Re: Materialism fails to account for the first person
On 29 May 2013, at 22:46, meekerdb wrote:
On 5/29/2013 9:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 May 2013, at 18:37, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 May 2013, at 17:47, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del%27s_incompleteness_theorems#Construction_of_a_statement_about_.22provability.22
2013/5/29 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
On Wed, May 29, 2013 at 2:37 AM, Bruno Marchal
marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
If you want to communicate why should I need to search at
all? And if even Google doesn't know what the hell Bpp is then
it's ridiculous to expect your readers to know what you're
talking about.
Come on, John. Search for true opinion. Bp p is a formula
using some notation for this,
So when I read your post and you said Bp p I should have said
to myself obviously if I Google true opinion it will tell me
what Bp p means. Well, that is not obvious to me at all but it
doesn't matter because I just Googled true opinion and I still
can't find a damn thing about Bp p.
Bp = I believe in p, or 'my opinion is that it is the case that
p', or, in the context of ideally correct (and simple machine):
Beweisbar('p').
p, when produced by some system, means, in all books on logic,
that p is true (from the system pov).
So Bp p is a ay to model true opinion, in some system.
When I write I always ask myself if anybody will understand what
I say, I may not always be successful in making myself clear but
at least I try. You're not even trying.
I have explained this more than one times on this list, to
different people, because once you get it you can't forget.
You have come perhaps too much recently, but you can always ask
question. You should not focus on the formula, but on what it
represents. It is also explained in sane04, and basically, in all
my papers on this subject. Probably with different notations.
Or perhaps you just agree with what Niels Bohr said I refuse to
speak more clearly than I think.
Bp is for I believe p, produced by some machinery (machine,
formal system, ...).
In particular, it is an expression in some modal logic. 'Belief'
obeys usually the axioms:
1. B(p-q) - B(p - Bq)
2. Bp - BBp
Bp p means (I believe in p) and p. P alone, in the assertative
mode of some entity means it is the case that p. (independently
of the veracity of p).
For knowledge, we use the axiom:
3. Bp - p
As Gödel saw in 1933, beweisbar, or provability, does not obey to
that third axiom, and so provability cannot model
knowledgeability. Indeed no consistent machine can prove B('0=1') -
0=1, which is equivalent with ~B('0=1'), which is self-
consistency.
I'm not sure I understand this. Are you saying we cannot take (Bp-
p) for all p as an axiom because it would entail Bf -f and then
~f-~Bf, and since ~f is true by definition it would entail that the
machine is consistent?
Yes.
More generally p - f is equivalent with ~p, as you can verify by
doing the truth table:
p - f
100
010
That's why Löb's theorem B(Bp - p) - Bp generalizes Gödel's second
incompleteness theorem: just replace p by f. B(~Bf) - Bf, ~Bf -
~B(~Bf), Dt - ~BDt.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Re: Materialism fails to account for the first person
On Wed, May 29, 2013 at 2:37 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: If you want to communicate why should I need to search at all? And if even Google doesn't know what the hell Bpp is then it's ridiculous to expect your readers to know what you're talking about. Come on, John. Search for true opinion. Bp p is a formula using some notation for this, So when I read your post and you said Bp p I should have said to myself obviously if I Google true opinion it will tell me what Bp p means. Well, that is not obvious to me at all but it doesn't matter because I just Googled true opinion and I still can't find a damn thing about Bp p. When I write I always ask myself if anybody will understand what I say, I may not always be successful in making myself clear but at least I try. You're not even trying. Or perhaps you just agree with what Niels Bohr said I refuse to speak more clearly than I think. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Materialism fails to account for the first person
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del%27s_incompleteness_theorems#Construction_of_a_statement_about_.22provability.22 2013/5/29 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com On Wed, May 29, 2013 at 2:37 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: If you want to communicate why should I need to search at all? And if even Google doesn't know what the hell Bpp is then it's ridiculous to expect your readers to know what you're talking about. Come on, John. Search for true opinion. Bp p is a formula using some notation for this, So when I read your post and you said Bp p I should have said to myself obviously if I Google true opinion it will tell me what Bp p means. Well, that is not obvious to me at all but it doesn't matter because I just Googled true opinion and I still can't find a damn thing about Bp p. When I write I always ask myself if anybody will understand what I say, I may not always be successful in making myself clear but at least I try. You're not even trying. Or perhaps you just agree with what Niels Bohr said I refuse to speak more clearly than I think. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Materialism fails to account for the first person
On 29 May 2013, at 17:47, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del%27s_incompleteness_theorems#Construction_of_a_statement_about_.22provability.22
2013/5/29 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
On Wed, May 29, 2013 at 2:37 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
If you want to communicate why should I need to search at all?
