RE: The Rapidly-Accelerating Computer
It is meaninless fr5om an objective point of view, but from a 'classical universe perspective' it has meaning. There is no objective meaning other that 'everything exists'. -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Sent: Friday, September 15, 2000 5:06 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: RE: The Rapidly-Accelerating Computer James writes: There is no distinction. No observer-moments are related. No observations are related to events. But of course, all observer-moments exists, and all events exist, so you could argue that all observations are accurate. So in this formulation, the question of whether a RAC could exist is meaningless? That doesn't sound like a very useful approach. Hal
anthropic thinking
An aside for Nick Bostrom: I belive we must apply anthropic reasoning not to people - they don't exist objectively - but to thoughts. An interesting point is that all thoughts about anthropic reasoning include something along the lines of , 'this is a thought about anthropic reasoning'. Why is this very current thought of yours (or observer moment, if you like) a thought about anthropic reasoning? The SSA implies that thoughts about anthropic reasoning make up a high proportion of all the thoughts in the multiverse... James
RE: You're hunting wild geese
It answers your question. If you want your 'empty' need to be satisfied, I recommend introspection. -Original Message- From: Brent Meeker [SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Sent: Tuesday, 06 June, 2000 5:05 AM To: everything-list Subject: Re: You're hunting wild geese On 05-Jun-00, Higgo James wrote: I have made my explanation abundently clear: WAP If our OM did not include 'we seem to need an explanation for seeming to be observers' then this question would not exist in the first place, so only 'seekers to the answer to that question'-type ideas can seek to answer that question. I simply apply WAP to ideas, not observers. I have said this several times, and it *does* answer your question. OK, I guess I do understand you. Usually the WAP is used to explain why the universe has certain chracteristics by saying they are the ones necessary that a class of physical entities - namely us - can exist. But you apply it to ideas; and as I understand it not to a particular class of ideas but to whatever particular ideas occur to you. So far as I can see this is a completely empty theory that boils down to whatever is is. Do you have some way of limiting it? Brent Meeker
this very moment
Would someone please give me a reason why there needs to be anything more to the observer than 'this very conscious moment' ? James -- --
RE: Everything is Just a Memory
Your question is, why will there be a bruno entity with the idea that 'he' is one moment on from 'you now'. The answer is MWI. Everything exists; surely you don't need persuading of that, Bruno? You then ask where my 'apparantly personal belief' comes from (or as Buddhists call it, the 'illusion of self'). The answer is, again, that a 'me' with such a belief does exist in the plenitude, and it is for you to suggest why 'I' should not be that 'me'. Correction: I do not tell you that there is only one observer moment; just that we experience only one suc moment and our deductive reasoning should not start with the assumption that the moment is related to any others. You ask where your meaningless questions come from. Again. MWI: there are very many meaningless questions I suppose an infinite numbe. If there was a limited supply of them, this would imply that the universe was much more complex than it need to be - Kolmogorov, counting algorithm etc. You then ask how to derive schroedinger equation: i.e. why do observer-moments which incude awareness of the schroedinger equation tend to include the same equation? I have long argued that all laws and constants are products of the weak anthropic principle, as per Barndon Carter. To try to put WAP in the language we are using here, the answer would be that the Scroedinger equation is one of our subjective ways of stringing together otherwise unrelated observer moments. There are no objective arrows of time, but we have invented/observed many subjective ones that tend to give the same answers. Now, while I claim that this is, in principle, all that is necessary to derive Schroedinger, I graoan at your insistence that I explain 'consciousness'. I deny that consciousness exists, by however you try to define it. There is this observer moment, and the onus is on you to demostrate that there is another related moment, which would be a pre-requisite of consiousness. James
RE: Everything is Just a Memory
Look at your original question. It answers itself. For more depth see http://www.higgo.com/quantum/middleway.htm -Original Message- From: Fritz Griffith [SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Sent: Thursday, January 20, 2000 1:12 AM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: RE: Everything is Just a Memory From: Higgo James [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: 'Fritz Griffith' [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: RE: Everything is Just a Memory Date: Wed, 19 Jan 2000 15:02:59 - Why does a rose smell sweet? Because we say so. James, instead of always responding with vague philisophical statements, why don't you explain yourself more in-depth? __ Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com
RE: middle way
