--- On Wed, 2/11/09, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > From a 1st perspective commonness is useless in
> the argument. The important is what it feels like for the experimenter.
> >
> > You seem to be saying that commonness of an experience has no effect on, 
> > what for practical purposes, is whether people should expect to experience 
> > it.  That is a contradiction in terms.  It is false by definition.  If an 
> > "uncommon" experience gets experienced just as often as a "common" 
> > experience, then by definition they are equally common and have equal 
> > measure.
> >
> That's not what I said. I said however uncommon an experience is, if it 
> exists... it exists by definition, if mwi is true, and measure is never 
> strictly null for any particular moment to have a successor then any moment 
> has a successor hence there exists a me moment of 1000 years old and it is 
> garanteed to be lived by definition.

It will be experienced - but not by most of "you".  For all practical purposes 
it might as well not exist.

> What you're saying is uncommon moment are *never* experienced (means their 
> measure is strictly null), for the QI argument to hold it is suffisant to 
> have at least *one* next moment for every moment.

No and no.


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