Re: Counterfactual Definiteness
Bruno et al: I think *"definiteness"* is always counterfactual since it *MUST* deny the potential influences from unknown factors (domains, a/effects, even some definitely counterfactual influences we do not recognize as such at all). It is a consequence of our agnostic view (as I recall: we agreed on such, at least to some degree) and our (accepted?) view on 'scientific' - as doubtful. I mean the 'counterfactual' mildly: it "counters" the factual *TOTAL* impact, not necessarily negating all the infuences. Our views are partial at best. I do not know much about rhe QM-related readings and am too old already to start learning. I accept my ignorance and try to live with it as long as I can. John Mikes On Sun, Apr 17, 2016 at 1:42 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 16 Apr 2016, at 01:46, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > On 16/04/2016 12:20 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 14 Apr 2016, at 14:31, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > It is interesting that you have not answered my question about what > exactly you mean by 'counterfactual definiteness' so that we know what you > mean when you say that a theory is not counterfactually definite. > > > It is hard to define, especially if we avoid being technical. But we have > a good example: QM-with-collapse (or QM with a single universe). Like > Einstein already explain at the Solvay Meeting: if QM (with a single > universe) is correct, we can't ascribe an element of reality knowing a > result that we would obtain with certainty if we would make some > measurement, but will not do. Then Kochen and Specker proved that QM (+ a > single universe) is precisely like that. The proof does not apply to the > many-world, although it might apply to some too much naive rendering of the > many world (notably if we interpret wrongly the singlet state as I have > explained in previous post). > > > I do not understand what you are saying. Are you claiming that ordinary QM > with collapse is counterfactually definite because Einstein realism does > not apply? > > > > > > I say the contrary: t is NOT counterfactual making Einstein realism not > able to be applied. > > > > > > > > I.e., we cannot know with certainty what would have been the outcome of an > experiment that was not performed? (This is also the consequence of the > Kochen-Specker result that no set of hidden variables can predict the > results of all possible spin measurements on a spin 1/2 particle.) I would > have thought that this was one possible definition of counterfactual > *indefiniteness*. > > > I would be OK too. > > > > > What additional fact about MWI changes this conclusion? > > > None. Except that with a single physical reality that counterfactualness > entails non locality, but the same conunterfactualness with eother > computationalism and/or QM-without collapse does not entail physical nopn > locality, but only its statistical *appearances* in the memory of the > machine testing it. > > > > > Since in MWI all possible experiments are performed in some word or other, > I would have thought that experimental outcomes are available for all > possible experiments -- nothing is *actually* indefinite > > > It is relatively to you knowledge of a state. If you measure the position > very precisely, you "soul" is attached to an infinity of > "body/representation" with many definite, but different, momenta. > > If you measure something the result is definite only relatively to one > representation among many. If you look at the transfer of information in > the 3p picture of the entire quantum teleportation, you can see that the > information is spread locally at all times. It is even somehow made > explicit if you are using Bob Coecke's use category to describe such > quantum events. > > http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0402130 > http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0402014 > > -- even though not all outcomes occur in this one world that we happen to > inhabit at the moment. > > > There is no real sense to say that we inhabit a world. We are all the > times in an infinity of worlds/situation, which differentiate or not > relatively to what we interact with. > An electronic orbital is a sort of map of the set of all words we are > relatively to the possible energy of that "electron". > But by the linearity of the tensor product, we share the worlds only with > the person we interact with. > You might look at the Rubin's paper (provided by Scerir). Or Bob's Coocke. > > I will comment your other post with more detail perhaps later. But I do > not really grasp your > > << > A and B perform their measurements at spacelike separation, but each > chooses the measurement orientation outside the light cone of the other. > There are four possible combinations of results, corresponding to four > worlds in the > MWI: |+>|+'>, |+>|-'>, |->|+'>, and |->|-'>. > Since each observer has a 50% chance of getting |+> and 50% of getting > |->, and the two measurements are completely independent of each other, it > would seem that each of these four worlds is
