date:20171227




On 12/27/2017 5:21 PM, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:



On Wednesday, December 27, 2017 at 3:43:05 PM UTC-7, Lawrence Crowell 
wrote:


The CMB is composed of radiation with a black body distribution
peaked at around 1000nm. The radiation is now in the microwave
band at about 1 mm wavelength. The IR photons were spread by the
expansion of spacetime by a factor of 1000, and the actual z
factor for the CMB is z = 1100. With the exponential expansion of
the universe this z will increase until the CMB is in the radio
wave band > 1m wavelength, and then eventually expanded beyond the
dimensions of any practical antenna. It will take about 10 billion
years for that to happan.

LC


There's a huge difference between photons falling below our threshold 
of detection, and those which can never reach us because they left 
their source after it had crossed our event horizon. AG


Not really.  From the event horizon they are redshifted to zero energy, 
which is the threshold of detection.  LC isn't talking about some 
current technological limit on detection.


Brent

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Re: Cosmological Red Shift



On Wednesday, December 27, 2017 at 3:43:05 PM UTC-7, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> The CMB is composed of radiation with a black body distribution peaked at 
> around 1000nm. The radiation is now in the microwave band at about 1 mm 
> wavelength. The IR photons were spread by the expansion of spacetime by a 
> factor of 1000, and the actual z factor for the CMB is z = 1100. With the 
> exponential expansion of the universe this z will increase until the CMB is 
> in the radio wave band > 1m wavelength, and then eventually expanded beyond 
> the dimensions of any practical antenna. It will take about 10 billion 
> years for that to happan.
>
> LC
>

There's a huge difference between photons falling below our threshold of 
detection, and those which can never reach us because they left their 
source after it had crossed our event horizon. AG 

>
>
> On Wednesday, December 27, 2017 at 2:17:49 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
> wrote:
>>
>> Since galaxies were formed after the CMB came into existence about 
>> 380,000 years after the BB, and those far away will wink out as they cross 
>> the cosmic horizon, why doesn't the CMB also wink out? I know the latter is 
>> reddening as the cosmos expands, and is ubiquitous, but when the question 
>> was posed to me last night at a meeting in Pasadena with former JPL 
>> colleagues, I didn't have a good answer. TIA, AG
>>
>

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Re: Cosmological Red Shift

2017-12-27 Thread Lawrence Crowell

The CMB is composed of radiation with a black body distribution peaked at 
around 1000nm. The radiation is now in the microwave band at about 1 mm 
wavelength. The IR photons were spread by the expansion of spacetime by a 
factor of 1000, and the actual z factor for the CMB is z = 1100. With the 
exponential expansion of the universe this z will increase until the CMB is 
in the radio wave band > 1m wavelength, and then eventually expanded beyond 
the dimensions of any practical antenna. It will take about 10 billion 
years for that to happan.

LC

On Wednesday, December 27, 2017 at 2:17:49 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
wrote:
>
> Since galaxies were formed after the CMB came into existence about 380,000 
> years after the BB, and those far away will wink out as they cross the 
> cosmic horizon, why doesn't the CMB also wink out? I know the latter is 
> reddening as the cosmos expands, and is ubiquitous, but when the question 
> was posed to me last night at a meeting in Pasadena with former JPL 
> colleagues, I didn't have a good answer. TIA, AG
>

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Re: What falsifiability tests has computationalism passed?

2017-12-27 Thread Lawrence Crowell

Computationalism is not something that is falsified any more than the 
mathematics employed in a theory are falsifiable. Computationalism is just 
the statement that certain physical processes are computations. Feynman 
diagrams describing the interactions of elementary particles involve 
particles exchanging each other according to Lie algebraic roots. In a 
sense this is a sort of computation. The physics is then modeled as a type 
of computation. There is nothing empirically testable about using this as a 
model idea. We can show that a particular computational model is false, but 
the idea that computation as a systematic approach to modeling is not 
testable.

LC

On Wednesday, December 27, 2017 at 1:18:30 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
> Bruno has often spoken of the confirmations of computationalism known to 
> date, and of the idea that it has passed many tests and not been falsified 
> so far.  I was hoping with this post to gather a complete list of those 
> tests.  What things in physics would disprove computationalism, and what 
> tests has it passed so far?  Below I try to collect a complete list from 
> memory but it may be faulty.  I ask that others might add to this list or 
> correct things I have gotten wrong:
>
> Tests and statuses of each test:
>
>- Non-emulability of physical laws
>   - Non-discreteness (continuousness) of space time --- (somewhat 
>   confirmed 
>   
>   )
>   - Infinite computation needed for tiniest amount of space --- (mostly 
>   confirmed 
>   
> 
>   )
>- Quantum Mechanics
>   - Uncertainty principal (inability to collect exact and complete 
>   knowledge about environment) --- (confirmed 
>   )
>   - Indeterminancy --- (appearance of randomness is confirmed 
>   , explanation 
>   for being an "appearance only" i.e. first person indeterminancy vs. 
>   fundamental randomness is made is plausible 
>   )
>   - Born Rule?
>   - Quantization of Energy?
>   - Unitarity
>- General Physics (I am not sure if these are required by 
>computationalism, and could use some more help on these)
>   - Linearity of physical laws?
>   - Time reversibility?
>   - Conservation of Information? (e.g. black hole information paradox)
>   - Finite Description of Quantum States (e.g. Bekenstein Bound 
>   )
>   - Link between Entropy and Information (e.g. Landauer's Principle 
>   )
>   - Existence of a "Time" dimension?
>- Consciousness
>   - Qualia - The non-communicable nature of some observations ?
>   - Finiteness - (finite memory / age / information content of 
>   experience)?
>
> Are there other things I am missing?  If any of the items I have included 
> are incorrect I would greatly appreciate any correction and further insight.
>
> Perhaps most interesting are any predictions which are presently 
> unconfirmed, as this would lead to predictions which could later be tested 
> and lead to a refutation of computationalism (or if passed, yield further 
> evidence for computationalism).
>
> Jason
>