And if even Google doesn't know what the hell Bpp is then it's
ridiculous to expect your readers to know what you're talking about.
Come on, John. Search for true opinion. Bp p is a formula
using some notation for this,
So when I read your post and you said Bp p I should have said to
myself obviously if I Google true opinion it will tell me what Bp
p means. Well, that is not obvious to me at all but it doesn't
matter because I just Googled true opinion and I still can't find
a damn thing about Bp p.
Bp = I believe in p, or 'my opinion is that it is the case that p',
or, in the context of ideally correct (and simple machine):
Beweisbar('p').
p, when produced by some system, means, in all books on logic, that p
is true (from the system pov).
So Bp p is a ay to model true opinion, in some system.
When I write I always ask myself if anybody will understand what I
say, I may not always be successful in making myself clear but at
least I try. You're not even trying.
I have explained this more than one times on this list, to different
people, because once you get it you can't forget.
You have come perhaps too much recently, but you can always ask
question. You should not focus on the formula, but on what it
represents. It is also explained in sane04, and basically, in all my
papers on this subject. Probably with different notations.
Or perhaps you just agree with what Niels Bohr said I refuse to
speak more clearly than I think.
Bp is for I believe p, produced by some machinery (machine, formal
system, ...).
In particular, it is an expression in some modal logic. 'Belief' obeys
usually the axioms:
1. B(p-q) - B(p - Bq)
2. Bp - BBp
Bp p means (I believe in p) and p. P alone, in the assertative
mode of some entity means it is the case that p. (independently of
the veracity of p).
For knowledge, we use the axiom:
3. Bp - p
As Gödel saw in 1933, beweisbar, or provability, does not obey to that
third axiom, and so provability cannot model knowledgeability. Indeed
no consistent machine can prove B('0=1') - 0=1, which is equivalent
with ~B('0=1'), which is self-consistency.
But it is trivial that the new connector Kp, defined by Bp p,
verifies the axiom 3. So we get a way to associate a knower to a
machine. But it cannot be defined in arithmetic, as you would need to
define a predicate like B('p') true('p'), which cannot exist by a
theorem of Tarski saying that true is not definable. We can only
simulate it by the modal trick of Theaetetus, for each arithmetical
formula. For example,
I know that 1+1=2 can be emulated by B('1+1=2') 1+1=2. But you
cannot find a general arithmetical predicate for knowledge, and this
makes such kind of knowledge confirming many studies by philosophers
and theologian, in the computer science setting.
Here belief is always a form of rational belief, which is basically
the meaning of the axiom 1 above.
Is is clearer? Ask anything.
I have already given such explanation here, and I will at some point
later explain this again on FOAR. No need to be angry or something,
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Re: Materialism fails to account for the first person
On 5/29/2013 9:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 May 2013, at 18:37, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 May 2013, at 17:47, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del%27s_incompleteness_theorems#Construction_of_a_statement_about_.22provability.22
2013/5/29 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com
On Wed, May 29, 2013 at 2:37 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
If you want to communicate why should I need to search at all? And
if
even Google doesn't know what the hell Bpp is then it's ridiculous to
expect
your readers to know what you're talking about.
Come on, John. Search for true opinion. Bp p is a formula using
some
notation for this,
So when I read your post and you said Bp p I should have said to myself
obviously if I Google true opinion it will tell me what Bp p means.
