Re: What are atheists for?

[Brent Meeker]

On 4/19/2017 6:42 PM, David Nyman wrote:



On 20 Apr 2017 12:57 a.m., "John Clark" > wrote:


On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 6:56 AM, David Nyman mailto:da...@davidnyman.com>>wrote:

​> ​
​I've often wondered whether Hoyle's heuristic could be a way
of short-cutting this dispute. Hoyle gives us a way to think
about every subjective moment


​As a kid I remember reading ​
Fred Hoyle's
​Novel "
October the First Is Too Late
​"​ and in it he wrote about consciousness for about half a
paragraph, is that what you're talking about?


Yes, I'm talking about that novel. I too read it more than forty years 
ago. However I recently re-read it and I can assure you that the 
treatment of conscious experience in the manner described is both 
extensive and central to the theme of the novel. Hoyle went out of the 
way to emphasise that he took his "heuristic" seriously as a 
scientist, as his former student John Gribbin fully attested. Julian 
Barbour also acknowledges Hoyle's priority in the notion of 
subjectivity as captured by time capsules, an essentially equivalent 
notion.




​> ​
Essentially the heuristic invites us to think of all
subjective experiences, aka observer moments, as a single
logical serialisation in which relative spatial and temporal
orientation is internal to each moment.


​
Well yes, but all that's really saying is that we have a
subjective feeling of time and space, but we already knew that.


It goes well beyond that, as the narrative is at pains to set out. 
Hoyle's physicist protagonist invites the other main character to 
place himself in the subjective position represented by any of the 
pigeon holes, in any order. Then he asks him to explain what he thinks 
his subjective experience would be. His response (the guy is very 
quick on the uptake) is that his experience would appear to be 
perfectly normally​ sequenced from a psycho-historical point of view, 
despite random ordering from an external perspective. He also 
immediately grasps that any number of apparently individualised 
perspectives could be "interleaved" in this manner whilst retaining 
psycho-historical continuity for each.


As I remember it Hoyle talked about events (that is to say a time
and a place) being in pigeon holes in no particular order and
consciousness is like a light
​flashing​
 on
​a sequence of
pigeon hole i
​n a very particular ​
order. The set of pigeon holes you have to work with is the same
as the set I have,  the thing that makes you different than me is
​that ​
the sequence of light flashes illuminating those pigeon holes is
different for you and me.


Yes, more or less. Hoyle's explicit conceptual point is that a single 
common agent could be occupying all these perceptual positions, in 
whatever extrinsic order, and the net subjective result would be as if 
you, me or any other notionally sentient entities were experiencing 
completely separated​ and sequenced personal histories. But this is 
just what one would expect, for example, of any computational device 
capable of compartmentalising one program's states from another's. 
Hence it establishes the distinction I mentioned between the notion of 
synchronization as publicly established with respect to a common clock 
and that of subjective simultaneity.



Or to put it another way
​,​
the difference between you and me is information. So if the
information on how my mind operates is put into a computer and
then my body is destroyed my consciousness does not stop, if two
phonographs are synchronized and playing the same
​
symphony and you destroy one machine, the music does not stop.
​ ​
The fundamental question you have to ask yourself is; are we, our
subjective existence, more like bricks or symphonies?

Actually Hoyle's analogy would have been better if he put thoughts
in those pigeon holes rather than events because you don't have
thoughts you are thoughts.


Subjectively, yes, I agree. But Hoyle actually makes this point 
explicitly.




​>​
 each 1-view is occupied serially and exclusively by the
single agent: i.e. *at one time and in one place*. Hence in
that sense only a single 1-view can possibly represent me *at
that one time and that one place*.


​I see no reason that must me true. Suppose all your life you had
2 brains in your head not one, the 2 brains were identical and
always received identical information from your senses so they
always agreed on how to operate your body. So perfect was the
agreement that neither brain suspected the existence of the other.
And then one day one of those brains was instantaneously stopped,
what would be the result?  Obviously a outside observer would
notice no change in your behavior so obje

Re: What are atheists for?

[David Nyman]

On 20 Apr 2017 12:57 a.m., "John Clark"  wrote:

On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 6:56 AM, David Nyman  wrote:

​> ​
> ​I've often wondered whether Hoyle's heuristic could be a way of
> short-cutting this dispute. Hoyle gives us a way to think about every
> subjective moment
>

​As a kid I remember reading ​
Fred Hoyle's
​Novel "
October the First Is Too Late
​"​ and in it he wrote about consciousness for about half a paragraph, is
that what you're talking about?


Yes, I'm talking about that novel. I too read it more than forty years ago.
However I recently re-read it and I can assure you that the treatment of
conscious experience in the manner described is both extensive and central
to the theme of the novel. Hoyle went out of the way to emphasise that he
took his "heuristic" seriously as a scientist, as his former student John
Gribbin fully attested. Julian Barbour also acknowledges Hoyle's priority
in the notion of subjectivity as captured by time capsules, an essentially
equivalent notion.




> ​> ​
> Essentially the heuristic invites us to think of all subjective
> experiences, aka observer moments, as a single logical serialisation in
> which relative spatial and temporal orientation is internal to each moment.
>

​
Well yes, but all that's really saying is that we have a subjective feeling
of time and space, but we already knew that.


