date:20180104


On 5/01/2018 1:46 am, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thursday, January 4, 2018, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


On 4/01/2018 6:41 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2018-01-04 6:57 GMT+01:00 Bruce Kellett
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>>:

My abacus does not talk to me.


That would mean no computation are conscious at all...


No, that does not follow. Even if consciousness is a computation,
it does not follow that all computations are conscious: A is a B
does not imply that all Bs are As.


technically your abacus is turing complete (well it has to be
large enough), so it could run a conscious computation... but
that doesn't mean that computation could talk to you, for that it
would also need an I/O system with our reality.


No, it does not have the necessary I/O equipment. But, as above,
even Turing completeness does not mean that every computation such
a Turing machine makes is conscious.

The real point of my original comment was that the only way you
can distinguish a conscious computation from a non-conscious one
is if it is conscious. In other words, the suggestion that
consciousness is a computation tells you absolutely nothing
interesting about consciousness.


Bruce


It tells you that consciousness can be multiply realized. That your 
"soul" can be resurrected by the right machine. It tells you that 
teleportation is possible. It tells you that first person 
indeterminacy is an artifact of duplication. It tells you that if 
arithmetic is real we must explain physics from the sum of experiences 
of the infinite consciousness Turing machines who exist in arithmetic.


If consciousness is a computation implementable on a universal Turing 
machine, then these things might follow, but that does not really tell 
us what consciousness is: it does not tell us which computations are 
conscious and which are not.


Bruce

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Re: What falsifiability tests has computationalism passed?


On 5/01/2018 12:18 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2018-01-04 12:36 GMT+01:00 Bruce Kellett >:


On 4/01/2018 6:41 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2018-01-04 6:57 GMT+01:00 Bruce Kellett
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>>:

My abacus does not talk to me.


That would mean no computation are conscious at all...


No, that does not follow. Even if consciousness is a computation,
it does not follow that all computations are conscious: A is a B
does not imply that all Bs are As.


You say that as your abacus does not talk to you that means not all 
computations are conscious... but that does not follows, it just means 
your abacus as not way to convey you it is conscious as it lacks a 
correct I/O system with you... the fact it does not talk to you is not 
evidence computations performed on it are not conscious even the 
simplest one.


Also if it was true *some* computations are conscious, as your abacus 
is turing complete, you could in principle run them on it... but your 
abacus still wouldn't talk to you, and it would be wrong to say that 
the computation is not conscious in this case...


The abacus was not a good example of a computation that was not 
conscious, because even if it were conscious it could not talk to me (no 
suitable I/O). However, a program that takes the number 2 as input and 
produces its square, namely 4, performs a perfectly good computation, 
but is clearly not conscious (else you reduce consciousness to 
triviality). This program is not universal, not part of a Turing machine 
(though it could be performed on such a machine). A computation 
performed on a machine is not the machine itself.


So we still need a mechanism by which we can sort conscious computations 
from the complete set of all computations, as produced, for example, by 
the universal dovetailer, since not all of these computations are conscious.


Bruce

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Re: What falsifiability tests has computationalism passed?

On 4/01/2018 11:59 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On Jan 4, 2018, at 12:50 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 4/01/2018 12:30 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 29 Dec 2017, at 01:29, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 29/12/2017 10:14 am, Russell Standish wrote:

This is computationalism - the idea that our human consciousness _is_
a computation (and nothing but a computation).

What distinguishes a conscious computation within the class of all
computations? After all, not all computations are conscious.

Universality seems enough.

What is a universal computation? From what you say below, universality appears
to be a property of a machine, not of a computation.

OK, universality is an attribute of a machine, relatively to some universal
machinery, like arithmetic or physics.

But just universality gives rise only to a highly non standard, dissociative,
form of consciousness. It might correspond to the cosmic consciousness alluded
by people living highly altered state of consciousness.

You need Löbianity to get *self-consciousness*, or reflexive consciousness. A machine is Löbian when its
universality is knowable by it. Equivalently, when the machine is universal and can prove its own
"Löb's formula". []([]p -> p) -> []p. Note that the second incompleteness theorem is the
particular case with p = f (f = "0≠1").

Löbanity is a property of the machine, not of the computation.

Yes. The same. I was talking about machine or about the person supported by
those machine. No machine (as conceived as a code, number, physical object) can
ever be conscious or think. It is always a more abstract notion implemented
through some machinery which do the thinking.

Similarly a computation cannot be conscious, but it can support a person, which
is the one having genuinely the thinking or conscious attribute.

The original suggestion by Russell was that "our human consciousness
_is_ a computation (and nothing but a computation)."

You seem to be steering away from Russell's straightforward position. If
human consciousness is a computation, then the computation is conscious
(it is an identity thesis). You say that the computation cannot be
conscious, but can support a person. It is difficult to see this as
anything other than the introduction of a dualistic element: the
computation supports a conscious person, but is not itself conscious? So
wherein does consciousness exist? You are introducing some unspecified
magic into the equation. And what characterizes those computations that
can support a person from those that cannot?

Bruce

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Re: What falsifiability tests has computationalism passed?


On 4/01/2018 11:00 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Yes, in my Conscience and Mechanism appendices, or in the appendice of the 
Lille thesis. I translated a Bell’s inequality in arithmetic, but cannot test 
it due to its intractability + my own incompetence of course. But Z1* 
introducing tuns of nesting modal boxes, making things hard to verify for 
reasonably complex formula.


Bell-like inequalities are easy to obtain -- in classical physics as 
well as in QM. The hard thing is to show that your theory requires that 
they be experimentally violated.


Bruce

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Re: What falsifiability tests has computationalism passed?

On 4 Jan 2018 21:04, "Brent Meeker"  wrote:

On 1/4/2018 5:13 AM, David Nyman wrote:

On 3 January 2018 at 21:57, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 1/3/2018 5:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>> On 03 Jan 2018, at 03:39, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>
>>
>>>
>>> On 1/2/2018 8:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
 Now, it
 could be that intelligent behavior implies mind, but as you yourself
 argue, we don't know that.

>>>
>>> Isn't this at the crux of the scientific study of the mind? There seemed
>>> to be universal agreement on this list that a philosophical zombie is
>>> impossible.
>>>
>>
>>
>> Precisely: that a philosophical zombie is impossible when we assume
>> Mechanism.
>>
>
> But the consensus here has been that a philosophical zombie is impossible
> because it exhibits intelligent behavior.
>
> Philosophical zombie remains logical consistent for a non computationalist
>> theory of mind.
>>
>
> It's logically consistent with a computationalist theory of brain. It is
> only inconsistent with a computationalist theory of mind because use
> include as an axiom that computation produces mind.  One can as say that
> intelligent behavior entails mind as an axiom of physicalism.  Logic is a
> very cheap standard for theories to meet.

ISTM that you are failing to take account of an important distinction
here, despite having acknowledged it in previous conversations. I don't
think of comp as really taking it as axiomatic that computation produces
mind. Of course, CTM, which comp takes as its nominal point of departure,
does do precisely that. But the comp theory seeks then to provide a
*persuasive* model of an 'internalised' epistemic access (i.e to knowledge)
that can be emulated via computation. This form of subjective access to
knowledge - as distinct from information, mechanism, or behaviour in
general - can, as you know, be represented by a toy model deploying a range
of self-referential modal logics. Of course this model doesn't directly
allow one to infer a priori the entire phenomenal spectrum of
consciousness. But it is adequate to demonstrate a range of distinctively
first-personal characteristics of mind, such as internal/external,
shareable/non-shareable, doubtable/undoubtable, that are otherwise
effectively indistinguishable from a purely third-personal perspective.
Hence part of its role is to *persuade* us that the distinction between
body and mind is coterminous with that between a 'universal' mechanistic
ontology and its possible epistemic consequences.

Of these, ISTM the most important is actually the first mentioned. The idea
that intelligent behaviour entails mind is equivalent to mind's being
something entirely extrinsic.

No, that's a logical fallacy.  That X is entailed by Y and Y is extrinsic,
does not imply that X is entirely extrinsic.