Well,
that is not obvious to me at all but it doesn't matter because I just
Googled
true opinion and I still can't find a damn thing about Bp p.
Bp = I believe in p, or 'my opinion is that it is the case that p', or, in the context
of ideally correct (and simple machine): Beweisbar('p').
p, when produced by some system, means, in all books on logic, that p is true (from
the system pov).
So Bp p is a ay to model true opinion, in some system.
When I write I always ask myself if anybody will understand what I say, I
may not
always be successful in making myself clear but at least I try. You're not
even
trying.
I have explained this more than one times on this list, to different people, because
once you get it you can't forget.
You have come perhaps too much recently, but you can always ask question. You should
not focus on the formula, but on what it represents. It is also explained in sane04,
and basically, in all my papers on this subject. Probably with different notations.
Or perhaps you just agree with what Niels Bohr said I refuse to speak more
clearly than I think.
Bp is for I believe p, produced by some machinery (machine, formal system,
...).
In particular, it is an expression in some modal logic. 'Belief' obeys usually
the axioms:
1. B(p-q) - B(p - Bq)
2. Bp - BBp
Bp p means (I believe in p) and p. P alone, in the assertative mode of some entity
means it is the case that p. (independently of the veracity of p).
For knowledge, we use the axiom:
3. Bp - p
As Gödel saw in 1933, beweisbar, or provability, does not obey to that third axiom, and
so provability cannot model knowledgeability. Indeed no consistent machine can prove
B('0=1') - 0=1, which is equivalent with ~B('0=1'), which is self-consistency.
I'm not sure I understand this. Are you saying we cannot take (Bp-p) for all p as an
axiom because it would entail Bf -f and then ~f-~Bf, and since ~f is true by definition
it would entail that the machine is consistent?
Brent
But it is trivial that the new connector Kp, defined by Bp p, verifies the axiom 3.
So we get a way to associate a knower to a machine. But it cannot be defined in
arithmetic, as you would need to define a predicate like B('p') true('p'), which
cannot exist by a theorem of Tarski saying that true is not definable. We can only
simulate it by the modal trick of Theaetetus, for each arithmetical formula. For example,
I know that 1+1=2 can be emulated by B('1+1=2') 1+1=2. But you cannot find a
general arithmetical predicate for knowledge, and this makes such kind of knowledge
confirming many studies by philosophers and theologian, in the computer science setting.
Here belief is always a form of rational belief, which is basically the meaning of the
axiom 1 above.
Is is clearer? Ask anything.
I have already given such explanation here, and I will at some point later explain this
again on FOAR. No need to be angry or something,
Bruno
Oops!
Of course I was talking to J. Clark, not Quentin.
Sorry,
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/
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Re: Materialism fails to account for the first person
On Mon, May 27, 2013 Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: John - you are being disingenuous here. Bruno has explained this [Bpp] at considerable length. If even mighty Google doesn't know what Bpp is then I'm not embarrassed in not knowing either. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Materialism fails to account for the first person
On Mon, May 27, 2013 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Have you heard about Gödel's theorem? Yes. The only difference between objective and subjective is that in one case information is universally available and in the other case the information only exists in 3 pounds of grey goo inside one particular bone box. There are other important difference. You can doubt the whole objective part, but you can't doubt the whole subjective part. Because you only have direct experience with the information inside your bone box and direct experience beats the conclusions from any theory; thus the greater the information you can get inside that box the broader your experience and the more the subjective will resemble the objective. Also, the term information has many different meaning, from something you can measure (Shannon) to something interpreted by some machine, or other entities. I agree that there is no mathematical way to measure the quality of information in a way comparable to how Shannon measured information's quantity. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Materialism fails to account for the first person
On 28 May 2013, at 17:52, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, May 27, 2013 Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
John - you are being disingenuous here. Bruno has explained this
[Bpp] at
considerable length.
If even mighty Google doesn't know what Bpp is then I'm not
embarrassed in not knowing either.
