Re: No MWI
modified paper from Tegmark: http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/0905/0905.2182v1.pdf Ronald On May 19, 5:41 pm, ronaldheld wrote: > I would like to branch away temporarily, due to the Star Trek movie. > Is it the case in MWI, that a decision is made in Universe A > (destruction of the Kelvin). Before that event, the Universe, or at > least the causal part of it has a certain physical configuration. > Immediately after that event, Universe B is identical physically(same > laws of Physics and constants), except there is the Narada and no > Kelvin? --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: No MWI
I would like to branch away temporarily, due to the Star Trek movie. Is it the case in MWI, that a decision is made in Universe A (destruction of the Kelvin). Before that event, the Universe, or at least the causal part of it has a certain physical configuration. Immediately after that event, Universe B is identical physically(same laws of Physics and constants), except there is the Narada and no Kelvin? --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: No MWI
2009/5/14 ronaldheld : > > read Aixiv.org:0905.0624v1 (quant-ph) and see if you agree with it This part at the end, proposing an empirical method of distinguishing between MWI and single world interpretations and reminiscent of quantum suicide experiments, is interesting: "Finally, suppose, notwithstanding all the arguments above, that we arrive at an Everettian theory that, while perhaps ad hoc and unattractive, is coherent – for example, some version of the many-minds interpretation[15]. It is generally believed that, without very advanced technology which allows the re-interference of macroscopically distinct branches, such a theory will necessarily be empirically indistinguishable from Copenhagen quantum theory. The following argument against this conclusion relies on anthropic reasoning and also on the hypothesis that species may evolve a consistent preference for or against higher population expectation over higher survival probability. An- thropic reasoning is notoriously tricky to justify, and we may anyway not necessarily have evolved demonstrable consistent preferences one way or the other, so the argument may not necessarily have practical application. Nonethe- less, it does show in principle that evolutionary evidence could make many-worlds theories more or less plausible. Consider a simple model of two species A and B, both of which begin with population P and are offered, each year, the option of doing something that depends on a quantum event and carries a 0.5 probability of extinction and a 0.5 probability of trebling the species population. Suppose that, if they reject the option, their population remains constant, as it does in between these decisions. Species A is risk-averse, and so always declines the option. Species B is risk-tolerant, and instinctively driven to maximise expected population, and so always accepts. Now let N be a large integer. After N years, if one-world quantum theory is correct, species A will have population P, and species B will have either population 0 (with probability (1−( 1 2 )N)) or population 3N (with probability ( 1 2 )N). In other words, species B will almost surely be extinct. If these are the only two species, and you are alive in the N-th year, almost certainly you belong to species A. If many-worlds quantum theory is correct, species A still has population P in all branches. Species B has population 0 in branches of total Born weight (1 − ( 1 2 )N), and population 3N in branches of total Born weight ( 1 2 )N. Now, if anthropic reasoning is justifiable here, and you are alive in the N-th year, almost certainly you belong to species B. (There are ( 3 2 )N times as many minds belonging to species B as to A after N years.) In other words, there is a sense in which long-run evolutionary success is defined by different measures in one-world and many-worlds quantum theory. If anthropic reasoning were justifiable, then one could in principle infer whether one-world or many-worlds quantum theory is likelier correct by seeing whether one belongs to a Born-weighted expected population maximising species or to a risk-averse species that seeks to maximise its Born-weighted survival probability. Readers may thus wish to consider whether their species has evolved a coherent strategy of either type." -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: No MWI
Le 18-mai-09, à 09:25, rexallen...@gmail.com a écrit : > > So,in terms of the many worlds interpretation, what is the standard > narrative explanation of the double slit experiment? I guess you are referring to the materialist MWI of QM, and not to the idealist MWI of Arithmetic (often discussed here). I suggest you read the book by David Deutsch "The Fabric of Reality" which motivates the QM MWI from the two slits experiments (well David uses four slits for making it clearer). You can ask supplementary questions on the FOR mailing list if you have still problems. > > In particular, in "MWI-speak", what exactly happens when you know > which slit the photon has passed through that causes the interference > pattern disappear? You get entangled with the outcome (which slit the phton has gone through). Your 2^aleph_zero consciousness states differentiate into about two continuum of "worlds" where you can remember which slit the photon has gone through. Measurement let you know in which relative part you are in the multiverse-partition defined by your measuring apparatus. > > Also, what is the MWI-based explanation for the quantum eraser > experiment? Erasing memory is the main way to fuse, or undifferentiate the QM (or comp) states, so that you can prepare an experiment corresponding to another partition of the multiverse. Saibal Mitra has proposed recently on the list some exploitation of this feature. Search his name on the arxiv.org, in the quant-phys part: "Changing the past by forgetting". Bruno Marchal http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: No MWI
