Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/24/2018 9:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 22 Jun 2018, at 02:26, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 6/21/2018 3:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 5:10 PM, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 6/21/2018 7:47 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 12:59 AM, Brent Meeker
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:



On 6/20/2018 9:48 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 5:24 PM, Brent Meeker
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:



On 6/19/2018 7:10 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 12:21 AM, Brent Meeker
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>
wrote:



On 6/18/2018 4:27 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 9:57 PM, Brent Meeker
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:



On 6/17/2018 4:43 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On 17 June 2018 at 13:26, 
mailto:agrayson2...@gmail.com>> wrote:


On Sunday, June 17, 2018 at 10:15:05
AM UTC, Jason wrote:



On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 12:12
AM, mailto:agrays...@gmail.com>> wrote:



  why do you prefer the MWI
compared to the
Transactional Interpretation?
I see both as absurd. so I
prefer to assume the wf is
just epistemic, and/or
that we have some holes in
the CI which have yet to be
resolved. AG

--



1. It's the simplest theory:
"MWI" is just the Schrodinger
equation,
nothing else. (it doesn't say
Schrodinger's equation only
applies sometimes,
or only at certain scales)

2. It explains more while
assuming less (it explains the
appearance of
collapse, without having to
assume it, thus is preferred by
Occam's razor)

3. Like every other successful
physical theory, it is linear,
reversible
(time-symmetric), continuous,
deterministic and does not
require faster than
light influences nor
retrocausalities

4. Unlike single-universe or
epistemic interpretations, "WF
is real" with
MWI is the only way we know how
to explain the functioning of
quantum
computers (now up to 51 qubits)

5. Unlike copenhagen-type
theories, it attributes no
special physical
abilities to observers or
measurement devices

6. Most of all, theories of
everything that assume a reality
containing
all possible observers and
observations lead directly to
laws/postulates of
quantum mechanics (see Russell
Standish's Theory of Nothing,
Chapter 7 and
Appendix D).

Given #6, we should revise our
view. It is not MWI and QM that
should
convince us of many worlds, but
rather the assumption of many
worlds (an
infinite and infinitely varied
reality) that gives us, and
explains all the
weirdness of QM. This should
overwhelmingly convince us of
 

Re: Do we live within a Diophantine equation?

[Jason Resch]

On Fri, Jun 22, 2018 at 3:30 PM, John Clark  wrote:

> On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 5:09 PM, Jason Resch  wrote:
>
> ​>* ​*
>> *The only thing I am asking is:*
>> *1) Physics -> Brains, Cars, Atoms, Etc.*
>> *2) ??? -> Physics -> Brains, Cars, Atoms, Etc.*
>> *Do we have enough information to decide between the above two theories?
>> Have we really ruled out anything sitting below physics?*
>>
>
> If I define physics as the thing that can tell the difference between a
> correct computation and a incorrect computation and between a corrupted
> memory and a uncorrupted memory, and as long as we're at this philosophic
> meta level that's not a  b ad definition, then I don't think anything
> is below physics.
>

Physical theories are based on induction from observations and experiences.

That process won't give us answers to these famous questions, posed by
physicists:

   1. Leibniz: "*Why is there something rather than nothing?*"
   2. Hawking: "*What is it that breathes fire into the equations* and
   makes a universe for them to describe? The usual approach of science of
   constructing a mathematical model cannot answer the questions of why there
   should be a universe for the model to describe. Why does the universe go to
   all the bother of existing?"
   3. Feynman: "It always bothers me that, according to the laws as we
   understand them today, it takes a computing machine an infinite number of
   logical operations to figure out what goes on in no matter how tiny a
   region of space, and no matter how tiny a region of time. How can all that
   be going on in that tiny space? *Why should it take an infinite amount
   of logic to figure out what one tiny piece of space/time is going to do?*
   "
   4. Wheeler: "*Why these equations, and not others?*"

If we're to answer these questions, we may need some kind of *metaphysical*
theory.  Preferably one that is simple, and can explain/predict our
observations.
The existence of all possible computations may be one possible avenue for
this.  So far, it is not ruled out, and might even be considered to be
partially confirmed.  It has the power to answer questions 2, 3 and 4.  And
for anyone who accepts arithmetical realism/no-cause needed for
arithmetical truth, then it can answer 1 as well.



>
>
>> ​>>​
>>> Then why is brain damage a big deal? Why do I need my brain to think?
>>>
>>
>> ​>* ​*
>> *The base computations that implement your brain may be sub-routines of a
>> larger computation,*
>>
>
> If true then that is an example of something physics can do but
> mathematics can not. And I have to say that is a mighty damn important
> sub-routine!
>

It's not truly doing something math is not, if you take the view that math
is what is ultimately "doing physics".


> ​>>​
>>> Without physics 2+2=3 would work just as well as 2+2=4 and insisting the
>>> answer is 4 would just be an arbitrary convention of no more profundity
>>> than the rules that tell us when to say "who" and when to say "whom".
>>>
>>> ​> ​
>> *For any computation to make sense, you need to be working under some
>> definitions of integers and relations between them. *
>>
>
> ​Definitions are made for our convenience, they do not create physical
> objects.
>

Physical theories are also made for our convenience and they do not tell
physical objects what to do.
Instead we study physical objects, and try to reason about what laws make
sense and describe the phenomenon we observe.

It is no different with mathematical theories (a.k.a. axioms and
theorems).  Mathematicians study mathematical objects, and reason about
what laws make sense to describe the phenomenon we observe.  When they find
sufficient justification, they can amend or extend the fundamental theories
(axioms), or even throw them out altogether.


> And there are an infinite number of ways integers and the relations
> between them could have been defined,
>

If they were defined differently, they wouldn't be the integers, but some
other thing.


