Re: Counterfactual Definiteness

[John Mikes]

Bruno et al:
I think *"definiteness"* is always counterfactual since it *MUST* deny the
potential influences from unknown factors (domains, a/effects, even some
definitely counterfactual influences we do not recognize as such at all).
It is a consequence of our agnostic view (as I recall: we agreed on such,
 at least to some degree) and our (accepted?) view on 'scientific' - as
doubtful.
I mean the 'counterfactual' mildly: it "counters" the factual *TOTAL*
impact, not necessarily negating all the infuences. Our views are partial
at best.

I do not know much about rhe QM-related readings and am too old already to
start learning. I accept my ignorance and try to live with it as long as I
can.

John Mikes

On Sun, Apr 17, 2016 at 1:42 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 16 Apr 2016, at 01:46, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> On 16/04/2016 12:20 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 14 Apr 2016, at 14:31, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> It is interesting that you have not answered my question about what
> exactly you mean by 'counterfactual definiteness' so that we know what you
> mean when you say that a theory is not counterfactually definite.
>
>
> It is hard to define, especially if we avoid being technical. But we have
> a good example: QM-with-collapse (or QM with a single universe). Like
> Einstein already explain at the Solvay Meeting: if QM (with a single
> universe) is correct, we can't ascribe an element of reality knowing a
> result that we would obtain with certainty if we would make some
> measurement, but will not do. Then Kochen and Specker proved that QM (+ a
> single universe) is precisely like that. The proof does not apply to the
> many-world, although it might apply to some too much naive rendering of the
> many world (notably if we interpret wrongly the singlet state as I have
> explained in previous post).
>
>
> I do not understand what you are saying. Are you claiming that ordinary QM
> with collapse is counterfactually definite because Einstein realism does
> not apply?
>
>
>
>
>
> I say the contrary: t is NOT counterfactual making Einstein realism not
> able to be applied.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> I.e., we cannot know with certainty what would have been the outcome of an
> experiment that was not performed? (This is also the consequence of the
> Kochen-Specker result that no set of hidden variables can predict the
> results of all possible spin measurements on a spin 1/2 particle.) I would
> have thought that this was one possible definition of counterfactual
> *indefiniteness*.
>
>
> I would be OK too.
>
>
>
>
> What additional fact about MWI changes this conclusion?
>
>
> None. Except that with a single physical reality that counterfactualness
> entails non locality, but the same conunterfactualness with eother
> computationalism and/or QM-without collapse does not entail physical nopn
> locality, but only its statistical *appearances* in the memory of the
> machine testing it.
>
>
>
>
> Since in MWI all possible experiments are performed in some word or other,
> I would have thought that experimental outcomes are available for all
> possible experiments -- nothing is *actually* indefinite
>
>
> It is relatively to you knowledge of a state. If you measure the position
> very precisely, you "soul" is attached to an infinity of
> "body/representation" with many definite, but different, momenta.
>
> If you measure something the result is definite only relatively to one
> representation among many. If you look at the transfer of information in
> the 3p picture of the entire quantum teleportation, you can see that the
> information is spread locally at all times. It is even somehow made
> explicit if you are using Bob Coecke's use category to describe such
> quantum events.
>
> http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0402130
> http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0402014
>
> -- even though not all outcomes occur in this one world that we happen to
> inhabit at the moment.
>
>
> There is no real sense to say that we inhabit a world. We are all the
> times in an infinity of worlds/situation, which differentiate or not
> relatively to what we interact with.
> An electronic orbital is a sort of map of the set of all words we are
> relatively to the possible energy of that "electron".
> But by the linearity of the tensor product, we share the worlds only with
> the person we interact with.
> You might look at the Rubin's paper (provided by Scerir). Or Bob's Coocke.
>
> I will comment your other post with more detail perhaps later. But I do
> not really grasp your
>
> <<
> A and B perform their measurements at spacelike separation, but each
> chooses the measurement orientation outside the light cone of the other.
> There are four possible combinations of results, corresponding to four
> worlds in the
> MWI: |+>|+'>, |+>|-'>, |->|+'>, and |->|-'>.
> Since each observer has a 50% chance of getting |+> and 50% of getting
> |->, and the two measurements are completely independent of each other, it
> would seem that each of 

Re: Counterfactual Definiteness

[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 Apr 2016, at 01:46, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 16/04/2016 12:20 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 14 Apr 2016, at 14:31, Bruce Kellett wrote:

It is interesting that you have not answered my question about  
what exactly you mean by 'counterfactual definiteness' so that we  
know what you mean when you say that a theory is not  
counterfactually definite.