Re: Counterfactual Definiteness
On 16 Apr 2016, at 01:46, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 16/04/2016 12:20 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Apr 2016, at 14:31, Bruce Kellett wrote: It is interesting that you have not answered my question about what exactly you mean by 'counterfactual definiteness' so that we know what you mean when you say that a theory is not counterfactually definite. It is hard to define, especially if we avoid being technical. But we have a good example: QM-with-collapse (or QM with a single universe). Like Einstein already explain at the Solvay Meeting: if QM (with a single universe) is correct, we can't ascribe an element of reality knowing a result that we would obtain with certainty if we would make some measurement, but will not do. Then Kochen and Specker proved that QM (+ a single universe) is precisely like that. The proof does not apply to the many-world, although it might apply to some too much naive rendering of the many world (notably if we interpret wrongly the singlet state as I have explained in previous post). I do not understand what you are saying. Are you claiming that ordinary QM with collapse is counterfactually definite because Einstein realism does not apply? I say the contrary: t is NOT counterfactual making Einstein realism not able to be applied. I.e., we cannot know with certainty what would have been the outcome of an experiment that was not performed? (This is also the consequence of the Kochen-Specker result that no set of hidden variables can predict the results of all possible spin measurements on a spin 1/2 particle.) I would have thought that this was one possible definition of counterfactual indefiniteness. I would be OK too. What additional fact about MWI changes this conclusion? None. Except that with a single physical reality that counterfactualness entails non locality, but the same conunterfactualness with eother computationalism and/or QM-without collapse does not entail physical nopn locality, but only its statistical *appearances* in the memory of the machine testing it. Since in MWI all possible experiments are performed in some word or other, I would have thought that experimental outcomes are available for all possible experiments -- nothing is actually indefinite It is relatively to you knowledge of a state. If you measure the position very precisely, you "soul" is attached to an infinity of "body/representation" with many definite, but different, momenta. If you measure something the result is definite only relatively to one representation among many. If you look at the transfer of information in the 3p picture of the entire quantum teleportation, you can see that the information is spread locally at all times. It is even somehow made explicit if you are using Bob Coecke's use category to describe such quantum events. http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0402130 http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0402014 -- even though not all outcomes occur in this one world that we happen to inhabit at the moment. There is no real sense to say that we inhabit a world. We are all the times in an infinity of worlds/situation, which differentiate or not relatively to what we interact with. An electronic orbital is a sort of map of the set of all words we are relatively to the possible energy of that "electron". But by the linearity of the tensor product, we share the worlds only with the person we interact with. You might look at the Rubin's paper (provided by Scerir). Or Bob's Coocke. I will comment your other post with more detail perhaps later. But I do not really grasp your << A and B perform their measurements at spacelike separation, but each chooses the measurement orientation outside the light cone of the other. There are four possible combinations of results, corresponding to four worlds in the MWI: |+>|+'>, |+>|-'>, |->|+'>, and |->|-'>. Since each observer has a 50% chance of getting |+> and 50% of getting |->, and the two measurements are completely independent of each other, it would seem that each of these four worlds is equally likely. >> The expressions |+>|+'>, |+>|-'>, |->|+'>, and |->|-'> does not describe the superposition in which the observer will self-localize in: it is not the singlet state, which describe an infinity of worlds where all pair of particles of Bob and Alice are correlated. The whole point is that the result of the measurement does not describe the state we measure, but the partition of the sort of worlds to which we *relatively* belong. It is a bit long to verify by hand, but the linearity of tensor products and of the evolution makes the correlated state remaining correlated, and when one of them make a measurement, it just tell Bob in which partition of the multiverse he *and "his" Alice" belong. Only if the states of Alice and Bob electron where counterfactually definite before the measurement would this en
Re: Counterfactual?