> so why did mathematicians pick the specific definition that they did?
> Because that's the only one that conforms with the physical world, and
> thats why mathematics is the best language to describe physics.
>

Here, we know the definitions are not primary, for we know (since Godel),
that the integers are more complex than any finite set of axioms can
describe.

Is reality not "kicking back", when:
It tells us there are things that are true about the integers which are not
part of our starting definitions?
It tells us no matter how much we might build and develop our theories
(axioms) about the integers over time, we know that we will never finish
the job.

To me, this is strong evidence that math is something objective, which
humans explore, rather than define or invent.


>
>> * ​> ​Without that, you can't even define what a Turing machine or what a
>> computation is.*
>>
>
> ​I don't need to describe either one because I've got something much much
> better than definitions, examples.​

Re: Do we live within a Diophantine equation?

[Jason Resch]

On Fri, Jun 22, 2018 at 5:41 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 20 Jun 2018, at 14:55, Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 11:36 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>> On 17 Jun 2018, at 02:18, Jason Resch  wrote:
>>
>> In solving Hilbert's 10th problem
>>  in the
>> negative, the work of Martin Davis, Yuri Matiyasevich, Hilary Putnam and
>> Julia Robinson culminated in 1970 with the MRDP theorem
>> 
>> which concludes:
>>
>> *Every computably enumerable set has a representation as a Diophantine
>> equation  (an equation
>> involving only integer coefficients and variables).*
>>
>> This shocked number theorists, because it meant simple equations
>> involving nothing more than a few integer variables have the full power of
>> Turing machines.  In fact, it was shown by Yuri Matiyasevich that a
>> universal Diophantine equation can be made with as few as 9 unknowns.
>>
>> Some examples:
>>
>>- k is even if there exists a solution to: k - 2x = 0
>>- k is a perfect square if there exists a solution to: k - x^2 = 0
>>- k is a Fibonacci number if there exists a solution to: k^4 -
>>k^2*x^2 - x^4 - 1 = 0
>>- (k+2) is a prime number if there exists a solution to the sum of: (these
>>14 equations
>>)
>>- k is a LISP program having output n, if the equation having
>>variables: k, n, x1, x2, x3 ... x2 (a polynomial having ~20,000
>>variables ) has a solution.
>>
>> The universality of Diophantine equations means there are polynomial
>> equations that compute things quite surprising, such as polynomials that
>> have solutions of 0, IFF:
>>
>>- One of the variables "k" is a valid MP3 file.
>>- One of the variables "k" is a JPEG image containing the image of a
>>cat (where the equation implements the same computation as a neural 
>> network
>>trained to recognize images of cats)
>>- For two of the variables "y" and "x", "y" equals a state of a chess
>>board after deep blue makes a move given a chess board with a state of 
>> "x".
>>- For two of the variables "y" and "x", "y" equals the state of the
>>Universal Dovetailer after performing "n" steps of execution.
>>
>>
>> The last example seems to suggest to me, that pure arithmetical truth,
>> concerning the solutions to equations, is identical to computation.  That
>> is to say, certain mathematical statements carry with them (effectively)
>> Turing machines, and their executions.
>>
>>
>> Matiyazevic results is indeed quite impressive. It finishes an inquiry
>> begun by Davis and Putnam with important progress by Julia Robinson, and
>> eventually Matiyazevic got the proof, and its solved the 10th problem of
>> Hilbert: there is no mechanical procedure to tell if a diophantine
>> polynomial equation has a solution or not. (Assuming Church’s thesis, as
>> Matiyzevic explains well in a ten page section in his book).
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Just as all solutions to the deep-blue implementing equation is
>> equivalent to the computations that Deep blue makes when evaluating the
>> board, and all solutions to the cat recognizing equation are equivalent to
>> the processing done by the trained neural network, all solutions to the
>> LISP equation are equivalent to the execution of every possible LISP
>> program (including the UD).
>>
>> Does this our conscious experience might be a direct consequence of
>> Diophantine equations?
>>
>>
>> Yes. Although you could *equivalently* say that our conscious experience
>> is a direct consequence of the combinators laws Kxy = x and Sxyz = xz(yz).
>>
>
>
> Do you have some references that you would recommend for someone wanting
> to learn more about combinator laws and how they lead to universality?
>
>
> I would simply recommend Smullyan’s book “How to mock a mocking bird?”,
> which proves in details the Turing universality of the combinators.
>
>
>
Thank you! I actually had a copy of this on my shelf, but I had yet to read
it.  I'll start tonight. :-)


>
>
> Is the above the same thing as a Y-combinator, or some more specific
> equation in lamda calculus or combinatorial logic? I wish to lean more.
>
>
> The Y combinator is the fixed point of Yx = x(Yx). All fixed point
> equation can be solved in combinatory logic. The Y combinator can be used
> to program the “definition by primitive recursion”, but, as Smullyan shows
> well, you can easily start from scratch and use the Dxyz = T(xx)yz trick.
> You need to be able to eliminate variables from combinations, but this too
> is well explained by Smullyan. His last book “A Beginner’s Further Guide to
> Mathematical Logic” contains a rather detailed summary of his book “How to
> Mock a Mocking Bird”.
> I have some rare text by Rosser, 

Re: Do we live within a Diophantine equation?

[Russell Standish]

On Fri, Jun 22, 2018 at 04:30:54PM -0400, John Clark wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 5:09 PM, Jason Resch  wrote:
> 
> ​>* ​*
> > *The only thing I am asking is:*
> > *1) Physics -> Brains, Cars, Atoms, Etc.*
> > *2) ??? -> Physics -> Brains, Cars, Atoms, Etc.*
> > *Do we have enough information to decide between the above two theories?
> > Have we really ruled out anything sitting below physics?*
> >
> 
> If I define physics as the thing that can tell the difference between a
> correct computation and a incorrect computation and between a corrupted
> memory and a uncorrupted memory, and as long as we're at this philosophic
> meta level that's not a  b ad definition, then I don't think anything
> is below physics.