So,in terms of the many worlds interpretation, what is the standard narrative explanation of the double slit experiment? In particular, in "MWI-speak", what exactly happens when you know which slit the photon has passed through that causes the interference pattern disappear? Also, what is the MWI-based explanation for the quantum eraser experiment? Rex --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: No MWI
Right, I copied and pasted it and it must have lost the superscript. Thanks for catching that. Jason On Fri, May 15, 2009 at 10:48 PM, russell standish wrote: > > On Fri, May 15, 2009 at 05:40:09PM -0500, Jason Resch wrote: >> Deutsch. "If the number is 64, people can shut their eyes but if it's >> 1064, they will no longer be able to pretend." >> >> Jason > > Hopefully you meant 10^64, not 1064, which is not all that startling. > > -- > > > Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > Mathematics > UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpco...@hpcoders.com.au > Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au > > > > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: No MWI
On Fri, May 15, 2009 at 05:40:09PM -0500, Jason Resch wrote: > Deutsch. "If the number is 64, people can shut their eyes but if it's > 1064, they will no longer be able to pretend." > > Jason Hopefully you meant 10^64, not 1064, which is not all that startling. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpco...@hpcoders.com.au Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: No MWI
David Deutsch gives this convincing argument against a single world: that one can't explain how quantum computers work without postulating other universes. The evidence for the multiverse, according to Deutsch, is equally overwhelming. "Admittedly, it's indirect," he says. "But then, we can detect pterodactyls and quarks only indirectly too. The evidence that other universes exist is at least as strong as the evidence for pterodactyls or quarks." Perhaps the sceptics will be convinced by a practical demonstration of the multiverse. And Deutsch thinks he knows how. By building a quantum computer, he says, we can reach out and mould the multiverse. "One day, a quantum computer will be built which does more simultaneous calculations than there are particles in the Universe," says Deutsch. "Since the Universe as we see it lacks the computational resources to do the calculations, where are they being done?" It can only be in other universes, he says. "Quantum computers share information with huge numbers of versions of themselves throughout the multiverse." Imagine that you have a quantum PC and you set it a problem. What happens is that a huge number of versions of your PC split off from this Universe into their own separate, local universes, and work on parallel strands of the problem. A split second later, the pocket universes recombine into one, and those strands are pulled together to provide the answer that pops up on your screen. "Quantum computers are the first machines humans have ever built to exploit the multiverse directly," says Deutsch. At the moment, even the biggest quantum computers can only work their magic on about 6 bits of information, which in Deutsch's view means they exploit copies of themselves in 26 universes-that's just 64 of them. Because the computational feats of such computers are puny, people can choose to ignore the multiverse. "But something will happen when the number of parallel calculations becomes very large," says Deutsch. "If the number is 64, people can shut their eyes but if it's 1064, they will no longer be able to pretend." Jason On Fri, May 15, 2009 at 10:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 15 May 2009, at 14:27, ronaldheld wrote: > >> >> I still do not see any arguments against what I read, that one >> Universe fits observations better than the MWI. > > > Just comp predicts many worlds/histories and the fact they play a key > role in the statistics of experiences. > > But with QM, many worlds seems to me to be a direct consequence of > > a) linearity of evolution > b) linearity of the tensor product > c) superposition of states > d) and nothing else (that is "only quantum physical histories", no > Bohm potential, no classical isolated computations, etc.) > > In this, comp is a problem for "d": the comp supervenience asks for > *all* histories, and to solve the mind body problem (or just the body > problem) we have to either justify completely "a, b, c, and d, from a > measure extracted from classical computer science", or to reject comp > or QM. > > But nature, both the observable one, and the one which proceeds by the > richness of the structure of the integers, suggests that "Many" is > much simpler than "One". The Mandelbrot set illustrates this too: a > very simple iteration leads to incredibly complex; self-similar, > repetitive (and probably universal) structure. Even without QM and/or > mechanism, the unicity of "anything" is rather doubtful. This is the > starting idea of the everything list. > > I also disagree a bit technically on some points in Kent's paper, and > generally I disagree even with MWI partisan. I have never understood > the Copenhagian Wave collapse. Even when you give a special dualist > role of consciousness: it does not work. Once you abandon the wave > collapse, or better, once you agree that physicist obeys to QM, it > seems to me that the many world cannot be avoided at all. Kent > criticizes it on the fact that we don't yet recover the Born rules, > but in my opinion this follows from Gleason Theorem + comp > indeterminacy. A very old book by Paulette Fevrier (a pioneer in > quantum logic) already suggests this (without really going through > Gleason-like theorem). > It is the equivalent of such a Gleason's theorem that comp is still > lacking, and that is why I hope the Z1* and X1* logic(s) gives the > right quantum logics capable of realizing von Neumann's dream to > extract the quantum proba from the quantum logic. Z1* and X1* are > quite promising with that respect, but a lot of work still remains to > be done. > > Now, I don't understand why Wallace introduces a notion of fuzzyness, > and some passage of Kent's paper remains a bit obscur. Perhaps you > could tell us what precisely makes you feel (in Kent's paper, or by > other way) that QM is still consistent with the idea of one world > without introducing a non (quantum) mechanical selection principle. > Kent is the author of many paper "against Everett", and none
