or 3-1p on Wikipedia. And speaking of bad faith, do you think Bruno *really* believes I'm a dogmatic catholic theologian who is even more hidebound than the Pope, or do you think maybe he was being just a tad duplicitous ? > > > It is bullying if you even refuse to read what you propose to > > criticize, Proofs are built on foundation of the previous steps so only a fool would keep reading a proof after a error was found, and I am not a fool. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit
On 7/11/2016 10:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jul 2016, at 18:35, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Sat, Jul 9, 2016 at 6:11 PM, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Jul 9, 2016 at 4:53 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: Thanks for illustrating what I just said. What you just said was: " Most sane people sooner or later realize that the only way to win this game is not to play it " And then I just said: "If true then the only logical conclusion to make is that Telmo Menezes is not sane." It is also possible that I am an outlier in this regard (most sane people...) or that I haven't reached the point where I am sick of playing the game (sooner or later). It is further possible that what I mean by "this game" is the game of arguing about the validity of the UDA (and please spare me from your usual jokes where you go to wikipedia looking for meaning of the acronym. Yes yes it's super funny). This is your usual modus operandi and I am sick of it. I say modus operandi because, judging from certain contributions you made to this mailing list it is quite clear that you do not have the limited intelligence required to honestly make such mistakes. That would be forgivable, but here, and more importantly as you do when discussing Bruno's theories, you argue in bad faith. Finally, yes it could be that I am not sane. Unlike you, I consider this possibility. The fact that you do not consider it is precisely what makes you a religious fundamentalist. Just because your religion has no name, doesn't mean that it does not exist. I'll spare you the trouble and paste you usual bromide. Here you go: "Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never heard that one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12." This is precisely the sort of manipulative bullshit that religious people use. The implicit appeal to common sense. The suggestion that your opponent is childish. Anything but directly addressing the ideas of your interlocutor. You argue in bad faith, you destroy honest discussion to score internet points and you bully people that were nothing but nice to you. Rather accurate description I'm afraid. I think John Clark's religion has a name, though, it is Materialismwhich includes Weak Materialism: the belief in some primary matter and/or its corresponding epistemological version: Physicalism (physics is the fundamental science, physics can't be reduced to anything else simpler). I use "weak materialism" for that religion, to oppose it to the use of "materialism" in philosophy of mind, which is that not only matter/force exists, but only matter/force exists. Note that mechanism is what makes materialism working well, as Diderot and the modern materialist and Naturalist usually think, but only up to some point as materialism stumbles down quickly on the mind/body problem. I think Descartes got the correct (monist) answer, but in his meditation, he needs to assume that God is good, which, even if true, cannot be assumed in a scientific derivation. But I think he got the main point though. Too bad he never finished his text "À la Recherche de la Vérité". Too bad he dismissed logic and neoplatonism, but there are historical contingencies which might explain this. Note that it is possible to disbelieve in primary matter and still be physicalist. (using a particular or special universal number + some oracle). When we assume mechanism, it is up to the materialist to explain what is primary matter and how it get the focus of consciousness, and it is up to the physicalist to explain what is the rôle, for consciousness, of the fundamental laws of physics, and why they can't be explained in term of the (infinities of) computations (measure). Explanation is easy. Prediction is hard. Physicalist can predict that cutting off oxygen from your brain will cause loss of consciousness. Explanations in terms of infinities of computations are like physics explaining things as "A consequence of the state of the universe and the laws of physics." Brent Some people, when they learn that you are open to the idea that (weak) materialism is wrong, will believe, for a time, that you are actually open to the fairy tales, superstition and magic, and so believe that you are mad. When they realize the error, and that immaterialism can also be only some mathematicalism, which usually assumes *less* than physicalism, it is too much embarrassing for them to admit. Then they hate you cordially when they eventually understand that they were the one still using magic in their religion. Bruno Thanks for illustrating what I just said. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group a
Re: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit
