Re: More than one kind of 'causality'?
On 9/20/05, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: On 19th September 2005 Marc Geddes writes:>Here's a speculation:> The model I'm working with for my theory seems to suggest 3 different >fundamental kinds of 'cause and effect'.> The first is physical causality - motion of physical objects through>space.>The second is mental causality - agents making choices which effect agents >The third is what I call 'Multiverse causality', a sort of highly abtsract>'causality' close to the notion of logical consistency/consilience - that>which ensures that knowledge has a certain ordered 'structure' to it . How does the second type differ from the first? Descartes thought there wasa difference, and a puzzle: how can the non-physical (i.e. the mental)affect the physical? His solution was that that the two fundamentally different domains - the mental and the physical - must somehow connect andinteract at the pineal gland. Of course, this conclusion is laughable, evenfor a dualist.The interaction of billiard balls is an archetypical example of what you call "physical causality". Suppose it were shown that this interactionimplements a conscious computation, as the less immediately accessible but(do you agree?) fundamentally similar interaction of atoms in the brain implements a conscious computation. Does the billiard ball interaction thentransform from the first type to the second type, or both types, or what?As for the third type of causality, could you give an example? --Stathis Papaioannou_SEEK: Over 80,000 jobs across all industries at Australia's #1 job site. http://ninemsn.seek.com.au?hotmail In the example with the billiard balls, there no reason why both kinds of causality cannot be equally valid properties of the system. There are simply two different interpretations of the system at work - one interpretation is in terms of function - changes in state - that we see as physical causality. The other interpretation is in terms of teleology - aims or ends - that we see as mental causality. Both valid. It's very difficult for me to try to explain the third kind of 'causality', because I'm not yet totally clear on what it is myself. I suspect it's some kind of subtle pattern across the multiverse which can't be easily described in plain English. Stephen Hawking proposed the notion of 'Imaginary Time', a kind of time existing 'at right angles' to ordinary physical time. This, I suspect, is equivalent to my proposed third kind of causality. To get a handle on the idea, you have to realize I'm not talking about something which takes place in ordinary physical or mental time. It's better to think of it , in fact, as a static platonic property of the multiverse. It's what grants 'Existence' to a thing - how the existence of a thing is implied by the existence of other things. So this kind of causality is better thought of as an abstract *logical* relationship between things.-- Please vist my website: http://www.riemannai.orgScience, Sci-Fi and Philosophy---THE BRAIN is wider than the sky,For, put them side by side, The one the other will includeWith ease, and you beside. -Emily Dickinson'The brain is wider than the sky'http://www.bartleby.com/113/1126.html
Re: More than one kind of 'causality'?
On 9/20/05, Pete Carlton <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: On Sep 19, 2005, at 1:00 AM, Marc Geddes wrote:> Here's a speculation:>> The model I'm working with for my theory seems to suggest 3 > different fundamental kinds of 'cause and effect'.>> The first is physical causality - motion of physical objects> through space.> The second is mental causality - agents making choices which > effect agents> The third is what I call 'Multiverse causality', a sort of highly> abtsract 'causality' close to the notion of logical consistency/> consilience - that which ensures that knowledge has a certain > ordered 'structure' to it .>> Anyone have any thoughts on this?>Here's my thought -- isn't it the case that we know enough about howbrains work today that, at the very least, it is a huge overstatement to refer to the first two types as "different fundamental kinds"? Inother words, I will claim that type 2 is actually nothing more than asubset of type 1, occurring in particular circumstances. What evidence goes against this view?-Pete I didn't mean to imply substance dualism. Of course I agree that higher level concepts like mind are completely dependent on lower level physics. A 'mental cause' is not something separate from physical causes. But this does not mean that the higher level kind of causality is *not real* Just because the high level kind of causality (mental causation) is completely *dependent* on lower level physics, doesn't mean that the mental kind of causality is necessarily completely *reducible* to lower level physics. In dealing with mental concepts, I think one is dealing with a higher level of description which for full explanation requires the positing of new properties not completely reducible to low level physics. Again though, I'm not suggesting that mental concepts are separate from physical concepts. -- Please vist my website:http://www.riemannai.orgScience, Sci-Fi and Philosophy---THE BRAIN is wider than the sky,For, put them side by side, The one the other will include With ease, and you beside. -Emily Dickinson'The brain is wider than the sky'http://www.bartleby.com/113/1126.html
Re: More than one kind of 'causality'?
