2009/2/12 Jack Mallah <[email protected]>: > > --- On Wed, 2/11/09, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote: >> I don't think it makes a difference if life is continuous or discrete: it is >> still possible to assert that future versions of myself are different people >> who merely experience the illusion of being me. >> However, this just becomes a semantic exercise. Saying that I will wake up >> in my bed tomorrow is equivalent to saying that someone sufficiently similar >> to me will wake up in my bed tomorrow. > > Exactly. > > And if your measure were to drop off dramatically overnight, it is equivalent > to saying that many _more people_ woke up in your bed today as compared to > the number of people who will wake up in your bed tommorrow. > > Which is equivalent to saying that, for all practical purposes, you will > probably die overnight. And that is the point.
You agree that if one version of me goes to bed tonight and one version of me wakes up tomorrow, then I should expect to wake up tomorrow. But if extra versions of me are manufactured and run today, then switched off when I go to sleep, then you are saying that I might not wake up tomorrow. The extra copies of me have somehow sapped my life strength. -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