It is hard to define, especially if we avoid being technical. But  
we have a good example: QM-with-collapse (or QM with a single  
universe). Like Einstein already explain at the Solvay Meeting: if  
QM (with a single universe) is correct, we can't ascribe an element  
of reality knowing a result that we would obtain with certainty if  
we would make some measurement, but will not do. Then Kochen and  
Specker proved that QM (+ a single universe) is precisely like  
that. The proof does not apply to the many-world, although it might  
apply to some too much naive rendering of the many world (notably  
if we interpret wrongly the singlet state as I have explained in  
previous post).


I do not understand what you are saying. Are you claiming that  
ordinary QM with collapse is counterfactually definite because  
Einstein realism does not apply?





I say the contrary: t is NOT counterfactual making Einstein realism  
not able to be applied.








I.e., we cannot know with certainty what would have been the outcome  
of an experiment that was not performed? (This is also the  
consequence of the Kochen-Specker result that no set of hidden  
variables can predict the results of all possible spin measurements  
on a spin 1/2 particle.) I would have thought that this was one  
possible definition of counterfactual indefiniteness.


I would be OK too.





What additional fact about MWI changes this conclusion?


None. Except that with a single physical reality that  
counterfactualness entails non locality, but the same  
conunterfactualness with eother computationalism and/or QM-without  
collapse does not entail physical nopn locality, but only its  
statistical *appearances* in the memory of the machine testing it.





Since in MWI all possible experiments are performed in some word or  
other, I would have thought that experimental outcomes are available  
for all possible experiments -- nothing is actually indefinite


It is relatively to you knowledge of a state. If you measure the  
position very precisely, you "soul" is attached to an infinity of  
"body/representation" with many definite, but different, momenta.


If you measure something the result is definite only relatively to one  
representation among many. If you look at the transfer of information  
in the 3p picture of the entire quantum teleportation, you can see  
that the information is spread locally at all times. It is even  
somehow made explicit if you are using Bob Coecke's use category to  
describe such quantum events.


http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0402130
http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0402014

-- even though not all outcomes occur in this one world that we  
happen to inhabit at the moment.


There is no real sense to say that we inhabit a world. We are all the  
times in an infinity of worlds/situation, which differentiate or not  
relatively to what we interact with.
An electronic orbital is a sort of map of the set of all words we are  
relatively to the possible energy of that "electron".
But by the linearity of the tensor product, we share the worlds only  
with the person we interact with.
You might look at the Rubin's paper (provided by Scerir). Or Bob's  
Coocke.


I will comment your other post with more detail perhaps later. But I  
do not really grasp your


<<
A and B perform their measurements at spacelike separation, but each  
chooses the measurement orientation outside the light cone of the  
other. There are four possible combinations of results, corresponding  
to four worlds in the

MWI: |+>|+'>, |+>|-'>, |->|+'>, and |->|-'>.
Since each observer has a 50% chance of getting |+> and 50% of getting  
|->, and the two measurements are completely independent of each  
other, it would seem that each of these four worlds is equally likely.

>>

The expressions |+>|+'>, |+>|-'>, |->|+'>, and |->|-'>  does not  
describe the superposition in which the observer will self-localize  
in: it is not the singlet state, which describe an infinity of worlds  
where all pair of particles of Bob and Alice are correlated.
The whole point is that the result of the measurement does not  
describe the state we measure, but the partition of the sort of worlds  
to which we *relatively* belong.
It is a bit long to verify by hand, but the linearity of tensor  
products and of the evolution makes the correlated state remaining  
correlated, and when one of them make a measurement, it just tell Bob  
in which partition of the multiverse he *and "his" Alice" belong.
Only if the states of Alice and Bob electron where counterfactually  
definite before the measurement would this 

RE: Counterfactual?