On 09 Jul 2016, at 18:35, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Sat, Jul 9, 2016 at 6:11 PM, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Jul 9, 2016 at 4:53 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: Thanks for illustrating what I just said. What you just said was: " Most sane people sooner or later realize that the only way to win this game is not to play it " And then I just said: "If true then the only logical conclusion to make is that Telmo Menezes is not sane." It is also possible that I am an outlier in this regard (most sane people...) or that I haven't reached the point where I am sick of playing the game (sooner or later). It is further possible that what I mean by "this game" is the game of arguing about the validity of the UDA (and please spare me from your usual jokes where you go to wikipedia looking for meaning of the acronym. Yes yes it's super funny). This is your usual modus operandi and I am sick of it. I say modus operandi because, judging from certain contributions you made to this mailing list it is quite clear that you do not have the limited intelligence required to honestly make such mistakes. That would be forgivable, but here, and more importantly as you do when discussing Bruno's theories, you argue in bad faith. Finally, yes it could be that I am not sane. Unlike you, I consider this possibility. The fact that you do not consider it is precisely what makes you a religious fundamentalist. Just because your religion has no name, doesn't mean that it does not exist. I'll spare you the trouble and paste you usual bromide. Here you go: "Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never heard that one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12." This is precisely the sort of manipulative bullshit that religious people use. The implicit appeal to common sense. The suggestion that your opponent is childish. Anything but directly addressing the ideas of your interlocutor. You argue in bad faith, you destroy honest discussion to score internet points and you bully people that were nothing but nice to you. Rather accurate description I'm afraid. I think John Clark's religion has a name, though, it is Materialism which includes Weak Materialism: the belief in some primary matter and/ or its corresponding epistemological version: Physicalism (physics is the fundamental science, physics can't be reduced to anything else simpler). I use "weak materialism" for that religion, to oppose it to the use of "materialism" in philosophy of mind, which is that not only matter/ force exists, but only matter/force exists. Note that mechanism is what makes materialism working well, as Diderot and the modern materialist and Naturalist usually think, but only up to some point as materialism stumbles down quickly on the mind/body problem. I think Descartes got the correct (monist) answer, but in his meditation, he needs to assume that God is good, which, even if true, cannot be assumed in a scientific derivation. But I think he got the main point though. Too bad he never finished his text "À la Recherche de la Vérité". Too bad he dismissed logic and neoplatonism, but there are historical contingencies which might explain this. Note that it is possible to disbelieve in primary matter and still be physicalist. (using a particular or special universal number + some oracle). When we assume mechanism, it is up to the materialist to explain what is primary matter and how it get the focus of consciousness, and it is up to the physicalist to explain what is the rôle, for consciousness, of the fundamental laws of physics, and why they can't be explained in term of the (infinities of) computations (measure). Some people, when they learn that you are open to the idea that (weak) materialism is wrong, will believe, for a time, that you are actually open to the fairy tales, superstition and magic, and so believe that you are mad. When they realize the error, and that immaterialism can also be only some mathematicalism, which usually assumes *less* than physicalism, it is too much embarrassing for them to admit. Then they hate you cordially when they eventually understand that they were the one still using magic in their religion. Bruno Thanks for illustrating what I just said. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr..
Re: Holiday Exercise
On 11-07-2016 13:49, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 11/07/2016 9:31 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: HOLIDAY EXERCISE: A guy undergoes the Washington Moscow duplication, starting again from Helsinki. Then in Moscow, but not in Washington, he (the one in Moscow of course) undergoes a similar Sidney-Beijing duplication. I write P(H->M) the probability in H to get M. In Helsinki, he tries to evaluate his chance to get Sidney. With one reasoning, he (the H-guy) thinks that P(H-M) = 1/2, and that P(M-S) = 1/2, and so conclude (multiplication of independent probability) that P(H-S) = 1/2 * 1/2 = 1/4. But with another reasoning, he thinks that the duplications give globally a triplication, leading eventually to a copy in W, a copy in S and a copy in B, and so, directly conclude P(H-S) = 1/3. So, is it 1/4 or 1/3 ? Neither. The probability that the guy starting from Helsinki gets to Sydney is unity. This is the problem with probabilities in the MWI -- how do you interpret probabilities when all possible outcomes occur with probability one? Bruce In duplication experiments the prior probability to exist at all in any of the possible states increases after the duplication, while in