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Peter Jones writes: > > > Physical determinism is the idea that the > > future is genrated form the persent by rigid physical > > laws. As opposed to the idea that the future is fixed > > becasue it is already "there", like the end of a movie > > which is already in the can , and need not bear any logical > > relation to what has gone before (especially > > if it is a david Lynch movie). > > I don't see how you can distinguish between a movie + projector > system and any other deterministic physical system. If you change th N'th fream of a move, the N+1'th frame does not change If you change the N'th stage of a causally-linked physical process the N+1'th stage *does* change. > If I turn the > projector on with the film in place, the ending of the movie is neither > more nor less fixed than the final arrangement of billiard balls if I hit > one of them with the cue. If I had hit the first ball a little differently, > or the air currents in the room had been a little different, then the > final arrangement of balls would have been different, but then if the > chemicals in the film had undergone some unexpected reaction, or the > motor of the projector started to behave differenltly, then the film > on the screen would also have been different: The only way the end of the film can change is if something happens to the *final* frames. The frames of the move are not causally interlinked. What makes a process a process is that changing one part of it changes other parts. I have explained this before. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Counterfactual?
Le 31-août-06, à 12:59, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : > But is there any sense in which we as humans are any more "free" than > billiard > balls or dice beyond the fact that we *feel* we are free? I have a > strong feeling > that my free will is not randomness and not determinism: is there > anything really > other tthan these two possibilities? The (relative) partial computable functions offers many ways to study varieties of mathematical processes in between. Self-observing machine cannot predict their own behavior, but they can predict that very unpredictability, though. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Counterfactual?
Peter Jones writes: > > But is there any sense in which we as humans are any more "free" than > > billiard > > balls or dice beyond the fact that we *feel* we are free? > > There may be. For instance, freedom might be a combination of > indeterminism and rational self-control. > > > I have a strong feeling > > that my free will is not randomness and not determinism: is there anything > > really > > other tthan these two possibilities? > > > Various combinations of them. Why should it not be a combination ? OK, that could be the case, but then the roll of the dice will probably also be best described as a combination of randomness and deterministic physical laws. So the reason I have free will and the dice do not is just that I feel I have free will, not that my behaviour is fundamentally any more or less predictable or subject to physical laws. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Counterfactual?
Peter Jones writes: > Physical determinism is the idea that the > future is genrated form the persent by rigid physical > laws. As opposed to the idea that the future is fixed > becasue it is already "there", like the end of a movie > which is already in the can , and need not bear any logical > relation to what has gone before (especially > if it is a david Lynch movie). I don't see how you can distinguish between a movie + projector system and any other deterministic physical system. If I turn the projector on with the film in place, the ending of the movie is neither more nor less fixed than the final arrangement of billiard balls if I hit one of them with the cue. If I had hit the first ball a little differently, or the air currents in the room had been a little different, then the final arrangement of balls would have been different, but then if the chemicals in the film had undergone some unexpected reaction, or the motor of the projector started to behave differenltly, then the film on the screen would also have been different: film <-> initial conditions projector <-> physical laws movie on screen <-> future physical state Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Counterfactual?
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Peter Jones writes: > > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > John Mikes writes: > > > > > > > Peter: > > > > "... A counterfactual is a COUNTERfactual - -it is > > > > something that could have happenned but didn't. There is no > > > > reason why we should be conscious of in things > > > > we coudl have done but didn't. ..." > > > > > > > > JM: > > > > It could not have happened in another way if it did happen THIS way.. > > > > WE may > > > > think - in our limited circle of knowledge - that something else was > > > > also > > > > viable, but in the deterministic world of a total (unlimited, not > > > > model-enclosed) interconnectedness - whatever happened, was "the" > > > > possible > > > > way of events. > > > > I am not talking about HP universes or thought experiments. > > > > > > Yes: the mere fact that we *think* it could have happened differently > > > does not > > > mean that it could have happened differently. > > > > Counterfactuals come from physical determinism, they > > are not contrary to it. Causal determism mean there are > > physical laws determining events which can be modelled > > by mathematival statements. The mathermatical > > formulation of physical laws allows you to answer > > hypothetical questions even if the actual situation cannot > > be phsyically realised for some practical reason. > > > > > > If the actual situation cannot > > be physically realised for some practical reason, > > there is a sense in which it is impossible -- > > but it is not the same sense of impossible > > as something which is forbidden by physical > > laws. > > But is there any sense in which we as humans are any more "free" than billiard > balls or dice beyond the fact that we *feel* we are free? There may be. For instance, freedom might be a combination of indeterminism and rational self-control. > I have a strong feeling > that my free will is not randomness and not determinism: is there anything > really > other tthan these two possibilities? Various combinations of them. Why should it not be a combination ? > Stathis Papaioannou > _ > Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. > http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Counterfactual?