No, but if X is to be understood as intrinsic, it demands a convincing
explication of why that claim of intrinsicality is warranted, other than as
a brute a posteriori assertion. IOW, if we already have a perfectly
adequate extrinsic account of all the relevant behaviour, what reason would
you propose for the additional assumption that this somehow additionally
entails all the phenomena of subjective internality, other than this is
(inconveniently) what remains to be explained?

Neither behaviour nor matter possess, or require in any explanatory role,
an 'interior' aspect. Neither matter nor behaviour have an 'inside' - plumb
their depths as you will and all you will discover is more 'outsides'. So
the axiom that intelligent behaviour entails mind would seem either to be
an effective elimination of the concept as redundant (popular in certain
recently discussed circles) or a theoretically ex nihilo evocation of
first-personal epistemic access on the exclusive basis of third-personal
action. The former option undercuts itself at the start; the latter seems
to lack any theoretical motivation other than a tacit (or on occasion
explicit) dismissal of the viability of any alternative approach to the
matter.

That's the same argument you've made in several different forms: Any third
person explanation of mind implies that there can be no first person
experience.  I don't see that it follows.

It doesn't. It's just that it's unargued for except as a brute 'identity'.
That's my point. That's why I contrasted it with the explicitly epistemic
elements of Bruno's theory. That's the sum and total of the distinction I'm
pointing out.

  Any reduction banishes the thing reduced.

Not at all. But that's just the point. In third person terms, when you
build a house from bricks, you don't then have the bricks plus a house
somehow evoked ex nihilo. You just have an optional redescription of the
same bricks. And that redescription, or emergent, is ultimately a
phenomenal construct. But you can 'reduce' that redescription to its
constituent bricks without banishing the phenomenal house. It continues
inconveniently to be present. That's the sense in whic

Re: What falsifiability tests has computationalism passed?

2018-01-04 Thread Brent Meeker




On 1/4/2018 5:13 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 3 January 2018 at 21:57, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 1/3/2018 5:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 03 Jan 2018, at 03:39, Brent Meeker wrote:



On 1/2/2018 8:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Now, it
could be that intelligent behavior implies mind, but
as you yourself
argue, we don't know that.


Isn't this at the crux of the scientific study of the
mind? There seemed to be universal agreement on this list
that a philosophical zombie is impossible.



Precisely: that a philosophical zombie is impossible when we
assume Mechanism.


But the consensus here has been that a philosophical zombie is
impossible because it exhibits intelligent behavior.

Philosophical zombie remains logical consistent for a non
computationalist theory of mind.


It's logically consistent with a computationalist theory of brain.
It is only inconsistent with a computationalist theory of mind
because use include as an axiom that computation produces mind. 
One can as say that intelligent behavior entails mind as an axiom
of physicalism.  Logic is a very cheap standard for theories to meet.


ISTM that you are failing to take account of an important distinction 
here, despite having acknowledged it in previous conversations. I 
don't think of comp as really taking it as axiomatic that computation 
produces mind. Of course, CTM, which comp takes as its nominal point 
of departure, does do precisely that. But the comp theory seeks then 
to provide a *persuasive* model of an 'internalised' epistemic access 
(i.e to knowledge) that can be emulated via computation. This form of 
subjective access to knowledge - as distinct from information, 
mechanism, or behaviour in general - can, as you know, be represented 
by a toy model deploying a range of self-referential modal logics. Of 
course this model doesn't directly allow one to infer a priori the 
entire phenomenal spectrum of consciousness. But it is adequate to 
demonstrate a range of distinctively first-personal characteristics of 
mind, such as internal/external, shareable/non-shareable, 
doubtable/undoubtable, that are otherwise effectively 
indistinguishable from a purely third-personal perspective. Hence part 
of its role is to *persuade* us that the distinction between body and 
mind is coterminous with that between a 'universal' mechanistic 
ontology and its possible epistemic consequences.


Of these, ISTM the most important is actually the first mentioned. The 
idea that intelligent behaviour entails mind is equivalent to mind's 
being something entirely extrinsic.


No, that's a logical fallacy.  That X is entailed by Y and Y is 
extrinsic, does not imply that X is entirely extrinsic.


Neither behaviour nor matter possess, or require in any explanatory 
role, an 'interior' aspect. Neither matter nor behaviour have an 
'inside' - plumb their depths as you will and all you will discover is 
more 'outsides'. So the axiom that intelligent behaviour entails mind 
would seem either to be an effective elimination of the concept as 
redundant (popular in certain recently discussed circles) or a 
theoretically ex nihilo evocation of first-personal epistemic access 
on the exclusive basis of third-personal action. The former option 
undercuts itself at the start; the latter seems to lack any 
theoretical motivation other than a tacit (or on occasion explicit) 
dismissal of the viability of any alternative approach to the matter.


That's the same argument you've made in several different forms: Any 
third person explanation of mind implies that there can be no first 
person experience.  I don't see that it follows.  Any reduction banishes 
the thing reduced.  It appears to be just an assertion to save the 
mystery.  Somehow an explanation in terms of number relations in a 
Platonic realm is OK.  Forget saving the phenomenon; save the soul.




And indeed this bears directly on the 'consensus' against 
philosophical zombies. Physicalism, and in its wake any putative 
entailment from intelligent behaviour directly to mind, leads 
ineluctably to the notion of zombies.


Only for those who intuitively dismiss any physical explanation of 
mind..."My computer can't have a mind.  If it did it could beat me at 
chess."


The only evidence contra the notion that all bodies are zombies is the 
conjunction of 'I am not a zombie' + solipsism is false.


And that internal reflection is essential to my intelligent behavior.  
It's interesting that comp also has to assume solipism is false.


Whereas this conjunction may indeed be true, it is an act of faith 
rather than any non-trivial explication of the relation between bodies 
and minds.


Bruno's explication of the relation between bodies and minds is so 
non-trivial it's aspirational.


Brent

--

Re: Fermi Paradox defined and solved (in 15 minutes)

On Thursday, January 4, 2018 at 1:44:26 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, January 4, 2018 at 8:11:28 AM UTC-7, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>>
>> On Thursday, January 4, 2018 at 8:26:33 AM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> Insofar as you proceed from ignorance by refusing to view a short video, 
>>> you have the mistaken impression that those witnesses find some religious 
>>> solace in their belief of an alien visitation. Anyway, who cares what some 
>>> religious zealots think about UFO's. I am merely laying out a case for the 
>>> existence of alien visitations. AG 
>>>
>>
>> I had sometime back a person call me ignorant for not wanting to watch a 
>> video on ancient alien astronauts --- Eric von Daniken rubbish. I more 
>> recently had somebody call me foolish for wishing to remain ignorant of the 
>> good news of Jesus etc. So maybe ignorance is a relative term. I am 
>> ignorant of what it is like to experience heroin, and I prefer to keep it 
>> that way. I am sorry, but I do not have a great interest in eye witness 
>> testimony over obscure events 70 years ago.
>>
>> LC 
>>
>
> Imagination challenged. If the crash occurred, it's the tip of the 
> iceberg; not to say numerous crashes but an on-going presence, which is 
> what the project manager  essentially concluded in his comments. Forget it. 
> Enjoy your calculations of low densities. And Brent and Clark can enjoy 
> their erroneous statements about eye-witness reports. They must know that 
> context is important in assessing the value of eye witness reports, but 
> refuse to acknowledge same. AG 
>

This  is a pretty imaginative 
take on the subject.

LC

 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sVbb6pZLfzU

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Re: What falsifiability tests has computationalism passed?