Marc, The most noticeable characteristic of what mental causality may amount to, seems to be the causal or quasi-causal play of decisions, achievements, satisfactions, understandings, etc., in terms of the logical & evidentiary dependences among them, and between each of them and other things. The dependence is ultimately on things which, in themselves, strike us as being _side effects, after-effects_, & the like: signs, indications, similarities, implications, evidences, etc., but which, as chosen, achieved, liked, fancied, expected, noticed, remembered, etc., (quasi-)determine or solicit us in manifold ways in our further decisions, performances, satisfactions, understandings (the effects are certainly not confined within minds, either). E.g., as we can see in the ways that markets behave, the factoring in of "information" or expectations/knowledge & so on. All this is in addition to other kinds of dependence embodied in people and society. At this point I would suggest doing an inventory of kinds of dependence, including complex dependences. I can think of at least three others besides the one above: corrective dependence (via feedback), including very precisely corrective dependence, on _output or "final" conditions_, seen especially in organisms generally; statistical dependence, including proximity-proportionate dependence, on _intermediate-stage conditions_, seen especially in matter generally; and a dependence, including sensitive dependence of transition rules (which sounds like the stuff of some sort of inverse-optimizational problems to me, but I haven't seen that said, & I'm no expert on any of this), on _initial conditions_, seen especially in dynamic systems generally. Since the question of what are the most fundamental dependences may vary with how commonsensical, how imaginative, etc., one is willing to be (not to mention, on what one actually knows), I usually end up with no opinion at all about what, if anything, is most basic in the biggest picture. But all these kinds of dependence seem rather general, -- feedback dependence is not confined to biology, for instance -- and for my part, I don't know how to characterize them with regard to causation except to say that they're at least causationlike. When you speak of forces and agent-minds, I get the feeling that you're thinking of Tegmark's Level I, and this stuff might be general enough to think of in association with Level II -- I don't mean the broad structure of Level II, I mean that the generality may be appropriate for the sort of diversity which one might expect across Level II, at least "our" Level II inflationary multiverse. (Meanwhile, actually, I've no firm view on whether there's a Multiverse, Tegmark's or otherwise.) But anyway the kinds of dependence may be things, or point to things, which you might want to take into account in your model. If the Multiverse of which you're thinking is Tegmark's, then I would note that it has four levels. I suppose that it could be that it is as you have it, or seem to have it, that two kinds of causality are apparent at Level I, and a third kind, a logical-consilience kind of causality, reaches across all levels. Yet, in such basic issues, one might wonder whether to look for more regularity or symmetry than that, though I admit that, in the biggest picture, there needs to be a "place" for asymmetry too. Regards, Ben Udell - Original Message ----- From: Marc Geddes To: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Monday, September 19, 2005 4:00 AM Subject: More than one kind of 'causality'? Here's a speculation: The model I'm working with for my theory seems to suggest 3 different fundamental kinds of 'cause and effect'. The first is physical causality - motion of physical objects through space. The second is mental causality - agents making choices which effect agents The third is what I call 'Multiverse causality', a sort of highly abtsract 'causality' close to the notion of logical consistency/consilience - that which ensures that knowledge has a certain ordered 'structure' to it . Anyone have any thoughts on this?-- Please vist my website:http://www.riemannai.orgScience, Sci-Fi and Philosophy---THE BRAIN is wider than the sky,For, put them side by side, The one the other will includeWith ease, and you beside. -Emily Dickinson'The brain is wider than the sky'http://www.bartleby.com/113/1126.html
RE: More than one kind of 'causality'?
On 19th September 2005 Marc Geddes writes: Here's a speculation: The model I'm working with for my theory seems to suggest 3 different fundamental kinds of 'cause and effect'. The first is physical causality - motion of physical objects through space. The second is mental causality - agents making choices which effect agents The third is what I call 'Multiverse causality', a sort of highly abtsract 'causality' close to the notion of logical consistency/consilience - that which ensures that knowledge has a certain ordered 'structure' to it . How does the second type differ from the first? Descartes thought there was a difference, and a puzzle: how can the non-physical (i.e. the mental) affect the physical? His solution was that that the two fundamentally different domains - the mental and the physical - must somehow connect and interact at the pineal gland. Of course, this conclusion is laughable, even for a dualist. The interaction of billiard balls is an archetypical example of what you call "physical causality". Suppose it were shown that this interaction implements a conscious computation, as the less immediately accessible but (do you agree?) fundamentally similar interaction of atoms in the brain implements a conscious computation. Does the billiard ball interaction then transform from the first type to the second type, or both types, or what? As for the third type of causality, could you give an example? --Stathis Papaioannou _ SEEK: Over 80,000 jobs across all industries at Australia's #1 job site. http://ninemsn.seek.com.au?hotmail
Re: More than one kind of 'causality'?