Re: No MWI
On 15 May 2009, at 14:27, ronaldheld wrote: > > I still do not see any arguments against what I read, that one > Universe fits observations better than the MWI. Just comp predicts many worlds/histories and the fact they play a key role in the statistics of experiences. But with QM, many worlds seems to me to be a direct consequence of a) linearity of evolution b) linearity of the tensor product c) superposition of states d) and nothing else (that is "only quantum physical histories", no Bohm potential, no classical isolated computations, etc.) In this, comp is a problem for "d": the comp supervenience asks for *all* histories, and to solve the mind body problem (or just the body problem) we have to either justify completely "a, b, c, and d, from a measure extracted from classical computer science", or to reject comp or QM. But nature, both the observable one, and the one which proceeds by the richness of the structure of the integers, suggests that "Many" is much simpler than "One". The Mandelbrot set illustrates this too: a very simple iteration leads to incredibly complex; self-similar, repetitive (and probably universal) structure. Even without QM and/or mechanism, the unicity of "anything" is rather doubtful. This is the starting idea of the everything list. I also disagree a bit technically on some points in Kent's paper, and generally I disagree even with MWI partisan. I have never understood the Copenhagian Wave collapse. Even when you give a special dualist role of consciousness: it does not work. Once you abandon the wave collapse, or better, once you agree that physicist obeys to QM, it seems to me that the many world cannot be avoided at all. Kent criticizes it on the fact that we don't yet recover the Born rules, but in my opinion this follows from Gleason Theorem + comp indeterminacy. A very old book by Paulette Fevrier (a pioneer in quantum logic) already suggests this (without really going through Gleason-like theorem). It is the equivalent of such a Gleason's theorem that comp is still lacking, and that is why I hope the Z1* and X1* logic(s) gives the right quantum logics capable of realizing von Neumann's dream to extract the quantum proba from the quantum logic. Z1* and X1* are quite promising with that respect, but a lot of work still remains to be done. Now, I don't understand why Wallace introduces a notion of fuzzyness, and some passage of Kent's paper remains a bit obscur. Perhaps you could tell us what precisely makes you feel (in Kent's paper, or by other way) that QM is still consistent with the idea of one world without introducing a non (quantum) mechanical selection principle. Kent is the author of many paper "against Everett", and none have ever convinced me. Give me time I read it less diagonally though ... Bruno > > > On May 15, 1:01 am, daddycay...@msn.com wrote: >> On May 14, 9:47 pm, daddycay...@msn.com wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >>> On May 14, 4:45 pm, Colin Hales >>> wrote: >> At the same time position 1 completely fails to explain an observer of the kind able to do 1a. >> >>> I would say that position 2 fails to explain the observer too, you >>> have to actually explain the observer to claim that a position >>> explains the observer. But position 2 at least provides the >>> topology >>> to allow doubt, so that there is room for an observer to be >>> explained >>> in the future. >> ... Yet position 1 behaviour stops you from finding position 2 ... and problems unsolved because they are only solvable by position 2 remain unsolved merely because of 1b religiosity. >> >>> If what you mean by religiosity is the disallowance of doubt, then >>> yes >>> by definition position 1 has religiosity and position 2 does not. I >>> agree that disallowance of doubt is not a good thing to have. I >>> think >>> you said that physicists would also agree, but that they don't >>> practice that way. I think it's just a matter of frame of mind. In >>> math we do that a lot, where we suppose that something is true and >>> see >>> where it leads. I guess in physics the supposing just lasts longer. >>> And the supposing in physics is in the form of math. What other >>> form >>> could supposing in physics possibly take? It seems that anything >>> you >>> suppose true you can put in the form of a mathematics statement. I >>> think it all boils down to the fact that we have to keep remembering >>> that we were just supposing, and be able to step back out of it and >>> suppose something else. I think that's where having lots of >>> people it >>> an advantage, some people are the really dedicated logical inference >>> one step at a time see where the supposition leads, do many >>> experiments, etc. Other people are the broad brush outside of the >>> box >>> thinkers that think up lots of different possibilites. >> Hmmm. Just in case there's a misunderstandin
Re: No MWI
