2009/2/12 Jack Mallah <jackmal...@yahoo.com>:
> --- On Wed, 2/11/09, Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> I don't think it makes a difference if life is continuous or discrete: it is
>> still possible to assert that future versions of myself are different people
>> who merely experience the illusion of being me.
>> However, this just becomes a semantic exercise. Saying that I will wake up
>> in my bed tomorrow is equivalent to saying that someone sufficiently similar
>> to me will wake up in my bed tomorrow.
> And if your measure were to drop off dramatically overnight, it is equivalent
> to saying that many _more people_ woke up in your bed today as compared to
> the number of people who will wake up in your bed tommorrow.
> Which is equivalent to saying that, for all practical purposes, you will
> probably die overnight. And that is the point.
You agree that if one version of me goes to bed tonight and one
version of me wakes up tomorrow, then I should expect to wake up
tomorrow. But if extra versions of me are manufactured and run today,
then switched off when I go to sleep, then you are saying that I might
not wake up tomorrow. The extra copies of me have somehow sapped my
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