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Re: What falsifiability tests has computationalism passed?

So you think Bruno's theory fails because spacetime is discrete?

However, gamma ray propagation from distant supernova show no
dispersion, which implies that spacetime is smooth to severl orders of
magnitude below the Planck scale.

But either way the physics a cannot be compared to Bruno's theory
because his theory makes not definite prediction even about the
existence of spacetime.

Brent

On 12/27/2017 1:22 PM, 'scerir' via Everything List wrote:

Brent wrote:
A good idea, but I don't see that these "predictions" of computationalism have
actually been derived. I think most of them are aspirational. For example, what is the
proof that spacetime is continuous - in fact what is the proof there is such a thing as
spacetime?

Actually Einstein wrote: "reality cannot at all be represented by a continuous
field." (The Meaning of Relativity, Princeton Science Library, 1988, p. 160). In a
letter to Hans Walter Dällenbach (1916) Einstein also wrote: “But you have correctly
grasped the drawback that the continuum brings. If the molecular view of matter is the
correct (appropriate) one, i.e., if a part of the universe is to be represented by a
finite number of moving points, then the continuum of the present theory contains too
great a manifold of possibilities. I also believe that this too great is responsible for
the fact that our present means of description miscarry with the quantum theory. The
problem seems to me how one can formulate statements about a discontinuum without calling
upon a continuum (space-time) as an aid; the latter should be banned from the theory as a
supplementary construction not justified by the essence of the problem, which corresponds
to nothing “real”. But we still lack the mathematical structure unfortunately. How much
have I already plagued myself in this way!”.

Re: Cosmological Red Shift




On 12/27/2017 1:22 PM, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:



On Wednesday, December 27, 2017 at 8:57:46 PM UTC, Brent wrote:

Even as the universe expands there will still be a part of it
which was close enough to us (in the distant past) that it is
still within our visible universe.

Brent


CMIIAW, but our galaxy formed a long time AFTER the time of 
recombination,


But if you look at a spacetime diagram of the evolution of the universe 
(c.f. Ned Wright's UCLA tutorial online) it's obvious that there is a 
piece of the CMB that was at the same place as the place our galaxy 
formed, using stationarity of the CMB as the reference frame.


Brent

so it's not obvious why the CMB doesn't wink out like the distant 
galaxies which are not in our vicinity, like Andromeda. AG



On 12/27/2017 12:17 PM, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:

Since galaxies were formed after the CMB came into existence
about 380,000 years after the BB, and those far away will wink
out as they cross the cosmic horizon, why doesn't the CMB also
wink out? I know the latter is reddening as the cosmos expands,
and is ubiquitous, but when the question was posed to me last
night at a meeting in Pasadena with former JPL colleagues, I
didn't have a good answer. TIA, AG
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Re: Cosmological Red Shift

2017-12-27 Thread Bruce Kellett


The CMB originated everywhere-- including where you are standing right now!

Bruce

On 28/12/2017 8:22 am, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:


On Wednesday, December 27, 2017 at 8:57:46 PM UTC, Brent wrote:

Even as the universe expands there will still be a part of it
which was close enough to us (in the distant past) that it is
still within our visible universe.

Brent


CMIIAW, but our galaxy formed a long time AFTER the time of 
recombination, so it's not obvious why the CMB doesn't wink out like 
the distant galaxies which are not in our vicinity, like Andromeda. AG



On 12/27/2017 12:17 PM, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:

Since galaxies were formed after the CMB came into existence
about 380,000 years after the BB, and those far away will wink
out as they cross the cosmic horizon, why doesn't the CMB also
wink out? I know the latter is reddening as the cosmos expands,
and is ubiquitous, but when the question was posed to me last
night at a meeting in Pasadena with former JPL colleagues, I
didn't have a good answer. TIA, AG




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Re: What falsifiability tests has computationalism passed?

2017-12-27 Thread 'scerir' via Everything List


Brent wrote:
A good idea, but I don't see that these "predictions" of computationalism have 
actually been derived.  I think most of them are aspirational.  For example, 
what is the proof that spacetime is continuous - in fact what is the proof 
there is such a thing as spacetime?