If you define physics that way, then you are using the term
differently to Bruno, for whom physics is very definitely
phenomenology - tables, chairs, billiard balls, electrons and such.

I made a somewhat similar point to Bruno, when I asked why his
platonic arithmetic could be considered ur-stuff (which I defined to
be pretty much how you define physics above). His retort was that
integers weren't stuff - but I think that is somewhat of a lost in
translation moment. The French word etouffe basically means material,
and in English stuff used to mean the same, but in more recent times has
taken on a placeholder function, a generic collection of "things".

The real point is that with computationalism (in particular the CT
thesis), it doesn't matter what the computers are made of (ie what the
ur-stuff really is), phenomenal physics will be the same, a
consequence of what is computible.

One mystery does remain though - why don't we see things like Hilbert
hotel computers? It is a somewhat hidden assumption of
computationalism that such things don't exist.


> 
> 
> > ​>>​
> >> Then why is brain damage a big deal? Why do I need my brain to think?
> >>
> >
> > ​>* ​*
> > *The base computations that implement your brain may be sub-routines of a
> > larger computation,*
> >
> 
> If true then that is an example of something physics can do but mathematics
> can not. And I have to say that is a mighty damn important sub-routine!
> 
> > ​>>​
> >> Without physics 2+2=3 would work just as well as 2+2=4 and insisting the
> >> answer is 4 would just be an arbitrary convention of no more profundity
> >> than the rules that tell us when to say "who" and when to say "whom".
> >>
> >> ​> ​
> > *For any computation to make sense, you need to be working under some
> > definitions of integers and relations between them. *
> >
> 
> ​Definitions are made for our convenience, they do not create physical
> objects. And there are an infinite number of ways integers and
> the relations between them could have been defined, so why did
> mathematicians pick the specific definition that they did? Because that's
> the only one that conforms with the physical world, and thats why
> mathematics is the best language to describe physics.
> 
> 
> > * ​> ​Without that, you can't even define what a Turing machine or what a
> > computation is.*
> >
> 
> ​I don't need to describe either one because I've got something much much
> better than definitions, examples.​
> 
> *​>​I can imagine a computation without a physical universe. *
> >
> 
> ​I can't.​
> 
> 
> ​>* ​*
> > *I can't imagine a computation without some form of arithmetical law.*
> >
> 
> ​I can. A Turing Machine will just keep on doing what its doing regardless
> of the English words or mathematical equations you use to describe its
> operation.
> 
> > ​>>​
> >> As far as simulation is concerned in some circumstances we could figure
> >> out that we live in a virtual reality, assuming the computer that is
> >> simulating us does not have finite capacity we might devise experiments
> >> that stretch it to its limits and we'd start to see glitches. Or the
> >> beings doing the simulating could simply tell us, as they have complete
> >> control over everything in our world so they would certainly be able
> >> to convince us they’re telling the truth.
> >>
> >>
> > ​>​
> > T
> > *hey could convince us something strange is going on, but they couldn't
> > convince us they weren't lying about whatever they might be telling us
> > about the architecture that is running the simulation.​ ​This follows
> > directly from the Church-Turing thesis. The Church-Turing thesis says any
> > program or Turing Machine can be executed/emulated by any computer.
> > Therefore, no program or machine can determine whether it is being computed
> > by or emulated by any particular Turing machine vs. any other that might be
> > emulating it.*
> >
> 
> ​OK, they could prove they're simulating us but they couldn't prove the
> logical hardware architecture of their machine worked the way they said it
> did, however in some circumstances they could provide some pretty
> compelling evidence that they were telling the truth. For example suppose
> they found out how to solve all non-deterministic polynomial 

Re: are black holes actually misunderstood wormholes?

[Lawrence Crowell]

My tendency is to say that wormholes do not exist. There are problems with 
these types of solutions. The biggest is they requires a source term that 
has negative energy or T^{00} < 0. This would mean the quantum field that 
defines this source is not bounded below. This means an infinite well 
spring of radiation can exist. 

These types of spacetimes have other oddities. A wormhole can have one of 
its openings boosted or accelerated out and then accelerated back so the 
wormhole has closed timelike curves. This means a quantum state could be 
sent into the wormhole and it would return prior to then. This means a 
quantum state is duplicated. This is a non-unitary process forbidden by 
quantum mechanics. So I see this as another obstruction to the idea of 
wormholes.

The ring down, and I think as well the peak, of gravitational radiation may 
carry information about the quantum nature of black holes. Certainly if 
wormholes collide the quantum information of the wormhole would be 
contained in these signals or ring down. These types of data will likely 
require a spacebased system such as e-LISA in order to capture so called 
gravitational memory. This is where the configuration of test masses is 
different after the passage of the gravitational wave. The earliest 
projected launch date ESA will loft this system is 2034. We have a bit of a 
wait.