You might search on Theatetus instead, as Russell suggested.
It is the older theory of knowledge. It is the idea that knowledge is
subjectively the same as belief, except that, *by definition* the
belief is correct.
The very old Wittgenstein, the one who wrote On Certainty,
eventually got it, and realize implicitly somehow he was wrong until
there.
The greek used it to develop the dream argument. You can find similar
argument in chinese and indian philosophies.
Now, by Gödel's theorem, provability (Gödel's beweisbar arithmetic
predicate Bew, which is sigma_1 complete and thus represent a
provability predicate enough rich to emulate all Turing machines, i.e.
to be universal in the Church-Turing-Post sense) does NOT obey
Bew('p') - p, with p an arbitrary arithmetical sentence. I write Bp -
p for the longer expression (and later this is amde precise by
theorem on the modal logics G and G*)
If PA, or any correct Löbian machine, would prove all Bp - p, this
would entail they would prove Bf - f, with f the constant
propositional 'false'), and so they would prove ~Bf, and they would
contradict Gödel's second incompleteness theorem.
But this means that the logical expressions Bew('p'), and Bew('p')
p will obeys different logics, and it can be shown that for the Löbian
machines (and even more general class of entities) such logic obeys
the classical theory of knowledge, axiomatized by the modal logic S4.
Indeed they are entirely formalized by S4 + K(K(p-Kp)-p)-p. K for
I know.
So, incompleteness makes the definition of Theatetus working well for
the case study of a simple notion of knowledge for the ideally correct
machines.
There are many interesting theorem, like the fact that the knower
cannot attribute a name to itself, that it feels like not being a
machine, and is somehow right on that, that he is a fixed point in a
relation between believe and truth, etc.
John,
UDA is supposed to explain that physics is in your head,
and
AUDA is supposed to explain that physics (and much more) is in the
head of *all* universal machine/number.
(the Lôbian one are just more chatty about all this).
It makes sense for people who, in this list, try to get a theory of
everything, explaining, without begging the question, from where
matter and consciousness comes from, and how they are related.
What I argue is that if we assume we can survive with a physical
digital brain, then physics get reduced to a relative measure problem
on all computations, or Turing emulable processes, as defined in
arithmetic.
I use arithmetic but any first order logical specification of a
universal system would work.
This will be translated by a refinement of Bp p, in fact by Bp p
Dt. With p restricted to the sigma_1 proposition (UD-accessible). Dt =
~Bf = self-consistency. This will again give the same extensional view
of arithmetic, but a quite different intensional, or modal, one. This
is too long to justify here. But this works, and give an arithmetical
quantization from which you can see the shadow of the quantum linear
symmetrical core of physical reality. Linearity should ensure the
existence of the first person plural deep histories.
Actually, arithmetical quantization appear with the Bp p, Bp Dt,
and Bp p Dt, (all p sigma_1) making possible many nuances.