On 4 Jan 2018 18:16, "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:

On Jan 4, 2018, at 1:22 PM, David Nyman  wrote:

On 4 January 2018 at 11:55, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> > On Jan 3, 2018, at 10:57 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> > On 1/3/2018 5:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>
> >> On 03 Jan 2018, at 03:39, Brent Meeker wrote:
> >>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> On 1/2/2018 8:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>  Now, it
>  could be that intelligent behavior implies mind, but as you yourself
>  argue, we don't know that.
> >>>
> >>> Isn't this at the crux of the scientific study of the mind? There
> seemed to be universal agreement on this list that a philosophical zombie
> is impossible.
> >>
> >>
> >> Precisely: that a philosophical zombie is impossible when we assume
> Mechanism.
> >
> > But the consensus here has been that a philosophical zombie is
> impossible because it exhibits intelligent behavior.
>
> Well, I think the consensus here is that computationalism is far more
> plausible than non-computationalism.
> Computationalism makes zombies non sensical.
>
>
>
> >
> >> Philosophical zombie remains logical consistent for a non
> computationalist theory of mind.
> >
> > It's logically consistent with a computationalist theory of brain. It is
> only inconsistent with a computationalist theory of mind because use
> include as an axiom that computation produces mind.  One can as say that
> intelligent behavior entails mind as an axiom of physicalism.  Logic is a
> very cheap standard for theories to meet.
>
> At first sight, zombies seems consistent with computationalism, but the
> notion of zombies requires the idea that we attribute mind to bodies
> (having the right behavior). But with computationalism, mind is never
> associated to a body, but only to the person having the infinity of
> (similar enough) bodies relative representation in arithmetic. There are no
> “real bodies” or “ontological bodies”, so the notion of zombie becomes
> senseless. The consciousness is associated with the person, which is never
> determined by one body.
>

So in the light of what you say above, does it then follow that the MGA
implies (assuming comp) that a physical system does *not* in fact implement
a computation in the relevant sense?

The physical world has to be able to implement the computation in the
relevant (Turing-Church-Post-Kleene CT) sense. You need this for the YD
“act of faith.

The physical world is a persistent illusion. It has to be enough persistent
that you wake up at the hospital with the digital brain.

I ask this because you say mind is *never* associated with a body, but mind
*is* associated with computation via the epistemic consequences of
universality.

A (conscious) third person can associate a mind/person to a body that he
perceives. It is polite.

The body perceived by that third person is itself a construction of its own
mind, and with computationalism (but also with QM), we know that such a
body is an (evolving) map of where, and in which states, we could find, sy,
the electron and proton of that body, and such snapshot is only a
computational state among infinitely many others which would works as well,
with respect to the relevant computations which brought its conscious state.
Now, the conscious first person cannot associate itself to any particular
body or computation.

Careful: sometimes I say that a machine can think, or maybe (I usually
avoid) that a computation can think or be conscious. It always mean,
respectively, that a machine can make a person capable of manifesting
itself relatively to you. But the machine and the body are local relative
representation.

A machine cannot think, and a computation (which is the (arithmetical)
dynamic 3p view of the sequence of the relative static machine/state)
cannot think. Only a (first) person can think, and to use that thinking
with respect to another person, a machine is handy, like brain or a
physical computer.

The person is in heaven (arithmetical truth) and on earth (sigma_1
arithmetical truth), simultaneously. But this belongs to G*, and I should
stay mute, or insist that we are in the “after-act-of-faith” position of
the one betting that comp is true, and … assuming comp is true. It is
subtle to talk on those things, and it is important to admit that we don’t
know the truth (or we do get inconsistent and fall in the theological trap).

If so, according to comp, it would follow that (the material appearance and
behaviour of) a body cannot be considered *causally* relevant to the
computation-mind polarity,

Yes, that is true, with respect to the arithmetical truth (where there is
no bodies, only natural numbers), and false for the physical realm, which,
despite being a statistics on dreams (associated to computations in
arithmetic)

but instead must be regarded as a consistent *consequence* of it.

Again that is correct in the 0th person view, but incorrect in the physical
phenomenal view (1p-plural). With respect to me, your brain m

Re: Fermi Paradox defined and solved (in 15 minutes)

2018-01-04 Thread agrayson2000



On Thursday, January 4, 2018 at 8:11:28 AM UTC-7, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> On Thursday, January 4, 2018 at 8:26:33 AM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>> Insofar as you proceed from ignorance by refusing to view a short video, 
>> you have the mistaken impression that those witnesses find some religious 
>> solace in their belief of an alien visitation. Anyway, who cares what some 
>> religious zealots think about UFO's. I am merely laying out a case for the 
>> existence of alien visitations. AG 
>>
>
> I had sometime back a person call me ignorant for not wanting to watch a 
> video on ancient alien astronauts --- Eric von Daniken rubbish. I more 
> recently had somebody call me foolish for wishing to remain ignorant of the 
> good news of Jesus etc. So maybe ignorance is a relative term. I am 
> ignorant of what it is like to experience heroin, and I prefer to keep it 
> that way. I am sorry, but I do not have a great interest in eye witness 
> testimony over obscure events 70 years ago.
>
> LC 
>

Imagination challenged. If the crash occurred, it's the tip of the iceberg; 
not to say numerous crashes but an on-going presence, which is what the 
project manager  essentially concluded in his comments. Forget it. Enjoy 
your calculations of low densities. And Brent and Clark can enjoy their 
erroneous statements about eye-witness reports. They must know that context 
is important in assessing the value of eye witness reports, but refuse to 
acknowledge same. AG 

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Re: What falsifiability tests has computationalism passed?

2018-01-04 Thread Brent Meeker




On 1/4/2018 3:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On Jan 3, 2018, at 10:57 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:



On 1/3/2018 5:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 03 Jan 2018, at 03:39, Brent Meeker wrote:



On 1/2/2018 8:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Now, it
could be that intelligent behavior implies mind, but as you yourself
argue, we don't know that.

Isn't this at the crux of the scientific study of the mind? There seemed to be 
universal agreement on this list that a philosophical zombie is impossible.


Precisely: that a philosophical zombie is impossible when we assume Mechanism.

But the consensus here has been that a philosophical zombie is impossible 
because it exhibits intelligent behavior.

Well, I think the consensus here is that computationalism is far more plausible 
than non-computationalism.
Computationalism makes zombies non sensical.




Philosophical zombie remains logical consistent for a non computationalist 
theory of mind.

It's logically consistent with a computationalist theory of brain. It is only 
inconsistent with a computationalist theory of mind because use include as an 
axiom that computation produces mind.  One can as say that intelligent behavior 
entails mind as an axiom of physicalism.  Logic is a very cheap standard for 
theories to meet.

At first sight, zombies seems consistent with computationalism, but the notion 
of zombies requires the idea that we attribute mind to bodies (having the right 
behavior). But with computationalism, mind is never associated to a body, but 
only to the person having the infinity of (similar enough) bodies relative 
representation in arithmetic. There are no “real bodies” or “ontological 
bodies”, so the notion of zombie becomes senseless. The consciousness is 
associated with the person, which is never determined by one body.


That's just word salad: A person has an infinity of bodies, but they're 
in arithmetic and there are no real bodies so the person is not 
determined by one body. ??












Of course that doesn't mean it's true. But it seems as good a working hypothesis as 
"Yes, doctor".  And in fact it's the working hypothesis of most studies of 
neurocognition, intelligence, and mind.

Neuroscience and AI often bet, more or less explicitly, on mechanism, or on its 
"strong AI" weakenings.

(Note that UDA use mechanism, but its translation in arithmetic needs only 
strong-AI. Note that if strong AI is true, and comp false, we get infinitely 
many zombies in arithmetic.

How do you know that?


I was wrong. Wrote to quickly. It is only if weak AI is true, and strong AI or 
comp false, that there will be infinitely many zombies in arithmetic. Of 
course, if strong AI is false, comp is false too.






very curious one, which lacks body and mind, but act like you and me. They are quite 
similar with the "Bohm's zombies", the beings in the branches of the universal 
quantum wave which have no particles.



If it's true then it provides a link from intelligent behavior to mind.

The "non-zombie" principle is a consequence of comp, but I doubt that it 
implies comp. It is not related to finiteness, as comp and strong AI are.




We already have links from from physics to brain to intelligent behavior.  So 
why isn't this the physics based theory of mind that Bruno et al keep saying is 
impossible?

This is a bit ambiguous and misleading. Comp makes physics necessary, and that 
is why with Occam, physics cannot be assumed primitively if we want to use 
actual physics to verify or refute comp.