Actually Einstein wrote: "reality cannot at all be represented by a continuous 
field." (The Meaning of Relativity, Princeton Science Library, 1988, p. 160). 
In a letter to Hans Walter Dällenbach (1916) Einstein also wrote: “But you have 
correctly grasped the drawback that the continuum brings. If the molecular view 
of matter is the correct (appropriate) one, i.e., if a part of the universe is 
to be represented by a finite number of moving points, then the continuum of 
the present theory contains too great a manifold of possibilities. I also 
believe that this too great is responsible for the fact that our present means 
of description miscarry with the quantum theory. The problem seems to me how 
one can formulate statements about a discontinuum without calling upon a 
continuum (space-time) as an aid; the latter should be banned from the theory 
as a supplementary construction not justified by the essence of the problem, 
which corresponds to nothing “real”. But we still lack the mathematical 
structure unfortunately. How much have I already plagued myself in this way!”. 

See also http://holometer.fnal.gov/

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Re: Cosmological Red Shift



On Wednesday, December 27, 2017 at 8:57:46 PM UTC, Brent wrote:
>
> Even as the universe expands there will still be a part of it which was 
> close enough to us (in the distant past) that it is still within our 
> visible universe.
>
> Brent
>

CMIIAW, but our galaxy formed a long time AFTER the time of recombination, 
so it's not obvious why the CMB doesn't wink out like the distant galaxies 
which are not in our vicinity, like Andromeda. AG 

>
> On 12/27/2017 12:17 PM, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
> Since galaxies were formed after the CMB came into existence about 380,000 
> years after the BB, and those far away will wink out as they cross the 
> cosmic horizon, why doesn't the CMB also wink out? I know the latter is 
> reddening as the cosmos expands, and is ubiquitous, but when the question 
> was posed to me last night at a meeting in Pasadena with former JPL 
> colleagues, I didn't have a good answer. TIA, AG
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Re: Cosmological Red Shift

Even as the universe expands there will still be a part of it which was 
close enough to us (in the distant past) that it is still within our 
visible universe.


Brent

On 12/27/2017 12:17 PM, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
Since galaxies were formed after the CMB came into existence about 
380,000 years after the BB, and those far away will wink out as they 
cross the cosmic horizon, why doesn't the CMB also wink out? I know 
the latter is reddening as the cosmos expands, and is ubiquitous, but 
when the question was posed to me last night at a meeting in Pasadena 
with former JPL colleagues, I didn't have a good answer. TIA, AG

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Re: What falsifiability tests has computationalism passed?




On 12/27/2017 12:44 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 27 Dec 2017, at 17:56, John Clark wrote:


Computationalism is the idea that the brain is an
 
information processing system and that a computer
 
can
 
perform all the complex behaviors that would be called intelligent if 
it were done by a human;


That is not computationalism. That is the weak AI thesis.

The strong AI thesis is that such machine would be conscious, and 
computationalism is the even stronger assumption that "I am machine" 
and that I would survive in the clinical usual mundane 1p sense with a 
copy made at some right substitution level. But then I get 
undetermined by the fact that no digital machine can ever determine 
which machines she is,


Suppose she is provided with the design drawings etc used to build her.  
Then she can point to them and say, "That is what machine I am."  And 
she could even write an emulation of herself to predict what she would 
think.


Brent

nor which computations support her in arithmetic. But relative measure 
makes still sense, and would justify the appearance of the physical 
laws from the arithmetical internal pov.



Note that I use the term computationalism also in a weaker sense:  as 
the "brain" is any portion of the physical universe which could be 
needed for this behavior+consciousness.



That nuance between weak AI/ and computationalism is of course quite 
important to understand the mind-body problem, and its embryonic 
computationalist solution. Obviously Weak AI thesis cannot handle the 
hard problem (which is the mind-body problem).






computationalism does NOT insist that everything is information 
processing




It is not part of the assumption. Indeed.





(although it does not rule out that possibility).



Actually, computationalism  implies it, (but you need to grasp UDA 
step 3  and sequel to get this).


Then without step 3, you can still use just the weak AI thesis to get 
that the machine will behave like understanding that physics is 
derivable from a consciousness theory, but logically, you are free to 
make them into zombie. Again, such nuances are important in philosophy 
of mind, metaphysics, etc.







If
 
a
n 
AI is made that is as smart or smarter than humans then we'll know 
it's right,


That is the weak-AI thesis. But we will evaluate relative competence only.




if that proved to be impossible then we'll know computationalism
 
is wrong.


OK.

That would be the case if the material hypostases get quite different 
from the logic of the observable inferred from observation.





Most of the things on your list, although very interesting in 
themselves, are irrelevant as far as the truth or falsehood of

 
computationalism
 
is concerned. For example, maybe we can't make perfect predictions of 
what physical systems will do because an infinite number o

f
calculations would be needed and that would be impossible, or maybe a 
finite but astronomically large number of calculations would be 
needed and that would be impractical, or maybe calculations have 
nothing to do with it and some effects have no cause and true 
randomness exists;

 
it doesn't matter because for whatever reason the fact remains that 
the human mind can't

 
predict with perfect precision
 
what
 
a physical system will do.


And
 
computationalism
 
has a lot to say about intelligent behavior but it has nothing to say 
about consciousness,

 
no scientific theory does because we all only have direct access to 
one conscious being and good science

 
can't be done with just one data point
,
and any argument in support
 
of the proposition that a computer that behaves intelligently is not 
conscious could also be used in support of the proposition that none of

our

fellow intelligent behaving human beings are conscious.



I am a machine, in the strong computationalist sense, entails that 
neither the physical reality, nor the bio-psycho-theo-logical reality 
can be 100% computable.