LC

On Saturday, June 23, 2018 at 3:01:53 PM UTC-5, cdemorsella wrote:
>
> As LIGO increases its sensitivity it is entering a domain in which its 
> instruments should be able to detect theorized ring down phase echoes (this 
> is the very last portion of a merging event of massive bodies that produces 
> a rapidly increasing frequency of waves that lead up to the moment of 
> merging, as the two merging objects undergo a final increasingly tight 
> cycle of rapidly narrowing orbits right before merging)  
>
> This increased sensitivity shouldd enable it to discoverif these 
> hypothetical echoes if they actually are being produced by the observed 
> event.
>
> If such echoes are discovered in these signals that would have major 
> implications for cosmology and would be evidence for the actual existence 
> of wormholes in our universe.
>
>  
> Quoting some selected paragraphs, from a Scientific American article: 
>
> "When two wormholes collide, they could produce ripples in space-time 
> that ricochet off themselves. Future instruments could detect these 
> gravitational “echoes,” providing evidence that these hypothetical tunnels 
> through space-time actually exist, a new paper suggests.
> ...
>
> To resolve this so-called black hole information paradox 
> ,
>  
> some physicists have suggested that event horizons don’t exist. Instead of 
> abysses from which nothing can return, black holes actually could be a host 
> of speculative black-hole-like objects that lack event horizons, such as 
> boson stars, gravastars, fuzzballs and even wormholes, which were theorized 
> by Albert Einstein and physicist Nathan Rosen decades ago.
> 
>
> In a 2016 study in the journal Physical Review Letters, physicists 
> hypothesized 
>  that 
> if two wormholes collided, they would produce gravitational waves very 
> similar to those generated from merging black holes. The only difference in 
> the signal would be in the last phase of the merger, called the ringdown, 
> when the newly combined black hole or wormhole relaxes into its final state.
> ...
>
> In the paper 
> , 
> published in January in the journal Physical Review D, the team of 
> physicists from Belgium and Spain analyzed wormholes that rotate, which are 
> more realistic than the non-spinning variety studied in the 2016 work. They 
> calculated what the resulting gravitational-wave signal would look like if 
> the wormholes merged.
>
> Because the strength of the signal drops during the ringdown, that section 
> of the signal would be too weak for LIGO’s current configuration to detect. 
> But that could change in the future, as researchers continue to upgrade and 
> fine-tune the instrument, the researchers said.
>
>
> “By the time we are running at full design sensitivity, I believe it may 
> be possible to resolve the ringdown phase where these echoes are predicted 
> to be,” said Stuver, who’s also a member of the LIGO team."
>
>
>

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Re: Radioactive Decay States

[agrayson2000]

On Sunday, June 24, 2018 at 3:03:07 AM UTC, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 6/23/2018 2:26 PM, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, June 23, 2018 at 9:21:05 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, June 23, 2018 at 7:52:08 PM UTC, Brent wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 6/23/2018 12:02 AM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, June 23, 2018 at 6:25:38 AM UTC, Brent wrote: 



 On 6/22/2018 3:13 PM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

 *I've been struggling lately with how to interpret a superposition of 
 states when it is ostensibly unintelligible, e.g., a cat alive and dead 
 simultaneously, or a radioactive source decayed and undecayed 
 simultaneously. If we go back to the vector space consisting of those 
 "little pointing things", it follows that any vector which is a sum of 
 other vectors, simultaneously shares the properties of the components in 
 its sum. This is simple and obvious. I therefore surmise that since a 
 Hilbert space is a linear vector space, this interpretation took hold as a 
 natural interpretation of superpositions in quantum mechanics, and led to 
 Schroedinger's cat paradox. I don't accept the explanation of decoherence 
 theory, that we never see these unintelligible superpositions because of 
 virtually instantaneous entanglements with the environment. Decoherence 
 doesn't explain why certain bases are stable; others not, even though, 
 apriori, all bases in a linear vector space are equivalent. These 
 considerations lead me to the conclusion that a quantum superposition of 
 states is just a calculational tool, and when the superposition consists 
 of 
 orthogonal component states, it allows us to calculate the probabilities 
 of 
 the measured system transitioning to the state of any component. In this 
 interpretation, essentially the CI, there remains the unsolved problem of 
 providing a mechanism for the transition from the SWE, to the collapse to 
 one of the eigenfunctions when the the measurement occurs. I prefer to 
 leave that as an unsolved problem, than accept the extravagance of the 
 MWI, 
 or decoherence theory, which IMO doesn't explain the paradoxes referred to 
 above, but rather executes what amounts to a punt, claiming the paradoxes 
 exist for short times so can be viewed as nonexistent, or solved. AG. *


 If you're willing to take QM as simply a calculational tool, then QBism 
 solve the problem of wf collapse.

 Brent

>>>
>>> Thanks. I'll check it out. Is QBism a plausible theory? Do some 
>>> professional "heavies" accept it? AG 
>>>
>>>
>>> Asher Peres started it and he was a "heavy weight".  Chris Fuchs has 
>>> been the main advocate, but he's kind of strange.  The interpretation is 
>>> not widely liked because it's the extreme end of instrumentalism.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>> *Let's go back to those little pointy things and write A = B + C, where B 
>> and C are basis states with appropriate multiplicative constants. Given 
>> this particular basis, one could interpret this equation as a superposition 
>> where A is understood as being in states B and C simultaneously. But A 
>> could be written in an infinite set of different sums using orthogonal or 
>> non orthogonal bases. So, given the lack of uniqueness, it seems an 
>> unwarranted stretch to assume any vector can be interpreted as being in two 
>> states simultaneously, If we drop this interpretation for quantum 
>> superpositions, most, possibly all the paradoxes go away. Who was the 
>> person who first interpreted a superposition in this way, which seems the 
>> root of many unnecessary, a[[ar problems in quantum mechanics? AG *
>>
>
> ... *Who first interpreted a quantum superposition this way, which seems 
> the root of many unnecessary, intractable problems in quantum mechanics, 
> inclusive of the idea that a particle can be in more than one position 
> simultaneously? AG*
>
>
> Of course in theory any pure state can be taken to be a basis vector and 
> there is an operator for which that state is an eigenvector, i.e. a basis 
> in which it is not a superposition.  But in practice we don't know what 
> that basis is and in general we cannot physically realize the corresponding 
> operator.  That's why a photon passing thru Young's slits is said to be in 
> a superposition of passing thru slit 1 and passing thru slit 2.  We know 
> how to create an operator that measures "passing thru slit 1" and we know 
> how to create an operator that measures "passing thru slit 2", but we don't 
> know how to construct an operator that measures "passes thru both slit 1 
> and slit 2".  We can write down the wf in the basis of "passing thru slit 
> 1" and "passing thru slit 2" and it's a coherent sum, i.e. a superposition 
> of those two.  Decoherence theory says that we can't construct an 
> instrument 