That very much depends on what physics comp makes necessary.

Well, if it violate our empirical physics, comp is refuted.


That's why we need to know what physics comp makes necessary in order to 
test it.







We can of course assume physics when doing physics, but not when doing 
computationalist theory of mind.

No, but we can assume physics when doing physicalist theory of mind.

Yes, but then the point is that a physicalist theory of mind (like with 
consciousness reducing the wave) will be non-computationalist.



OK? "physics" is necessary for machine/numbers is what makes the physical 
assumption eliminable, and is what makes computationalism testable.

But it doesn't seem to be testable because the conclusions drawn from it are 
extremely general


Not at all. It is very precise mathematical theories (qZ1*, qX1*, qS4Grz1).


Those are not theories, they are axiomatic systems.  Theories include an 
interpretation applying the mathematics to the observable world.








and already known

No. They are totally unknown, even ignored. I bet, and many others bet, in the 
eighties that this would be refuted before 2000. Some thought having already refute 
it, but they assumed a theory which was already refuted by incompleteness. Then we 
got the main confirmation in the nineties, but still no contradiction with 
“nature".




and supported by other assumptions: e.g. linearity of QM, probabilistic 
physics.  It doesn't tell us why memories get less re

Re: What falsifiability tests has computationalism passed?

> On Jan 4, 2018, at 1:22 PM, David Nyman  wrote:
> 
> On 4 January 2018 at 11:55, Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> > On Jan 3, 2018, at 10:57 PM, Brent Meeker  > > wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> > On 1/3/2018 5:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>
> >> On 03 Jan 2018, at 03:39, Brent Meeker wrote:
> >>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> On 1/2/2018 8:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>  Now, it
>  could be that intelligent behavior implies mind, but as you yourself
>  argue, we don't know that.
> >>>
> >>> Isn't this at the crux of the scientific study of the mind? There seemed 
> >>> to be universal agreement on this list that a philosophical zombie is 
> >>> impossible.
> >>
> >>
> >> Precisely: that a philosophical zombie is impossible when we assume 
> >> Mechanism.
> >
> > But the consensus here has been that a philosophical zombie is impossible 
> > because it exhibits intelligent behavior.
> 
> Well, I think the consensus here is that computationalism is far more 
> plausible than non-computationalism.
> Computationalism makes zombies non sensical.
> 
> 
> 
> >
> >> Philosophical zombie remains logical consistent for a non computationalist 
> >> theory of mind.
> >
> > It's logically consistent with a computationalist theory of brain. It is 
> > only inconsistent with a computationalist theory of mind because use 
> > include as an axiom that computation produces mind.  One can as say that 
> > intelligent behavior entails mind as an axiom of physicalism.  Logic is a 
> > very cheap standard for theories to meet.
> 
> At first sight, zombies seems consistent with computationalism, but the 
> notion of zombies requires the idea that we attribute mind to bodies (having 
> the right behavior). But with computationalism, mind is never associated to a 
> body, but only to the person having the infinity of (similar enough) bodies 
> relative representation in arithmetic. There are no “real bodies” or 
> “ontological bodies”, so the notion of zombie becomes senseless. The 
> consciousness is associated with the person, which is never determined by one 
> body.
> 
> So in the light of what you say above, does it then follow that the MGA 
> implies (assuming comp) that a physical system does *not* in fact implement a 
> computation in the relevant sense?

The physical world has to be able to implement the computation in the relevant 
(Turing-Church-Post-Kleene CT) sense. You need this for the YD “act of faith.

The physical world is a persistent illusion. It has to be enough persistent 
that you wake up at the hospital with the digital brain.

> I ask this because you say mind is *never* associated with a body, but mind 
> *is* associated with computation via the epistemic consequences of 
> universality.

A (conscious) third person can associate a mind/person to a body that he 
perceives. It is polite. 

The body perceived by that third person is itself a construction of its own 
mind, and with computationalism (but also with QM), we know that such a body is 
an (evolving) map of where, and in which states, we could find, sy, the 
electron and proton of that body, and such snapshot is only a computational 
state among infinitely many others which would works as well, with respect to 
the relevant computations which brought its conscious state.
Now, the conscious first person cannot associate itself to any particular body 
or computation.

Careful: sometimes I say that a machine can think, or maybe (I usually avoid) 
that a computation can think or be conscious. It always mean, respectively, 
that a machine can make a person capable of manifesting itself relatively to 
you. But the machine and the body are local relative representation.

A machine cannot think, and a computation (which is the (arithmetical) dynamic 
3p view of the sequence of the relative static machine/state) cannot think. 
Only a (first) person can think, and to use that thinking with respect to 
another person, a machine is handy, like brain or a physical computer.

The person is in heaven (arithmetical truth) and on earth (sigma_1 arithmetical 
truth), simultaneously. But this belongs to G*, and I should stay mute, or 
insist that we are in the “after-act-of-faith” position of the one betting that 
comp is true, and … assuming comp is true. It is subtle to talk on those 
things, and it is important to admit that we don’t know the truth (or we do get 
inconsistent and fall in the theological trap).

> If so, according to comp, it would follow that (the material appearance and 
> behaviour of) a body cannot be considered *causally* relevant to the 
> computation-mind polarity,

Yes, that is true, with respect to the arithmetical truth (where there is no 
bodies, only natural numbers), and false for the physical realm, which, despite 
being a statistics on dreams (associated to computations in arithmetic)

> but instead must be regarded as a consistent *consequence* of it.

Again that is correct in

Re: Fermi Paradox defined and solved (in 15 minutes)

On Thursday, January 4, 2018 at 8:26:33 AM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
> Insofar as you proceed from ignorance by refusing to view a short video, 
> you have the mistaken impression that those witnesses find some religious 
> solace in their belief of an alien visitation. Anyway, who cares what some 
> religious zealots think about UFO's. I am merely laying out a case for the 
> existence of alien visitations. AG 
>

I had sometime back a person call me ignorant for not wanting to watch a 
video on ancient alien astronauts --- Eric von Daniken rubbish. I more 
recently had somebody call me foolish for wishing to remain ignorant of the 
good news of Jesus etc. So maybe ignorance is a relative term. I am 
ignorant of what it is like to experience heroin, and I prefer to keep it 
that way. I am sorry, but I do not have a great interest in eye witness 
testimony over obscure events 70 years ago.

LC 

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What falsifiability tests has computationalism passed?

2018-01-04 Thread Jason Resch

On Thursday, January 4, 2018, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

> On 4/01/2018 6:41 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> 2018-01-04 6:57 GMT+01:00 Bruce Kellett :
>
>> My abacus does not talk to me.
>>
>>
> That would mean no computation are conscious at all...
>
>
> No, that does not follow. Even if consciousness is a computation, it does
> not follow that all computations are conscious: A is a B does not imply
> that all Bs are As.
>
> technically your abacus is turing complete (well it has to be large
> enough), so it could run a conscious computation... but that doesn't mean
> that computation could talk to you, for that it would also need an I/O
> system with our reality.
>
>
> No, it does not have the necessary I/O equipment. But, as above, even
> Turing completeness does not mean that every computation such a Turing
> machine makes is conscious.
>
> The real point of my original comment was that the only way you can
> distinguish a conscious computation from a non-conscious one is if it is
> conscious. In other words, the suggestion that consciousness is a
> computation tells you absolutely nothing interesting about consciousness.
>
>
> Bruce
>

It tells you that consciousness can be multiply realized. That your "soul"
can be resurrected by the right machine. It tells you that teleportation is
possible. It tells you that first person indeterminacy is an artifact of
duplication. It tells you that if arithmetic is real we must explain
physics from the sum of experiences of the infinite consciousness Turing
machines who exist in arithmetic.