So, computationalism is different from digital physics (the belief 
that the physical universe is itself a computable object). I have 
given reasons that digital physics is inconsistent (with or withput 
computationalism).


The non computability of the individual prediction in QM confirms the 
existence of the global First Person Indeterminacy on infinities of 
computations in arithmetic.


Bruno






 
John K Clark




On Wed, Dec 27, 2017 at 2:18 AM, Jason Resch > wrote:


Bruno has often spoken of the confirmations of computationalism
known to date, and of the idea that it has passed many tests and
not been falsified so far.  I was hoping with this post to gather
a complete list of those tests.  What things in physics would
disprove computationalism, and what tests has it passed so far? 
Below I try to collect a complete list from memory but i

Re: What falsifiability tests has computationalism passed?



On 27 Dec 2017, at 20:02, Brent Meeker wrote:

A good idea, but I don't see that these "predictions" of  
computationalism have actually been derived.  I think most of them  
are aspirational.  For example, what is the proof that spacetime is  
continuous - in fact what is the proof there is such a thing as  
spacetime?


Yes, space-time is not yet there. It needs (I can argue) the right  
Temperley-Lieb coupling between variants of the proximity algebra  
given by the arithmetical quantization. That is for the next  
generation to solve or to refute computationalism, and improved our  
theory of mind. But we know already that the theology (and thus the  
physics) is invariant for the addition of oracles, and Löbianity  
appears to be quite sticky for the self-referential creatures.


Bruno




Brent

On 12/26/2017 11:18 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
Bruno has often spoken of the confirmations of computationalism  
known to date, and of the idea that it has passed many tests and  
not been falsified so far.  I was hoping with this post to gather a  
complete list of those tests.  What things in physics would  
disprove computationalism, and what tests has it passed so far?   
Below I try to collect a complete list from memory but it may be  
faulty.  I ask that others might add to this list or correct things  
I have gotten wrong:


Tests and statuses of each test:
Non-emulability of physical laws
Non-discreteness (continuousness) of space time --- (somewhat  
confirmed)
Infinite computation needed for tiniest amount of space --- (mostly  
confirmed)

Quantum Mechanics
Uncertainty principal (inability to collect exact and complete  
knowledge about environment) --- (confirmed)
Indeterminancy --- (appearance of randomness is confirmed,  
explanation for being an "appearance only" i.e. first person  
indeterminancy vs. fundamental randomness is made is plausible)

Born Rule?
Quantization of Energy?
Unitarity
General Physics (I am not sure if these are required by  
computationalism, and could use some more help on these)

Linearity of physical laws?
Time reversibility?
Conservation of Information? (e.g. black hole information paradox)
Finite Description of Quantum States (e.g. Bekenstein Bound)
Link between Entropy and Information (e.g. Landauer's Principle)
Existence of a "Time" dimension?
Consciousness
Qualia - The non-communicable nature of some observations ?
Finiteness - (finite memory / age / information content of  
experience)?
Are there other things I am missing?  If any of the items I have  
included are incorrect I would greatly appreciate any correction  
and further insight.


Perhaps most interesting are any predictions which are presently  
unconfirmed, as this would lead to predictions which could later be  
tested and lead to a refutation of computationalism (or if passed,  
yield further evidence for computationalism).


Jason
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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: What falsifiability tests has computationalism passed?



On 27 Dec 2017, at 17:56, John Clark wrote:

Computationalism is the idea that the brain is an information  
processing system and that a computer can perform all the  
complex behaviors that would be called intelligent if it were done  
by a human;


That is not computationalism. That is the weak AI thesis.

The strong AI thesis is that such machine would be conscious, and  
computationalism is the even stronger assumption that "I am machine"  
and that I would survive in the clinical usual mundane 1p sense with a  
copy made at some right substitution level. But then I get  
undetermined by the fact that no digital machine can ever determine  
which machines she is, nor which computations support her in  
arithmetic. But relative measure makes still sense, and would justify  
the appearance of the physical laws from the arithmetical internal pov.



Note that I use the term computationalism also in a weaker sense:  as  
the "brain" is any portion of the physical universe which could be  
needed for this behavior+consciousness.



That nuance between weak AI/ and computationalism is of course quite  
important to understand the mind-body problem, and its embryonic  
computationalist solution. Obviously Weak AI thesis cannot handle the  
hard problem (which is the mind-body problem).






computationalism does NOT insist that everything is information  
processing


It is not part of the assumption. Indeed.




(although it does not rule out that possibility).


Actually, computationalism  implies it, (but you need to grasp UDA  
step 3  and sequel to get this).


Then without step 3, you can still use just the weak AI thesis to get  
that the machine will behave like understanding that physics is  
derivable from a consciousness theory, but logically, you are free to  
make them into zombie. Again, such nuances are important in philosophy  
of mind, metaphysics, etc.





If an AI is made that is as smart or smarter than  
humans then we'll know it's right,


That is the weak-AI thesis. But we will evaluate relative competence  
only.




if that proved to be impossible then we'll know  
computationalism is wrong.


OK.

That would be the case if the material hypostases get quite different  
from the logic of the observable inferred from observation.