Its a different mode of description. Physics does not describe the
subjective state. Also, causation no. 2 appears to work in the
opposite direction to causation no. 1.
Cheers
On Mon, Sep 19, 2005 at 06:01:45PM -0700, Pete Carlton wrote:
>
> On Sep 19, 2005, at 1:00 AM, Marc Geddes wrote:
>
> >Here's a speculation:
> >
> >The model I'm working with for my theory seems to suggest 3
> >different fundamental kinds of 'cause and effect'.
> >
> >The first is physical causality - motion of physical objects
> >through space.
> >The second is mental causality - agents making choices which
> >effect agents
> >The third is what I call 'Multiverse causality', a sort of highly
> >abtsract 'causality' close to the notion of logical consistency/
> >consilience - that which ensures that knowledge has a certain
> >ordered 'structure' to it .
> >
> >Anyone have any thoughts on this?
> >
>
> Here's my thought -- isn't it the case that we know enough about how
> brains work today that, at the very least, it is a huge overstatement
> to refer to the first two types as "different fundamental kinds"? In
> other words, I will claim that type 2 is actually nothing more than a
> subset of type 1, occurring in particular circumstances. What
> evidence goes against this view?
>
> -Pete
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Re: More than one kind of 'causality'?
On Sep 19, 2005, at 1:00 AM, Marc Geddes wrote: Here's a speculation: The model I'm working with for my theory seems to suggest 3 different fundamental kinds of 'cause and effect'. The first is physical causality - motion of physical objects through space. The second is mental causality - agents making choices which effect agents The third is what I call 'Multiverse causality', a sort of highly abtsract 'causality' close to the notion of logical consistency/ consilience - that which ensures that knowledge has a certain ordered 'structure' to it . Anyone have any thoughts on this? Here's my thought -- isn't it the case that we know enough about how brains work today that, at the very least, it is a huge overstatement to refer to the first two types as "different fundamental kinds"? In other words, I will claim that type 2 is actually nothing more than a subset of type 1, occurring in particular circumstances. What evidence goes against this view? -Pete
Re: More than one kind of 'causality'?
Stephen, without any 'implication' to 'logic' (I leave that to Bruno) my theoretical disapproval for the term 'cause' coming from the (reductionist?) view of our physical (both verbally and scientifically meant) universe: we have a model with boundaries (my distinction, I hope in congruence with Hal's lexicon) and we search for the "most obvious" originator for an event WITHIN those boundaries (within any of our models we consider). My wholistic view of 'complexity' acknowledges the interconnection of 'them all', our model is connected to extraneous (beyond boundary) factors as well with effects (and responses) whether we recognize them or not. So to "pick" a cause may please the order, but is incomplete at least. The origination of the cumulative changes of nature cannot be restricted to any (maybe in our restricted observation: the most ostentatious) single "cause". I 'feel' (I am far from having studied it in any depth) that the "3rd kind" is close to my vision, except for the connotation of the (in my views) restricted QM-related Multiverse and explanations from the model-view physics (Q or class). I would keep away from the use of 'teleological'. Best regards to Marc and you John Mikes --- Stephen Paul King <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Dear Marc, > > Is this proposed third kind of cause similar to > the notion of Implication in logic? > > Kindest regards, > > Stephen > ----- Original Message ----- > From: Marc Geddes > To: everything-list@eskimo.com > Sent: Monday, September 19, 2005 4:36 AM > Subject: Re: More than one kind of 'causality'? > > > > Yes, my first proposed kind of causation is indeed > the usual physics kind of causation. > > I'm not sure that you understood my second > proposed kind of causation - a choice made by a > teleological agent (like humans) which affects the > teleology (process of moving towards one's goals) of > other agents. This is not 'downward causation' or > 'efficient causation' as far as I can tell. > > My third proposed kind of causation is highly > abstract in nature and hard to explain. It involves > the structure of the Multiverse (patterns across > multiple QM branches). A sort of 'Platonic' cause > tying different kinds of knowledge together - i.e > establishing a logical 'direction' for complexity. > > On 9/19/05, Russell Standish > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > OK - the first is the usual sort of cause used > in Physics, or material > cause. The second is sometimes known as downward > causation, or > efficient causation. The third one, though I'm > struggling with. Is it > the same as my "circular causation", sort of > first and final casuation > rolled into one? > > Cheers >
Re: More than one kind of 'causality'?