 Jason

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Re: Fermi Paradox defined and solved (in 15 minutes)

2018-01-04 Thread agrayson2000



On Thursday, January 4, 2018 at 5:20:32 AM UTC-7, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> On Wednesday, January 3, 2018 at 8:06:05 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, January 3, 2018 at 3:02:25 PM UTC-7, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, January 3, 2018 at 11:33:04 AM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:

 On Tue, Jan 2, 2018 at 4:02 PM, Lawrence Crowell <
 goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:
  

> > 
> We may in fact be little more than a vast almost infinitely 
> improbable fluke .
>

 There is a excellent talk on that very subject at :
  

 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bt6n6Tu1beg 

 It's called "*Improbable Life:* *An Unappealing But Plausible 
 Scenario for Life's Origin on Earth*". Start looking about 3 minutes 
 in, that's when it gets good.

>>>
>>> I have seen Ed Turner talk at conferences. The talk is interesting and 
>>> it does illustrate one of two things. The first is the spatial extent of 
>>> the universe is infinite 
>>>
>>
>> The finite age of the universe implies otherwise; as does the fact that 
>> the CMB comes in from all directions. IMO, it's a closed, finite 
>> hyperspace; not infinite. AG
>>
>
> Inflationary cosmology addresses this problem. The rapid expansion of the 
> universe during a high energy vacuum transition is what results in 
> antipodal regions of the universe having the same causal origins. I wrote a 
> paper on how inflation as a quantum critical phase transition could do this 
> for an infinitely large spatial region in an FLRW/AdS spacetime. 
>  
>
>>
>> so that even the most improbable event or set of configurations must 
>>> occur. The second is this illustrates the need for some additional 
>>> mechanism for the development of pre-biotic chemistry that leads to 
>>> biology. The first of these is in the affirmative of the implausibility of 
>>> life. It is interesting this might serve as evidence for an infinite 
>>> universe. Of course there will be a need for continued research to find a 
>>> mechanism that bridges this gap. For that matter we really do not 
>>> understand how nucleic acids can form outside a biological context. I have 
>>> thought there might be some sort of quantum transition in shape from 
>>> related molecules. 
>>>
>>> It is plausible that prebiotic chemistry exists on Mars or in the ocean 
>>> interior of Jovian and Cronian moons. Maybe a spacecraft with an aerogel 
>>> might fly through these geyser plumes and return samples. We might find 
>>> prebiotic chemistry or even biology elsewhere in the solar system. Evidence 
>>> for life on distant extrasolar planets could be sought be looking for 
>>> planets containing oxygen and methane.  Success in finding prebiotic 
>>> chemistry or understanding abiogenesis means we have lost some evidence or 
>>> argument for an infinite cosmos. Finding absolutely no life elsewhere in 
>>> the universe might in some ways be useful and interesting in itself. It 
>>> will certainly be interesting to see how this works out.
>>>
>>> The great filter could also mean we happen to be the first intelligent 
>>> life form in this galaxy. However, given behavior on Earth (think of Trump 
>>> arguing he has a bigger nuclear button than Kim Jong Un of N Korea) it 
>>> could point to the strong prospect for self-extermination of ETIs. Global 
>>> warming and other issues compound that prospect. 
>>>
>>> I suppose what I find depressing about the UFO stuff, along with ancient 
>>> alien astronauts etc, is it is an idea that we can appeal to some higher 
>>> beings to answer our questions. It is similar to religion in that way. 
>>> Religion promises ultimate knowledge in the next life or with the coming 
>>> great day of God. We can find ultimate enlightenment when the space beings 
>>> out there finally come down to reveal themselves. 
>>>
>>
>> No evidence that's the plan of the aliens. They seem too ugly to be the 
>> basis for super natural beings who some are waiting for. AG
>>
>
> Uhmm disconnect --- this is not a plan of aliens but rather ideas people 
> have about UFOs. The subject borders on religion, and L Ron Hubbard even 
> started the religion of Scientology.
>
> LC
>

Insofar as you proceed from ignorance by refusing to view a short video, 
you have the mistaken impression that those witnesses find some religious 
solace in their belief of an alien visitation. Anyway, who cares what some 
religious zealots think about UFO's. I am merely laying out a case for the 
existence of alien visitations. AG 

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Re: What falsifiability tests has computationalism passed?

2018-01-04 Thread Quentin Anciaux

2018-01-04 12:36 GMT+01:00 Bruce Kellett :

> On 4/01/2018 6:41 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> 2018-01-04 6:57 GMT+01:00 Bruce Kellett :
>
>> My abacus does not talk to me.
>>
>>
> That would mean no computation are conscious at all...
>
>
> No, that does not follow. Even if consciousness is a computation, it does
> not follow that all computations are conscious: A is a B does not imply
> that all Bs are As.
>

You say that as your abacus does not talk to you that means not all
computations are conscious... but that does not follows, it just means your
abacus as not way to convey you it is conscious as it lacks a correct I/O
system with you... the fact it does not talk to you is not evidence
computations performed on it are not conscious even the simplest one.

Also if it was true *some* computations are conscious, as your abacus is
turing complete, you could in principle run them on it... but your abacus
still wouldn't talk to you, and it would be wrong to say that the
computation is not conscious in this case...


>
>
> technically your abacus is turing complete (well it has to be large
> enough), so it could run a conscious computation... but that doesn't mean
> that computation could talk to you, for that it would also need an I/O
> system with our reality.
>
>
> No, it does not have the necessary I/O equipment. But, as above, even
> Turing completeness does not mean that every computation such a Turing
> machine makes is conscious.
>
> The real point of my original comment was that the only way you can
> distinguish a conscious computation from a non-conscious one is if it is
> conscious. In other words, the suggestion that consciousness is a
> computation tells you absolutely nothing interesting about consciousness.
>
> Bruce
>
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Re: What falsifiability tests has computationalism passed?

On 3 January 2018 at 21:57, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 1/3/2018 5:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>> On 03 Jan 2018, at 03:39, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>
>>
>>>
>>> On 1/2/2018 8:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
 Now, it
 could be that intelligent behavior implies mind, but as you yourself
 argue, we don't know that.

>>>
>>> Isn't this at the crux of the scientific study of the mind? There seemed
>>> to be universal agreement on this list that a philosophical zombie is
>>> impossible.
>>>
>>
>>
>> Precisely: that a philosophical zombie is impossible when we assume
>> Mechanism.
>>
>
> But the consensus here has been that a philosophical zombie is impossible
> because it exhibits intelligent behavior.
>
> Philosophical zombie remains logical consistent for a non computationalist
>> theory of mind.
>>
>
> It's logically consistent with a computationalist theory of brain. It is
> only inconsistent with a computationalist theory of mind because use
> include as an axiom that computation produces mind.  One can as say that
> intelligent behavior entails mind as an axiom of physicalism.  Logic is a
> very cheap standard for theories to meet.

ISTM that you are failing to take account of an important distinction
here, despite having acknowledged it in previous conversations. I don't
think of comp as really taking it as axiomatic that computation produces
mind. Of course, CTM, which comp takes as its nominal point of departure,
does do precisely that. But the comp theory seeks then to provide a
*persuasive* model of an 'internalised' epistemic access (i.e to knowledge)
that can be emulated via computation. This form of subjective access to
knowledge - as distinct from information, mechanism, or behaviour in
general - can, as you know, be represented by a toy model deploying a range
of self-referential modal logics. Of course this model doesn't directly
allow one to infer a priori the entire phenomenal spectrum of
consciousness. But it is adequate to demonstrate a range of distinctively
first-personal characteristics of mind, such as internal/external,
shareable/non-shareable, doubtable/undoubtable, that are otherwise
effectively indistinguishable from a purely third-personal perspective.
Hence part of its role is to *persuade* us that the distinction between
body and mind is coterminous with that between a 'universal' mechanistic
ontology and its possible epistemic consequences.

Of these, ISTM the most important is actually the first mentioned. The idea
that intelligent behaviour entails mind is equivalent to mind's being
something entirely extrinsic. Neither behaviour nor matter possess, or
require in any explanatory role, an 'interior' aspect. Neither matter nor
behaviour have an 'inside' - plumb their depths as you will and all you
will discover is more 'outsides'. So the axiom that intelligent behaviour
entails mind would seem either to be an effective elimination of the
concept as redundant (popular in certain recently discussed circles) or a
theoretically ex nihilo evocation of first-personal epistemic access on the
exclusive basis of third-personal action. The former option undercuts
itself at the start; the latter seems to lack any theoretical motivation
other than a tacit (or on occasion explicit) dismissal of the viability of
any alternative approach to the matter.

