Hi Hal, You say my theory is a subset of yours. I don't understand. I have no theory, just a deductive argument that IF we are (digital) machine then "the physical world" is in our head. Then I show how a Universal Turing Machine can discover it in its own "head". This makes comp, or variants, testable.
I have no theory (beside theory of number and machine), I'm just listening to the machine. That's all. Then I compare the comp-physics with empirical physics. Do you grasp the Universal Dovetailer Argument? Ask if not. Regards, Bruno Le 20-févr.-07, à 04:42, Hal Ruhl a écrit : > > Hi Bruno: > > At 05:43 AM 2/19/2007, you wrote: > > >> Le 18-févr.-07, à 03:33, Hal Ruhl a écrit : >> >>> >>> Hi Bruno: >>> >>> In response I will start with some assumptions central to my >>> approach. >>> >>> The first has to do with the process of making a list. >>> >>> The assumption is: >>> >>> Making a list of items [which could be some of >>> the elements of a set for example] is always a >>> process of making a one to one mapping of the >>> items to some of the counting numbers such as: >>> >>> 1 - an item >>> 2 - an item not previously on the list >>> 3 - an item not previously on the list >>> . >>> . >>> . >>> n - last item and it was not previously on the list >> >> >> I don' t see clearly an assumption here. I guess you are assuming >> existence of things capable of being put in a list. > > What I am trying to do is establish what making a > list is in my model and does it have any mathematical credence. > > I make it an assumption because some may believe > that "make a list" means something different. > >> Effectively? then >> why not use the Wi (cf Cutland's book or older explanations I have >> provided on the list. Help yourself with Podniek's page perhaps, or >> try >> to be just informal. >> > > See below > > > > >>> >>> My second assumption is: >>> >>> Objects [such as states of universes for example] have properties. >> >> >> You talk like if it was an axiomatic. A good test to see if it is an >> axiomatic consists to change the primitive words you are using by >> arbitrary words. You are saying "glass of bears have trees and >> garden". > > Did you mean class not "glass"? > >> You can add that you mean that the term "glass of bear" is *intended >> for states of universes, > > I am not a mathematician so I do not quite understand the above. > >> but recall the goal is to provide an >> explanation for the appearance of the "states of universes". > > If I understand you, that comes later in the walk through of my model > >> In general >> properties are modelized by sets. It is ok to presuppose some naive >> set >> theory, but then you "axiomatic" has to be clean. >> > > See below > > > >>> >>> My third assumption is: >>> >>> All of the properties it is possible for objects to have can be >>> listed. >> >> >> I guess you assume church thesis, and you are talking about effective >> properties. >> > > To me at this point the Church Thesis is an > ingredient in some of the possible state > succession sequences allowed in my model. > > I mean all properties I do not know if that is > the same as your "effective" properties. > > >>> >>> My fourth assumption is: >>> >>> The list of possible properties of objects is countably infinite. >> >> >> ? (lists are supposed to be countably infinite (or finite)). >> > > This is my point above - "to list" inherently a > countably infinite [as max length] process. > > I would add that my third assumption becomes more > important later as one of the keys to my model's dynamic. > > > >>> >>> Conclusions so far: >>> [All possible objects are defined by all the sub lists of the full >>> list.] >>> [The number of objects is uncountably infinite] >> >> What is the full list? > > The list of all possible properties of objects. > > >>> >>> I will stop there for now and await comments. >>> >>> As to the remainder of the post: >>> >>> In the above I have not reached the point of >>> deriving the dynamic of my model but I am not >>> focusing on computations when I say that any >>> succession of states is allowed. Logically >>> related successions are allowed. Successions >>> displaying any degree of randomness are also allowed. >> >> >> I have already mentionned that comp entails some strong form of (first >> person) randomness. Indeed, a priori to much. >> > > Yes we have discussed this before, and it is one > of the reasons I continue to believe that your approach is a sub set > of mine. > > I know it has taken a long time for me to reach a > level in my model where I could even begin to use > an axiom based description and I appreciate your patience. > >>> >>> I would like to finish the walk through of my >>> model before discussing white rabbits and observation. >> >> >> I am really sorry Hall. It looks you want to be both informal and >> formal. It does not help me to understand what you are trying to say. > > I have read that it takes 10 years of focused > practice to become an expert in a given sub discipline. > > At this point in my practice of engineering I am > on my way to becoming an expert in a fifth sub discipline. > > I hope you can understand why I must continue to > find a path to the development and expression of > my ideas in this venue that is short of becoming > an expert in mathematical expression. > > I appreciate your help and perhaps with a little > more of it I can reach what you are asking for. > > Perhaps it is also a good idea to exhaust the > idea of whether or not your approach is or is not > a sub set of another approach. > > Yours > > Hal Ruhl > > > > > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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