It goes well beyond that, as the narrative is at pains to set out. Hoyle's
physicist protagonist invites the other main character to place himself in
the subjective position represented by any of the pigeon holes, in any
order. Then he asks him to explain what he thinks his subjective experience
would be. His response (the guy is very quick on the uptake) is that his
experience would appear to be perfectly normally​ sequenced from a
psycho-historical point of view, despite random ordering from an external
perspective. He also immediately grasps that any number of apparently
individualised perspectives could be "interleaved" in this manner whilst
retaining psycho-historical continuity for each.

As I remember it Hoyle talked about events (that is to say a time and a
place) being in pigeon holes in no particular order and consciousness is
like a light
​flashing​
 on
​a sequence of
pigeon hole i
​n a very particular ​
order. The set of pigeon holes you have to work with is the same as the set
I have,  the thing that makes you different than me is
​that ​
the sequence of light flashes illuminating those pigeon holes is different
for you and me.


Yes, more or less. Hoyle's explicit conceptual point is that a single
common agent could be occupying all these perceptual positions, in whatever
extrinsic order, and the net subjective result would be as if you, me or
any other notionally sentient entities were experiencing completely
separated​ and sequenced personal histories. But this is just what one
would expect, for example, of any computational device capable of
compartmentalising one program's states from another's. Hence it
establishes the distinction I mentioned between the notion of
synchronization as publicly established with respect to a common clock and
that of subjective simultaneity.


Or to put it another way
​,​
the difference between you and me is information. So if the information on
how my mind operates is put into a computer and then my body is destroyed
my consciousness does not stop, if two phonographs are synchronized and
playing the same
​
symphony and you destroy one machine, the music does not stop.
​ ​
The fundamental question you have to ask yourself is; are we, our
subjective existence, more like bricks or symphonies?

Actually Hoyle's analogy would have been better if he put thoughts in those
pigeon holes rather than events because you don't have thoughts you are
thoughts.


Subjectively, yes, I agree. But Hoyle actually makes this point explicitly.



​>​
>  each 1-view is occupied serially and exclusively by the single agent:
> i.e. *at one time and in one place*. Hence in that sense only a single
> 1-view can possibly represent me *at that one time and that one place*.
>

​I see no reason that must me true. Suppose all your life you had 2 brains
in your head not one, the 2 brains were identical and always received
identical information from your senses so they always agreed on how to
operate your body. So perfect was the agreement that neither brain
suspected the existence of the other. And then one day one of those brains
was instantaneously stopped, what would be the result?  Obviously a outside
observer would notice no change in your behavior so objectively there would
be no difference, and no thoughts would be interrupted so there would be no
subjective change either. If stopping that brain makes no objective
difference and it makes no subjective difference then it's safe to say it
just makes no difference.


I agree. But this is surely an example of what I say above: i.e. here we
have a single view representing my subjective situation at one time

Re: What are atheists for?

[John Clark]

On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 6:56 AM, David Nyman  wrote:

​> ​
> ​I've often wondered whether Hoyle's heuristic could be a way of
> short-cutting this dispute. Hoyle gives us a way to think about every
> subjective moment
>

​As a kid I remember reading ​
Fred Hoyle's
​Novel "
October the First Is Too Late
​"​ and in it he wrote about consciousness for about half a paragraph, is
that what you're talking about?



> ​> ​
> Essentially the heuristic invites us to think of all subjective
> experiences, aka observer moments, as a single logical serialisation in
> which relative spatial and temporal orientation is internal to each moment.
>

​
Well yes, but all that's really saying is that we have a subjective feeling
of time and space, but we already knew that. As I remember it Hoyle talked
about events (that is to say a time and a place) being in pigeon holes in
no particular order and consciousness is like a light
​flashing​
 on
​a sequence of
pigeon hole i
​n a very particular ​
order. The set of pigeon holes you have to work with is the same as the set
I have,  the thing that makes you different than me is
​that ​
the sequence of light flashes illuminating those pigeon holes is different
for you and me.

Or to put it another way
​,​
the difference between you and me is information. So if the information on
how my mind operates is put into a computer and then my body is destroyed
my consciousness does not stop, if two phonographs are synchronized and
playing the same
​
symphony and you destroy one machine, the music does not stop.
​ ​
The fundamental question you have to ask yourself is; are we, our
subjective existence, more like bricks or symphonies?

Actually Hoyle's analogy would have been better if he put thoughts in those
pigeon holes rather than events because you don't have thoughts you are
thoughts.

​>​
>  each 1-view is occupied serially and exclusively by the single agent:
> i.e. *at one time and in one place*. Hence in that sense only a single
> 1-view can possibly represent me *at that one time and that one place*.
>

​I see no reason that must me true. Suppose all your life you had 2 brains
in your head not one, the 2 brains were identical and always received
identical information from your senses so they always agreed on how to
operate your body. So perfect was the agreement that neither brain
suspected the existence of the other. And then one day one of those brains
was instantaneously stopped, what would be the result?  Obviously a outside
observer would notice no change in your behavior so objectively there would
be no difference, and no thoughts would be interrupted so there would be no
subjective change either. If stopping that brain makes no objective
difference and it makes no subjective difference then it's safe to say it
just makes no difference.

Also I don't think it makes much sense in saying your consciousness
occupies a unique space. When you think about The
Eiffel Tower
​
is your subjectivity in
​France​
 or is it in a bone box sitting on your shoulders?

  John K Clark

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Re: What are atheists for?