Peter Jones writes: > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > John Mikes writes: > > > > > Peter: > > > "... A counterfactual is a COUNTERfactual - -it is > > > something that could have happenned but didn't. There is no > > > reason why we should be conscious of in things > > > we coudl have done but didn't. ..." > > > > > > JM: > > > It could not have happened in another way if it did happen THIS way.. WE > > > may > > > think - in our limited circle of knowledge - that something else was also > > > viable, but in the deterministic world of a total (unlimited, not > > > model-enclosed) interconnectedness - whatever happened, was "the" possible > > > way of events. > > > I am not talking about HP universes or thought experiments. > > > > Yes: the mere fact that we *think* it could have happened differently does > > not > > mean that it could have happened differently. > > Counterfactuals come from physical determinism, they > are not contrary to it. Causal determism mean there are > physical laws determining events which can be modelled > by mathematival statements. The mathermatical > formulation of physical laws allows you to answer > hypothetical questions even if the actual situation cannot > be phsyically realised for some practical reason. > > > If the actual situation cannot > be physically realised for some practical reason, > there is a sense in which it is impossible -- > but it is not the same sense of impossible > as something which is forbidden by physical > laws. But is there any sense in which we as humans are any more "free" than billiard balls or dice beyond the fact that we *feel* we are free? I have a strong feeling that my free will is not randomness and not determinism: is there anything really other tthan these two possibilities? Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Counterfactual?
John M wrote: > Peter: > There is a clash of concepts - as I feel. > I do not 'read' what "physical" has to do in the fact > of 'determinism': if determinism is not (deemed) as > 'physical', it does not determin? Physical determinism is the idea that the future is genrated form the persent by rigid physical laws. As opposed to the idea that the future is fixed becasue it is alreafy "there", like the end of a movie which is already in the can , and need not bear any logical relation to what has gone before (especially if it is a david Lynch movie). > Laws (physical?) do not determin anything. Explain: > yes or oppose to. The deductions of the majority of > the observed cases (=laws, predictions) do not "act". I don't see what you mean > Furthermore: > If something is (or seems) impossible (= does not > occur) then the possibility of a mathematical > formulation of it does not make it realizable. If the mathematical model is accurate, and it allows different outcomes under different circumstances, then the physical reality it models prsumable has counterfactual possibilities. > Of > course we see the difference between mental simulation > and observation (who knows "the truth"?) but to keep > George's (nonexistent-haha) sanity - we may as well > differentiate between what we think as observed and > what we deduce upon a theory. > Your last par is absolutely true - I think in the > opposite sense from why you wrote it. As history shows > we may detect any 'new rules' (laws) any time to come. > (Even if it is not written in the 17-19c physix > bible.) > > I concur fully with Stathis's remark - adding that we > have no acces to the other universes at this ppoint, > but as we 'think' about them (mentally created them) > -they may be similarly deterministic as ours. I mean: > (in my view of a Multiverse), consisting of unlimited > and unlimitedly different universes. We just cannot > think otherwise. (Maybe some of us can on this list). > > John Mikes > > John M > > --- 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Counterfactual?