Most of the things on your list, although very interesting in  
themselves, are irrelevant as far as the truth or falsehood of  
computationalism is concerned. For example, maybe we can't make  
perfect predictions of what physical systems will do because an  
infinite number of calculations would be needed and that would  
be impossible, or maybe a finite but astronomically large number of  
calculations would be needed and that would be impractical, or maybe  
calculations have nothing to do with it and some effects have no  
cause and true randomness exists; it doesn't matter because for  
whatever reason the fact remains that the human mind can't  
predict with perfect precision what a physical system  
will do.


And computationalism has a lot to say about  
intelligent behavior but it has nothing to say about  
consciousness, no scientific theory does because we all only  
have direct access to one conscious being and good science  
can't be done with just one data point, and any argument in  
support of the proposition that a computer that behaves  
intelligently is not conscious could also be used in support of the  
proposition that none of our fellow intelligent behaving  
human beings are conscious.



I am a machine, in the strong computationalist sense, entails that  
neither the physical reality, nor the bio-psycho-theo-logical reality  
can be 100% computable.


So, computationalism is different from digital physics (the belief  
that the physical universe is itself a computable object). I have  
given reasons that digital physics is inconsistent (with or withput  
computationalism).


The non computability of the individual prediction in QM confirms the  
existence of the global First Person Indeterminacy on infinities of  
computations in arithmetic.


Bruno






 John K Clark



On Wed, Dec 27, 2017 at 2:18 AM, Jason Resch   
wrote:


Bruno has often spoken of the confirmations of computationalism  
known to date, and of the idea that it has passed many tests and not  
been falsified so far.  I was hoping with this post to gather a  
complete list of those tests.  What things in physics would disprove  
computationalism, and what tests has it passed so far?  Below I try  
to collect a complete list from memory but it may be faulty.  I ask  
that others might add to this list or correct things I have gotten  
wrong:


Tests and statuses of each test:
Non-emulability of physical laws
Non-discreteness (continuousness) of space time --- (somewhat  
confirmed)
Infinite computation needed for tiniest amount of space --- (mostly

Re: Cosmological Red Shift

Since galaxies were formed after the CMB came into existence about 380,000 
years after the BB, and those far away will wink out as they cross the 
cosmic horizon, why doesn't the CMB also wink out? I know the latter is 
reddening as the cosmos expands, and is ubiquitous, but when the question 
was posed to me last night at a meeting in Pasadena with former JPL 
colleagues, I didn't have a good answer. TIA, AG

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Re: What falsifiability tests has computationalism passed?



On 27 Dec 2017, at 08:18, Jason Resch wrote:

Bruno has often spoken of the confirmations of computationalism  
known to date, and of the idea that it has passed many tests and not  
been falsified so far.  I was hoping with this post to gather a  
complete list of those tests.  What things in physics would disprove  
computationalism, and what tests has it passed so far?  Below I try  
to collect a complete list from memory but it may be faulty.  I ask  
that others might add to this list or correct things I have gotten  
wrong:


Tests and statuses of each test:
Non-emulability of physical laws
Non-discreteness (continuousness) of space time --- (somewhat  
confirmed)
Infinite computation needed for tiniest amount of space --- (mostly  
confirmed)

Quantum Mechanics
Uncertainty principal (inability to collect exact and complete  
knowledge about environment) --- (confirmed)
Indeterminancy --- (appearance of randomness is confirmed,  
explanation for being an "appearance only" i.e. first person  
indeterminancy vs. fundamental randomness is made is plausible)

Born Rule?
Quantization of Energy?
Unitarity
General Physics (I am not sure if these are required by  
computationalism, and could use some more help on these)

Linearity of physical laws?
Time reversibility?
Conservation of Information? (e.g. black hole information paradox)
Finite Description of Quantum States (e.g. Bekenstein Bound)
Link between Entropy and Information (e.g. Landauer's Principle)
Existence of a "Time" dimension?
Consciousness
Qualia - The non-communicable nature of some observations ?
Finiteness - (finite memory / age / information content of  
experience)?
Are there other things I am missing?  If any of the items I have  
included are incorrect I would greatly appreciate any correction and  
further insight.


Perhaps most interesting are any predictions which are presently  
unconfirmed, as this would lead to predictions which could later be  
tested and lead to a refutation of computationalism (or if passed,  
yield further evidence for computationalism).


This would deserve a long detailed answer, and when there is more time  
for me I could do that, although it can, thanks to Solovay theorems,  
quickly be encapsulated technically. To test the consequence of  
digital mechanism, alias computationalism,  you need to compare the  
physics inferred from observation with the physics "in the head of the  
machine", that is the one which UDA defines a probability 1 for the  
events true in all consistent computational continuations (cf step 3 +  
the coffee-cup promised at both end). So the measure one must be  
defined by []p & p, or at the least []p & <>t, with p obtained by an  
halting computational process (which mimic in some way all non  
terminating one), and that is obtained by restraining the arithmetical  
interpretation of the atomic sentences on the sigma_1 proposition. Up  
to now this is tested as the three variants []p&p, []p&<>t and  
[]p&<>t&p obeys some (different) modal quantum logic. By reversing a  
transformation due to Goldblatt we get quantum logics for three modes  
of self-references (knowability, observability, and sensibility), and  
two of them split along truth/provability, justifying the difference  
between quanta and qualia (except that quanta happens to exist in the  
first person plural part, which imposes the "many-world" aspect of  
physics formally (as we do have it intuitively already when we grasp  
that all computations are emulated in Arithmetic.