[David Nyman]

On 19 Apr 2017 7:50 p.m., "Brent Meeker"  wrote:



On 4/19/2017 3:56 AM, David Nyman wrote:

On 19 April 2017 at 08:24, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

John has never write one clear post refuting the step-3 which would make it
> possible to answer by one post. There is no need for this, as the answer is
> in the publications, which makes clear the 1-3 distinction, so the
> ambiguity that John dreams for cannot occur.


​I've often wondered whether Hoyle's heuristic could be a way of
short-cutting this dispute. Hoyle gives us a way to think about every
subjective moment as if it occurred within the 1-view of a common agent.
Essentially the heuristic invites us to think of all subjective
experiences, aka observer moments, as a single logical serialisation in
which relative spatial and temporal orientation is internal to each moment.
In comp terms this conceptual agent might perhaps be the virgin
(unprogrammed) machine, on the basis that all such machines are effectively
computationally equivalent. Anyway, in this way of thinking, after my
3-duplication there are of course two 3-copies; so in the 3-view it can
make perfect sense to say that each copy is me (i.e. one of my
continuations). Hence my expectation in that same 3-sense is that I will be
present in both locations. However, again in terms of the heuristic, it is
equally the case that each 1-view is occupied serially and exclusively by
the single agent: i.e. *at one time and in one place*. Hence in that sense
only a single 1-view can possibly represent me *at that one time and that
one place*. Hoyle shows us how all the copies can indeed come to occupy
each of their relative spatio-temporal locations in the logical
serialisation, but also that *these cannot occur simultaneously*.

The crucial point to bear in mind is that according to Hoyle, both of these
understandings are equally true and *do not contradict each other*.
Furthermore, comp or no comp, they are surely consistent with anything we
would reasonably expect to experience: namely, that whenever sufficiently
accurate copies of our bodies could be made, using whatever method, our
expectation would nevertheless be to find ourselves occupying a single
1-view, representing a subjectively exclusive spatio-temporal location.
Indeed it is that very 1-view which effectively defines the relative
boundaries of any given time and place. Subjective experiences are
temporally and spatially bounded by definition; it is therefore inescapable
that they are mutually exclusive in the 1-view. So what Hoyle's method
achieves here is a clear and important distinction between the notion of
3-synchronisation (i.e. temporal co-location with respect to a publicly
available clock) and that of 1-simultaneity (i.e. the co-occurrence of two
spatio-temporally distinct perspectives within a single, momentary 1-view).
Whereas the former is commonplace and hence to be expected, the latter is
entirely inconsistent with normal experience and hence should not be.

By the way, I shall be on holiday in Sicily from April 20th until May 12th
(one of me only, I trust) so I probably won't be appearing much in the list
during that period.


It seems to me that this is mostly a semantic problem arising from a
mismatch between common language and a theory built on computations
producing "observer moments" or "events of consciousness" or "thoughts".
The theory implies that at a fundamental level there is no "you".  You are
a construct, made of a sequence of experiences.  Bruno's "duplication"
isn't really duplicating something, it's just forking the sequence.  So
talk of 1-person or 3-person is misleading - those are emergent concepts at
a much higher level than computations and even experiences.  They are at a
level where physics has emerged and so it makes sense to talk about where
"you" are.  That's why I tend to emphasize the essential role of an
environment as referent for "thoughts" and I think the material world, even
if not fundamental, is just as fundamental as the mental world.


I don't think I'd take particular issue with any of this. For the record
though, Hoyle's metaphor wasn't specifically about computationalism. In the
novel, the explicit background assumption was a physical multiverse. The
heuristic, as I call it, was Hoyle's view of the relation between that
physical context and the self-localisation of sentient agents in perceptual
time and space. I guess you could call it Everettian with monopsychic
overtones. He also made it clear that this wasn't just a narrative device;
he also took it seriously as a scientist. Anyway, as was indeed its purpose
in Hoyle's story, I hold out the faint hope that it just might help defuse
an otherwise unnecessary misunderstanding and its attendant terminological
wrangles.

David



Brent

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Re: What are atheists for?

[John Clark]

On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 4:30 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:



> Read the paper. Then comment.
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
>


​I read the paper till it got stupid, and then I did comment.

John K Clark​

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Re: What are atheists for?

[Brent Meeker]

On 4/19/2017 10:14 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Apr 18, 2017  Telmo Menezes >wrote:


​>> ​
Ah yes that mythical magical post that you've been talking
about for years, the wonderful post where you logically refute
all my points and make your theory crystal clear with no
circularity or ambiguity, the post that is, unfortunately, as
hard to find
​as ​
the Loch Ness Monster, unicorns,
​or ​
the
​ ​
pot of gold at the end of
​ ​
a
​ ​
rainbow. 



​> ​
You know why it's hard to find? Because every time that post shows
up you:
​ ​
go silent;
wait a certain amount of time;
​ ​
come back to the beginning of the loop.
​ ​
That's why.


​
*BULLSHIT!!* Prove me wrong, find the
​ ​
Loch Ness Monster
​,


Read the paper. Then comment.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html

Brent

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Re: What are atheists for?

[Brent Meeker]

On 4/19/2017 3:56 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 19 April 2017 at 08:24, Bruno Marchal > wrote:


John has never write one clear post refuting the step-3 which
would make it possible to answer by one post. There is no need for
this, as the answer is in the publications, which makes clear the
1-3 distinction, so the ambiguity that John dreams for cannot occur.