Hi Ken This is also something Han Moravec identified. It's true that Everett does not say this explicitly, but it is implicit in his paper, at least the way I read it. But I'm really just following Deutsch, and a few discussions with Rainer Plaga. Essentially, MWI is no better than Copenhagen if this is not true as there is a mystery consciousness link initiating a split. James -Original Message- From: Ken Fisher [SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Sent: Tuesday, November 23, 1999 2:17 PM To: Higgo James Cc: '[EMAIL PROTECTED]' Subject: Re: middle way Hi James What's up with the list? I seem not to heve received anything since 20th November. Did I unsubscribe by mistake? And where's the archive? I've received 10 messages since then and I'm still able to access the archive at http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/ Comments, please, on the following piece for inclusion in the Journal of the Buddhist society. Notification of any actual inaccuracies will be especially welcome. I think it's good and I didn't find any inaccuracies, but I do have a question. You say: According to Everett's MWI, the universe is branching off every Planck Time [1e-43 second] into countless billions of other universes, each an unmoving snapshot in time, and each branching out in turn. You've suggested in several of your posts to this list and the avoidl list that the universe branches *every Planck time*, but I've never found another source that seems so sure about it. I'd be interested if you have any references. It's certainly not the view, for example, of the mwi faq at http://www.hedweb.com/everett/everett.htm#do which says: Worlds irrevocably split at the sites of measurement-like interactions associated with thermodynamically irreversible processes... I'd very much appreciate comments about this either from you or from anyone else on the list. Ken Fisher
Observer-moments
The concept of the observer-moment is at the heart of much of our thinking. I believe this is a problem, because the very words 'observer moment' are self-contradictory. How can you have an observer (a consciousness) in a moment (a snapshot in time). Think about it. In which snapshot (universe) did that thought occur? I am not proposing any solution to this problem - just pointing out that any edifice built on the idea of an observer-moment is bound to crumble. James
RE: Know your mind
Not until we know everything. -Original Message- From: Devin Harris [SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Sent: Thursday, July 15, 1999 4:42 AM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Know your mind Dr. Russell Standish wrote: Entities able to see the whole of reality would just see a blandness of zero information. In fact, they would not be able to see themselves, pointing to an essential contradiction of omniscient beings. Does this mean that the more we learn the less we know. Devin
Know your mind
Bruno, Hans I'm not sure why someone else's knowledge of a system has any bearing on it's subjective experience. If it does, then anyone who believes in God (omniscient) is, by this definition, not capable of subjective experience in their own view. Minds are piles of components; why does it matter if they can be known? I have just received Robot, and perhaps the issue is discussed in more detail there. James
RE: Confessions of a quantum suicidal
A note like 'Farewell cruel world I've branched to a better place'? -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Sent: Saturday, June 19, 1999 2:00 AM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Confessions of a quantum suicidal That's a very interesting story. I wonder if any suicides have ever been discovered where there was a note or other evidence that they were attempting quantum suicide? Of course these ideas are not well known so it is unlikely that the investigators would attach any significance to such evidence. Hal
RE: Fwd: Why physical laws
You have jsut asked: There would be more unfamiliar environments, so why don't I find myself in an unfamiliar environment? Err... because you're used to it. In fact, we are less likely to find ourselves in regions where raindrops are like elephants because they would be less conducive to life. I don't deny there are 'laws', just that the laws are an objective feature of reality. If we take our visible world, but add the very many laws needed to shape raindrops like elephants, thise same laws would probably preclude the evolution of a useful circulatory system. -Original Message- From: Wei Dai [SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Sent: Tuesday, June 08, 1999 11:08 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Fwd: Why physical laws On Tue, Jun 08, 1999 at 01:54:03AM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: To answer your question, I could say that, in my opinion, the real essence of the world is disorder. The world is becoming undone every Planck time and is also reconstituted every Planck Time, as James Higgo recently stated. What brings order to chaos is the fact that we can ONLY observe the portion of this many world which supports our existence, and this is precisely the portion where per force the physical laws exist for if they didn't we would not be around to observe the world. Higgo and Levy, Do this thought experiment: consider a region of the meta-universe that is exactly identical to ours, but where all of the raindrops are shaped like elephants. If all regions are ruled by disorder, then there must be many more regions where these kind of wierd things happen then regions where they don't. Why are we not in such a region? Why do we never observe apparent violations of physical law that do not threaten our existence? It must be that most regions do follow physical laws.