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/24/2018 8:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 21 Jun 2018, at 22:19, Brent Meeker  wrote:



On 6/21/2018 2:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 20 Jun 2018, at 00:47, Brent Meeker  wrote:



On 6/19/2018 8:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Most of these objections to CI are answered by decoherence theory.

I have no clue how to interpret decoherence with a collapse theory.

You use decoherence theory until you get to the reduced density matrix that is diagonal 
FAPP (or for all conscious purposes) and then you declare it is exactly diagonal and cut 
the other "worlds" loose.

But why adding that last steps? Why to make the diagonal exact if not to cut 
the other worlds?

Because if you don't, a further evolution may undo the measurement/perception.

I know it looks sad, but that is not an argument. In fact undoing some 
measurement/perception might be required for overall consistency, and is also a 
useful quantum gate.

The squared amplitudes can be asymptotical, and get the number zero is not 
always possible, but all what counts is to be relatively small to have enough 
determinism to keep the partial control.

And how much is that?

Brent

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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/24/2018 8:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 21 Jun 2018, at 22:12, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 6/21/2018 2:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 20 Jun 2018, at 00:28, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 6/19/2018 7:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 16 Jun 2018, at 22:41, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 6/16/2018 10:16 AM, John Clark wrote:


​> ​
/Another universe comes into existence when Joe the Plumber
performs, say, a spin measurement./


But a measurement (whatever in the world that means) does not 
need to be made and there is nothing special about Joe, if 
Everett is right the same thing happens every time an electron 
in Joe's skin encounters a photon, or for that matter whenever 
an electron anywhere encounters anything.


That's where MWI gets fuzzy.


Not more than QM itself. We can define a world by a branch of the 
universe wave. But such world will be “world” only as part of a 
personal history. Everett disagrees, but his “relative state” is a 
better wording than “many-worlds” which is often confusing.




Do all the submicroscopic events that make to macroscopic 
difference create different worlds? That can't be right because 
"worlds" are classical things.  So the Heisenberg but problem 
seems to reappear in different form.


Heisenberg cut disappear, it is just that worlds differentiate 
from our perspective when they make difference for us, like when 
they can no more interfere. There is no cut, only the quantum wave 
(in the Schroedinger picture) and relative state related to 
macroscopic irreversibility, which needs only the classical chaos 
to be irreversible FAPP. Histories are internal things, already a 
form of first person plural notion.


Right.  But how FAPP does it have to be, how irreversible, in order 
that it constitutes a conscious distinct state?  That's how the 
Heisenberg cut problem reappears at a different level.


Very quickly, like when you mix milk in the coffee. Pure statistics 
theory provides the numbers, like when we can use Gauss e^(-x^2) 
instead of Pascal triangle. You don’t need 0 on the diagonal, only 
tiny numbers.


I think you mean OFF the diagonal.


Indeed.



But how do you know you only need tiny numbers, and how tiny?  I have 
thought that perhaps there should be a smallest non-zero unit of 
probability; but it has been pointed out that even tiny numbers may 
add up when the density matrix is transformed to some other basis.


It is just that the numbers are tiny only from your (3p) personal 
points of view. You brain needs to be enough of a mixture for 
consciousness to differentiate into universal machine (relative) 
state. In the case (which I doubt) that the brain is a quantum 
computer, we would be able to exploit the numbers which are not tiny 
in the relevant base to exploit quantum computing ability.








You don’t need purely orthogonal state, the big numbers and 
classical chaos will lead to the right quasi classical phenomenology,


So you say.  But that requires a theory of "phenomenology", i.e. a 
theory of how perception is realized.


But I extract the quantum from such a phenomenology. Perception is 
mainly [a]p with [a] designing a variant of the logic of 
self-reference G, or G*.


It is provably realised in all models of the consistent extensions of 
very elementary arithmetic.


(You might need to study some books on self-reference (the provability 
logic) to get the point).


So you're claiming that you have derived QM from perception (as 
described by provability).  But how does it then follow that perception 
is classical?   Also that doesn't solve the problem of small  
off-diagonal terms not being small when written in a different basis.


Brent

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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/24/2018 8:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I agree. To change QM, and getting the correct spin measurement in 
all directions, you would need to de-linearise slightly the SWE, but 
this makes the many worlds able to interact (Weinberg showed this, 
and Plaga in this list a long time ago). Problem: it makes 
thermodynamical laws wrong. Well, it makes almost all physical laws 
wrong).


"Wrong" comes in degrees.


The Löbian machine agrees with you, like f, []f, [][]f, [][][]f, …. 
There are big lies and small lies in the machine’s mind.




QM made all physical laws wrong at the time.


Not really. QM on the contrary consolidate them in their scale on more 
solid base. QM made only the metaphysical interpretation of those 
theories wrong.


I take your point that where classical physics saved the phenomenon so 
did QM.  But QM did more than that; for example it showed why atoms were 
stable and had discrete emission spectra.


The same can be said with computationalism: it should (and seems to 
give) a very solid base of the quantum physical laws, with much less 
ontological requirement.





GR made Newtonian gravity and spacetime wrong.