​I've often wondered whether Hoyle's heuristic could be a way of 
short-cutting this dispute. Hoyle gives us a way to think about every 
subjective moment as if it occurred within the 1-view of a common 
agent. Essentially the heuristic invites us to think of all subjective 
experiences, aka observer moments, as a single logical serialisation 
in which relative spatial and temporal orientation is internal to each 
moment. In comp terms this conceptual agent might perhaps be the 
virgin (unprogrammed) machine, on the basis that all such machines are 
effectively computationally equivalent. Anyway, in this way of 
thinking, after my 3-duplication there are of course two 3-copies; so 
in the 3-view it can make perfect sense to say that each copy is me 
(i.e. one of my continuations). Hence my expectation in that same 
3-sense is that I will be present in both locations. However, again in 
terms of the heuristic, it is equally the case that each 1-view is 
occupied serially and exclusively by the single agent: i.e. *at one 
time and in one place*. Hence in that sense only a single 1-view can 
possibly represent me *at that one time and that one place*. Hoyle 
shows us how all the copies can indeed come to occupy each of their 
relative spatio-temporal locations in the logical serialisation, but 
also that *these cannot occur simultaneously*.


The crucial point to bear in mind is that according to Hoyle, both of 
these understandings are equally true and *do not contradict each 
other*. Furthermore, comp or no comp, they are surely consistent with 
anything we would reasonably expect to experience: namely, that 
whenever sufficiently accurate copies of our bodies could be made, 
using whatever method, our expectation would nevertheless be to find 
ourselves occupying a single 1-view, representing a subjectively 
exclusive spatio-temporal location. Indeed it is that very 1-view 
which effectively defines the relative boundaries of any given time 
and place. Subjective experiences are temporally and spatially bounded 
by definition; it is therefore inescapable that they are mutually 
exclusive in the 1-view. So what Hoyle's method achieves here is a 
clear and important distinction between the notion of 
3-synchronisation (i.e. temporal co-location with respect to a 
publicly available clock) and that of 1-simultaneity (i.e. the 
co-occurrence of two spatio-temporally distinct perspectives within a 
single, momentary 1-view). Whereas the former is commonplace and hence 
to be expected, the latter is entirely inconsistent with normal 
experience and hence should not be.


By the way, I shall be on holiday in Sicily from April 20th until May 
12th (one of me only, I trust) so I probably won't be appearing much 
in the list during that period.


It seems to me that this is mostly a semantic problem arising from a 
mismatch between common language and a theory built on computations 
producing "observer moments" or "events of consciousness" or 
"thoughts".  The theory implies that at a fundamental level there is no 
"you".  You are a construct, made of a sequence of experiences. Bruno's 
"duplication" isn't really duplicating something, it's just forking the 
sequence.  So talk of 1-person or 3-person is misleading - those are 
emergent concepts at a much higher level than computations and even 
experiences.  They are at a level where physics has emerged and so it 
makes sense to talk about where "you" are.  That's why I tend to 
emphasize the essential role of an environment as referent for 
"thoughts" and I think the material world, even if not fundamental, is 
just as fundamental as the mental world.


Brent

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Re: What are atheists for?

[John Clark]

On Tue, Apr 18, 2017  Telmo Menezes  wrote:

​>> ​
>> Ah yes that mythical magical post that you've been talking about for
>> years, the wonderful post where you logically refute all my points and make
>> your theory crystal clear with no circularity or ambiguity, the post that
>> is, unfortunately, as hard to find
>> ​as ​
>> the Loch Ness Monster, unicorns,
>> ​or ​
>> the
>> ​ ​
>> pot of gold at the end of
>> ​ ​
>> a
>> ​ ​
>> rainbow.
>
>
> ​> ​
> You know why it's hard to find? Because every time that post shows up you:
> ​ ​
> go silent;
> wait a certain amount of time;
> ​ ​
> come back to the beginning of the loop.
> ​ ​
> That's why.


​
*BULLSHIT!!* Prove me wrong, find the
​ ​
Loch Ness Monster
​, find this wonderful post that proves that the personal pronoun "you" can
be used without ambiguity in the future perfect tense even if a "you"
duplicating machine is going to be used on "you" in the future. Show me the
post that explains why the question "what one and only one city will you
see in the future after you have been duplicated?" can have one and only
one answer. And after that show me the magical unicorn of a post that says
which of the two cities "you" end up seeing. Was the one and only one
correct answer Moscow or Washington?

You seem very familiar with this mysterious post that I "go silent" about,
so it shouldn't take you long to find it. I await your reply with
eagerness.

​> ​
> How to talk about first-person experience vs. third-person theory


​You tell me.​


> ​> ​
> with
> ​ ​
> someone who is fixated on pronoun legalese?


​Legalese my ass. If you claim to have a scientific theory you should be
able to clearly explain it without circularity and do it with AT LEAST as
little ambiguity as a lawyer can argue his case at the Supreme Court. The
entire point of Bruno's paper is to explore the relationship between the
first-person experience and the third-person, and yet on page 1 he already
throws around a word like "you" as if the matter has already been settled,
even when "you" is about to walk into a "you" duplicating machine. Bruno is
starting with the very thing he's trying to prove, from page 1 line 1 Bruno
is assuming the "you" duplicating machine can't really duplicate EVERYTHING
about "you" only some of the things.

Bruno assumes that there is some mysterious thing called "1-p you" that
can't be duplicated, the "1-p you" is of course just a euphemism for
"soul". I do admit if one starts with the assumption that the soul exists
then it's easy to conclude the soul exists, but I can find no reason to
doubt a you duplicating machine can duplicate everything about you
including your soul, sorry I meant to say including your 1-p you.