And indeed this bears directly on the 'consensus' against philosophical
zombies. Physicalism, and in its wake any putative entailment from
intelligent behaviour directly to mind, leads ineluctably to the notion of
zombies. The only evidence contra the notion that all bodies are zombies is
the conjunction of 'I am not a zombie' + solipsism is false. Whereas this
conjunction may indeed be true, it is an act of faith rather than any
non-trivial explication of the relation between bodies and minds.

David

>
>
>>
>>
>>
>> Of course that doesn't mean it's true. But it seems as good a working
>>> hypothesis as "Yes, doctor".  And in fact it's the working hypothesis of
>>> most studies of neurocognition, intelligence, and mind.
>>>
>>
>> Neuroscience and AI often bet, more or less explicitly, on mechanism, or
>> on its "strong AI" weakenings.
>>
>> (Note that UDA use mechanism, but its translation in arithmetic needs
>> only strong-AI. Note that if strong AI is true, and comp false, we get
>> infinitely many zombies in arithmetic.
>>
>
> How do you know that?
>
> very curious one, which lacks body and mind, but act like you and me. They
>> are quite similar with the "Bohm's zombies", the beings in the branches of
>> the universal quantum wave which have no particles.
>>
>>
>> If it's true then it provides a link from intelligent behavior to mind.
>>>
>>
>> The "non-zombie" principle is a consequence of comp, but I doubt that it
>> implies comp. It is not related to finiteness, as comp and strong AI are.
>>
>>
>>
>> We already have links from from physics to brain to intelligent
>>> behavior.  So why isn't this the physics based

Re: What falsifiability tests has computationalism passed?


> On Jan 4, 2018, at 12:50 PM, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On 4/01/2018 12:30 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> On 29 Dec 2017, at 01:29, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>> On 29/12/2017 10:14 am, Russell Standish wrote:
 This is computationalism - the idea that our human consciousness _is_
 a computation (and nothing but a computation).
>>> 
>>> What distinguishes a conscious computation within the class of all 
>>> computations? After all, not all computations are conscious.
>> 
>> Universality seems enough.
> 
> What is a universal computation? From what you say below, universality 
> appears to be a property of a machine, not of a computation.

OK, universality is an attribute of a machine, relatively to some universal 
machinery, like arithmetic or physics.




> 
>> But just universality gives rise only to a highly non standard, 
>> dissociative, form of consciousness. It might correspond to the cosmic 
>> consciousness alluded by people living highly altered state of consciousness.
>> 
>> You need Löbianity to get *self-consciousness*, or reflexive consciousness. 
>> A machine is Löbian when its universality is knowable by it. Equivalently, 
>> when the machine is universal and can prove its own "Löb's formula". []([]p 
>> -> p) -> []p. Note that the second incompleteness theorem is the particular 
>> case with p = f (f = "0≠1").
> 
> Löbanity is a property of the machine, not of the computation.

Yes. The same. I was talking about machine or about the person supported by 
those machine. No machine (as conceived as a code, number, physical object) can 
ever be conscious or think. It is always a more abstract notion implemented 
through some machinery which do the thinking.

Similarly a computation cannot be conscious, but it can support a person, which 
is the one having genuinely the thinking or conscious attribute.

But, sometimes I commit abuse of language for reason of being short and clear. 
Sorry for the possible confusion possible.

Bruno




> 
> Bruce
> 
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Re: Fermi Paradox defined and solved (in 15 minutes)

On Wednesday, January 3, 2018 at 9:49:20 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, January 3, 2018 at 8:34:21 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 1/3/2018 6:00 PM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, January 3, 2018 at 3:43:14 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 1/3/2018 8:44 AM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>> That program has been revealed to be the child of Harry Reid, Senator 
 from Nevada. At the request of Bigelow, who is advancing the idea of big 
 inflated habitable modules in space, this program germinated. Bigelow is 
 interested in UFO stuff and wanted a program to investigate this. This 
 program was not started because of some serious military concern.

 LC

>>>
>>> I wrote the Pentagon is taking the issue seriously, which doesn't mean 
>>> it's considered a national security threat. Anyway, we can't be subject to 
>>> visitations since your calculations are dispositive. AG
>>>
>>>
>>> What the Pentagon is taking seriously is that they have funding to spend 
>>> on this.
>>>
>>
>> And you know that how? Woman's intuition? AG
>>
>>
>> I worked for the Pentagon for 52yrs.  I know how they think.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
> If they have such a dim view of what they do, that is, what motivates 
> them, why did you continue to work for them -- to line your pocket? AG 
>

These posters are in some part a way of maintaining moral or humor. I 
remember a poster at work that featured a picture of a nuclear burst and 
mushrooming fireball with the message, "When you care to send the very 
best."

LC 

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Re: What falsifiability tests has computationalism passed?

On 4 January 2018 at 11:55, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> > On Jan 3, 2018, at 10:57 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> > On 1/3/2018 5:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>
> >> On 03 Jan 2018, at 03:39, Brent Meeker wrote:
> >>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> On 1/2/2018 8:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>  Now, it
>  could be that intelligent behavior implies mind, but as you yourself
>  argue, we don't know that.
> >>>
> >>> Isn't this at the crux of the scientific study of the mind? There
> seemed to be universal agreement on this list that a philosophical zombie
> is impossible.
> >>
> >>
> >> Precisely: that a philosophical zombie is impossible when we assume
> Mechanism.
> >
> > But the consensus here has been that a philosophical zombie is
> impossible because it exhibits intelligent behavior.
>
> Well, I think the consensus here is that computationalism is far more
> plausible than non-computationalism.
> Computationalism makes zombies non sensical.
>
>
>
> >
> >> Philosophical zombie remains logical consistent for a non
> computationalist theory of mind.
> >
> > It's logically consistent with a computationalist theory of brain. It is
> only inconsistent with a computationalist theory of mind because use
> include as an axiom that computation produces mind.  One can as say that
> intelligent behavior entails mind as an axiom of physicalism.  Logic is a
> very cheap standard for theories to meet.
>
> At first sight, zombies seems consistent with computationalism, but the
> notion of zombies requires the idea that we attribute mind to bodies
> (having the right behavior). But with computationalism, mind is never
> associated to a body, but only to the person having the infinity of
> (similar enough) bodies relative representation in arithmetic. There are no
> “real bodies” or “ontological bodies”, so the notion of zombie becomes
> senseless. The consciousness is associated with the person, which is never
> determined by one body.
>

So in the light of what you say above, does it then follow that the MGA
implies (assuming comp) that a physical system does *not* in fact implement
a computation in the relevant sense? I ask this because you say mind is
*never* associated with a body, but mind *is* associated with computation
via the epistemic consequences of universality. If so, according to comp,
it would follow that (the material appearance and behaviour of) a body
cannot be considered *causally* relevant to the computation-mind polarity,
but instead must be regarded as a consistent *consequence* of it.