I still do not see any arguments against what I read, that one Universe fits observations better than the MWI. Ronald On May 15, 1:01 am, daddycay...@msn.com wrote: > On May 14, 9:47 pm, daddycay...@msn.com wrote: > > > > > > > On May 14, 4:45 pm, Colin Hales wrote: > > > > At the same time position 1 completely fails to explain an > > > observer of the kind able to do 1a. > > > I would say that position 2 fails to explain the observer too, you > > have to actually explain the observer to claim that a position > > explains the observer. But position 2 at least provides the topology > > to allow doubt, so that there is room for an observer to be explained > > in the future. > > > > ... > > > Yet position 1 behaviour stops you from finding position 2 ... > > > and problems unsolved because they are only solvable by position 2 > > > remain unsolved merely because of 1b religiosity. > > > If what you mean by religiosity is the disallowance of doubt, then yes > > by definition position 1 has religiosity and position 2 does not. I > > agree that disallowance of doubt is not a good thing to have. I think > > you said that physicists would also agree, but that they don't > > practice that way. I think it's just a matter of frame of mind. In > > math we do that a lot, where we suppose that something is true and see > > where it leads. I guess in physics the supposing just lasts longer. > > And the supposing in physics is in the form of math. What other form > > could supposing in physics possibly take? It seems that anything you > > suppose true you can put in the form of a mathematics statement. I > > think it all boils down to the fact that we have to keep remembering > > that we were just supposing, and be able to step back out of it and > > suppose something else. I think that's where having lots of people it > > an advantage, some people are the really dedicated logical inference > > one step at a time see where the supposition leads, do many > > experiments, etc. Other people are the broad brush outside of the box > > thinkers that think up lots of different possibilites. > > > > Hmmm. Just in case there's a misunderstanding of position 2, here's > > > their contrast rather more pointedly: > > > > Position 1 > > > 1a There's a mathematics which describes how the natural world behaves > > > when we look. > > > 1b Reality is literally made of the mathematics 1a. (I act as if this > > > were the case) > > > > Position 2 > > > 1a There's a mathematics which describes how the natural world behaves > > > when we look. > > > 1b There's a *separate* mathematics of an underlying reality which > > > operates to produce an observer who sees the reality behaving as per 1a > > > maths. > > > 1c There's the actual underlying reality, which is doubted (not claimed) > > > to 'be' 1b or 1a. > > > I think that your first description of position 2 seemed to > > necessitate some kind of basic matter that things are made of. But I > > think your second description of position 2 (above, by the way, 2a, > > 2b, 2c typo above) doesn't necessarily require that. In face your 2c > > above says that the underlying reality is doubted to be 1b or 1a. I > > think that your doubt and underlying reality could all be placed in 2b > > instead and you could get rid of 2c. I think that Bruno's G might > > correspond to 2a and G* might correspond to 2b, and viola, comp! > > > Tom> > > i.e. in the case where you put the doubt and underlying reality into > 2b, then G* could correspond to 2b.- Hide quoted text - > > - Show quoted text - --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: No MWI
On May 14, 9:47 pm, daddycay...@msn.com wrote: > On May 14, 4:45 pm, Colin Hales wrote: > > > > > At the same time position 1 completely fails to explain an > > observer of the kind able to do 1a. > > I would say that position 2 fails to explain the observer too, you > have to actually explain the observer to claim that a position > explains the observer. But position 2 at least provides the topology > to allow doubt, so that there is room for an observer to be explained > in the future. > > > ... > > Yet position 1 behaviour stops you from finding position 2 ... > > and problems unsolved because they are only solvable by position 2 > > remain unsolved merely because of 1b religiosity. > > If what you mean by religiosity is the disallowance of doubt, then yes > by definition position 1 has religiosity and position 2 does not. I > agree that disallowance of doubt is not a good thing to have. I think > you said that physicists would also agree, but that they don't > practice that way. I think it's just a matter of frame of mind. In > math we do that a lot, where we suppose that something is true and see > where it leads. I guess in physics the supposing just lasts longer. > And the supposing in physics is in the form of math. What other form > could supposing in physics possibly take? It seems that anything you > suppose true you can put in the form of a mathematics statement. I > think it all boils down to the fact that we have to keep remembering > that we were just supposing, and be able to step back out of it and > suppose something else. I think that's where having lots of people it > an advantage, some people are the really dedicated logical inference > one step at a time see where the supposition leads, do many > experiments, etc. Other people are the broad brush outside of the box > thinkers that think up lots of different possibilites. > > > > > > > Hmmm. Just in case there's a misunderstanding of position 2, here's > > their contrast rather more pointedly: > > > Position 1 > > 1a There's a mathematics which describes how the natural world behaves > > when we look. > > 1b Reality is literally made of the mathematics 1a. (I act as if this > > were the case) > > > Position 2 > > 1a There's a mathematics which describes how the natural world behaves > > when we look. > > 1b There's a *separate* mathematics of an underlying reality which > > operates to produce an observer who sees the reality behaving as per 1a > > maths. > > 1c There's the actual underlying reality, which is doubted (not claimed) > > to 'be' 1b or 1a. > > I think that your first description of position 2 seemed to > necessitate some kind of basic matter that things are made of. But I > think your second description of position 2 (above, by the way, 2a, > 2b, 2c typo above) doesn't necessarily require that. In face your 2c > above says that the underlying reality is doubted to be 1b or 1a. I > think that your doubt and underlying reality could all be placed in 2b > instead and you could get rid of 2c. I think that Bruno's G might > correspond to 2a and G* might correspond to 2b, and viola, comp! > > Tom> i.e. in the case where you put the doubt and underlying reality into 2b, then G* could correspond to 2b. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: No MWI
