On 27 Aug 2009, at 08:19, marc.geddes wrote:
> But is there a form of math more powerful than algebra? Yes,
> Category/
> Set Theory! Unlike algebra, Category/Set theory really *can* fully
> reason about itself, since Sets/categories can contain other Sets/
> Categories. Greg Cantor first ex
2009/8/26 David Nyman :
>
> 2009/8/26 Stathis Papaioannou :
>
>> With the example of the light, you alter the photoreceptors in the
>> retina so that they respond the same way when to a blue light that
>> they would have when exposed to a red light.
>
> Ah, so the alien has photoreceptors and reti
2009/8/27 Brent Meeker :
> Does functionalism mean nothing more than if the same inputs produce
> the same outputs then the experience will be the same? I think this
> is to simplistic. To reduce it to a really simple example, suppose
> your brain functions so that:
>
> You look at sky.
> Blue
2009/8/27 Bruno Marchal :
> You are right. A simpler example is a dreamer and a rock, and the
> whole universe. They have locally the same input and output: none! So
> they are functionally identical, yet very different from the first
> person perspective. This is why in comp I make explicit the
2009/8/27 David Nyman :
> There's something trickier here, too. When you say "unless you are
> the system", this masks an implicit - and dualistic - assumption in
> addition to PM monism. It is axiomatic that any properly monistic
> materialist account must hold all properties of a system to be
2009/8/27 Quentin Anciaux :
> This is because if consciousness is a computational process then it is
> independant of the (physical or ... virtual) implementation. If I
> perfom the computation on an abacus or within my head or with stones
> on the ground... it is the same (from the computation p
2009/8/27 Stathis Papaioannou :
> Perhaps not, but it's just words. Materialists use "dualism" as a term
> of abuse, and some materialists will call anyone who thinks a lot
> about consciousness a dualist, while some of those who think a lot
> about consciousness will do anything to avoid being c
On 24 Aug, 16:23, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 22 Aug 2009, at 21:10, Brent Meeker wrote:
> But you see Brent, here you confirm that materialist are religious in
> the way they try to explain, or explain away the mind body problem. I
> can imagine that your consciousness supervene on something
>
On 26 Aug, 01:00, David Nyman wrote:
> Just so. To recapitulate the (approximate) history of this part of the
> discussion, Peter and I had been delving into the question - posed by
> him - of whether a complete scan of a brain at the subatomic level
> could in principle capture all the availa
On 26 Aug, 21:49, Brent Meeker wrote:
> David Nyman wrote:
> The question is whether PM is sufficient to describe the system.
> Language is almost certainly inadequate to describing what it is like
> to 'be' the system - you cannot even fully describe what it is like to
> be you. That's why I
On 27 Aug, 01:35, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/8/27 Brent Meeker :
> > The idea of 'being' somebody (or thing) else already assumes dualism.
> > It assumes some 'I' that could move to be Stathis or a bat and yet
> > retain some identity. But on a functionalist view 'I' already am
> > Stathis and
marc.geddes wrote:
> "That which can be destroyed by the truth should be."
>
> -- P.C. Hodgell
>
> Today, among logicians, Bayesian Inference seems to be the new dogma
> for all encompassing theory of rationality. But I have different
> ideas, so I'm going to present an argument suggesting an a
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2009/8/26 David Nyman :
>> 2009/8/26 Stathis Papaioannou :
>>
>>> With the example of the light, you alter the photoreceptors in the
>>> retina so that they respond the same way when to a blue light that
>>> they would have when exposed to a red light.
>> Ah, so the alien
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 2009/8/27 Brent Meeker :
>
>> Does functionalism mean nothing more than if the same inputs produce
>> the same outputs then the experience will be the same? I think this
>> is to simplistic. To reduce it to a really simple example, suppose
>> your brain functions so
On 21 Aug, 16:39, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/8/21 Flammarion :
> > Do you concede that many aspects of mind -- cognition, memory and so
> > on --
> > are not part of any Hard Problem?
>
> Yes, absolutely. But I think our basic divergence is that I say you
> can't end up at these destinations unl
On 21 Aug, 21:01, Brent Meeker wrote:
> Flammarion wrote:
> > Do you think that if you scanned my brain right down to the atomic
> > level,
> > you still wouldn't have captured all the information?
>
> That's an interesting question and one that I think relates to the
> importance of context.
On 21 Aug, 20:40, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 21 Aug 2009, at 17:39, David Nyman wrote:
> With UDA alone, of course not.
>
> But AUDA does provides a a theory of qualia which explains why no 1-
> person can and will ever explain the qualitative feature of its qualia.
It treats qualia as *cognit
2009/8/27 Flammarion :
>> and hence that it can't
>> in and of itself tell us anything fundamental about ontology.
>
> I don't think it revelas it sown ontology. OTOH, it must somehow
> be taken accounto fi in any succesful ontology because everything
> must.
I've considered the various comment
On 26 Aug, 17:58, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 26 Aug 2009, at 17:58, Brent Meeker wrote:
> > What about lower levels? Surely it doesn't matter whether 10,000 K+
> > cross the axon membrane or 10,001 cross. So somehow looking at just
> > the right level matters in the hypothesis of functionalis
On 27 Aug, 08:54, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2009/8/26 David Nyman :
> This is because if consciousness is a computational process then it is
> independant of the (physical or ... virtual) implementation. If I
> perfom the computation on an abacus or within my head or with stones
> on the ground
David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/8/27 Flammarion :
>
>
>
>>> and hence that it can't
>>> in and of itself tell us anything fundamental about ontology.
>>>
>> I don't think it revelas it sown ontology. OTOH, it must somehow
>> be taken accounto fi in any succesful ontology because everything
>>
Flammarion wrote:
>
>
> On 21 Aug, 21:01, Brent Meeker wrote:
>> Flammarion wrote:
>
>>> Do you think that if you scanned my brain right down to the atomic
>>> level,
>>> you still wouldn't have captured all the information?
>> That's an interesting question and one that I think relates to the
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