Peter: There is a clash of concepts - as I feel. I do not 'read' what "physical" has to do in the fact of 'determinism': if determinism is not (deemed) as 'physical', it does not determin? Laws (physical?) do not determin anything. Explain: yes or oppose to. The deductions of the majority of the observed cases (=laws, predictions) do not "act". Furthermore: If something is (or seems) impossible (= does not occur) then the possibility of a mathematical formulation of it does not make it realizable. Of course we see the difference between mental simulation and observation (who knows "the truth"?) but to keep George's (nonexistent-haha) sanity - we may as well differentiate between what we think as observed and what we deduce upon a theory. Your last par is absolutely true - I think in the opposite sense from why you wrote it. As history shows we may detect any 'new rules' (laws) any time to come. (Even if it is not written in the 17-19c physix bible.) I concur fully with Stathis's remark - adding that we have no acces to the other universes at this ppoint, but as we 'think' about them (mentally created them) -they may be similarly deterministic as ours. I mean: (in my view of a Multiverse), consisting of unlimited and unlimitedly different universes. We just cannot think otherwise. (Maybe some of us can on this list). John Mikes John M --- 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > John Mikes writes: > > > > > Peter: > > > "... A counterfactual is a COUNTERfactual - -it > is > > > something that could have happenned but didn't. > There is no > > > reason why we should be conscious of in things > > > we coudl have done but didn't. ..." > > > > > > JM: > > > It could not have happened in another way if it > did happen THIS way.. WE may > > > think - in our limited circle of knowledge - > that something else was also > > > viable, but in the deterministic world of a > total (unlimited, not > > > model-enclosed) interconnectedness - whatever > happened, was "the" possible > > > way of events. > > > I am not talking about HP universes or thought > experiments. > > > > Yes: the mere fact that we *think* it could have > happened differently does not > > mean that it could have happened differently. > > Counterfactuals come from physical determinism, they > are not contrary to it. Causal determism mean there > are > physical laws determining events which can be > modelled > by mathematival statements. The mathermatical > formulation of physical laws allows you to answer > hypothetical questions even if the actual situation > cannot > be phsyically realised for some practical reason. > > > If the actual situation cannot > be physically realised for some practical reason, > there is a sense in which it is impossible -- > but it is not the same sense of impossible > as something which is forbidden by physical > laws. > > > > > It could be that there is just a single > > deterministic universe and we are just playing out > our lives like actors in a film. God > > knows exactly how I'm going to finish this > sentence, even if I don't until after the fact. > > > > Stathis Papaioannou > > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Counterfactual?
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > John Mikes writes: > > > Peter: > > "... A counterfactual is a COUNTERfactual - -it is > > something that could have happenned but didn't. There is no > > reason why we should be conscious of in things > > we coudl have done but didn't. ..." > > > > JM: > > It could not have happened in another way if it did happen THIS way.. WE may > > think - in our limited circle of knowledge - that something else was also > > viable, but in the deterministic world of a total (unlimited, not > > model-enclosed) interconnectedness - whatever happened, was "the" possible > > way of events. > > I am not talking about HP universes or thought experiments. > > Yes: the mere fact that we *think* it could have happened differently does not > mean that it could have happened differently. Counterfactuals come from physical determinism, they are not contrary to it. Causal determism mean there are physical laws determining events which can be modelled by mathematival statements. The mathermatical formulation of physical laws allows you to answer hypothetical questions even if the actual situation cannot be phsyically realised for some practical reason. If the actual situation cannot be physically realised for some practical reason, there is a sense in which it is impossible -- but it is not the same sense of impossible as something which is forbidden by physical laws. > It could be that there is just a single > deterministic universe and we are just playing out our lives like actors in a > film. God > knows exactly how I'm going to finish this sentence, even if I don't until > after the fact. > > Stathis Papaioannou > _ > Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. > http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Counterfactual?
John Mikes writes: > Peter: > "... A counterfactual is a COUNTERfactual - -it is > something that could have happenned but didn't. There is no > reason why we should be conscious of in things > we coudl have done but didn't. ..." > > JM: > It could not have happened in another way if it did happen THIS way.. WE may > think - in our limited circle of knowledge - that something else was also > viable, but in the deterministic world of a total (unlimited, not > model-enclosed) interconnectedness - whatever happened, was "the" possible > way of events. > I am not talking about HP universes or thought experiments. Yes: the mere fact that we *think* it could have happened differently does not mean that it could have happened differently. It could be that there is just a single deterministic universe and we are just playing out our lives like actors in a film. God knows exactly how I'm going to finish this sentence, even if I don't until after the fact. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---