RE: why is death painful?
All good points, but if you look at the bigger picture, the universe is all the same stuff, all numbers. The concept of 'my' is meaningless (or can you show otherwise?), so caring about 'my measure' is foolish. Yes, our genes would care, if they could care. So what? -Original Message- From: Wei Dai [SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Sent: Monday, June 07, 1999 9:59 AM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: why is death painful? Should one make decisions based on objective or subjective consequences of his actions? By objective, I mean one should consider how one's actions affect the external world, and by subjective I mean one should only consider one's future subjective experiences. This is very much related to the quantum suicide debate, since the QS advocates argue (as I understand it) that a decrease in one's measure (which is definitely a feature of the objective universe) should be ignored as a part of decision making since it is not directly subjectively detectable. Evolution must have had two choices when it programmed our brains to make decisions as they relate to death. It could have made death or circumstances leading to death painful and made us avoid actions that lead to the subjective experience of pain, or it could have made us consider the effect of each of our potential actions on our measure and avoid actions that lead to a decrease in measure. Apparently it chose the former, presumably because it's easier for evolution to accomplish. But because of this our genes are now in trouble because we have found ways to kill ourselves painlessly. So what does this mean for us? Since subjective decision making is a legacy of our evolutionary past, and can be shown to be less general than objective decision making, it should no longer be used. Therefore, QS advocates will have to come up with a new justification for ignoring one's measure. I don't think there is one. That doesn't mean one should care about one's measure, just that there is no reason why one shouldn't.
RE: Bayesian boxes and Independence of Scales
George's point is also the main problem with Nick Bostrom's latest paper re Adam Eve. By inventing these exceptionally unlikely people, he smuggles the 'paradox' in to his paper. I forget, perhaps that's what started thread. GS Levy wrote: It all depends how you measure my age. In fact, my lifeline extends uninterrupted probably four billions years (or possibly more), since it first appeared on earth, and we may even be cousins. And by the way, your lifeline also extends that much. Joyeux Anniversaire! Happy Birthday! :-) George
RE: Marchal Thesis
Can you subscribe me so I can contribute but not send me stuff? I get it through another address. -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Sent: Tuesday, May 11, 1999 6:40 AM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Marchal Thesis Bruno Marchal's paper, Computation, Physis and Cognition English translation 1st draft Introduction The computationalist hypothesis, or more simply, *mechanism*, which I consider here, is the hypothesis according to which *I* am a machine or *you* are a machine. The precise way in which I am interested in the hypothesis that we can survive, not just with an artificial heart or kidney, etc., but also with an artificial digital brain (finitely describable) assuming it is suitably configured at an adequate level. The aim is not to defend this hypothesis but to examine the consequences, notably concerning the mind-body problem. In particular I shall show, contrary to a very widespread belief, among philosophers and doctors as much as the layman, that mechanism is incompatible with materialism. I will demonstrate that mechanism is incompatible with materialist monism, which claims that is only one universe, which can in principle be described entirely in terms of physics. On the way I will demonstrate that mchanism is also incompatible with dualism, which holds that there is simultaneously a tangible world (described by physics) and a mental world. Hence I will show that mechanism necessitates a monist idealism incompatible with any form of materialism. This proof will not resolve the mind- body problem, but will lead towards a new formulation of the question. Essentially, with the computationalist hypothesis, the mind-body problem is transformed in the research deriving: 1. a phenomenology of mind - capable of explaining the origin and nature of knowledge and belief; and 2. a phenomenology of matter, capable of explaining the origin and nature of our observations and our theories of physics. The first point can hardly be considered original. With computationalism, psychology is, *in principle*, trivially reduced to information theory. The originality is in the demonstration that to resolve the body-mind problem, one is obliged to derive the phenomenology of matter from the phenomenology of mind. That is, physics is *in principle* a branch of psychology. This is precisely the reverse of our usual attempts to reduce or try to understand psychological phenomena from the substrate of the brain - physical, or even cosmic or universal. On the contrary, mechanism demands a psychology which eliminates all materialist ontology rather than a materialism which eliminates mental ontology. Mechanism therefore requires us to consider physics as a branch of psychology, itself a branch of information theory, which is in turn a branch of