On Wednesday, December 25, 2013 2:09:07 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Dec 2013, at 16:18, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, December 25, 2013 5:07:22 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Dec 2013, at 17:31, Craig Weinberg wrote:
It's straighforward I think. What you are
On 25 December 2013 16:51, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
On Saturday, December 21, 2013 5:28:29 PM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
Craig,
Sorry, but I don't really understand what you are trying to get at. Your
terminology is not giving me any clarity of what you are really
On 21 Dec 2013, at 21:52, Edgar Owen wrote:
Liz,
No, that doesn't make Reality subject to the halting problem. The
halting problem is when a computer program is trying to reach some
independently postulated result and may or may not be able to reach
it.
Reality doesn't have any
On 25 Dec 2013, at 16:18, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, December 25, 2013 5:07:22 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Dec 2013, at 17:31, Craig Weinberg wrote:
It's straighforward I think. What you are saying is that this
semantic trick prevents us from seeing that the truth
Liz,
No, that doesn't make Reality subject to the halting problem. The halting
problem is when a computer program is trying to reach some independently
postulated result and may or may not be able to reach it.
Reality doesn't have any problem like this. It just computes the logical
results
I have probably missed this - I don't have time to engage as much as I
would like with this list (or any others) - but where or how are these
computations taking place?
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On 21 Dec 2013, at 17:32, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Thursday, December 19, 2013 10:13:25 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Dec 2013, at 15:07, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Thursday, December 19, 2013 5:23:20 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hello Craig,
That is the very well known attempt
On 21 Dec 2013, at 19:06, Edgar Owen wrote:
Craig,
Godel's Theorem applies only to human mathematical systems.
provably assuming that humans are arithmetically sound machine (which
is a rather strong assumption).
It doesn't apply to the logico-mathematical system of reality, of
On Sunday, December 22, 2013 7:21:05 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Dec 2013, at 17:32, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Thursday, December 19, 2013 10:13:25 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Dec 2013, at 15:07, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Thursday, December 19, 2013
On 22 Dec 2013, at 14:56, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Sunday, December 22, 2013 7:21:05 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Mathematics is not enough for the mind and experience of ... the
machines.
i agree, of course, but how is that view compatible with
computationalism?
It prevents the
On Thursday, December 19, 2013 10:13:25 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Dec 2013, at 15:07, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Thursday, December 19, 2013 5:23:20 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hello Craig,
That is the very well known attempt by Lucas to use Gödel's theorem to
refute
Reality is analogous to a running software program. Godel's Theorem does
not apply. A human could speculate as to whether any particular state of
Reality could ever arise computationally and it might be impossible to
determine that, but again that has nothing to do with the actual operation
of
On 20 Dec 2013, at 01:01, LizR wrote:
On 20 December 2013 11:40, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 12/19/2013 1:30 PM, Jesse Mazer wrote:
To me it seems like thinking something is true is much more of a
fuzzy category that asserting something is true
Maybe. But note that Bruno's MGA
A nice exposition, Jesse. But it bothers me that it seems to rely on the idea of output
and a kind of isolation like invoking a meta-level. What if instead of Craig Weinberg
will never in his lifetime assert that this statement is true we considered Craig
Weinberg will never in his lifetime
To me it seems like thinking something is true is much more of a fuzzy
category that asserting something is true (even assertions can be
ambiguous when stated in natural language, but they can be made non-fuzzy
by requiring that each assertion be framed in terms of some formal language
and entered
On 12/19/2013 1:30 PM, Jesse Mazer wrote:
To me it seems like thinking something is true is much more of a fuzzy category that
asserting something is true
Maybe. But note that Bruno's MGA is couched in terms of a dream, just to avoid any
input/output. That seems like a suspicious move to
On 20 December 2013 11:40, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 12/19/2013 1:30 PM, Jesse Mazer wrote:
To me it seems like thinking something is true is much more of a fuzzy
category that asserting something is true
Maybe. But note that Bruno's MGA is couched in terms of a dream, just
If this is a proof of the falsity of mechanism, is there any chance of a
precis? :-)
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On 19 December 2013 08:32, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
If this is a proof of the falsity of mechanism, is there any chance of a
precis? :-)
The argument has been restated with elaboration by Penrose, and has
been extensively criticised.
http://www.iep.utm.edu/lp-argue/
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Stathis
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