For a proof to be worth anything you need to get more out of it than you
put in, even I can prove that the Ryman hypothesis is true if you let me
start with the assumption that the Ryman hypothesis is true, but that is
unlikely to earn me the Fields Medal.

  John K Clark

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Re: What are atheists for?

[David Nyman]

On 19 April 2017 at 16:48, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 19 Apr 2017, at 12:56, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 19 April 2017 at 08:24, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> John has never write one clear post refuting the step-3 which would make
>> it possible to answer by one post. There is no need for this, as the answer
>> is in the publications, which makes clear the 1-3 distinction, so the
>> ambiguity that John dreams for cannot occur.
>
>
> ​I've often wondered whether Hoyle's heuristic could be a way of
> short-cutting this dispute. Hoyle gives us a way to think about every
> subjective moment as if it occurred within the 1-view of a common agent.
> Essentially the heuristic invites us to think of all subjective
> experiences, aka observer moments, as a single logical serialisation in
> which relative spatial and temporal orientation is internal to each moment.
> In comp terms this conceptual agent might perhaps be the virgin
> (unprogrammed) machine, on the basis that all such machines are effectively
> computationally equivalent.
>
>
> Exactly. With comp you have to fix one universal base to name all the
> other number/program/machine, and their relative states relatively to the
> universal numbers which implements them. The universal numbers are what
> define the relative computations. A computation is only a sequence of
> elementary local deformation, and once a universal sequence of phi_i is
> given, they are parametrised by four numbers some u, and its own sequence
> of phi_u(i,j)^s = phi_i(j)^s (the sth step of the computation by u of the
> program i on the input j).
>
> But Hoyle heuristic does not seem to solve the "prediction" problem, for
> each 1p-views there is an infinity of universal competing universal numbers
> (and thus computations) below the substitution level (and worst: it is
> impossible for the 1p to know its substitution level).
>

​Sure, but I believe the idea is that after the metaphorical "selection"
(i.e. not a real process - more below) of any given 1-view, the "agent"
finds itself immediately 1-relativised to a particular psychological
history. Hence ISTM that, from each 1-view, relative predictions would be
the same as in the usual comp situation. Of course, there is always the
issue of differential measure over the entire class of 1-views. Hoyle's
heuristic imposes a quasi-frequency interpretation of probability for any
finite segment of the serialisation and, in terms of histories, we do
indeed find ourselves (at least psychologically) bounded within some
quasi-finite segment. So I imagine Hoyle would want us to think in terms of
the "most probable" continuations being selected more frequently, whether
these are considered absolutely pre-selection, or relatively post. Of
course the agent is bound to "encounter" 1-views of lower probability, but
then this is ultimately a matter to be resolved in the struggle between
consistent remembering (hardly ever) and inconsistent forgetting (almost
always). One could say that the former are perhaps analogous to the
in-phase, least-action part of Feynman's path integral approach and the
latter with the out-of-phase part.


>
> Anyway, in this way of thinking, after my 3-duplication there are of
> course two 3-copies; so in the 3-view it can make perfect sense to say that
> each copy is me (i.e. one of my continuations). Hence my expectation in
> that same 3-sense is that I will be present in both locations. However,
> again in terms of the heuristic, it is equally the case that each 1-view is
> occupied serially and exclusively by the single agent: i.e. *at one time
> and in one place*. Hence in that sense only a single 1-view can possibly
> represent me *at that one time and that one place*. Hoyle shows us how all
> the copies can indeed come to occupy each of their relative spatio-temporal
> locations in the logical serialisation, but also that *these cannot occur
> simultaneously*.
>
>
> I think it is the indexical view, that Saunders attributes to Everett.
>

​Well, it's clear from the narrative of the novel that Hoyle meant the
1-view.
​

> It is also implicit in Galileo and Einstein relativity theory. With the
> discovery of the universal number in arithmetic, and their executions and
> interaction are described by elementary reasoning, although tedious like I
> have try to give you a gist lately :)
>
>
>
> The crucial point to bear in mind is that according to Hoyle, both of
> these understandings are equally true and *do not contradict each other*.
>
>
> Mechanism would be inconsistent. But even arithmetic and computer science
> would be inconsistent. It would be like the discovery of a program capable
> to predict in advance the specific answer to where its backup will be
> upload in a cut and double paste operation.
>
> In "real life" that is made precise and simple, I think, by the temporary
> definition of the first person by the owner of the personal diary, which
> enter the teleportation box.
>
> In the math, that will be be featu

Re: What are atheists for?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 19 Apr 2017, at 12:56, David Nyman wrote:


On 19 April 2017 at 08:24, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

John has never write one clear post refuting the step-3 which would  
make it possible to answer by one post. There is no need for this,  
as the answer is in the publications, which makes clear the 1-3  
distinction, so the ambiguity that John dreams for cannot occur.


​I've often wondered whether Hoyle's heuristic could be a way of  
short-cutting this dispute. Hoyle gives us a way to think about  
every subjective moment as if it occurred within the 1-view of a  
common agent. Essentially the heuristic invites us to think of all  
subjective experiences, aka observer moments, as a single logical  
serialisation in which relative spatial and temporal orientation is  
internal to each moment. In comp terms this conceptual agent might  
perhaps be the virgin (unprogrammed) machine, on the basis that all  
such machines are effectively computationally equivalent.