I would not say that. It shows them to be approximation. That’s the 
advantage for Platonism: it bets at the start that what we see is not 
the real thing, but approximation due to our finite abilities.


It shows Newtonian gravity is an approximation in a certain domain (the 
weak field limit).  But it's not even approximately right for a black 
hole.  The possibility of gravitational waves or a wormhole is a 
fundamental difference, as is the idea of a dynamic geometry.


Brent




  So if we reconcile our theories of spacetime and quantum fields the 
result will likely be a theory that makes "all physical laws wrong”.


Yes, as the physical laws have to be deduced from simpler ideas, and 
with Mechanism, the physicals arise from the unique measure on 
computational histories that we must extracted from a logic of bet on 
sigma_1 sentences, which we get with the adjunction of the consistency 
condition (<>t).


Bruno



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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 22 Jun 2018, at 02:26, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/21/2018 3:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 5:10 PM, Brent Meeker > > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 6/21/2018 7:47 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 12:59 AM, Brent Meeker >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 6/20/2018 9:48 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
 
 
 On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 5:24 PM, Brent Meeker >>> > wrote:
 
 
 On 6/19/2018 7:10 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
> 
> 
> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 12:21 AM, Brent Meeker  > wrote:
> 
> 
> On 6/18/2018 4:27 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 9:57 PM, Brent Meeker > > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 6/17/2018 4:43 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>> On 17 June 2018 at 13:26,  > > wrote:
>> 
>> On Sunday, June 17, 2018 at 10:15:05 AM UTC, Jason wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 12:12 AM, > > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>>   why do you prefer the MWI compared to the Transactional Interpretation?
>> I see both as absurd. so I prefer to assume the wf is just epistemic, 
>> and/or
>> that we have some holes in the CI which have yet to be resolved. AG
>> 
>> --
>> 
>> 
>> 1. It's the simplest theory: "MWI" is just the Schrodinger equation,
>> nothing else. (it doesn't say Schrodinger's equation only applies 
>> sometimes,
>> or only at certain scales)
>> 
>> 2. It explains more while assuming less (it explains the appearance of
>> collapse, without having to assume it, thus is preferred by Occam's 
>> razor)
>> 
>> 3. Like every other successful physical theory, it is linear, reversible
>> (time-symmetric), continuous, deterministic and does not require faster 
>> than
>> light influences nor retrocausalities
>> 
>> 4. Unlike single-universe or epistemic interpretations, "WF is real" with
>> MWI is the only way we know how to explain the functioning of quantum
>> computers (now up to 51 qubits)
>> 
>> 5. Unlike copenhagen-type theories, it attributes no special physical
>> abilities to observers or measurement devices
>> 
>> 6. Most of all, theories of everything that assume a reality containing
>> all possible observers and observations lead directly to laws/postulates 
>> of
>> quantum mechanics (see Russell Standish's Theory of Nothing, Chapter 7 
>> and
>> Appendix D).
>> 
>> Given #6, we should revise our view. It is not MWI and QM that should
>> convince us of many worlds, but rather the assumption of many worlds (an
>> infinite and infinitely varied reality) that gives us, and explains all 
>> the
>> weirdness of QM. This should overwhelmingly convince us of MWI-type
>> everything theories over any single-universe interpretation of quantum
>> mechanics, which is not only absurd, but completely devoid of 
>> explanation.
>> With the assumption of a large reality, QM is made explainable and
>> understandable: as a theory of observation within an infinite reality.
>> 
>> Jason
>> 
>> You forgot #7. It asserts multiple, even infinite copies of an observer,
>> replete with memories, are created when an observer does a simple quantum
>> experiment. So IMO the alleged "cure" is immensely worse than the 
>> disease,
>> CI, that is, just plain idiotic. AG
>> It is important to make the distinction between our intuition and
>> common sense and actual formal reasoning. The former can guide the
>> latter very successfully, but the history of science teaches us that
>> this is not always the case. You don't provide an argument, you just
>> present your gut feeling as if it were the same thing as irrefutable
>> fact.
>> 
>> I think Scott Aaronson has the right attitude toward this:
>> 
>> https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=326 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> As such a strong believer in quantum computers (he's staked $100,000 of 
>> his own money on the future construction of large scale quantum 
>> computers), I would love to ask Scott Aaronson what he thinks about 
>> running a conscious AI on such a quantum computer.  That trivially leads 
>> to "many worlds" at least as seen by that AI.
> 
> If it's so trivial maybe you can explain it. 
> 
> 1. A quantum computer is isolated from the environment so as to remain in 
> a super position of many possible states.
> 2. Quantum computers are Turing universal, anything that can be 
> programmed on a classical computer can be programmed on a quantum computer
> 3. Assuming 

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 21 Jun 2018, at 22:19, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/21/2018 2:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 20 Jun 2018, at 00:47, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 6/19/2018 8:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Most of these objections to CI are answered by decoherence theory.
 I have no clue how to interpret decoherence with a collapse theory.
>>> You use decoherence theory until you get to the reduced density matrix that 
>>> is diagonal FAPP (or for all conscious purposes) and then you declare it is 
>>> exactly diagonal and cut the other "worlds" loose.
>> But why adding that last steps? Why to make the diagonal exact if not to cut 
>> the other worlds?
> 
> Because if you don't, a further evolution may undo the measurement/perception.

I know it looks sad, but that is not an argument. In fact undoing some 
measurement/perception might be required for overall consistency, and is also a 
useful quantum gate.

The squared amplitudes can be asymptotical, and get the number zero is not 
always possible, but all what counts is to be relatively small to have enough 
determinism to keep the partial control.

