Re: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*

On 03 Sep 2005, at 20:54, Hal Finney wrote:Okay, I was mostly trying to clarify the terminology.  The problem is that sometimes you use "comp" as if it is the same as computationalism, and sometimes it seems to include these additional concepts of the Church Thesis and Arithmetical Realism.  Maybe

Re: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*

On 05 Sep 2005, at 19:13, Hal Finney wrote: Bruno writes: I will think about it, but I do think that CT and AR are just making the YD more precise. Also everybody in cognitive science agree explicitly or implicitly with both CT and AR, so to take them away from YD could be more confusing.

Re: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*

On 06 Sep 2005, at 02:27, Lee Corbin wrote: Bruno writes Well, even at step 0 (Yes doctor), if the doctor is honest it will warn you that the artificial brain is a digital device, and I cannot imagine him explaining what that really means in all generality without invoking Church thesis.

Re: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*

On 06 Sep 2005, at 04:49, Lee Corbin wrote:Why, whyever for?  Isn't it true that most people don't object to their *physical* destruction because they realize that they'll continue to live on as abstract machines?  For sure, those who believe fully in the Universal Distribution don't really care

Re: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*

At the risk of digressing... Here are two questions to ponder: Can the entire collection of minds (human at least) that exists be simulated as one computer? That is, is it possible to design a computer such that it behaves exactly like the whole of intellectual existence does? conversely, is

What Would Leibniz be Working on Today?

Suppose that Leibniz's God had spared him the rigors of getting old, and that he retained a fresh young brain and body over these hundreds of years. What would be his beliefs today, and what subjects would interest him the most? We have to assume that as the 1700's unfolded, he would grudgingly

RE: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*

Norm writes You [Hal Finney] say, . . . the Church Thesis, which I would paraphrase as saying that there are no physical processes more computationally powerful than a Turing machine, or in other words that the universe could in principle be simulated on a TM. I wouldn't be surprised if most

RE: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*

Bruno writes [Hal wrote] I wouldn't be surprised if most people who believe that minds can be simulated on TMs also believe that everything can be simulated on a TM. They are wrong. Note that this is just Bruno's opinion. Hal's statement really is true: most people don't agree with

RE: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*

Bruno writes The accepted *definition* by usage that everyone uses is that it is a *claim* that classical (non-QM) robots could be conscious, that minds could be uploaded into computers. So invent your own term if you don't like how the rest of the world is using of computationalism.

RE: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*

Bruno writes On 06 Sep 2005, at 04:49, Lee Corbin wrote: Why, whyever for? Isn't it true that most people don't object to their *physical* destruction because they realize that they'll continue to live on as abstract machines? For sure, those who believe fully in the

Re: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*

On Tue, Sep 06, 2005 at 09:35:02PM -0700, Lee Corbin wrote: Bruno writes If minds are turing-emulable then indeed minds cannot perceive something as being provably non-turing-emulable, but minds can prove that 99,999...% of comp-Platonia is not turing-emulable. I don't pretend to

RE: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*

Aditya writes At the risk of digressing... I don't think that that's possible on the Everything list by definition! Here are two questions to ponder: Can the entire collection of minds (human at least) that exists be simulated as one computer? That is, is it possible to design a