Exactly. With comp you have to fix one universal base to name all the  
other number/program/machine, and their relative states relatively to  
the universal numbers which implements them. The universal numbers are  
what define the relative computations. A computation is only a  
sequence of elementary local deformation, and once a universal  
sequence of phi_i is given, they are parametrised by four numbers some  
u, and its own sequence of phi_u(i,j)^s = phi_i(j)^s (the sth step of  
the computation by u of the program i on the input j).


But Hoyle heuristic does not seem to solve the "prediction" problem,  
for each 1p-views there is an infinity of universal competing  
universal numbers (and thus computations) below the substitution level  
(and worst: it is impossible for the 1p to know its substitution level).



Anyway, in this way of thinking, after my 3-duplication there are of  
course two 3-copies; so in the 3-view it can make perfect sense to  
say that each copy is me (i.e. one of my continuations). Hence my  
expectation in that same 3-sense is that I will be present in both  
locations. However, again in terms of the heuristic, it is equally  
the case that each 1-view is occupied serially and exclusively by  
the single agent: i.e. *at one time and in one place*. Hence in that  
sense only a single 1-view can possibly represent me *at that one  
time and that one place*. Hoyle shows us how all the copies can  
indeed come to occupy each of their relative spatio-temporal  
locations in the logical serialisation, but also that *these cannot  
occur simultaneously*.


I think it is the indexical view, that Saunders attributes to Everett.  
It is also implicit in Galileo and Einstein relativity theory. With  
the discovery of the universal number in arithmetic, and their  
executions and interaction are described by elementary reasoning,  
although tedious like I have try to give you a gist lately :)





The crucial point to bear in mind is that according to Hoyle, both  
of these understandings are equally true and *do not contradict each  
other*.


Mechanism would be inconsistent. But even arithmetic and computer  
science would be inconsistent. It would be like the discovery of a  
program capable to predict in advance the specific answer to where its  
backup will be upload in a cut and double paste operation.


In "real life" that is made precise and simple, I think, by the  
temporary definition of the first person by the owner of the personal  
diary, which enter the teleportation box.


In the math, that will be be featured by the difference between "[]p",  
and "[]p & p", with other nuances. They do not contradict each other,  
as G* proves them equivalent on arithmetic, but they obey quite  
different logic. A logic of communicable beliefs about oneself, and a  
logic of informal non communicable personal intuition/knowledge, here  
limited to the rational. "[]p & p" cannot be captured by one box  
definable in arithmetic, we can only meta-define it on simpler machine  
than us that we trust. here you have to introspect yourself if you  
agree or not with the usual axioms I have given (which is really the  
question, did you take your kids back from school when a teacher dares  
to tell them that 2+2=4.




Furthermore, comp or no comp, they are surely consistent with  
anything we would reasonably expect to experience: namely, that  
whenever sufficiently accurate copies of our bodies could be made,  
using whatever method, our expectation would nevertheless be to find  
ourselves occupying a single 1-view, representing a subjectively  
exclusive spatio-temporal location. Indeed it is that very 1-view  
which effectively defines the relative boundaries of any given time  
and place. Subjective experiences are temporally and spatially  
bounded by definition; it is therefore inescapable that they are  
mutually exclusive in the 1-view.


Assuredly.



So what Hoyle's method achieves here is a clear and important  
distinct

Re: What are atheists for?

[David Nyman]

On 19 April 2017 at 08:24, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

John has never write one clear post refuting the step-3 which would make it
> possible to answer by one post. There is no need for this, as the answer is
> in the publications, which makes clear the 1-3 distinction, so the
> ambiguity that John dreams for cannot occur.


​I've often wondered whether Hoyle's heuristic could be a way of
short-cutting this dispute. Hoyle gives us a way to think about every
subjective moment as if it occurred within the 1-view of a common agent.
Essentially the heuristic invites us to think of all subjective
experiences, aka observer moments, as a single logical serialisation in
which relative spatial and temporal orientation is internal to each moment.
In comp terms this conceptual agent might perhaps be the virgin
(unprogrammed) machine, on the basis that all such machines are effectively
computationally equivalent. Anyway, in this way of thinking, after my
3-duplication there are of course two 3-copies; so in the 3-view it can
make perfect sense to say that each copy is me (i.e. one of my
continuations). Hence my expectation in that same 3-sense is that I will be
present in both locations. However, again in terms of the heuristic, it is
equally the case that each 1-view is occupied serially and exclusively by
the single agent: i.e. *at one time and in one place*. Hence in that sense
only a single 1-view can possibly represent me *at that one time and that
one place*. Hoyle shows us how all the copies can indeed come to occupy
each of their relative spatio-temporal locations in the logical
serialisation, but also that *these cannot occur simultaneously*.

The crucial point to bear in mind is that according to Hoyle, both of these
understandings are equally true and *do not contradict each other*.
Furthermore, comp or no comp, they are surely consistent with anything we
would reasonably expect to experience: namely, that whenever sufficiently
accurate copies of our bodies could be made, using whatever method, our
expectation would nevertheless be to find ourselves occupying a single
1-view, representing a subjectively exclusive spatio-temporal location.
Indeed it is that very 1-view which effectively defines the relative
boundaries of any given time and place. Subjective experiences are
temporally and spatially bounded by definition; it is therefore inescapable
that they are mutually exclusive in the 1-view. So what Hoyle's method
achieves here is a clear and important distinction between the notion of
3-synchronisation (i.e. temporal co-location with respect to a publicly
available clock) and that of 1-simultaneity (i.e. the co-occurrence of two
spatio-temporally distinct perspectives within a single, momentary 1-view).
Whereas the former is commonplace and hence to be expected, the latter is
entirely inconsistent with normal experience and hence should not be.

