On Fri, Feb 13, 2009 at 07:31:29PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> > I'm a little confused. Did you mean Dp here? Dp = -B-p
>
>
> Fair question, given my sometimes poor random typo!
>
...
> deduce Bp) , well, if you remind the definition of the Kripke
> semantics, you can see that
>
> Bp
On 12 Feb 2009, at 22:12, russell standish wrote:
>
> On Thu, Feb 12, 2009 at 04:48:22PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> Excellent post Johnatan.
>>
>> Of course those who know a bit of AUDA (which I have already
>> explained
>> on the list) know that from the third person self-reference vie
On Thu, Feb 12, 2009 at 04:48:22PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Excellent post Johnatan.
>
> Of course those who know a bit of AUDA (which I have already explained
> on the list) know that from the third person self-reference views we
> have cul-de-sac everywhere ("we die all the times",
On 12 Feb 2009, at 14:30, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> 2009/2/12 Johnathan Corgan :
>
>> It is an open question (to me at least) whether there are any
>> observer
>> moments without successors, i.e., where the amplitude of the SW
>> goes to
>> zero. If it does not, then this implies that
SSA vs. RSSA arguments on the
> list here, and I'm sure I'm risking a rehash of things back then, the
> recent traffic over "adult vs. child" and "AB continuity" seems to
> revolve around this anyway.
>
> It seems intuitively obvious to me that
2009/2/12 Johnathan Corgan :
> It is an open question (to me at least) whether there are any observer
> moments without successors, i.e., where the amplitude of the SW goes to
> zero. If it does not, then this implies that the always branching tree
> of observer moments has no leaf nodes--rather
And could you explicit the "not by you", if the "me" of 1000 years old has
all my memories up to now (+ his own from now on to 1000 years old)... It is
me, if you disagree what is personnal identity for you ? What is the magical
"I" you're talking about ?
Quentin
2009/2/12 Quentin Anciaux
>
>
>
2009/2/12 Jack Mallah
>
> --- On Wed, 2/11/09, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > > > From a 1st perspective commonness is useless in
> > the argument. The important is what it feels like for the experimenter.
> > >
> > > You seem to be saying that commonness of an experience has no effect
> on, what fo
--- On Wed, 2/11/09, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > > From a 1st perspective commonness is useless in
> the argument. The important is what it feels like for the experimenter.
> >
> > You seem to be saying that commonness of an experience has no effect on,
> > what for practical purposes, is whether
2009/2/12 Jack Mallah :
>
> --- On Wed, 2/11/09, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> I don't think it makes a difference if life is continuous or discrete: it is
>> still possible to assert that future versions of myself are different people
>> who merely experience the illusion of being me.
>> Howev
Jack,
> There are some people who will, but relatively few. That is what counts for
> QS to be invalid.
Hmm, that does not make QS invalid (see Quentin and Jonathan's posts for
my views on the issue, they have expressed everything clearly), and in
fact you have already conceded QI (by assert
While I wasn't around for the original ASSA vs. RSSA arguments on the
list here, and I'm sure I'm risking a rehash of things back then, the
recent traffic over "adult vs. child" and "AB continuity" seems to
revolve around this anyway.
It seems intuitively o
2009/2/11 Jack Mallah
>
> --- On Wed, 2/11/09, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > From a 1st perspective commonness is useless in the argument. The
> important is what it feels like for the experimenter.
>
> You seem to be saying that commonness of an experience has no effect on,
> what for practical pu
--- On Wed, 2/11/09, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> From a 1st perspective commonness is useless in the argument. The important
> is what it feels like for the experimenter.
You seem to be saying that commonness of an experience has no effect on, what
for practical purposes, is whether people should
2009/2/11 Jack Mallah
>
> --- On Wed, 2/11/09, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > 2009/2/11 Jack Mallah
> > > And if your measure were to drop off dramatically overnight, it is
> equivalent to saying that many _more people_ woke up in your bed today as
> compared to the number of people who will wake u
--- On Wed, 2/11/09, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2009/2/11 Jack Mallah
> > And if your measure were to drop off dramatically overnight, it is
> > equivalent to saying that many _more people_ woke up in your bed today as
> > compared to the number of people who will wake up in your bed tommorrow.
2009/2/11 Jack Mallah
>
> --- On Wed, 2/11/09, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > I don't think it makes a difference if life is continuous or discrete: it
> is still possible to assert that future versions of myself are different
> people who merely experience the illusion of being me.
> > However,
--- On Wed, 2/11/09, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> I don't think it makes a difference if life is continuous or discrete: it is
> still possible to assert that future versions of myself are different people
> who merely experience the illusion of being me.
> However, this just becomes a semantic
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