Bruno





> 
> Brent
> 
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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 21 Jun 2018, at 22:12, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/21/2018 2:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 20 Jun 2018, at 00:28, Brent Meeker >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 6/19/2018 7:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 16 Jun 2018, at 22:41, Brent Meeker  > wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/16/2018 10:16 AM, John Clark wrote:
>> ​> ​ Another universe comes into existence when Joe the Plumber 
>> performs, say, a spin measurement.
>> 
>> But a measurement (whatever in the world that means) does not need to be 
>> made and there is nothing special about Joe, if Everett is right the 
>> same thing happens every time an electron in Joe's skin encounters a 
>> photon, or for that matter whenever an electron anywhere encounters 
>> anything.
> 
> That's where MWI gets fuzzy. 
 
 Not more than QM itself. We can define a world by a branch of the universe 
 wave. But such world will be “world” only as part of a personal history. 
 Everett disagrees, but his “relative state” is a better wording than 
 “many-worlds” which is often confusing.
 
 
 
> Do all the submicroscopic events that make to macroscopic difference 
> create different worlds?  That can't be right because "worlds" are 
> classical things.  So the Heisenberg but problem seems to reappear in 
> different form.
 
 Heisenberg cut disappear, it is just that worlds differentiate from our 
 perspective when they make difference for us, like when they can no more 
 interfere. There is no cut, only the quantum wave (in the Schroedinger 
 picture) and relative state related to macroscopic irreversibility, which 
 needs only the classical chaos to be irreversible FAPP. Histories are 
 internal things, already a form of first person plural notion. 
>>> 
>>> Right.  But how FAPP does it have to be, how irreversible, in order that it 
>>> constitutes a conscious distinct state?  That's how the Heisenberg cut 
>>> problem reappears at a different level.
>> 
>> Very quickly, like when you mix milk in the coffee. Pure statistics theory 
>> provides the numbers, like when we can use Gauss e^(-x^2) instead of Pascal 
>> triangle. You don’t need 0 on the diagonal, only tiny numbers.
> 
> I think you mean OFF the diagonal. 

Indeed.



> But how do you know you only need tiny numbers, and how tiny?  I have thought 
> that perhaps there should be a smallest non-zero unit of probability; but it 
> has been pointed out that even tiny numbers may add up when the density 
> matrix is transformed to some other basis.

It is just that the numbers are tiny only from your (3p) personal points of 
view. You brain needs to be enough of a mixture for consciousness to 
differentiate into universal machine (relative) state. In the case (which I 
doubt) that the brain is a quantum computer, we would be able to exploit the 
numbers which are not tiny in the relevant base to exploit quantum computing 
ability.





> 
>> You don’t need purely orthogonal state, the big numbers and classical chaos 
>> will lead to the right quasi classical phenomenology,
> 
> So you say.  But that requires a theory of "phenomenology", i.e. a theory of 
> how perception is realized.

But I extract the quantum from such a phenomenology. Perception is mainly 
[a]p with [a] designing a variant of the logic of self-reference G, or G*.

It is provably realised in all models of the consistent extensions of very 
elementary arithmetic.

(You might need to study some books on self-reference (the provability logic) 
to get the point).

Bruno




> 
> Brent
> 
>> for most relative observers. We don’t need to kill all white rabbits, just 
>> to make them relatively rare. 
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> Brent
>>> 
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>> 
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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 21 Jun 2018, at 18:55, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/21/2018 1:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 19 Jun 2018, at 16:10, Jason Resch >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 12:21 AM, Brent Meeker >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 6/18/2018 4:27 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
 
 
 On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 9:57 PM, Brent Meeker >>> > wrote:
 
 
 On 6/17/2018 4:43 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
 On 17 June 2018 at 13:26,  >>> > wrote:
 
 On Sunday, June 17, 2018 at 10:15:05 AM UTC, Jason wrote:
 
 
 On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 12:12 AM, >>> > wrote:
 
 
   why do you prefer the MWI compared to the Transactional Interpretation?
 I see both as absurd. so I prefer to assume the wf is just epistemic, 
 and/or
 that we have some holes in the CI which have yet to be resolved. AG
 
 --
 
 
 1. It's the simplest theory: "MWI" is just the Schrodinger equation,
 nothing else. (it doesn't say Schrodinger's equation only applies 
 sometimes,
 or only at certain scales)
 
 2. It explains more while assuming less (it explains the appearance of
 collapse, without having to assume it, thus is preferred by Occam's razor)
 
 3. Like every other successful physical theory, it is linear, reversible
 (time-symmetric), continuous, deterministic and does not require faster 
 than
 light influences nor retrocausalities
 
 4. Unlike single-universe or epistemic interpretations, "WF is real" with
 MWI is the only way we know how to explain the functioning of quantum
 computers (now up to 51 qubits)
 
 5. Unlike copenhagen-type theories, it attributes no special physical
 abilities to observers or measurement devices
 
 6. Most of all, theories of everything that assume a reality containing
 all possible observers and observations lead directly to laws/postulates of
 quantum mechanics (see Russell Standish's Theory of Nothing, Chapter 7 and
 Appendix D).
 
 Given #6, we should revise our view. It is not MWI and QM that should
 convince us of many worlds, but rather the assumption of many worlds (an
 infinite and infinitely varied reality) that gives us, and explains all the
 weirdness of QM. This should overwhelmingly convince us of MWI-type
 everything theories over any single-universe interpretation of quantum
 mechanics, which is not only absurd, but completely devoid of explanation.
 With the assumption of a large reality, QM is made explainable and
 understandable: as a theory of observation within an infinite reality.
 