In my PhD thesis I am wrong when I say that []p&p collapse on p  
sigma_1. It does not, and it does also provide a quantum logic,  
confirming a point by Plotinus, linking the enlightened universal soul  
directly to matter, as someone said, the soul has already a foot on  
the terrestrial plane in Plotinus Platonism.


Note that the very existence of physical laws and its mathematical  
aspect confirms also already Mechanism, and it is the believer in a  
primary physical reality which have to explain their theory of minds,  
and of matter, and how that matter select the computations which all  
exists (even provably in RA).


If S4Grz1, X1*, and Z1* differ too much from empirical quantum logic,  
that would be an evidence for primary matter, but up to now, we don't  
find any, but then such logic are not easily tractable, and we have to  
expect them to be quantum speedable. The FPI is confirmed, the non- 
cloning, the appearance of some continuum, the non booleanity of the  
observable, the many world, and neoplatonist theology, etc.


We must dig on the arithmetical semi-computable hypostases. But for  
this people must learn mathematical logic and its relation with  
computer science.


Of course, an empirical confirmation is always an infinite process. If  
mechanism is true, we will never rationally know that.


Bruno




Jason

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Re: did Jesus exist




Thinking about all this, here is a recent publication of mine, which  
is relevant. I do have a beginning of understanding of the "machine  
enlightenment" process, and here I was asked to talk on the Western  
and Eastern spiritual approaches, and explain this with some more  
details.


I think it is free up to february 2018.

 B. Marchal. The East, the West and the universal machine, Progress  
in Biophysics and Molecular Biology Volume 131, December 2017, Pages  
251-260


https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S007961071730130X


Bruno



On 27 Dec 2017, at 20:17, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 27 Dec 2017, at 00:30, Brent Meeker wrote:

But were there many persons and many events, each one mythically  
embellished, and merged into one?



Forty years ago, some scholars have discussed the existence of  
Jesus, and the mainstream reaction was that the existence of Jesus  
was rather well verified. I have not follow this since, and I am not  
much interested in such question, as they have few relevance with  
mathematical theology, except as possible example of illumination,  
and the misunderstanding of disciples.


My guess is that Jesus is just one among infinitely many Löbian  
machine introspecting itself enough to experience, in a deeply  
altered state of consciousness; the transcendence of Truth.


He might have said "I am the son of God", like a Salvia divinorum  
smoker can say "I am the daughter of Salvia", say. As the experience  
is related with the non justifiable non definable, the wiser stay  
mute, but some talk, and the problem is when people interpret them  
literally.


I translate in arithmetic "God exist", or "a Reality exist" by  
Consistency:  ~[]f, that is <>t. In logic Consistency of a machine/ 
theory/word/number is equivalent with the exist of a model which  
satisfies, in some sense, the machine/theory/word/number. In modal  
logic <>t means that some truth (t) is in some accessible world, or  
that we are not in a cul-de-sac world.


The mystic discovers and explores its own G*. It is like God given  
to him/her/it the elementary non-provable/non-communicable/non- 
assumable truth:


<>t
~[]<>t
<><>t
<>[]f
<>[]<>f
etc.

And the "literal reading" of this leads quickly to inconsistency,  
given that the machine does not need god to prove <>t -> ~[]<>t, but  
as God told them <>t, they forget ~[]<>t, and then people assumed or  
take for granted <>t, and well God disappears, and you get in the,  
alas consistent, lying mode []f, a cul-de-sac world where nothing is  
consistent and everything is necessary.


In the theology of machines there is no prophets, but there are  
machines with variate degrees of enlightenment, and logical wiseness  
to be able to use with caution. In the ideal case they are mute on  
this. Or prophets are re-interpreted by people doing a mystical  
experience forgetting the "11th commandment", the "~[]<>t", "all  
this is for personal use, don"t tell the others", etc. Without  
document, it is hard to evaluate if the responsibility of the  
blasphemy of literalism is in the mystics (inspiring the religion)  
or in the disciples. The greeks up to Plotinus, despite its mystical  
experiences and the importance he attributes to such experience,  
will subdue theology to rationality, but some late neoplatonists  
will insist on theurgy and rituals, perhaps to imitate or survive  
with the growing attraction to the "christian?" quickly developing  
religion.


We can also study mathematically, once we agree with Church, or  
Turing, ..., what a (platonist) machine can prove, and not prove  
about itself. Platonist means here that the machine believes/asserts/ 
agrees with classical logic. From Gödel 1931 to Löb 1955 to Solovay  
1976, etc.


Actually a machine can do two things with <>t, as well as with []f,  
it can apply it as a self-referential axiom, and it that case the  
one saying <>t becomes inconsistent and the one saying []f becomes  
unsound (a liar), or the machine can take the "arithmetical content  
of it" as a new axiom, in which case the machine remains consistent  
and get its ability sped up on infinitely many inputs.


There is no problem with theories. There is only problem with dogma,  
and some are old remnant of long histories, some are not conscious,  
and that is why some look for some experience which can shake them  
enough to be able to put doubt on the old unconscious prejudice.


