Le 26-sept.-06, à 16:03, Russell Standish a écrit :
I would say also that interpretations could be inconsistent,
? ? ?
I guess you are using the word interpretation in some non standard
way.
It would help us, and you, if you could work on a glossary.
but
perhaps there is not much
On Fri, Sep 29, 2006 at 11:46:20AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 26-sept.-06, à 16:03, Russell Standish a écrit :
I would say also that interpretations could be inconsistent,
? ? ?
I guess you are using the word interpretation in some non standard
way.
It would help us, and
Hi Russell,
I got your book. Congratulation for that very nice introduction to the
subject and to your ideas. It is a very gentle and lovely book.
Probably because you are to kind to your audience, it seems to me you
have sacrifice perhaps a bit of rigor. I am still not sure about your
most
On Tue, Sep 26, 2006 at 04:10:32PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hi Russell,
I got your book. Congratulation for that very nice introduction to the
subject and to your ideas. It is a very gentle and lovely book.
Probably because you are to kind to your audience, it seems to me you
have
Le 14-sept.-06, à 00:52, Russell Standish a écrit :
That the experience of time is necessarily experienced by all conscious
points of view is to my knowledge not even addressed by other
philosophers. Even Bruno seems to skirt the issue,
? (I think that consciousness is needed for *all*
Periklis Akritidis writes:
Why would you care about the opinion of those observers left forever
behind...
from the possibility that all this MWI stuff is just wrong, of course).
Even in my scheme where
there is just a possibility of death some calculations I have done suggest
that
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Periklis Akritidis writes:
Why would you care about the opinion of those observers left forever
behind...
from the possibility that all this MWI stuff is just wrong, of course). Even
in my scheme where
there is just a possibility of death some calculations I
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
This is the most immediate response of people to the QTI idea: even if it's
true,
what do I care if other versions of me survive in the multiverse if I'm going
to die?
According to QTI you are not going to die in any universe because there
are no dead ends in
David Nyman wrote:
Some of us may recall the tontine, invented in the 17th century by a
Neapolitan banker called Lorenzo de Tonti as an investment scheme, but
now illegal, in the US and UK at least. The only beneficiary is the
last survivor, who scoops the pool. A QTI tontine would presumably
Tom Caylor writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Tom Caylor writes:
After many life-expectancy-spans worth of narrow escapes, after
thousands or millions of years, wouldn't the probability be pretty high
for my personality/memory etc. to change so much that I wouldn't
recognize
Periklis Akritidis writes:
QTI apparently implies a very efficient machine to compute the solution
to any well defined problem. Suppose you want to factor a large number.
The machine simply generates some random numbers using thermal noise,
computes their product, compares it with the number
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Yet another QTI money-making scheme, this one rather less frightening
than standard QS: you find a gambling game which is completely fair (easier
said than done) and take with you the means of instant death, like a strong
poison which you keep in your pocket. You
Periklis Akritidis wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Yet another QTI money-making scheme, this one rather less frightening
than standard QS: you find a gambling game which is completely fair (easier
said than done) and take with you the means of instant death, like a strong
poison
Some of us may recall the tontine, invented in the 17th century by a
Neapolitan banker called Lorenzo de Tonti as an investment scheme, but
now illegal, in the US and UK at least. The only beneficiary is the
last survivor, who scoops the pool. A QTI tontine would presumably make
winners of *all*
On Wed, Sep 13, 2006 at 02:56:30PM -, David Nyman wrote:
Russell Standish wrote:
If you can demonstrate this as a theorem, or even as a moderately
convincing argument why this should be so, I'd be most grateful for a
presentation. I'm all for eliminating unnecessary hypotheses.
