Re: The Meaning of Life

On 2/20/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > On Feb 19, 7:00 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > On 2/20/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > > On Feb 19, 4:00 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > On 2/20/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PR

Re: Searles' Fundamental Error

On 2/20/07, John Mikes <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Stathis (barging in to your post to Mark); > Your premis is redundant, a limited model (machine) cannot be (act, > perform, sense, react etc.) identical to the total it was cut out from. So > you cannot prove it either. As i GOT the difference lat

Re: Searles' Fundamental Error

On 2/20/07, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Stathis:'Would any device that can create a representation of the world, > itself and the relationship between the world and itself be conscious?' > > MP: Well that, in a nutshell, is how I understand it; with the proviso > that it is dynamic: tha

Re: Searles' Fundamental Error

On 2/20/07, Jesse Mazer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > >I would bet on functionalism as the correct theory of mind for various > >reasons, but I don't see that there is anything illogical the possibility > >that consciousness is substrate-dependent. Let's say that when you rub > two > >carbon ato

Re: The Meaning of Life

Tom Caylor wrote: > On Feb 19, 7:00 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> On 2/20/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> >>> On Feb 19, 4:00 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: On 2/20/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > These are positivis

Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Hi Hal, You say my theory is a subset of yours. I don't understand. I have no theory, just a deductive argument that IF we are (digital) machine then "the physical world" is in our head. Then I show how a Universal Turing Machine can discover it in its own "head". This makes comp, or variants

Re: Searles' Fundamental Error

Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > On 2/20/07, *Mark Peaty* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] > > wrote: > > Stathis:'Would any device that can create a representation of the > world, itself and the relationship between the world and itself be > conscious?' > > MP: We

Re: Searles' Fundamental Error

Le 19-févr.-07, à 20:14, Brent Meeker a écrit : > > Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> Le 18-févr.-07, à 13:57, Mark Peaty a écrit : >> >> My main problem with Comp is that it needs several unprovable >> assumptions to be accepted. For example the Yes Doctor hypothesis, >> wherein it is a

Re: Searles' Fundamental Error

Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > On 2/20/07, *Jesse Mazer* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] > > wrote: > > > >I would bet on functionalism as the correct theory of mind for various > >reasons, but I don't see that there is anything illogical the > possibility >

Computer reads minds

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/6346069.stm But is the *computer* conscious of the decision? Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send em

Re: Searles' Fundamental Error

Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Le 19-févr.-07, à 20:14, Brent Meeker a écrit : > >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> Le 18-févr.-07, à 13:57, Mark Peaty a écrit : >>> >>> My main problem with Comp is that it needs several unprovable >>> assumptions to be accepted. For example the Yes Doctor hypoth

Re: Computer reads minds

Brent: 2 questions (and pls try to take them seriously): 1. do you have a common-sensibly expressible meaning for 'conscious' - in this respect, of machines (computers being so? (conscious of - is easier, but also not obvious). 2. The BBC article allows 'scans' to inform about 'theoretical' (or

Re: Computer reads minds

John Mikes wrote: > Brent: > > 2 questions (and pls try to take them seriously): > > 1. do you have a common-sensibly expressible meaning for 'conscious' - > in this respect, of machines (computers being so? (conscious of - is > easier, but also not obvious). Short answer - Not a well define

Re: Searles' Fundamental Error

Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > >On 2/20/07, Jesse Mazer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > > > >I would bet on functionalism as the correct theory of mind for various > > >reasons, but I don't see that there is anything illogical the >possibility > > >that consciousness is substrate-dependent. Let'

Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Thanks, Bruno, lots of remarkable notions in your remarks (I mean: I can write remarks to them 0 sorry for the pun). Let me interject in Italics below. John On 2/5/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Hi John, > > > Le 03-févr.-07, à 17:20, John Mikes a écrit : > > > Stathis, Bruno, >

Re: Computer reads minds

On 2/21/07, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/6346069.stm > > But is the *computer* conscious of the decision? > > Brent Meeker My hand in a sense reads my mind because it moves when I will it to move, but normally it is not thought to participate in the

Re: Searles' Fundamental Error

On 2/21/07, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > A human with an intact brain behaving like an awake human could not > > really be a zombie unless you believe in magic. However, it is possible > > to conceive of intelligently-behaving beings who do not have an internal > > life because they l

Re: Searles' Fundamental Error

They're completely blind, walking into things and falling over. They insist that they see things and they confabulate, claiming that they see tables and chairs if they believe they are in a dining room, that they can see the face of someone they know when they are talking to them, and so on. It is

Re: Searles' Fundamental Error

On 2/21/07, Jesse Mazer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > >On 2/20/07, Jesse Mazer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > > > > > > >I would bet on functionalism as the correct theory of mind for > various > > > >reasons, but I don't see that there is anything illogical

Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

Hi Bruno: As to my grasp of the UDA I think I understood it at one time well enough for my purpose but that will become clearer as I progress through my model. There are not too many more steps. Examining the complete list of possible properties of objects we should find "Empty of all infor

Re: Searles' Fundamental Error

Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > >It is a complicated issue. Patients with psychotic illnesses can sometimes >reflect on a past episode and see that they were unwell then even though >they insisted they were not at the time. They then might say something >like, >"I don't know I'm unwell when I'm u

Re: Searles' Fundamental Error

On 2/21/07, Jesse Mazer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > > >It is a complicated issue. Patients with psychotic illnesses can > sometimes > >reflect on a past episode and see that they were unwell then even though > >they insisted they were not at the time. They th