I am Huxleyan, I like his Philosophia Perennis, and tend to believe  
that all religion have the same fundamental core, its mystical root,  
shared by the universal mind, i.e. the mind of the universal  
(Löbian) machine.
When a religion is institutionaliozed and get literalist, it becomes  
a system preventing any authentical research, it is an fabric of  
atheism made by de facto disbelievers for special interests: it is  
in the "[]f" mode.


Bruno









Brent

On 12/26/2017 9:38 AM, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
Revisionist BS by Anne

Re: did Jesus exist



On 27 Dec 2017, at 00:30, Brent Meeker wrote:

But were there many persons and many events, each one mythically  
embellished, and merged into one?



Forty years ago, some scholars have discussed the existence of Jesus,  
and the mainstream reaction was that the existence of Jesus was rather  
well verified. I have not follow this since, and I am not much  
interested in such question, as they have few relevance with  
mathematical theology, except as possible example of illumination, and  
the misunderstanding of disciples.


My guess is that Jesus is just one among infinitely many Löbian  
machine introspecting itself enough to experience, in a deeply altered  
state of consciousness; the transcendence of Truth.


He might have said "I am the son of God", like a Salvia divinorum  
smoker can say "I am the daughter of Salvia", say. As the experience  
is related with the non justifiable non definable, the wiser stay  
mute, but some talk, and the problem is when people interpret them  
literally.


I translate in arithmetic "God exist", or "a Reality exist" by  
Consistency:  ~[]f, that is <>t. In logic Consistency of a machine/ 
theory/word/number is equivalent with the exist of a model which  
satisfies, in some sense, the machine/theory/word/number. In modal  
logic <>t means that some truth (t) is in some accessible world, or  
that we are not in a cul-de-sac world.


The mystic discovers and explores its own G*. It is like God given to  
him/her/it the elementary non-provable/non-communicable/non-assumable  
truth:


<>t
~[]<>t
<><>t
<>[]f
<>[]<>f
etc.

And the "literal reading" of this leads quickly to inconsistency,  
given that the machine does not need god to prove <>t -> ~[]<>t, but  
as God told them <>t, they forget ~[]<>t, and then people assumed or  
take for granted <>t, and well God disappears, and you get in the,  
alas consistent, lying mode []f, a cul-de-sac world where nothing is  
consistent and everything is necessary.


In the theology of machines there is no prophets, but there are  
machines with variate degrees of enlightenment, and logical wiseness  
to be able to use with caution. In the ideal case they are mute on  
this. Or prophets are re-interpreted by people doing a mystical  
experience forgetting the "11th commandment", the "~[]<>t", "all this  
is for personal use, don"t tell the others", etc. Without document, it  
is hard to evaluate if the responsibility of the blasphemy of  
literalism is in the mystics (inspiring the religion) or in the  
disciples. The greeks up to Plotinus, despite its mystical experiences  
and the importance he attributes to such experience, will subdue  
theology to rationality, but some late neoplatonists will insist on  
theurgy and rituals, perhaps to imitate or survive with the growing  
attraction to the "christian?" quickly developing religion.


We can also study mathematically, once we agree with Church, or  
Turing, ..., what a (platonist) machine can prove, and not prove about  
itself. Platonist means here that the machine believes/asserts/agrees  
with classical logic. From Gödel 1931 to Löb 1955 to Solovay 1976, etc.


Actually a machine can do two things with <>t, as well as with []f, it  
can apply it as a self-referential axiom, and it that case the one  
saying <>t becomes inconsistent and the one saying []f becomes unsound  
(a liar), or the machine can take the "arithmetical content of it" as  
a new axiom, in which case the machine remains consistent and get its  
ability sped up on infinitely many inputs.


There is no problem with theories. There is only problem with dogma,  
and some are old remnant of long histories, some are not conscious,  
and that is why some look for some experience which can shake them  
enough to be able to put doubt on the old unconscious prejudice.


I am Huxleyan, I like his Philosophia Perennis, and tend to believe  
that all religion have the same fundamental core, its mystical root,  
shared by the universal mind, i.e. the mind of the universal (Löbian)  
machine.
When a religion is institutionaliozed and get literalist, it becomes a  
system preventing any authentical research, it is an fabric of atheism  
made by de facto disbelievers for special interests: it is in the  
"[]f" mode.


Bruno









Brent

On 12/26/2017 9:38 AM, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
Revisionist BS by Anne O'Reilly? You can attribute it to the author  
without being subject to crucifixion. So there was no Jesus, no  
disciples, no Last Supper, no throwing money changers out of the  
Temple, no Paul who knew the disciples, no women who found the tomb  
empty, no Mary, no Joseph, no Peter who was crucified upside down  
in Rome? Obviously there's mythical embellishment, but the model of  
no person at the heart of the story is a huge stretch and IMO  
unjustified. AG


On Tuesday, December 26, 2017 at 3:51:33 PM UTC, Lawrence Crowell  
wrote:

Written to somebody else:

Jesus as portrayed in the Gospels most lik

Re: What falsifiability tests has computationalism passed?

A good idea, but I don't see that these "predictions" of 
computationalism have actually been derived.  I think most of them are 
aspirational.  For example, what is the proof that spacetime is 
continuous - in fact what is the proof there is such a thing as spacetime?