Johnathan Corgan writes:
David Nyman wrote:
[re: QTI]
This has obvious
implications for retirement planning in general and avoidance of the
more egregious cul-de-sac situations. On the other hand, short of
outright lunacy vis-a-vis personal safety, it also seems to imply that
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Tom Caylor writes:
After many life-expectancy-spans worth of narrow escapes, after
thousands or millions of years, wouldn't the probability be pretty high
for my personality/memory etc. to change so much that I wouldn't
recognize myself, or that I could be
Russell Standish wrote:
2) RSSA vs ASSA - Isn't it the case that all 'absolute' self samples
will appear to be 'relative' (i.e. to their own content) and hence
1st-person experience can be 'time-like' without the need for
'objective' sequencing of observer moments? If the 'pov' is that
On Wed, Sep 13, 2006 at 07:40:06AM -, David Nyman wrote:
Why do we need to assume TIME as an ordering process for 'successive'
moments under the RSSA assumption? Isn't it the case that, under the
ASSA assumption, 1st-person experience would continue to appear
'time-like' (because of its
Russell Standish wrote:
If you can demonstrate this as a theorem, or even as a moderately
convincing argument why this should be so, I'd be most grateful for a
presentation. I'm all for eliminating unnecessary hypotheses.
'Fraid I don't have a theorem! However, as to 'moderately convincing
Hi Russell
I just received the book and have swiftly perused it (one of many
iterations I expect). I find it to be a clear presentation of your own
approach as well as a fine exposition of many topics from the list that
had me baffled. A couple of things immediately occur:
1) QTI - I must say
David Nyman wrote:
[re: QTI]
This has obvious
implications for retirement planning in general and avoidance of the
more egregious cul-de-sac situations. On the other hand, short of
outright lunacy vis-a-vis personal safety, it also seems to imply that
from the 1st-person pov we are likely
Johnathan Corgan wrote:
If my expectation is that QTI is true and I'll be living for a very long
time, I may adjust my financial planning accordingly. But QTI only
applies to my own first-person view; I'll be constantly shedding
branches where I did indeed die. If I have any financial
David Nyman wrote:
Is this in fact your expectation? And do you so plan? Forgive me if
this seems overly personal, but I'm fascinated to discover if anyone
actually acts on these beliefs.
It's not overly personal; I brought it up in fact.
But personally, no, I don't act on these beliefs
Johnathan Corgan wrote:
It does seem to me the theory hinges on whether cul-de-sac's exist or
not, hence my earlier questioning. I've already accepted the essential
underlying MWI explanation.
Yes, the question of cul-de-sacs is indeed interesting. However, it
seems to me that they need
Johnathan Corgan wrote:
David Nyman wrote:
[re: QTI]
This has obvious
implications for retirement planning in general and avoidance of the
more egregious cul-de-sac situations. On the other hand, short of
outright lunacy vis-a-vis personal safety, it also seems to imply that
from the
Johnathan Corgan wrote:
QTI makes a big twist on this by removing from the numerator *and*
denominator those outcomes where consciousness ceases.
Precisely. And this is what should bias one's choices in the case that
one is prepared to bet on the validity of QTI.
Not sure what the question
(This is the original post that seems somehow to have gone missing)
Hi Russell
I just received the book and have swiftly perused it (one of many
iterations I expect). I find it to be a clear presentation of your own
approach as well as a fine exposition of many topics from the list that
had me
Brent Meeker wrote:
Everett who originated the MWI thought about QTI. Although he never
explicitly said
he believed it, he led a very unhealthy life style smoking, drinking, eating
to
excees, never exercising and he died young, of a heart attack IIRC. So some
of his
acquaintences
Johnathan Corgan wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
These questions may reduce to something like, Is there a lower limit to
the amplitude of the SWE?
If measure is infinitely divisible, then is there any natural scale to
its absolute value?
I think it is not and there is a lower limit below which
-
From: Johnathan Corgan [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Tuesday, September 12, 2006 7:43 PM
Subject: Re: Russell's book
David Nyman wrote:
[re: QTI]
This has obvious
implications for retirement planning in general and avoidance of the
more egregious cul
After many life-expectancy-spans worth of narrow escapes, after
thousands or millions of years, wouldn't the probability be pretty high
for my personality/memory etc. to change so much that I wouldn't
recognize myself, or that I could be more like another person than my
original self, and so for
On Tue, Sep 12, 2006 at 12:52:25PM -, David Nyman wrote:
Hi Russell
I just received the book and have swiftly perused it (one of many
iterations I expect). I find it to be a clear presentation of your own
approach as well as a fine exposition of many topics from the list that
had me
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