On May 14, 4:45 pm, Colin Hales wrote: > > At the same time position 1 completely fails to explain an > observer of the kind able to do 1a. I would say that position 2 fails to explain the observer too, you have to actually explain the observer to claim that a position explains the observer. But position 2 at least provides the topology to allow doubt, so that there is room for an observer to be explained in the future. > ... > Yet position 1 behaviour stops you from finding position 2 ... > and problems unsolved because they are only solvable by position 2 > remain unsolved merely because of 1b religiosity. If what you mean by religiosity is the disallowance of doubt, then yes by definition position 1 has religiosity and position 2 does not. I agree that disallowance of doubt is not a good thing to have. I think you said that physicists would also agree, but that they don't practice that way. I think it's just a matter of frame of mind. In math we do that a lot, where we suppose that something is true and see where it leads. I guess in physics the supposing just lasts longer. And the supposing in physics is in the form of math. What other form could supposing in physics possibly take? It seems that anything you suppose true you can put in the form of a mathematics statement. I think it all boils down to the fact that we have to keep remembering that we were just supposing, and be able to step back out of it and suppose something else. I think that's where having lots of people it an advantage, some people are the really dedicated logical inference one step at a time see where the supposition leads, do many experiments, etc. Other people are the broad brush outside of the box thinkers that think up lots of different possibilites. > Hmmm. Just in case there's a misunderstanding of position 2, here's > their contrast rather more pointedly: > > Position 1 > 1a There's a mathematics which describes how the natural world behaves > when we look. > 1b Reality is literally made of the mathematics 1a. (I act as if this > were the case) > > Position 2 > 1a There's a mathematics which describes how the natural world behaves > when we look. > 1b There's a *separate* mathematics of an underlying reality which > operates to produce an observer who sees the reality behaving as per 1a > maths. > 1c There's the actual underlying reality, which is doubted (not claimed) > to 'be' 1b or 1a. > I think that your first description of position 2 seemed to necessitate some kind of basic matter that things are made of. But I think your second description of position 2 (above, by the way, 2a, 2b, 2c typo above) doesn't necessarily require that. In face your 2c above says that the underlying reality is doubted to be 1b or 1a. I think that your doubt and underlying reality could all be placed in 2b instead and you could get rid of 2c. I think that Bruno's G might correspond to 2a and G* might correspond to 2b, and viola, comp! Tom --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: No MWI
On Thu, May 14, 2009 at 6:18 PM, Colin Hales wrote: > > My ability to mentally manipulate mathematics therefore makes me a > powerful lord of reality and puts me in a position of great authority and > clarity. Aren't people who are good at math already pretty much in this position? Engineering, phsyics, chemistry, finance, etc., all require some aptitude with math. If you have significant mathematical ability, then you should be in a very good position in the modern world, all other things being equal. Whether reality IS math, or is just described by math...being good at math is a major bonus either way. If reality IS math...I'm not sure how much extra this really buys you over reality just being describable by math. So I think your "god complex" explanation is off. > Yet we have religious zeal surrounding (1b) What is the difference between "religious zeal" and just "regular zeal"? How do you tell the difference? Is any sign of zeal automatically tagged as "religious"? Or only certain kinds of zeal? > It is not that MWI is true/false it's that confinement to the discourse > of MWI alone is justified only on religious grounds of the kind I have > delineated. I think you overestimate people's devotion to MWI. I myself only occasionally pray to it. On Thu, May 14, 2009 at 6:18 PM, Colin Hales wrote: > Hi, > When I read quantum mechanics and listen to those invested in the many > places the mathematics leads, What strikes me is the extent to which the > starting point is mathematics. That is, the entire discussion is couched as > if the mathematics is defining what there is, rather than a mere describing > what is there. I can see that the form of the mathematics projects a > multitude of possibilities. But those invested in the business seem to > operate under the assumption - an extra belief - about the relationship of > the mathematics to reality. It imbues the discussion. At least that is how > it appears to me. Consider the pragmatics of it. I, scientist X, am in a > position of adopting 2 possible mindsets: > > Position 1 > 1a) The mathematics of quantum mechanics is very accurately predictive of > observed phenomena > 1b) Reality literally IS the mathematics of quantum mechanics (and by > extension all the multitudinous alternative realities actually exist). > Therefor to discuss mathematical constructs is to speak literally of > reality. My ability to mentally manipulate mathematics therefore makes me a > powerful lord of reality and puts me in a position of great authority and > clarity. > > Position 2 > 2a) The mathematics of quantum mechanics is very accurately predictive of > observed phenomena > 2b) Reality is not the mathematics of (a). Reality is constructed of > something that merely