Dear Marc, Is this proposed third kind of cause similar to the notion of Implication in logic? Kindest regards, Stephen - Original Message - From: Marc Geddes To: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Monday, September 19, 2005 4:36 AM Subject: Re: More than one kind of 'causality'? Yes, my first proposed kind of causation is indeed the usual physics kind of causation. I'm not sure that you understood my second proposed kind of causation - a choice made by a teleological agent (like humans) which affects the teleology (process of moving towards one's goals) of other agents. This is not 'downward causation' or 'efficient causation' as far as I can tell. My third proposed kind of causation is highly abstract in nature and hard to explain. It involves the structure of the Multiverse (patterns across multiple QM branches). A sort of 'Platonic' cause tying different kinds of knowledge together - i.e establishing a logical 'direction' for complexity. On 9/19/05, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: OK - the first is the usual sort of cause used in Physics, or materialcause. The second is sometimes known as downward causation, or efficient causation. The third one, though I'm struggling with. Is itthe same as my "circular causation", sort of first and final casuationrolled into one?Cheers
Re: More than one kind of 'causality'?
Yes, my first proposed kind of causation is indeed the usual physics kind of causation. I'm not sure that you understood my second proposed kind of causation - a choice made by a teleological agent (like humans) which affects the teleology (process of moving towards one's goals) of other agents. This is not 'downward causation' or 'efficient causation' as far as I can tell. My third proposed kind of causation is highly abstract in nature and hard to explain. It involves the structure of the Multiverse (patterns across multiple QM branches). A sort of 'Platonic' cause tying different kinds of knowledge together - i.e establishing a logical 'direction' for complexity. On 9/19/05, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: OK - the first is the usual sort of cause used in Physics, or materialcause. The second is sometimes known as downward causation, or efficient causation. The third one, though I'm struggling with. Is itthe same as my "circular causation", sort of first and final casuationrolled into one?Cheers -- Please vist my website:http://www.riemannai.orgScience, Sci-Fi and Philosophy---THE BRAIN is wider than the sky,For, put them side by side, The one the other will includeWith ease, and you beside. -Emily Dickinson'The brain is wider than the sky'http://www.bartleby.com/113/1126.html
Re: More than one kind of 'causality'?
OK - the first is the usual sort of cause used in Physics, or material
cause. The second is sometimes known as downward causation, or
efficient causation. The third one, though I'm struggling with. Is it
the same as my "circular causation", sort of first and final casuation
rolled into one?
Cheers
On Mon, Sep 19, 2005 at 08:00:32PM +1200, Marc Geddes wrote:
> Here's a speculation:
> The model I'm working with for my theory seems to suggest 3 different
> fundamental kinds of 'cause and effect'.
> The first is physical causality - motion of physical objects through space.
> The second is mental causality - agents making choices which effect agents
> The third is what I call 'Multiverse causality', a sort of highly abtsract
> 'causality' close to the notion of logical consistency/consilience - that
> which ensures that knowledge has a certain ordered 'structure' to it .
>
> Anyone have any thoughts on this?
>
> --
>
> Please vist my website:
> http://www.riemannai.org
>
> Science, Sci-Fi and Philosophy
>
> ---
>
> THE BRAIN is wider than the sky,
> For, put them side by side,
> The one the other will include
> With ease, and you beside.
>
> -Emily Dickinson
>
> 'The brain is wider than the sky'
> http://www.bartleby.com/113/1126.html
--
*PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which
is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a
virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this
email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you
may safely ignore this attachment.
A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile)
Mathematics0425 253119 (")
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02
pgpzDQwGWzDu5.pgp
Description: PGP signature
More than one kind of 'causality'?
Here's a speculation: The model I'm working with for my theory seems to suggest 3 different fundamental kinds of 'cause and effect'. The first is physical causality - motion of physical objects through space. The second is mental causality - agents making choices which effect agents The third is what I call 'Multiverse causality', a sort of highly abtsract 'causality' close to the notion of logical consistency/consilience - that which ensures that knowledge has a certain ordered 'structure' to it . Anyone have any thoughts on this?-- Please vist my website:http://www.riemannai.orgScience, Sci-Fi and Philosophy--- THE BRAIN is wider than the sky,For, put them side by side, The one the other will includeWith ease, and you beside. -Emily Dickinson'The brain is wider than the sky' http://www.bartleby.com/113/1126.html