unitary QM this is conserved (except if one or more of the possible outcomes is death). The correct way to analyze Bruno style duplication arguments is to start with assigning some measure m to the observer before any duplication is carried out, in this case the observer at H. Then H gives rises to two copies in states W and M (we can call them copies, but they are actually different observers as they have different memories stored in their brains, so they are different algorithms). The measures will be m for each of these observers. Then W is not going to be copied, while M gives rise to S and B, so we end up with 3 observers each with measure m. The probability is thus 1/3. In an analogue MWI setting, the outcome is different, at each duplication the measure for a particular outcome is halved. W thus has a measure of m/2, while S and B each have a measure of m/4, the probability is thus 1/4. Saibal -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit
What if John does not want to engage with the argument? Shouldn't it be his right to say "no"? I'm arriving at the conclusion that his constant replies, negative + insulting as they are, are actually on par with the weird impatient expectation by you guys "that he should just answer in the fucking way we want him to" - a posture that is just as hostile, even in the politeness trappings you love to waltz around with linguistically. It takes two to tango and continue with the small, eternal bickering orgy that you've sucked this list into. Have your UDA threads by all means, but the automatic assumption that every list member "must go through UDA" before they've even consented to such a private theological exercise is plain rude. The arguments of what was debunked, referring to some huge audience of "we", who have all swallowed comp hook, line, and sinker is also curious. Why not address that audience with this burning ambition, or Bruno's peers, or publications on foundations of science, theology, modal logic etc.? People are here for ensemble TOE discussion and the platform seems to have developed into Bruno's advertising/propaganda corner. And whoever says "no" is an enemy of science. Whoever does not want to engage with UDA the way we want is being strange/egoistic. Such assumptions make Bruno's side seem arrogant and guilty of blaspheme. Besides being incredibly rude socially, tearing people into "Helsinki, Moscow" without seeking explicit consent WITH the disclaimer that this thought experiment supports a worldview where science and theology loose the usual boundary, that physics reverses into machine psychology, that we are all assumed to be universal machines... not stating these things clearly at the start, but then exposing people's personal belief systems to this list "John is a fundamentalist" -via their replies- is perhaps beyond rude and already odious, depending on your psychological health. Because people's inner theological stances are a private matter which comp adherents (meaning Telmo and Bruno) feel they have a right to trample over by fast-tracking them into the future of science via the thought experiment too quickly. But no, we couldn't have the kind of politeness that respects personal boundaries; just the kind that uses all kinds of politeness markers to trample on the exact right that the argument proposes to champion: saying "no" to the comp doctor and any form of his marketing, including UDA. Your sense for manners and good argumentative form, posture, and patience is most weird, and it is understandable that some people would feel coerced by the rushed, selectively packaged aspect of presenting the argument. I prefer laughing and fart jokes in my discussions on ontology. They ensure absence of seriousness. Nirvana is already here but it is obviously your choice to split hairs, so consider being more measured in your responses for "opening the eyes of the world". Respect people's basic theological boundaries and control that tendency for the kind of discourse, where when people have a beer with you, you'l be the types obsessively returning to your subject even when group discussion moves on with "one more thing about comp though is that..." Because of this attitude, the absence of informal discussion (this place was also used to share jokes in non obsequious fashion), I won't even get into the theological problems I see with comp. Without the laughter and all the force you guys enforce via emails with you too, I have come to the conclusion that you're already at the point where you mistake comp for reality much too often. And that's further than any scientist should go, regardless of subject. Especially preaching ignorance and modesty the way you guys do. This leaves me with little interest to even bring up such problems here because you are forever decided on these issues. Indeed, these are the beginning trappings of false religions and no longer the kind of inquiring open science that interests me. I decline on the infinite bickering contest. Thank goodness for Brent's and John Mike's post. They are what hold this whole kindergarten together. PGC On Mon, Jul 11, 2016 at 2:03 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote: > On Sat, Jul 9, 2016 at 11:25 PM, John Clark wrote: > > On Sat, Jul 9, 2016 , Telmo Menezes wrote: > > > >> > >> > > >> I am sick of > >> playing the game > > > > > > Yes I know you said that before, but then why do you continue to play it? > > Human nature. > > > > >> > >> what I mean by "this game" is the game of > >> > >> arguing about the validity of the UDA (and please spare me from your > >> > >> usual jokes where you go to wikipedia looking for meaning of the > >> > >> acronym. Yes yes it's super funny). > > > > > > I'll tell you what I'm sick of, I'm not sick of arguing with you, that's > > fun, but I'm sick of Bruno's acting as if his silly homemade acronyms > should > > be well known to every educated person when even Google doesn't know what > > the hell h