[Stathis Papaioannou]

Peter Jones writes:

 Physical determinism is the idea that the
 future is genrated form the persent by rigid physical
 laws. As opposed to the idea that the future is fixed
 becasue it is already there, like the end of a movie
 which is already in the can , and need not bear any logical
 relation to what has gone before (especially
 if it is a david Lynch movie).

I don't see how you can distinguish between a movie + projector 
system and any other deterministic physical system. If I turn the 
projector on with the film in place, the ending of the movie is neither 
more nor less fixed than the final arrangement of billiard balls if I hit 
one of them with the cue. If I had hit the first ball a little differently, 
or the air currents in the room had been a little different, then the 
final arrangement of balls would have been different, but then if the 
chemicals in the film had undergone some unexpected reaction, or the 
motor of the projector started to behave differenltly, then the film 
on the screen would also have been different:

film - initial conditions
projector - physical laws
movie on screen - future physical state

Stathis Papaioannou
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RE: Counterfactual?

[Stathis Papaioannou]

Peter Jones writes:

  But is there any sense in which we as humans are any more free than 
  billiard
  balls or dice beyond the fact that we *feel* we are free?
 
 There may be. For instance, freedom might be a combination of
 indeterminism and rational self-control.

  I have a strong feeling
  that my free will is not randomness and not determinism: is there anything 
  really
  other tthan these two possibilities?
 
 
 Various combinations of them. Why should it not be a combination ?

OK, that could be the case, but then the roll of the dice will probably also be 
best 
described as a combination of randomness and deterministic physical laws. So 
the 
reason I have free will and the dice do not is just that I feel I have free 
will, not that my 
behaviour is fundamentally any more or less predictable or subject to physical 
laws.

Stathis Papaioannou
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Re: Counterfactual?

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 31-août-06, à 12:59, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :


 But is there any sense in which we as humans are any more free than 
 billiard
 balls or dice beyond the fact that we *feel* we are free? I have a 
 strong feeling
 that my free will is not randomness and not determinism: is there 
 anything really
 other tthan these two possibilities?


The (relative) partial computable functions offers many ways to study 
varieties of mathematical processes in between. Self-observing machine 
cannot predict their own behavior, but they can predict that very 
unpredictability, though.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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RE: Counterfactual?

[Stathis Papaioannou]

Peter Jones writes:

 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
  John  Mikes writes:
 
   Peter:
   ... A counterfactual is a COUNTERfactual - -it is
   something that could have happenned but didn't. There is no
   reason why we should be conscious of in things
   we coudl have done but didn't. ...
  
   JM:
   It could not have happened in another way if it did happen THIS way.. WE 
   may
   think - in our limited circle of knowledge - that something else was also
   viable, but in the deterministic world of  a total (unlimited, not
   model-enclosed) interconnectedness - whatever happened, was the possible
   way of events.
   I am not talking about HP universes or thought experiments.
 
  Yes: the mere fact that we *think* it could have happened differently does 
  not
  mean that it could have happened differently.
 
 Counterfactuals come from physical determinism, they
 are not contrary to it. Causal determism mean there are
 physical laws determining events which can be modelled
 by mathematival statements. The mathermatical
 formulation of physical laws allows you to answer
 hypothetical questions even if the actual situation cannot
 be phsyically realised for some practical reason.
 
 
 If the actual situation cannot
 be physically realised for some practical reason,
 there is a sense in which it is impossible --
 but it is not the same sense of impossible
 as something which is forbidden by physical
 laws.

But is there any sense in which we as humans are any more free than billiard 
balls or dice beyond the fact that we *feel* we are free? I have a strong 
feeling 
that my free will is not randomness and not determinism: is there anything 
really 
other tthan these two possibilities?

Stathis Papaioannou
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Re: Counterfactual?

[1Z]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
 Peter Jones writes:

  Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
   John  Mikes writes:
  
Peter:
... A counterfactual is a COUNTERfactual - -it is
something that could have happenned but didn't. There is no
reason why we should be conscious of in things
we coudl have done but didn't. ...
   