number theory. The word, branch is used here in a slightly more general sense than normal; this will be clarified during the course of the proof. An attentive logician will note that matter is not *logically* eliminated. But he would fail at any attempt to explain physical sensations through physical science alone. There is a certain irony in this situation. Mechanism is generally invoked by reductionist materialists to debunk the spirit and to counter dualism and other spiritualism. And it works in practice, but on closer examination (as proposed here), the dematerialisation does not stop with the spirit but extends to the body, matter and the universe. This work is not speculative. It stands up well to demonstration or hypothetico-deductive argument: IF mechanism is true THEN physics *must* be derived from psychology. I clarify this point in Chapter 2. Note on methodology To help the reader keep track of the proof, I decided to be as brief as possible. The poof, which starts in Chapter 3, finishes by the end of Chapter 4. It does not assume any specific knowledge, except a familiarity with Church's Thesis and, of course, a smattering of high-school classical philosopy (good treatments are given in Huisman and Vergez, 1996 or Nagel, 1987). Appendix D provides an introduction to the mind-body problem as well as some supplementry definitions on the concept of sufficient conditions for mechanism. Chapter 1, which defines the hypotheses of the *entire* work, raises some technical points which are not ued in the proof. This additional material will be used before Chapter 5. Chapter 5 examines the search for a solution to the mind-body problem in the light of the proof given here. Unlike the proof, this research has a few prerequisite techniques. You may consult the technical report (Marchal, 1995) or the appendices of this paper, or certain works such as Boolos, 1995, Webb, 1980, as well as Albert, 1992 and Maudlin, 1994 on physics.
Everett
I'm trying to locate the original Everett paper Everet, H, 1957, Rev. Mod. Phys 29, 454. Anyone know where I can get it online? James
Roy Frieden
Has anyone read that piece in New Scientist recently about all physical laws being derived from the lagrangian representing the gap between our knowledge of the system and 'what nature knows'? It seems pertinent. http://www.newscientist.com/ns/19990130/iisthelaw.html
Jacques, champion of quantum suicide
Jacques, Darwin has a lot of work to do before I become a slave to my genes, which is what you advocate. I don't say consciousness jumps magically. Our consciousness, like anything, exists in the same form in very many sets of universes. It doesn't make sense to say 'I am that one' or 'no, I'm that one'. You are all of them, and as many sets you could call 'you' get 'shut down' because of a vacuum collapse or supernova or quantum suicide experiemnt, they become no longer you, and irrelevant to you. This is not an everyday concept, and I am not surprised you have difficulty with it. But please persevere. Like Bryce DeWitt and MWI, you will eventually be its most ardent champion. -Original Message- From: Jacques M Mallah [SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Sent: 25 January 1999 23:04 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Misc.measurement On Fri, 22 Jan 1999 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Jacques Mallah, we don't care about our measure, we only care if we should buy a tontine in the knowledge that we will benefit from it in 100, 1000, 10'1000 years. We know that in some branches we will, but we don't know if we will experience a smooth flow of consciousness which will inevitably mean we awake one morning to find ourselves 1000 years old. Obviously we don't intend to try to commit suicide (at least until this issue is resolved). I see. You think that if you are killed, your consciousness would magically jump into the other parts of the universe where you-like beings continue to exist. That's what your 'smooth flow of consciousness amounts to. Well, if that were true, then the amount of 'you' in the universe would not really decrease. Your measure would by definition be conserved as a function of time, but would become more concentrated in the survivors. But of course there is absolutely no reason to think that; it's nothing more than your version of religion. Logic says that since copies are independent, your measure would be proportional to the number of surving copies and would decrease. The fact that you are still saying you don't care about measure, indicates to me that you still don't understand the concept. Perhaps Darwin has more work to do. - - - - - - - Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate I know what no one else knows - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/
RE: Amoeba croaks -