By the way, I shall be on holiday in Sicily from April 20th until May 12th
(one of me only, I trust) so I probably won't be appearing much in the list
during that period.

David

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Re: What are atheists for?

[Telmo Menezes]

Bruno and Quentin,

In my view John is not a troll -- in the sense that I don't think he
is insincere. I think he's an intellectual bully, and I think there
are many of them in the world of academia or otherwise.

I think all the horrible stuff of organized religion does not come
from religion itself. It is just the exploitation of a more
fundamental, and perhaps abstract, human flaw. It's a certain flavour
of close-mindedness that can thrive on any set of ideas. This can be
done with science, it can be done with ideology and we are living in
an era where what I am saying is perhaps all too evident. I would say
that this bad instinct comes when the desire to be right, for status
or for meaning overrides the desire for truth-seeking.

I call John a bully not because he disagrees with Bruno. Blindly
agreeing is not truth-seeking. I call him that because he is
intellectually closed to the possibility that he might be missing
something, and then uses tricks to protect his ego: forced
misunderstanding of words, name-calling, the "peepee" argument and so
on.

To be sure, I admit that I have been guilty in the past of all the
things I am describing above. He are all human.

I agree with Quentin that it is a waste of time to dwell on this topic too much.

I was attracted to this mailing list because it was an environment
where "crazy" ideas where given a chance, and discussed seriously be
interested and interesting people. Such environments are fragile, they
last while they last. If not John, someone else would play the role of
the bully.

I am a bit sad that discussion is now moving to facebook. For sure
it's a way to "escape" and try to recover the freedom, but it is
misguided. Facebook is an algorithmically-controlled environment. I
cannot write a post there and be sure that the people who follow a
certain group will have a chance to read it. That's for facebook to
decide, ultimately based on advertiser-imposed constraints.

Telmo.


On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 9:36 AM, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
> I think you're overthinking it... The motivation of John is clear, plain and
> simple, he is a troll... He likes to contradict, if his contradiction is
> plainly false the better... He has no other motivation than being a troll...
> he must enjoy it that much for doing it since so long.
>
> So don't feed the troll, stop answering him... as he likes it, that can
> continue till death of one of you, you won't make him acknowledge anything
> you say or change his mind... that would presuppose he has one, which is
> very unlikely.
>
> 2017-04-19 9:24 GMT+02:00 Bruno Marchal :
>>
>>
>> On 18 Apr 2017, at 18:10, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 5:48 PM, John Clark  wrote:

 On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 4:27 AM, Bruno Marchal 
 wrote:
>>
>>

>> John Clark has no need to precisely define the word "you" because John
>> Clark has no need to use that or any other personal pronoun to explain
>> John
>> Clark's ideas but instead can simply
>> use a proper noun. By contrast Bruno Marchal can not do that because
>> the
>> inherent ambiguity the word "you" will always have if a "you"
>> duplicating
>> machine is going to be used
>> on "you"
>> in the future is the only thing that disguises the underlying
>> silliness of Bruno Marchal's ideas.
>>
>
>>
> I can do that, I did do that, and you did not answer. I let you find
> the
> post.



 Ah yes that mythical magical post that you've been talking about for
 years,
 the wonderful post where you logically refute all my points and make
 your
 theory crystal clear with no circularity or ambiguity, the post that is,
 unfortunately, as hard to find
 as
 the Loch Ness Monster, unicorns,
 or
 the
 pot of gold at the end of
 a
 rainbow.
>>>
>>>
>>> You know why it's hard to find? Because every time that post shows up
>>> you:
>>>
>>> go silent;
>>> wait a certain amount of time;
>>> come back to the beginning of the loop.
>>>
>>> That's why. It doesn't take an oracle to figure out that this
>>> computation doesn't terminate.
>>>
>>> In any case, the post will never work with you. Natural language is (I
>>> think necessarily) ambiguous, so it is only possible to discuss ideas
>>> if all interlocutors are acting in good faith. The opportunities to
>>> misinterpret anything on purpose are infinite, and you are a master at
>>> taking advantage of them.
>>>
>>> How to talk about first-person experience vs. third-person theory with
>>> someone who is fixated on pronoun legalese? Forget about it -- with no
>>> offense to Bruno -- it's a fool's errand.
>>
>>
>>
>> John was doing a rhetorical maneuver again. The "mythical post" was just
>> the sane04 paper. I was only alluding to the hundreds of post where he did
>> what you describe above, where he introduces an ambiguity in the proper name
>> or pronouns by abstracting from the 1p-

Re: What are atheists for?

[Quentin Anciaux]

I think you're overthinking it... The motivation of John is clear, plain
and simple, he is a troll... He likes to contradict, if his contradiction
is plainly false the better... He has no other motivation than being a
troll... he must enjoy it that much for doing it since so long.

So don't feed the troll, stop answering him... as he likes it, that can
continue till death of one of you, you won't make him acknowledge anything
you say or change his mind... that would presuppose he has one, which is
very unlikely.