David


>
>
>
> >
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>> Of course that doesn't mean it's true. But it seems as good a working
> hypothesis as "Yes, doctor".  And in fact it's the working hypothesis of
> most studies of neurocognition, intelligence, and mind.
> >>
> >> Neuroscience and AI often bet, more or less explicitly, on mechanism,
> or on its "strong AI" weakenings.
> >>
> >> (Note that UDA use mechanism, but its translation in arithmetic needs
> only strong-AI. Note that if strong AI is true, and comp false, we get
> infinitely many zombies in arithmetic.
> >
> > How do you know that?
>
>
> I was wrong. Wrote to quickly. It is only if weak AI is true, and strong
> AI or comp false, that there will be infinitely many zombies in arithmetic.
> Of course, if strong AI is false, comp is false too.
>
>
>
>
>
> >
> >> very curious one, which lacks body and mind, but act like you and me.
> They are quite similar with the "Bohm's zombies", the beings in the
> branches of the universal quantum wave which have no particles.
> >>
> >>
> >>> If it's true then it provides a link from intelligent behavior to mind.
> >>
> >> The "non-zombie" principle is a consequence of comp, but I doubt that
> it implies comp. It is not related to finiteness, as comp and strong AI are.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>> We already have links from from physics to brain to intelligent
> behavior.  So why isn't this the physics based theory of mind that Bruno et
> al keep saying is impossible?
> >>
> >> This is a bit ambiguous and misleading. Comp makes physics necessary,
> and that is why with Occam, physics cannot be assumed primitively if we
> want to use actual physics to verify or refute comp.
> >
> > That very much depends on what physics comp makes necessary.
>
> Well, if it violate our empirical physics, comp is refuted.
>
>
>
> >
> >> We can of course assume physics when doing physics, but not when doing
> computationalist theory of mind.
> >
> > No, but we can assume physics when doing physicalist theory of mind.
>
> Yes, but then the point is that a physicalist theory of mind (like with
> consciousness reducing the wave) will be non-computationalist.
>
>
> >
> >>
> >> OK? "physics" is necessary for machine/numbers is what makes the
> physical assumption eliminable, and is what makes computationalism testable.
> >
> > But it doesn't seem to be testable because the conclusions drawn from it
> are extremely general
>
>
> Not at all. It is very precise

Re: Fermi Paradox defined and solved (in 15 minutes)

On Wednesday, January 3, 2018 at 8:06:05 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, January 3, 2018 at 3:02:25 PM UTC-7, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>>
>> On Wednesday, January 3, 2018 at 11:33:04 AM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>>>
>>> On Tue, Jan 2, 2018 at 4:02 PM, Lawrence Crowell <
>>> goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>  
>>>
 > 
 We may in fact be little more than a vast almost infinitely improbable 
 fluke .

>>>
>>> There is a excellent talk on that very subject at :
>>>  
>>>
>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bt6n6Tu1beg 
>>>
>>> It's called "*Improbable Life:* *An Unappealing But Plausible Scenario 
>>> for Life's Origin on Earth*". Start looking about 3 minutes in, that's 
>>> when it gets good.
>>>
>>
>> I have seen Ed Turner talk at conferences. The talk is interesting and it 
>> does illustrate one of two things. The first is the spatial extent of the 
>> universe is infinite 
>>
>
> The finite age of the universe implies otherwise; as does the fact that 
> the CMB comes in from all directions. IMO, it's a closed, finite 
> hyperspace; not infinite. AG
>

Inflationary cosmology addresses this problem. The rapid expansion of the 
universe during a high energy vacuum transition is what results in 
antipodal regions of the universe having the same causal origins. I wrote a 
paper on how inflation as a quantum critical phase transition could do this 
for an infinitely large spatial region in an FLRW/AdS spacetime. 
 

>
> so that even the most improbable event or set of configurations must 
>> occur. The second is this illustrates the need for some additional 
>> mechanism for the development of pre-biotic chemistry that leads to 
>> biology. The first of these is in the affirmative of the implausibility of 
>> life. It is interesting this might serve as evidence for an infinite 
>> universe. Of course there will be a need for continued research to find a 
>> mechanism that bridges this gap. For that matter we really do not 
>> understand how nucleic acids can form outside a biological context. I have 
>> thought there might be some sort of quantum transition in shape from 
>> related molecules. 
>>
>> It is plausible that prebiotic chemistry exists on Mars or in the ocean 
>> interior of Jovian and Cronian moons. Maybe a spacecraft with an aerogel 
>> might fly through these geyser plumes and return samples. We might find 
>> prebiotic chemistry or even biology elsewhere in the solar system. Evidence 
>> for life on distant extrasolar planets could be sought be looking for 
>> planets containing oxygen and methane.  Success in finding prebiotic 
>> chemistry or understanding abiogenesis means we have lost some evidence or 
>> argument for an infinite cosmos. Finding absolutely no life elsewhere in 
>> the universe might in some ways be useful and interesting in itself. It 
>> will certainly be interesting to see how this works out.
>>
>> The great filter could also mean we happen to be the first intelligent 
>> life form in this galaxy. However, given behavior on Earth (think of Trump 
>> arguing he has a bigger nuclear button than Kim Jong Un of N Korea) it 
>> could point to the strong prospect for self-extermination of ETIs. Global 
>> warming and other issues compound that prospect. 
>>
>> I suppose what I find depressing about the UFO stuff, along with ancient 
>> alien astronauts etc, is it is an idea that we can appeal to some higher 
>> beings to answer our questions. It is similar to religion in that way. 
>> Religion promises ultimate knowledge in the next life or with the coming 
>> great day of God. We can find ultimate enlightenment when the space beings 
>> out there finally come down to reveal themselves. 
>>
>
> No evidence that's the plan of the aliens. They seem too ugly to be the 
> basis for super natural beings who some are waiting for. AG
>

Uhmm disconnect --- this is not a plan of aliens but rather ideas people 
have about UFOs. The subject borders on religion, and L Ron Hubbard even 
started the religion of Scientology.

LC

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Re: Dreamless Sleep?


> On Jan 3, 2018, at 11:34 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 1/3/2018 6:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>> On 01 Jan 2018, at 19:01, John Clark wrote:
>> 
>>> On Fri, Dec 1, 2017 at 12:45 PM, Bruno Marchal >> > wrote:
 https://www.sciencealert.com/your-consciousness-does-not-switch-off-during-a-dreamless-sleep-say-scientists
  
 
>>> 
>>> >  Wonderful!
>>> 
>>> I found nothing wonderful in it,    I thought it was a rather silly 
>>> article. Why should the movement of somebody's eyeballs be better evidence 
>>> for consciousness than the movement of somebody's vocal cords that make a 
>>> sound like "I was not conscious"?
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> What is wonderful is that scientists get confirmation that we keep some form 
>> of consciousness during the NON-REM sleep. Until recently, it was taken as 
>> as "mainstream-admitted" that consciousness appears in REM sleep and the 
>> awaken state but disappears in "deep or slow, non-REM dreams". Descartes and 
>> many Mystics have claimed the contrary ... until that paper and research, 
>> which of course needs confirmation, etc. 
>> 
>> Thanks to Salvia divinorum reports (and personal), I can make full sense of 
>> Descartes' assertion that we are conscious at all moment during the whole 
>> night sleep. What happens is that we don't memorize easily the content of 
>> those non-REM-sleep. It seems much more difficult than the common 
>> REM-dreams, which are still hard to remember for many people.
> 
> I don't know why it was even a question.  It's common knowledge that you can 
> whisper a person's name to them and they'll wake up immediately, whatever 
> their stage of sleep.  So the difference between REM and non-REM sleep is not 
> fundamental to awareness.

OK. It is not a bad argument. The reason is that most people, if asked if they 
were conscious (after being been awaked with the whisper, say) claim to have no 
memory of having been conscious, when awaken in slow-sleep (as opposed to 
REM-sleep where they mention vivid imageries). In the field, most experts seem 
to have believed that slow-sleep was not accompanied by consciousness, but 
things change.

Bruno



> 
> Brent
> 
>> 
>> Note that the eye-ball movement concerned only the REM-dreams (discovered by 
>> Jouvet). When we dream, we are awaken and paralysed, according to Hobson 
>> theory of dream, except for the ocular muscles, so that a lucid dreamer can 
>> use that to communicate their dreams and experience in "real time" (with a 
>> 10/13 ratio difference though, in the average). Then the EEG can show that 
>> when we sing or when we move the arms during sleep, the same cerebral 
>> activity is trigged, same as when we do that in the non-sleep state.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>>  John K Clark
>>> 
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
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>>> .
>> 
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
>> 
>> 
>> 
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> 
> 
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Re: What falsifiability tests has computationalism passed?