JM:
It could not have happened in another way if it did happen THIS way.. 
WE may
think - in our limited circle of knowledge - that something else was 
also
viable, but in the deterministic world of  a total (unlimited, not
model-enclosed) interconnectedness - whatever happened, was the 
possible
way of events.
I am not talking about HP universes or thought experiments.
  
   Yes: the mere fact that we *think* it could have happened differently 
   does not
   mean that it could have happened differently.
 
  Counterfactuals come from physical determinism, they
  are not contrary to it. Causal determism mean there are
  physical laws determining events which can be modelled
  by mathematival statements. The mathermatical
  formulation of physical laws allows you to answer
  hypothetical questions even if the actual situation cannot
  be phsyically realised for some practical reason.
 
 
  If the actual situation cannot
  be physically realised for some practical reason,
  there is a sense in which it is impossible --
  but it is not the same sense of impossible
  as something which is forbidden by physical
  laws.

 But is there any sense in which we as humans are any more free than billiard
 balls or dice beyond the fact that we *feel* we are free?

There may be. For instance, freedom might be a combination of
indeterminism and rational self-control.

 I have a strong feeling
 that my free will is not randomness and not determinism: is there anything 
 really
 other tthan these two possibilities?


Various combinations of them. Why should it not be a combination ?

 Stathis Papaioannou
 _
 Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail.
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RE: Counterfactual?

[Stathis Papaioannou]

John  Mikes writes:

 Peter:
 ... A counterfactual is a COUNTERfactual - -it is
 something that could have happenned but didn't. There is no
 reason why we should be conscious of in things
 we coudl have done but didn't. ...
 
 JM:
 It could not have happened in another way if it did happen THIS way.. WE may
 think - in our limited circle of knowledge - that something else was also
 viable, but in the deterministic world of  a total (unlimited, not
 model-enclosed) interconnectedness - whatever happened, was the possible
 way of events.
 I am not talking about HP universes or thought experiments.

Yes: the mere fact that we *think* it could have happened differently does not 
mean that it could have happened differently. It could be that there is just a 
single 
deterministic universe and we are just playing out our lives like actors in a 
film. God 
knows exactly how I'm going to finish this sentence, even if I don't until 
after the fact.

Stathis Papaioannou
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Re: Counterfactual?

[1Z]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
 John  Mikes writes:

  Peter:
  ... A counterfactual is a COUNTERfactual - -it is
  something that could have happenned but didn't. There is no
  reason why we should be conscious of in things
  we coudl have done but didn't. ...
 
  JM:
  It could not have happened in another way if it did happen THIS way.. WE may
  think - in our limited circle of knowledge - that something else was also
  viable, but in the deterministic world of  a total (unlimited, not
  model-enclosed) interconnectedness - whatever happened, was the possible
  way of events.
  I am not talking about HP universes or thought experiments.

 Yes: the mere fact that we *think* it could have happened differently does not
 mean that it could have happened differently.

Counterfactuals come from physical determinism, they
are not contrary to it. Causal determism mean there are
physical laws determining events which can be modelled
by mathematival statements. The mathermatical
formulation of physical laws allows you to answer
hypothetical questions even if the actual situation cannot
be phsyically realised for some practical reason.


If the actual situation cannot
be physically realised for some practical reason,
there is a sense in which it is impossible --
but it is not the same sense of impossible
as something which is forbidden by physical
laws.



  It could be that there is just a single
 deterministic universe and we are just playing out our lives like actors in a 
 film. God
 knows exactly how I'm going to finish this sentence, even if I don't until 
 after the fact.

 Stathis Papaioannou
 _
 Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail.
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Re: Counterfactual?