Re: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit
On Sat, Jul 9, 2016 at 11:25 PM, John Clark wrote: > On Sat, Jul 9, 2016 , Telmo Menezes wrote: > >> >> > >> I am sick of >> playing the game > > > Yes I know you said that before, but then why do you continue to play it? Human nature. > >> >> what I mean by "this game" is the game of >> >> arguing about the validity of the UDA (and please spare me from your >> >> usual jokes where you go to wikipedia looking for meaning of the >> >> acronym. Yes yes it's super funny). > > > I'll tell you what I'm sick of, I'm not sick of arguing with you, that's > fun, but I'm sick of Bruno's acting as if his silly homemade acronyms should > be well known to every educated person when even Google doesn't know what > the hell he's talking about. I think this gets to the root of the problem, and it's all in your head. You pride yourself in your scientific culture so you feel personally insulted when someone uses some obscure acronym that you don't know about. That is irrational. I have never seen Bruno acting like anyone is uneducated or dumb for not knowing something, much less is acronyms. It is all in your head. What I have seen is you making fun of Bruno's ideas for years, even though he was always available to clear up the meaning of his acronyms to you. But you play the game of pretending you don't know what they mean, because you just want to sabotage the debate. People have been discussing Bruno's Universal Dovetailer Argument for many years on this mailing list. It is normal that, at some point, we start using abbreviations like UDA. This is not an exercise in self-importance, it's just how acronyms are born anywhere. Bruno's argument has not reached the mainstream, so it's fairly normal that wikipedia does contain an entry about it. This is surely true of millions of ambitious concepts that are being explored by niches of humanity all over. Nothing special about it. The Universal Dovetailer is a perfectly well defined (and quite interesting) concept in computer science. I do think this one is mentioned in wikipedia, by the way. The argument around the UD (see, it's annoying to keep writing the same thing over and over) captures the interest of a lot of people here, clearly including you -- you have been discussing it for years. What you are saying is what? That we should not give Bruno the satisfaction of creating acronyms for things that he thought and that we debate over and over? Don't you think that is terribly petty? I have witnessed Bruno give a lecture having in mind a general audience, and the did not assume people to know what a FUNCTION is. much less some obscure acronym. It's all a matter of context, a concept you seem to have a hard time grasping. Don't we have the right to have a niche place to discuss less known ideas that we find exciting? What the hell is the problem with that? How can you think that this is a personal insult to you? > I'm also sick of pretending that substituting > "1p" for "me" and "3p" for "you" is a great scientific achievement. Well that's not on Bruno, it's common in philosophical discussion everywhere. The way you phrase it tells me that you don't fully grasp the concepts, but that's not very surprising given the incorrect arguments you use against the UDA. In any case, I don't think anyone is under the impression that these are scientific advancements at all. 1p and 3p are just useful concepts to talk about certain things, surely useful when we are dealing with the mind-body problem. I don't get this "scientific advancement" obsession, where hard-to-grasp ideas are glorified. Hard-to-grasp ideas are a necessary evil at most. Science is about the search for truth, and if we could express all the truth at a basic school level that would be great. >> > >> This is your usual modus operandi and I am sick of it. > > > You already said that more than once, and I already asked why you continue > doing something you're sick of. Because I think Bruno has something interesting to tell the world, and not a lot of people know about it. So I am doing my small part to leave it on the record that not everyone thinks like you. > >> >> > >> you argue in bad faith. > > > I then to think all faith is bad You can check the definition of "Bad Faith" on Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bad_faith Of course you know this, and you know that "faith" in this context has no relation whatsoever with the notion of "religious faith". So this turns out to be a good example of arguing in bad faith -- you ignore what you know is meant and run for a dictionary definition that you like. You do this a lot. > but perhaps I could figure out that you're > taking about if you gave a specific example rather than vague generalities. I do above and I did before, but you removed them when answering to me. You also do that a lot. >> >> > >> it is precisely >> what makes you a religious fundamentalist. Just because your religion >> has no name, doesn't mean that it does not exist.I'll spare yo