I hate to admit it but Jacques does a reasonable job of explaining how classical probability translates into the MWI view in his last posting. Essentially, a probability refers to the proportion of universes subsequent to yours (using your personal arrow of time). Could you refer me to Schmidhuber ? If you would like the english version of your thesis proof-read at some stage, I would be happy to do so. James -Original Message- From: Marchal [SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Sent: 14 January 1999 09:22 To: Higgo James Cc: '[EMAIL PROTECTED]' Subject: RE: Amoeba croaks - Hi James, But I think we need to be clear that classical probability is merely the way we perceive the relationship between universes in MWI. This sound interesting but I am not sure I understand you fully, and I would be happy if you could be a little more specific. Some people would say that classical logic is the internal logic of individual branch in the MWI. My personal feeling (let us say) is that classical logic is the simplest logic of communication between people-and/or-apparatus. This idea appear to Bohr, but also Brouwer (the founder of intuitionnist (the first modern non classical logic)). It is not unlike your idea once we look at people as turing machines (perhaps). The thesis is impressive and the images came out perfectly. Glad to hear that ! My French is lousy but is C.2.3 not Max's experiment? Did you think of it first, simultaneously, or later? I look forward, anxiously, to the English version. Indeed C.2.2 and C.2.3. are Max's experiment. I publish the idea in my 1988 (french) paper, and in my 1991 (english) paper. As far as I know I am the first having publish that. I discover later the idea in Hans Moravec's book Mind Children (also 1988, Harvard University Press). I guess Max didn't notice these works, because he comes from physics and cosmology. I find Max's paper (Many Worlds or Many Words) very interesting, although I differ in the conclusion. There are also big similarities (and big differences) between Max's TOE and what I call Mechanism. I guess there are interesting common points with Schmidhuber too. But I don't think computationnalism put the metaphysical question away : quite the contrary, computationnalism makes these problem (mathematically) formulable. Please be patient for the english version because I am rather busy. You can also try to get my papers with the bibliography in the thesis (in a pre-internet manner, you know !). Best luck for your thesis. Bruno
RE: we can only exist in a world which is large enough to evolve us
WAP does not forbid anything, except things which would not allow us to exist. The Price paragraph you quote is absurd out of context. -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Sent: 14 January 1999 17:51 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: we can only exist in a world which is large enough to evolve us Higgo, James, [EMAIL PROTECTED], writes: There are no 'backwards in time regions' - the entire universe is as much backward in time as it is forward in time. You really need to read Huw Price. And Deutsch, to understand that what we perceive as the flow of time is just one of many relationships between different universes. I have read Deutsch, and I will look at Huw Price's book. However I must say after reading his web page at http://plato.stanford.edu/price/TAAP.html that I was not happy to read: : But if we are to avoid the double standard fallacy, we need to consider : time symmetrically, and take seriously the possibility that the arrow : of time may reverse when the universe recollapses into a big crunch. When I know that someone is leading up to an absurd conclusion like this one, it is hard for me to read him with an open mind. I still don't see how the Anthropic Principle forbids universes with a mixture of forwards- and backwards-time regions. As long as we evolve in a forwards-time area we should be protected from backwards-time effects. But once we look out into new regions we should expect to see some where time is running backwards, if all that prevented it was the AP. Hal
RE: quantum suicide = a jolly good idea
Max's point is that this is a flaw in the argument you're criticising. You should have said 'yes way!'. But you propose a neat solution with your brain-zapper. Where can I buy one? -Original Message- From: Jacques M. Mallah [SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Sent: 04 December 1998 18:10 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: RE: quantum suicide = deadly dumb Higgo James wrote: Jaques, try reading what Max wrote, then post a better reply. Higgo, try reading what I wrote, then post a better reply. Jacques Mallah wrote: Max Tegmark wrote: However, I think there's a flaw. After all, dying isn't a binary thing where you're either dead or alive - rather, there's a whole continuum of states of progressively decreasing self-awareness. What makes the quantum suicide work is that you force an abrupt transition. I suspect that when I get old, my brain cells will gradually give out (indeed, that's already started happening...) so that I keep feeling self-aware, but less and less so, the final death being quite anti-climactic, sort of like when an amoeba croaks. Do you buy this? No way. It's a desperate attempt to save a very bad idea, and it shows. I can't blame you for wanting to, but what I really respect is when someone admits he made a mistake. I assume this is what you (Higgo) are referring to? I stand by it. Would you have us believe that if only I could hook up a device to my head, that could measure my neurons to see if they are giving out (which is of course a quantum process), and instantly kill me if they are, then since only the few copies of me with healthy brains will exist, that I would be immortal? Ridiculous. BTW, for more on the anthropic principle, see my page on it at http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/anth.htm - - - - - - - Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate I know what no one else knows - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/