> On Jan 4, 2018, at 4:58 AM, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 1/2/2018 6:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>> On 01 Jan 2018, at 23:38, Brent Meeker wrote:
>> 
>>> 
>>> No. I do not commit the fallacy of "Your god is false, so my god is real".  
>>> I'm willing to say I don't know what must be real.
>> 
>> 
>> You just did it. You just said in your previews post: " I think arithmetic 
>> is a human invention...not the basis of reality."
> 
> A logician should know the difference between saying what something is not 
> and saying what something is.


You need to have some idea of what is real, to assert that arithmetic is not 
what is fundamentally real.



> ...
>> 
>>> Bell is (rightly) famous for suggesting an definitive experiment...not just 
>>> an illustration.
>> 
>> Here too. In particular the violation of Bell's inequality itself can be 
>> tested in the machine's physics. That is detailed in my long thesis version.
> 
> Is it available online?

Yes, in my Conscience and Mechanism appendices, or in the appendice of the 
Lille thesis. I translated a Bell’s inequality in arithmetic, but cannot test 
it due to its intractability + my own incompetence of course. But Z1* 
introducing tuns of nesting modal boxes, making things hard to verify for 
reasonably complex formula.

Bruno


> 
> Brent
> 
>> It leads to complex math, but that is hardly an argument of falsity. If the 
>> results were not ignored, (for pseudo-philosophical reason intolerable in 
>> science), we would have already refuted computationalism (or that classical 
>> indexical weak formulation of it), or improved it, notably by noting which 
>> of S4Grz1, Z1* and X1* are closer to the physicists' quantum logic. Note 
>> that if physics is entirely explained in S4Grz1, that would be a case for 
>> some sort of solipsism, but not ecaxtly the common one, and also, there are 
>> few chance that can happen (because quantum logic obeys the excluded middle, 
>> and the quantum logic coming from S4Grz1 does not).
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
> 
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Re: What falsifiability tests has computationalism passed?

> On Jan 3, 2018, at 10:57 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 1/3/2018 5:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>> On 03 Jan 2018, at 03:39, Brent Meeker wrote:
>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 1/2/2018 8:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 Now, it
 could be that intelligent behavior implies mind, but as you yourself
 argue, we don't know that.
>>> 
>>> Isn't this at the crux of the scientific study of the mind? There seemed to 
>>> be universal agreement on this list that a philosophical zombie is 
>>> impossible.
>> 
>> 
>> Precisely: that a philosophical zombie is impossible when we assume 
>> Mechanism. 
> 
> But the consensus here has been that a philosophical zombie is impossible 
> because it exhibits intelligent behavior.

Well, I think the consensus here is that computationalism is far more plausible 
than non-computationalism.
Computationalism makes zombies non sensical. 

> 
>> Philosophical zombie remains logical consistent for a non computationalist 
>> theory of mind.
> 
> It's logically consistent with a computationalist theory of brain. It is only 
> inconsistent with a computationalist theory of mind because use include as an 
> axiom that computation produces mind.  One can as say that intelligent 
> behavior entails mind as an axiom of physicalism.  Logic is a very cheap 
> standard for theories to meet.

At first sight, zombies seems consistent with computationalism, but the notion 
of zombies requires the idea that we attribute mind to bodies (having the right 
behavior). But with computationalism, mind is never associated to a body, but 
only to the person having the infinity of (similar enough) bodies relative 
representation in arithmetic. There are no “real bodies” or “ontological 
bodies”, so the notion of zombie becomes senseless. The consciousness is 
associated with the person, which is never determined by one body.

> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> Of course that doesn't mean it's true. But it seems as good a working 
>>> hypothesis as "Yes, doctor".  And in fact it's the working hypothesis of 
>>> most studies of neurocognition, intelligence, and mind.
>> 
>> Neuroscience and AI often bet, more or less explicitly, on mechanism, or on 
>> its "strong AI" weakenings.
>> 
>> (Note that UDA use mechanism, but its translation in arithmetic needs only 
>> strong-AI. Note that if strong AI is true, and comp false, we get infinitely 
>> many zombies in arithmetic. 
> 
> How do you know that?

I was wrong. Wrote to quickly. It is only if weak AI is true, and strong AI or 
comp false, that there will be infinitely many zombies in arithmetic. Of 
course, if strong AI is false, comp is false too.

> 
>> very curious one, which lacks body and mind, but act like you and me. They 
>> are quite similar with the "Bohm's zombies", the beings in the branches of 
>> the universal quantum wave which have no particles.
>> 
>> 
>>> If it's true then it provides a link from intelligent behavior to mind.
>> 
>> The "non-zombie" principle is a consequence of comp, but I doubt that it 
>> implies comp. It is not related to finiteness, as comp and strong AI are.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> We already have links from from physics to brain to intelligent behavior.  
>>> So why isn't this the physics based theory of mind that Bruno et al keep 
>>> saying is impossible?
>> 
>> This is a bit ambiguous and misleading. Comp makes physics necessary, and 
>> that is why with Occam, physics cannot be assumed primitively if we want to 
>> use actual physics to verify or refute comp. 
> 
> That very much depends on what physics comp makes necessary.

Well, if it violate our empirical physics, comp is refuted.

> 
>> We can of course assume physics when doing physics, but not when doing 
>> computationalist theory of mind.
> 
> No, but we can assume physics when doing physicalist theory of mind.

Yes, but then the point is that a physicalist theory of mind (like with 
consciousness reducing the wave) will be non-computationalist.

> 
>> 
>> OK? "physics" is necessary for machine/numbers is what makes the physical 
>> assumption eliminable, and is what makes computationalism testable.
> 
> But it doesn't seem to be testable because the conclusions drawn from it are 
> extremely general

Not at all. It is very precise mathematical theories (qZ1*, qX1*, qS4Grz1). 

> and already known

No. They are totally unknown, even ignored. I bet, and many others bet, in the 
eighties that this would be refuted before 2000. Some thought having already 
refute it, but they assumed a theory which was already refuted by 
incompleteness. Then we got the main confirmation in the nineties, but still no 
contradiction with “nature".

> and supported by other assumptions: e.g. linearity of QM, probabilistic 
> physics.  It doesn't tell us why memories get less reliable when they are 
> more often recalled. 

That kind of things are expected to be understood through mechanism.

> It doesn't tell us why we have no memories of early childhood.  It doesn

Re: What falsifiability tests has computationalism passed?


On 4/01/2018 12:30 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 29 Dec 2017, at 01:29, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 29/12/2017 10:14 am, Russell Standish wrote:

This is computationalism - the idea that our human consciousness _is_
a computation (and nothing but a computation).


What distinguishes a conscious computation within the class of all 
computations? After all, not all computations are conscious.


Universality seems enough.


What is a universal computation? From what you say below, universality 
appears to be a property of a machine, not of a computation.


But just universality gives rise only to a highly non standard, 
dissociative, form of consciousness. It might correspond to the cosmic 
consciousness alluded by people living highly altered state of 
consciousness.


You need Löbianity to get *self-consciousness*, or reflexive 
consciousness. A machine is Löbian when its universality is knowable 
by it. Equivalently, when the machine is universal and can prove its 
own "Löb's formula". []([]p -> p) -> []p. Note that the second 
incompleteness theorem is the particular case with p = f (f = "0≠1").


Löbanity is a property of the machine, not of the computation.

Bruce

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Re: What falsifiability tests has computationalism passed?


On 4/01/2018 6:41 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2018-01-04 6:57 GMT+01:00 Bruce Kellett >:


My abacus does not talk to me.


That would mean no computation are conscious at all...


No, that does not follow. Even if consciousness is a computation, it 
does not follow that all computations are conscious: A is a B does not 
imply that all Bs are As.


technically your abacus is turing complete (well it has to be large 
enough), so it could run a conscious computation... but that doesn't 
mean that computation could talk to you, for that it would also need 
an I/O system with our reality.


No, it does not have the necessary I/O equipment. But, as above, even 
Turing completeness does not mean that every computation such a Turing 
machine makes is conscious.


The real point of my original comment was that the only way you can 
distinguish a conscious computation from a non-conscious one is if it is 
conscious. In other words, the suggestion that consciousness is a 
computation tells you absolutely nothing interesting about consciousness.


Bruce

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Re: What falsifiability tests has computationalism passed?