Re: Holiday Exercise
On 11/07/2016 9:31 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: *Holiday Exercise:* A guy undergoes the Washington Moscow duplication, starting again from Helsinki. Then in Moscow, but not in Washington, he (the one in Moscow of course) undergoes a similar Sidney-Beijing duplication. I write P(H->M) the probability in H to get M. In Helsinki, he tries to evaluate his chance to get Sidney. With one reasoning, he (the H-guy) thinks that P(H-M) = 1/2, and that P(M-S) = 1/2, and so conclude (multiplication of independent probability) that P(H-S) = 1/2 * 1/2 = 1/4. But with another reasoning, he thinks that the duplications give globally a triplication, leading eventually to a copy in W, a copy in S and a copy in B, and so, directly conclude P(H-S) = 1/3. So, is it 1/4 or 1/3 ? Neither. The probability that the guy starting from Helsinki gets to Sydney is unity. This is the problem with probabilities in the MWI -- how do you interpret probabilities when all possible outcomes occur with probability one? Bruce Can you modify a bit the protocol so that we get any of those results? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Holiday Exercise (was: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit
Those tired of Clark's argument can skip up to the (more interesting) Holiday Exercise below. My be this could help Clark to try to find a new argument, as again, he just brought his usual invalid trick, as I show one last times. On 10 Jul 2016, at 19:29, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Jul 10, 2016 Bruno Marchal wrote: > Pleasen replaced "all copies" by "each copy", and call them as you want. OK. 1) Each copy saw only one city. Excellent! That is the correct 1-view description. Now, you just need to interview each copy about the prediction made in Helsinki and written in the diary to evaluate the better one. If you agree that "Each copy saw only one city", you have to agree that "each copy realize that "W & M" is refuted, that half of the copies refute all specific predictions, and that all verifies "W V M". 2) All the copies together saw 2 cities. Correct 3p description of the experiences of all copies. That is the 3-1 view. We need it to get the correct "1)", but "all the copies" is not a person, that is why you correctly add "together" (which is the 3-1 view, in which we are not interested). 3) All the copies have an equal right to call themselves "John Clark". Yes, but below you are using "3') All the copies has an equal right to call themselves "John Clark", like if the set of reconstituted people was a sort of super-entity. That is the 3-1 view. But we are asked about the 1-views. Again, better to use "each" than "all", you get back to what you were asked to avoid. 4) The statement "John Clark will see two cities" turned out to be unambiguously true. In the 3-1 view, sure. But we asked about the 1-views. If you were talking about the 1-views, then that is directly refuted by each copy, or each 1-view (or all of them, well understood). Given the enunciation of the problem, you are just wrong, as the verification procedure has shown again above. 5) The statements "you will see one city" and "you will see 2 cities" and "you will see no city" turned out to be neither true nor false because in a world of people duplicating machines the personal pronoun "you" is ambiguous. > When interviewing each of them in the cities, each have no problem to understand to whom I am asking the question, whatever words are used for it. But the interviewees do NOT agree among themselves to whom the question was asked. Utter non sense, again made possible by the confusion you introduce by abstracting from the precision given. If I don't give the precision, you say: vague, ambiguous. If I give you the precision (like in the papers, books), you say "pee-pee jargon", and refuse to use them. When eventually you use them, you say the result is not original, but fail to say why you don't move on the next step. So which one was right? Trivially both when in Helsinki the prediction written in the diary was "W v M", and none for any other. There is no ambiguity, and the prediction are simple and clear, and the criteria of verification (interviewing all copies) is very clear too. You might try to use the exercise below to try to find another refutation. Your current attempt has been debunked many times, and as Telmo and other said, it is a bit boring. == Holiday Exercise: A guy undergoes the Washington Moscow duplication, starting again from Helsinki. Then in Moscow, but not in Washington, he (the one in Moscow of course) undergoes a similar Sidney-Beijing duplication. I write P(H->M) the probability in H to get M. In Helsinki, he tries to evaluate his chance to get Sidney. With one reasoning, he (the H-guy) thinks that P(H-M) = 1/2, and that P(M-S) = 1/2, and so conclude (multiplication of independent probability) that P(H-S) = 1/2 * 1/2 = 1/4. But with another reasoning, he thinks that the duplications give globally a triplication, leading eventually to a copy in W, a copy in S and a copy in B, and so, directly conclude P(H-S) = 1/3. So, is it 1/4 or 1/3 ? Can you modify a bit the protocol so that we get any of those results? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