[John M]

Peter:
There is a clash of concepts - as I feel.
I do not 'read' what physical has to do in the fact
of 'determinism': if determinism is not (deemed) as
'physical', it does not determin? 
Laws (physical?) do not determin anything. Explain:
yes or oppose to. The deductions of the majority of
the observed cases (=laws, predictions) do not act.
Furthermore:
If something is (or seems) impossible (= does not
occur) then the possibility of a mathematical
formulation of it does not make it realizable. Of
course we see the difference between mental simulation
and observation (who knows the truth?) but to keep
George's (nonexistent-haha) sanity - we may as well
differentiate between what we think as observed and
what we deduce upon a theory. 
Your last par is absolutely true - I think in the
opposite sense from why you wrote it. As history shows
we may detect any 'new rules' (laws) any time to come.
(Even if it is not written in the 17-19c physix
bible.)

I concur fully with Stathis's remark - adding that we
have no acces to the other universes at this ppoint,
but as we 'think' about them (mentally created them)
-they may be similarly deterministic as ours. I mean:
(in my view of a Multiverse), consisting of unlimited
and unlimitedly different universes. We just cannot
think otherwise. (Maybe some of us can on this list).

John Mikes

John M

--- 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

 
 
 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
  John  Mikes writes:
 
   Peter:
   ... A counterfactual is a COUNTERfactual - -it
 is
   something that could have happenned but didn't.
 There is no
   reason why we should be conscious of in things
   we coudl have done but didn't. ...
  
   JM:
   It could not have happened in another way if it
 did happen THIS way.. WE may
   think - in our limited circle of knowledge -
 that something else was also
   viable, but in the deterministic world of  a
 total (unlimited, not
   model-enclosed) interconnectedness - whatever
 happened, was the possible
   way of events.
   I am not talking about HP universes or thought
 experiments.
 
  Yes: the mere fact that we *think* it could have
 happened differently does not
  mean that it could have happened differently.
 
 Counterfactuals come from physical determinism, they
 are not contrary to it. Causal determism mean there
 are
 physical laws determining events which can be
 modelled
 by mathematival statements. The mathermatical
 formulation of physical laws allows you to answer
 hypothetical questions even if the actual situation
 cannot
 be phsyically realised for some practical reason.
 
 
 If the actual situation cannot
 be physically realised for some practical reason,
 there is a sense in which it is impossible --
 but it is not the same sense of impossible
 as something which is forbidden by physical
 laws.
 
 
 
   It could be that there is just a single
  deterministic universe and we are just playing out
 our lives like actors in a film. God
  knows exactly how I'm going to finish this
 sentence, even if I don't until after the fact.
 
  Stathis Papaioannou
 
 

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Re: Counterfactual?

[1Z]

John M wrote:
 Peter:
 There is a clash of concepts - as I feel.
 I do not 'read' what physical has to do in the fact
 of 'determinism': if determinism is not (deemed) as
 'physical', it does not determin?

Physical determinism is the idea that the
future is genrated form the persent by rigid physical
laws. As opposed to the idea that the future is fixed
becasue it is alreafy there, like the end of a movie
which is already in the can , and need not bear any logical
relation to what has gone before (especially
if it is a david Lynch movie).


 Laws (physical?) do not determin anything. Explain:
 yes or oppose to. The deductions of the majority of
 the observed cases (=laws, predictions) do not act.

I don't see what you mean

 Furthermore:
 If something is (or seems) impossible (= does not
 occur) then the possibility of a mathematical
 formulation of it does not make it realizable.

If the mathematical model is accurate, and it allows different outcomes

under different circumstances, then the physical reality
it models prsumable has counterfactual possibilities.

  Of
 course we see the difference between mental simulation
 and observation (who knows the truth?) but to keep
 George's (nonexistent-haha) sanity - we may as well
 differentiate between what we think as observed and
 what we deduce upon a theory.
 Your last par is absolutely true - I think in the
 opposite sense from why you wrote it. As history shows
 we may detect any 'new rules' (laws) any time to come.
 (Even if it is not written in the 17-19c physix
 bible.)

 I concur fully with Stathis's remark - adding that we
 have no acces to the other universes at this ppoint,
 but as we 'think' about them (mentally created them)
 -they may be similarly deterministic as ours. I mean:
 (in my view of a Multiverse), consisting of unlimited
 and unlimitedly different universes. We just cannot
 think otherwise. (Maybe some of us can on this list).
 
 John Mikes
 
 John M
 
 --- 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:



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