Brent

On 12/26/2017 11:18 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
Bruno has often spoken of the confirmations of computationalism known 
to date, and of the idea that it has passed many tests and not been 
falsified so far.  I was hoping with this post to gather a complete 
list of those tests.  What things in physics would disprove 
computationalism, and what tests has it passed so far?  Below I try to 
collect a complete list from memory but it may be faulty.  I ask that 
others might add to this list or correct things I have gotten wrong:


Tests and statuses of each test:

  * Non-emulability of physical laws
  o Non-discreteness (continuousness) of space time --- (somewhat
confirmed
)
  o Infinite computation needed for tiniest amount of space ---
(mostly confirmed

)
  * Quantum Mechanics
  o Uncertainty principal (inability to collect exact and complete
knowledge about environment) --- (confirmed
)
  o Indeterminancy --- (appearance of randomness is confirmed
,
explanation for being an "appearance only" i.e. first person
indeterminancy vs. fundamental randomness is made is plausible
)
  o Born Rule?
  o Quantization of Energy?
  o Unitarity
  * General Physics (I am not sure if these are required by
computationalism, and could use some more help on these)
  o Linearity of physical laws?
  o Time reversibility?
  o Conservation of Information? (e.g. black hole information paradox)
  o Finite Description of Quantum States (e.g. Bekenstein Bound
)
  o Link between Entropy and Information (e.g. Landauer's
Principle )
  o Existence of a "Time" dimension?
  * Consciousness
  o Qualia - The non-communicable nature of some observations ?
  o Finiteness - (finite memory / age / information content of
experience)?

Are there other things I am missing?  If any of the items I have 
included are incorrect I would greatly appreciate any correction and 
further insight.


Perhaps most interesting are any predictions which are presently 
unconfirmed, as this would lead to predictions which could later be 
tested and lead to a refutation of computationalism (or if passed, 
yield further evidence for computationalism).


Jason
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Re: What falsifiability tests has computationalism passed?

2017-12-27 Thread John Clark

Computationalism is the idea that the brain is an
 
information processing system and that a computer
 
can
 
perform all the complex behaviors that would be called intelligent if it
were done by a human; computationalism does NOT insist that everything is
information processing
 
(although it does not rule out that possibility).
 
If
 
a
n 
AI is made that is as smart or smarter than humans then we'll know it's
right, if that proved to be impossible then we'll know computationalism
 
is wrong.

Most of the things on your list, although very interesting in themselves,
are irrelevant as far as the truth or falsehood of
 
computationalism
 
is concerned. For example, maybe we can't make perfect predictions of what
physical systems will do because an infinite number o
f
calculations would be needed and that would be impossible, or maybe a
finite but astronomically large number of calculations would be needed and
that would be impractical, or maybe calculations have nothing to do with it
and some effects have no cause and true randomness exists;
 
it doesn't matter because for whatever reason the fact remains that the
human mind can't
 
predict with perfect precision
 
what
 
a physical system will do.


And
 
computationalism
 
has a lot to say about intelligent behavior but it has nothing to say
about consciousness,
 
no scientific theory does because we all only have direct access to one
conscious being and good science
 
can't be done with just one data point
,
and any argument in support
 
of the proposition that a computer that behaves intelligently is not
conscious could also be used in support of the proposition that none of
our

fellow intelligent behaving human beings are conscious.

 
John K Clark




On Wed, Dec 27, 2017 at 2:18 AM, Jason Resch  wrote:

Bruno has often spoken of the confirmations of computationalism known to
> date, and of the idea that it has passed many tests and not been falsified
> so far.  I was hoping with this post to gather a complete list of those
> tests.  What things in physics would disprove computationalism, and what
> tests has it passed so far?  Below I try to collect a complete list from
> memory but it may be faulty.  I ask that others might add to this list or
> correct things I have gotten wrong:
>
> Tests and statuses of each test:
>
>- Non-emulability of physical laws
>   - Non-discreteness (continuousness) of space time --- (somewhat
>   confirmed
>   
>   )
>   - Infinite computation needed for tiniest amount of space --- (mostly
>   confirmed
>   
> 
>   )
>- Quantum Mechanics
>   - Uncertainty principal (inability to collect exact and complete
>   knowledge about environment) --- (confirmed
>   )
>   - Indeterminancy --- (appearance of randomness is confirmed
>   , explanation
>   for being an "appearance only" i.e. first person indeterminancy vs.
>   fundamental randomness is made is plausible
>   )
>   - Born Rule?
>   - Quantization of Energy?
>   - Unitarity
>- General Physics (I am not sure if these are required by
>computationalism, and could use some more help on these)
>   - Linearity of physical laws?
>   - Time reversibility?
>   - Conservation of Information? (e.g. black hole information paradox)
>   - Finite Description of Quantum States (e.g. Bekenstein Bound
>   )
>   - Link between Entropy and Information (e.g. Landauer's Principle
>   )
>   - Existence of a "Time" dimension?
>- Consciousness
>   - Qualia - The non-communicable nature of some observations ?
>   - Finiteness - (finite memory / age / information content of
>   experience)?
>
> Are there other things I am missing?  If any of the items I have included
> are incorrect I would greatly appreciate any correction and further insight.
>
> Perhaps most interesting are any predictions which are presently
> unconfirmed, as this would lead to predictions which could later be tested
> and lead to a refutation of computationalism (or if passed, yield further
> evidence for computationalism).
>
> Jason
>
>
>

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Re: did Jesus exist