This is old hat, but I've been thinking about it on awakening every
morning for the last week. Is consciousness - i.e. the actual first-
person experience itself - literally uncomputable from any third-
person perspective? The only rationale for adducing the additional
existence of any 1-p experi
Hi,
Is there a problem with the idea that 3-p can be derived from some
combinatorics of many interacting 1-p's? Is there a reason why we keep
trying to derive 1-p from 3-p?
Onward!
Stephen
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David Nyman wrote:
This is old hat, but I've been thinking about it on awakening every
morning for the last week. Is consciousness - i.e. the actual first-
person experience itself - literally uncomputable from any third-
person perspective? The only rationale for adducing the additional
existe
On 17 February 2010 05:07, David Nyman wrote:
> This is old hat, but I've been thinking about it on awakening every
> morning for the last week. Is consciousness - i.e. the actual first-
> person experience itself - literally uncomputable from any third-
> person perspective? The only rationale
> Is there a problem with the idea that 3-p can be derived from some
> combinatorics of many interacting 1-p's? Is there a reason why we keep
> trying to derive 1-p from 3-p?
I suspect there's a problem either way. AFAICS the issue is that, in
3-p and 1-p, there exist two irreducibly different r
On 16 February 2010 22:21, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Consciousness could be computable in the sense that if you are the
> computation, you have the experience.
Yes, but that's precisely not the sense I was referring to. Rather
the sense I'm picking out is that neither the existence, nor the
David Nyman wrote:
Is there a problem with the idea that 3-p can be derived from some
combinatorics of many interacting 1-p's? Is there a reason why we keep
trying to derive 1-p from 3-p?
I suspect there's a problem either way. AFAICS the issue is that, in
3-p and 1-p, there exist two ir
David Nyman wrote:
On 16 February 2010 22:21, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Consciousness could be computable in the sense that if you are the
computation, you have the experience.
Yes, but that's precisely not the sense I was referring to. Rather
the sense I'm picking out is that neit
On 17 February 2010 00:06, Brent Meeker wrote:
> I don't see that my 1-p experience is at all "causally closed". In fact,
> thoughts pop into my head all the time with no provenance and no hint of
> what caused them.
The problem is that if one believes that the 3-p narrative is causally
suffici
On 17 February 2010 00:16, Brent Meeker wrote:
> But suppose we had a really good theory and understanding of the brain so
> that we could watch yours in operation on some kind of scope (like an fMRI,
> except in great detail) and from our theory we could infer that "David's now
> thinking X. An
David Nyman wrote:
On 17 February 2010 00:06, Brent Meeker wrote:
I don't see that my 1-p experience is at all "causally closed". In fact,
thoughts pop into my head all the time with no provenance and no hint of
what caused them.
The problem is that if one believes that the 3-p narr
David Nyman wrote:
On 17 February 2010 00:16, Brent Meeker wrote:
But suppose we had a really good theory and understanding of the brain so
that we could watch yours in operation on some kind of scope (like an fMRI,
except in great detail) and from our theory we could infer that "David's no
You guys should Read Chalmers: Philosophy of Mind, Classical and
contemporary Readings
and
Philosophy and the mirror of nature. Richard Rorty
In particular "The Concepts of Counsciousness" By Ned Block and "Mental
Causation" by stephen Yablo will get you nearer to where you are trying to
get.
B
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