appears/behaves quantum-mechanically to an observer > made of whatever it is, within a universe made of it. The mathematics of > this "something" is not the mathematics of kind (a). > > Note > 1a) = 2a) > 1b) and 2b) they are totally different. > > The (a) is completely consistent with either (b). > Yet we have religious zeal surrounding (1b) > > I hope that you can see the subtlety of the distinction between position 1 > and position 2. As a thinking person in the logical position of wondering > what position to adopt, position 1 is *completely unjustified*. The > parsimonious position is one in which the universe is made of something > other than 1b maths, and then to find a method of describing ways in which > position 1 might seem apparent to an observer made of whatever the universe > is actually made of.. The nice thing about position 2 is that I have room > for *doubt* in 2b which does not exist in 1b. In position 2 I have: > > (i) laws of nature that are the describing system (predictive of phenomena > in the usual ways) > (ii) behaviours of a doubtable 'stuff' relating in doubtable ways to produce > an observer able to to (i) > > In position 1 there is no doubt of kind (ii). That doubt is replaced by > religious adherence to an unfounded implicit belief which imbues the > discourse. At the same time position 1 completely fails to explain an > observer of the kind able to do 1a. > > In my ponderings on this I am coming to the conclusion that the very nature > of the discourse and training self-selects for people who's mental skills in > abstract symbol manipulation make Position 1 a dominating tendency. > Aggregates of position 1 thinkers - such as the everything list and 'fabric > of reality' act like small cults. There is some kind of psychological > payback involved in position 1 which selects for people susceptible to > religiosity of kind 1b. Once you have a couple of generations of these folk > who are so disconnected from the reality of themselves as embedded, situated > agents/observers... that position 2, which involves an admission of > permanent ignorance of some kind, and thereby demoting the physicist from > the prime source of authority over reality, is margin
Re: No MWI
Brent Meeker wrote: > Colin Hales wrote: > >> Hi, >> When I read quantum mechanics and listen to those invested in the many >> places the mathematics leads, What strikes me is the extent to which the >> starting point is mathematics. That is, the entire discussion is couched >> as if the mathematics is defining what there is, rather than a mere >> describing what is there. I can see that the form of the mathematics >> projects a multitude of possibilities. But those invested in the >> business seem to operate under the assumption - an extra belief - about >> the relationship of the mathematics to reality. It imbues the >> discussion. At least that is how it appears to me. Consider the >> pragmatics of it. I, scientist X, am in a position of adopting 2 >> possible mindsets: >> >> Position 1 >> 1a) The mathematics of quantum mechanics is very accurately predictive >> of observed phenomena >> 1b) Reality literally IS the mathematics of quantum mechanics (and by >> extension all the multitudinous alternative realities actually exist). >> Therefor to discuss mathematical constructs is to speak literally of >> reality. My ability to mentally manipulate mathematics therefore makes >> me a powerful lord of reality and puts me in a position of great >> authority and clarity. >> > > I don't know many physicist who takes this position. I guess Max Tegmark > would > be one. But most physicists seem to take the math as descriptive. It is > more > often mathematicians who are Platonists; not I think because of ego, but > because > mathematics seems to be "discovered" rather than "invented". > > I know that most physicists would, when asked, likely deny that their mathematics has been taken as real. It's more that their behaviour is 'as if' they have, because position2 has not been adopted and there . >> Position 2 >> 2a) The mathematics of quantum mechanics is very accurately predictive >> of observed phenomena >> 2b) Reality is not the mathematics of (a). Reality is constructed of >> something that merely appears/behaves quantum-mechanically to an >> observer made of whatever it is, within a universe made of it. The >> mathematics of this "something" is not the mathematics of kind (a). >> > > What about the mathematics is as complete a description as we have of > whatever > underlying reality there may be. So we might as well, provisionally, > identify > it with the real. > > Brent > > It's not complete and it has 1 chronic abject failure: to explain scientists (scientific observation). The position 1a 'laws of nature' presuppose the scientist and scientific observation in the sense that they merely 'organise appearances' in a scientist - the scientist is built into the laws and the explanation as to why there are any 'appearances' at all (as delivered in brain material) goes unexplained... thrown away in the act of objectivity. If there's a perfectly servicable alternative (position 2), and a chromic problem in cognitive science, the more reasonable (in terms of doubt management) position 2 might be thought to be deserving more attention Hmmm. Just in case there's a misunderstanding of position 2, here's their contrast rather more pointedly: Position 1 1a There's a mathematics which describes how the natural world behaves when we look. 1b Reality is literally made of the mathematics 1a. (I act as if this were the case) Position 2 1a There's a mathematics which describes how the natural world behaves when we look. 1b There's a *separate* mathematics of an underlying reality which operates to produce an observer who sees the reality behaving as per 1a maths. 