2017-04-19 9:24 GMT+02:00 Bruno Marchal :

>
> On 18 Apr 2017, at 18:10, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
> On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 5:48 PM, John Clark  wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 4:27 AM, Bruno Marchal 
>>> wrote:
>>>

>
>>> John Clark has no need to precisely define the word "you" because
> John
> Clark has no need to use that or any other personal pronoun to explain
> John
> Clark's ideas but instead can simply
> use a proper noun. By contrast Bruno Marchal can not do that because
> the
> inherent ambiguity the word "you" will always have if a "you"
> duplicating
> machine is going to be used
> on "you"
> in the future is the only thing that disguises the underlying
> silliness of Bruno Marchal's ideas.
>
>

> I can do that, I did do that, and you did not answer. I let you find
 the
 post.

>>>
>>>
>>> Ah yes that mythical magical post that you've been talking about for
>>> years,
>>> the wonderful post where you logically refute all my points and make your
>>> theory crystal clear with no circularity or ambiguity, the post that is,
>>> unfortunately, as hard to find
>>> as
>>> the Loch Ness Monster, unicorns,
>>> or
>>> the
>>> pot of gold at the end of
>>> a
>>> rainbow.
>>>
>>
>> You know why it's hard to find? Because every time that post shows up you:
>>
>> go silent;
>> wait a certain amount of time;
>> come back to the beginning of the loop.
>>
>> That's why. It doesn't take an oracle to figure out that this
>> computation doesn't terminate.
>>
>> In any case, the post will never work with you. Natural language is (I
>> think necessarily) ambiguous, so it is only possible to discuss ideas
>> if all interlocutors are acting in good faith. The opportunities to
>> misinterpret anything on purpose are infinite, and you are a master at
>> taking advantage of them.
>>
>> How to talk about first-person experience vs. third-person theory with
>> someone who is fixated on pronoun legalese? Forget about it -- with no
>> offense to Bruno -- it's a fool's errand.
>>
>
>
> John was doing a rhetorical maneuver again. The "mythical post" was just
> the sane04 paper. I was only alluding to the hundreds of post where he did
> what you describe above, where he introduces an ambiguity in the proper
> name or pronouns by abstracting from the 1p-3p distinction in the
> duplication experiences, and when someone explained this to him, he
> answered with "peepee" or thing at that level. I was alluding to hundreds
> of posts. John has never write one clear post refuting the step-3 which
> would make it possible to answer by one post. There is no need for this, as
> the answer is in the publications, which makes clear the 1-3 distinction,
> so the ambiguity that John dreams for cannot occur.
>
> It is not innocuous, as John is not the only one doing that. he is the
> only one doing it in front of me, so to speak. But the refusal of my thesis
> in 1998 in Brussels was based on similar maneuver (behind my back though),
> and the disappearance of the Le Monde prize too, and this by the director
> of the thesis in France, which was rather enthusiast at the defense of the
> thesis. That is why I try to understand their motivation. I know the
> motivation in Brussels, but elsewhere it is still a mystery.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>> Telmo.
>>
>> John K Clark
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> --
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>>> "Everything List" group.
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>>>
>>
>> --
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>>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To

Re: What are atheists for?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 18 Apr 2017, at 18:10, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 5:48 PM, John Clark   
wrote:
On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 4:27 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:




John Clark has no need to precisely define the word "you" because  
John
Clark has no need to use that or any other personal pronoun to  
explain John

Clark's ideas but instead can simply
use a proper noun. By contrast Bruno Marchal can not do that  
because the
inherent ambiguity the word "you" will always have if a "you"  
duplicating

machine is going to be used
on "you"
in the future is the only thing that disguises the underlying
silliness of Bruno Marchal's ideas.





I can do that, I did do that, and you did not answer. I let you  
find the

post.



Ah yes that mythical magical post that you've been talking about  
for years,
the wonderful post where you logically refute all my points and  
make your
theory crystal clear with no circularity or ambiguity, the post  
that is,

unfortunately, as hard to find
as
the Loch Ness Monster, unicorns,
or
the
pot of gold at the end of
a
rainbow.


You know why it's hard to find? Because every time that post shows  
up you:


go silent;
wait a certain amount of time;
come back to the beginning of the loop.

That's why. It doesn't take an oracle to figure out that this
computation doesn't terminate.

In any case, the post will never work with you. Natural language is (I
think necessarily) ambiguous, so it is only possible to discuss ideas
if all interlocutors are acting in good faith. The opportunities to
misinterpret anything on purpose are infinite, and you are a master at
taking advantage of them.

How to talk about first-person experience vs. third-person theory with
someone who is fixated on pronoun legalese? Forget about it -- with no
offense to Bruno -- it's a fool's errand.



John was doing a rhetorical maneuver again. The "mythical post" was  
just the sane04 paper. I was only alluding to the hundreds of post  
where he did what you describe above, where he introduces an ambiguity  
in the proper name or pronouns by abstracting from the 1p-3p  
distinction in the duplication experiences, and when someone explained  
this to him, he answered with "peepee" or thing at that level. I was  
alluding to hundreds of posts. John has never write one clear post  
refuting the step-3 which would make it possible to answer by one  
post. There is no need for this, as the answer is in the publications,  
which makes clear the 1-3 distinction, so the ambiguity that John  
dreams for cannot occur.


It is not innocuous, as John is not the only one doing that. he is the  
only one doing it in front of me, so to speak. But the refusal of my  
thesis in 1998 in Brussels was based on similar maneuver (behind my  
back though), and the disappearance of the Le Monde prize too, and  
this by the director of the thesis in France, which was rather  
enthusiast at the defense of the thesis. That is why I try to  
understand their motivation. I know the motivation in Brussels, but  
elsewhere it is still a mystery.


Bruno





Telmo.


John K Clark




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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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