Bruno
John K Clark
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Re: Materialism fails to account for the first person
On Tue, May 28, 2013 at 1:33 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: If even mighty Google doesn't know what Bpp is then I'm not embarrassed in not knowing either. You might search on Theatetus instead, as Russell suggested. If you want to communicate why should I need to search at all? And if even Google doesn't know what the hell Bpp is then it's ridiculous to expect your readers to know what you're talking about. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Materialism fails to account for the first person
On 26 May 2013, at 19:08, John Clark wrote: On Sun, May 26, 2013 Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Materialism fails to account for the first person Can non-materialism do better and if so how? Yes, by using the mathematical theory of self-reference. The only problem is that eventually matter has to be redefined through coherence conditions on machine's dreams/computations. The details of this explains that the knower (Bp p) makes sense thanks to incompleteness which makes both Bp and (Bp p) equivalent, (they prove the same arithmetical sentences) but not provably so by the machine, and this makes it obeying to a knowledge logic, unlike provability which obeys a belief logic. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Materialism fails to account for the first person
On Mon, May 27, 2013 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Can non-materialism do better and if so how? Yes, by using the mathematical theory of self-reference. I've never heard of the mathematical theory of self-reference. And it's no great mystery, the only difference between you and me is that we each can access memories that the other can not, and we process information in slightly different ways, in other words we have different personalities. The only difference between objective and subjective is that in one case information is universally available and in the other case the information only exists in 3 pounds of grey goo inside one particular bone box. The details of this explains that the knower (Bp p) Yet another of your homemade anagrams, this time it sounds like a oil company not what a baby does to a diaper. I could probably figure out what you mean if I thought about it enough, but if you don't take the effort to make yourself understood I don't see why I should make an effort to understand you. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Materialism fails to account for the first person
On 27 May 2013, at 19:28, John Clark wrote: On Mon, May 27, 2013 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Can non-materialism do better and if so how? Yes, by using the mathematical theory of self-reference. I've never heard of the mathematical theory of self-reference. Have you heard about Gödel's theorem? The mathematical theory of self-reference is the general theory, containing Löb theorems, many other fixed points theorem, and eventually axiomatized by Solovay who showed that the modal logic G and G* formalize respectively the provable and the true (but not necessarily provable) part about self-reference, provable by machine, or some more general entities. Here is one non modal paper, three good textbooks, and a recreative introduction. Smorynski, C., 1981, Fifty Years of Self-Reference in Arithmetic, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, Vol. 22, n° 4, pp. 357-374. Smorynski C., 1985, Self-Reference and Modal Logic., Springer Verlag. Boolos G., 1979, The Unprovability of Consistency, an Essay in Modal Logic, Cambridge University Press. Boolos, G. (1993). The Logic of Provability. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. The recreative introduction: Smullyan R., 1987, Forever Undecided, Alfred A. Knopf, New York. And it's no great mystery, the only difference between you and me is that we each can access memories that the other can not, and we process information in slightly different ways, in other words we have different personalities. OK. The only difference between objective and subjective is that in one case information is universally available and in the other case the information only exists in 3 pounds of grey goo inside one particular bone box. There are other important difference. You can doubt the whole objective part, but you can't doubt the whole subjective part. Also, the term information has many different meaning, from something you can measure (Shannon) to something interpreted by some machine, or other entities. The details of this explains that the knower (Bp p) Yet another of your homemade anagrams, this time it sounds like a oil company not what a baby does to a diaper. I could probably figure out what you mean if I thought about it enough, but if you don't take the effort to make yourself understood I don't see why I should make an effort to understand you. You need to read the book above, or to read my papers where I re- explain this from scratch, but concisely. It is computer science and mathematical logic. That is of course useful to reason when you assume computationalism. Bp p is for an arithmetical proposition asserting Beweisbar(p) p, with p some arithmetical proposition, and 'p', the Gödel number of the arithmetical sentence representing p. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Materialism fails to account for the first person
On Mon, May 27, 2013 at 01:28:42PM -0400, John Clark wrote: The details of this explains that the knower (Bp p) Yet another of your homemade anagrams, this time it sounds like a oil company not what a baby does to a diaper. I could probably figure out what you mean if I thought about it enough, but if you don't take the effort to make yourself understood I don't see why I should make an effort to understand you. John - you are being disingenuous here. Bruno has explained this at considerable length. Bp p is not an anagram (or an abbreviation even), but a formula, that captures the notion of Knowledge put forward by Plato in Theatetus. Now there's plenty to argue with there, to be sure, but suggesting that Bruno hasn't made the effort to explain it is not one of them. Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Materialism fails to account for the first person
Materialism fails to account for the first person Sentience or sentient experience or experience or consciousness all require a subject who is conscious. The first person in grammatical language. I. This is missing in materialistic accounts of consciousness, but present in Leibniz's monads. Dr. Roger Clough NIST (ret.) 5/26/2013 See my Leibniz site at http://team.academia.edu/RogerClough -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Materialism fails to account for the first person
On Sun, May 26, 2013 Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Materialism fails to account for the first person Can non-materialism do better and if so how? John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