1c There's the actual underlying reality, which is doubted (not claimed) to 'be' 1b or 1a. Position 2 is justified because when you simulate 2b it on a computer you can see, operating inside it, what constitutes the observation system of the scientist) ... it produces a scientist with a scientific observation system. That observation system reveals the natural world to be behaving 'as-if' math 1a was driving it, when in reality it is not. Thus the chronic problem is of position 1 behaviour is solved. Instead of "many" extra worlds... you only need 1. ... all the while MWI remains just as predictive. == I understand your position on the matter, but I wonder as to the psychology of it in general. Let's posit position 2 as the real epistemic option for scientists inside a natural world. Lets say the 'hard problem' of explaining scientists is solved by position 2 work in the year 2050 when simulation can handle 40 orders of magnitude of detailLet's say in 2075 a historian is characterising the mindset of 20th century physics. What they describe is an entire century of unjustified self-deception promulgated by a kind of systemic practical religious behaviour which is denied, by the physicists/mathematicians, in *omission*. That is, their tacit sub
Re: No MWI
Colin Hales wrote: > Hi, > When I read quantum mechanics and listen to those invested in the many > places the mathematics leads, What strikes me is the extent to which the > starting point is mathematics. That is, the entire discussion is couched > as if the mathematics is defining what there is, rather than a mere > describing what is there. I can see that the form of the mathematics > projects a multitude of possibilities. But those invested in the > business seem to operate under the assumption - an extra belief - about > the relationship of the mathematics to reality. It imbues the > discussion. At least that is how it appears to me. Consider the > pragmatics of it. I, scientist X, am in a position of adopting 2 > possible mindsets: > > Position 1 > 1a) The mathematics of quantum mechanics is very accurately predictive > of observed phenomena > 1b) Reality literally IS the mathematics of quantum mechanics (and by > extension all the multitudinous alternative realities actually exist). > Therefor to discuss mathematical constructs is to speak literally of > reality. My ability to mentally manipulate mathematics therefore makes > me a powerful lord of reality and puts me in a position of great > authority and clarity. I don't know many physicist who takes this position. I guess Max Tegmark would be one. But most physicists seem to take the math as descriptive. It is more often mathematicians who are Platonists; not I think because of ego, but because mathematics seems to be "discovered" rather than "invented". > > Position 2 > 2a) The mathematics of quantum mechanics is very accurately predictive > of observed phenomena > 2b) Reality is not the mathematics of (a). Reality is constructed of > something that merely appears/behaves quantum-mechanically to an > observer made of whatever it is, within a universe made of it. The > mathematics of this "something" is not the mathematics of kind (a). What about the mathematics is as complete a description as we have of whatever underlying reality there may be. So we might as well, provisionally, identify it with the real. Brent > > Note > 1a) = 2a) > 1b) and 2b) they are totally different. > > The (a) is completely consistent with either (b). > Yet we have religious zeal surrounding (1b) > > I hope that you can see the subtlety of the distinction between position > 1 and position 2. As a thinking person in the logical position of > wondering what position to adopt, position 1 is *completely > unjustified*. The parsimonious position is one in which the universe is > made of something other than 1b maths, and then to find a method of > describing ways in which position 1 might seem apparent to an observer > made of whatever the universe is actually made of.. The nice thing about > position 2 is that I have room for *doubt* in 2b which does not exist in > 1b. In position 2 I have: > > (i) laws of nature that are the describing system (predictive of > phenomena in the usual ways) > (ii) behaviours of a doubtable 'stuff' relating in doubtable ways to > produce an observer able to to (i) > > In position 1 there is no doubt of kind (ii). That doubt is replaced by > religious adherence to an unfounded implicit belief which imbues the > discourse. At the same time position 1 completely fails to explain an > observer of the kind able to do 1a. > > In my ponderings on this I am coming to the conclusion that the very > nature of the discourse and training self-selects for people who's > mental skills in abstract symbol manipulation make Position 1 a > dominating tendency. Aggregates of position 1 thinkers - such as the > everything list and 'fabric of reality' act like small cults. There is > some kind of psychological payback involved in position 1 which selects > for people susceptible to religiosity of kind 1b. Once you have a couple > of generations of these folk who are so disconnected from the reality of > themselves as embedded, situated agents/observers... that position 2, > which involves an admission of permanent ignorance of some kind, and > thereby demoting the physicist from the prime source of authority over > reality, is marginalised and eventually more or less invisible. > > It is not that MWI is true/false it's that confinement to the > discourse of MWI alone is justified only on religious grounds of the > kind I have delineated. You can be quite predictive and at the same time > not actually be discussing reality at all - and you'll never realise it. > I.E. Position 2 could be right and all the MWI predictions can still be > right. Yet position 1 behaviour stops you from finding position 2 ... > and problems unsolved because they are only solvable by position 2 > remain unsolved merely because of 1b religiosity. > > Can anyone else here see this cultural schism operating? > > regards > > Colin Hales > > > > > > Jason Resch wrote: >> The following link shows convinci
Re: No MWI