 Jason
 
 You forgot #7. It asserts multiple, even infinite copies of an observer,
 replete with memories, are created when an observer does a simple quantum
 experiment. So IMO the alleged "cure" is immensely worse than the disease,
 CI, that is, just plain idiotic. AG
 It is important to make the distinction between our intuition and
 common sense and actual formal reasoning. The former can guide the
 latter very successfully, but the history of science teaches us that
 this is not always the case. You don't provide an argument, you just
 present your gut feeling as if it were the same thing as irrefutable
 fact.
 
 I think Scott Aaronson has the right attitude toward this:
 
 https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=326 
 
 
 
 As such a strong believer in quantum computers (he's staked $100,000 of 
 his own money on the future construction of large scale quantum 
 computers), I would love to ask Scott Aaronson what he thinks about 
 running a conscious AI on such a quantum computer.  That trivially leads 
 to "many worlds" at least as seen by that AI.
>>> 
>>> If it's so trivial maybe you can explain it. 
>>> 
>>> 1. A quantum computer is isolated from the environment so as to remain in a 
>>> super position of many possible states.
>>> 2. Quantum computers are Turing universal, anything that can be programmed 
>>> on a classical computer can be programmed on a quantum computer
>>> 3. Assuming Computational Theory of mind, a quantum computer can execute 
>>> the same conscious program as "Brent Meeker's Brain"
>>> 4. The quantum computer can be arranged to entangle an unmeasured particle 
>>> with Brent Meeker's quantum brain emulation,
>>> a) by feeding in spin up as an auditory tone in Brent Meeker's left 
>>> auditory nerve
>>> b) by feeding in spin down as an auditory tone in Brent Meeker's right 
>>> auditory nerve
>>> 5. The quantum brain simulation, being isolated from the environment, 
>>> remains in a super position of the Brent Meeker brain emulation hearing an 
>>> auditory tone in his left and 

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 21 Jun 2018, at 18:51, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/21/2018 1:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 19 Jun 2018, at 07:24, Brent Meeker >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 6/18/2018 4:33 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
 
 
 On Mon, Jun 18, 2018 at 12:01 AM, Brent Meeker >>> > wrote:
 
 
 On 6/17/2018 2:24 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
> 
> 
> On Sunday, June 17, 2018,  > wrote:
> 
> 
> On Sunday, June 17, 2018 at 12:29:35 PM UTC, Jason wrote:
> 
> 
> On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 6:26 AM, > wrote:
> 
> 
> On Sunday, June 17, 2018 at 10:15:05 AM UTC, Jason wrote:
> 
> 
> On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 12:12 AM, > wrote:
> 
> 
>  why do you prefer the MWI compared to the Transactional Interpretation? 
> I see both as absurd. so I prefer to assume the wf is just epistemic, 
> and/or that we have some holes in the CI which have yet to be resolved. 
> AG 
> -- 
> 
> 
> 1. It's the simplest theory: "MWI" is just the Schrodinger equation, 
> nothing else. (it doesn't say Schrodinger's equation only applies 
> sometimes, or only at certain scales)
> 
> 2. It explains more while assuming less (it explains the appearance of 
> collapse, without having to assume it, thus is preferred by Occam's razor)
> 
> 3. Like every other successful physical theory, it is linear, reversible 
> (time-symmetric), 
>   continuous, deterministic and does not require faster than light 
> influences nor retrocausalities
> 
> 4. Unlike single-universe or epistemic interpretations, "WF is real" with 
> MWI is the only way we know how to explain the functioning of quantum 
> computers (now up to 51 qubits)
> 
> 5. Unlike copenhagen-type theories, it attributes no special physical 
> abilities to observers or measurement devices
> 
> 6. Most of all, theories of everything that assume a reality containing 
> all possible observers and observations lead directly to laws/postulates 
> of quantum mechanics (see Russell Standish's Theory of Nothing 
> , Chapter 7 and 
> Appendix D).
> 
> Given #6, we should revise our view. It is not MWI and QM that should 
> convince us of many worlds, but rather the assumption of many worlds (an 
> infinite and infinitely varied reality) that gives us, and explains all 
> the weirdness of QM. This should overwhelmingly convince us of MWI-type 
> everything theories over any single-universe interpretation of quantum 
> mechanics, which is not only absurd, but completely devoid of 
> explanation. With the assumption of a large reality, QM is made 
> explainable and understandable: as a theory of observation within an 
> infinite reality.
> 
> Jason
> 
> You forgot #7. It asserts multiple, even infinite copies of an observer, 
> replete with   memories, 
> are created when an observer does a simple quantum experiment. So IMO the 
> alleged "cure" is immensely worse than the disease, CI, that is, just 
> plain   idiotic. AG 
> 
> 
> There are many atoms, many planets, many solar systems, many galaxies, 
> many Hubble volumes, and it is believed many universes.  On what basis 
> are you so certain there aren't many histories? (That is, other states in 
> the wave function that are predicted to be there by our well established 
> scientific theories, but which the theory explains we cannot see or 
> interact with except in very limited controlled manners)?
>  
> If you find MWI distasteful you might prefer to think of it as the 
> many-minds interpretation as described by Heinz-Dieter Zeh, or the 
> "zero-universe interpretation" as explained by Ron Garrett: 
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dEaecUuEqfc 
> 
> 
> I think you are hung up on the "creation", I think it is conceptually 
> easier to grasp under the understanding that it is all already there.  If 
> you look at the homepage of Wei Dai (who founded this e-mailing list 
>  20 years ago) he outlines what he 
> calls "a very simple interpretation of quantum mechanics 
> " which is basically this: 
> all the states are already there.
> 
> Sounds like Super-Determinism proposed by t'Hooft, and referenced 
> yesterday by Brent, which proposes the universe knows beforehand what 
> kind of experiment Joe the Plumber will perform. Too ridiculous for my 
> tastes, and of