Hi, When I read quantum mechanics and listen to those invested in the many places the mathematics leads, What strikes me is the extent to which the starting point is mathematics. That is, the entire discussion is couched as if the mathematics is defining what there is, rather than a mere describing what is there. I can see that the form of the mathematics projects a multitude of possibilities. But those invested in the business seem to operate under the assumption - an extra belief - about the relationship of the mathematics to reality. It imbues the discussion. At least that is how it appears to me. Consider the pragmatics of it. I, scientist X, am in a position of adopting 2 possible mindsets: Position 1 1a) The mathematics of quantum mechanics is very accurately predictive of observed phenomena 1b) Reality literally IS the mathematics of quantum mechanics (and by extension all the multitudinous alternative realities actually exist). Therefor to discuss mathematical constructs is to speak literally of reality. My ability to mentally manipulate mathematics therefore makes me a powerful lord of reality and puts me in a position of great authority and clarity. Position 2 2a) The mathematics of quantum mechanics is very accurately predictive of observed phenomena 2b) Reality is not the mathematics of (a). Reality is constructed of something that merely appears/behaves quantum-mechanically to an observer made of whatever it is, within a universe made of it. The mathematics of this "something" is not the mathematics of kind (a). Note 1a) = 2a) 1b) and 2b) they are totally different. The (a) is completely consistent with either (b). Yet we have religious zeal surrounding (1b) I hope that you can see the subtlety of the distinction between position 1 and position 2. As a thinking person in the logical position of wondering what position to adopt, position 1 is *completely unjustified*. The parsimonious position is one in which the universe is made of something other than 1b maths, and then to find a method of describing ways in which position 1 might seem apparent to an observer made of whatever the universe is actually made of.. The nice thing about position 2 is that I have room for *doubt* in 2b which does not exist in 1b. In position 2 I have: (i) laws of nature that are the describing system (predictive of phenomena in the usual ways) (ii) behaviours of a doubtable 'stuff' relating in doubtable ways to produce an observer able to to (i) In position 1 there is no doubt of kind (ii). That doubt is replaced by religious adherence to an unfounded implicit belief which imbues the discourse. At the same time position 1 completely fails to explain an observer of the kind able to do 1a. In my ponderings on this I am coming to the conclusion that the very nature of the discourse and training self-selects for people who's mental skills in abstract symbol manipulation make Position 1 a dominating tendency. Aggregates of position 1 thinkers - such as the everything list and 'fabric of reality' act like small cults. There is some kind of psychological payback involved in position 1 which selects for people susceptible to religiosity of kind 1b. Once you have a couple of generations of these folk who are so disconnected from the reality of themselves as embedded, situated agents/observers... that position 2, which involves an admission of permanent ignorance of some kind, and thereby demoting the physicist from the prime source of authority over reality, is marginalised and eventually more or less invisible. It is not that MWI is true/false it's that confinement to the discourse of MWI alone is justified only on religious grounds of the kind I have delineated. You can be quite predictive and at the same time not actually be discussing reality at all - and you'll never realise it. I.E. Position 2 could be right and all the MWI predictions can still be right. Yet position 1 behaviour stops you from finding position 2 ... and problems unsolved because they are only solvable by position 2 remain unsolved merely because of 1b religiosity. Can anyone else here see this cultural schism operating? regards Colin Hales Jason Resch wrote: > The following link shows convincingly that what one gains by accepting > MWI is far greater than what one loses (an answer to the born > probabilities) > > http://www.overcomingbias.com/2008/05/if-many-worlds.html > > "The only law in all of quantum mechanics that is non-linear, > non-unitary, non-differentiable and discontinuous. It would prevent > physics from evolving locally, with each piece only looking at its > immediate neighbors. Your 'collapse' would be the only fundamental > phenomenon in all of physics with a preferred basis and a preferred > space of simultaneity. Collapse would be the only phenomenon in all > of physics that violates CPT symmetry, Liouville's Theorem, and > Special Relativity. In your o
Re: No MWI
The following link shows convincingly that what one gains by accepting MWI is far greater than what one loses (an answer to the born probabilities) http://www.overcomingbias.com/2008/05/if-many-worlds.html "The only law in all of quantum mechanics that is non-linear, non-unitary, non-differentiable and discontinuous. It would prevent physics from evolving locally, with each piece only looking at its immediate neighbors. Your 'collapse' would be the only fundamental phenomenon in all of physics with a preferred basis and a preferred space of simultaneity. Collapse would be the only phenomenon in all of physics that violates CPT symmetry, Liouville's Theorem, and Special Relativity. In your original version, collapse would also have been the only phenomenon in all of physics that was inherently mental. Have I left anything out?" Jason On Thu, May 14, 2009 at 7:06 AM, ronaldheld wrote: > > read Aixiv.org:0905.0624v1 (quant-ph) and see if you agree with it > Ronald > > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
No MWI
read Aixiv.org:0905.0624v1 (quant-ph) and see if you agree with it Ronald --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
